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Abstract 
This thesis responds to the rapidly proliferating academic, civil society and policy 
discourses that posit diasporas as powerful and positive actors in the development of 
their 'homelands'. These discourses highlight diaspora organisations as key institutions 
through which international migrants and their descendants contribute to the progress of 
'home'. Consequently, these organisations are being lauded as new development actors 
that should be engaged and supported by governments and international agencies 
interested in pursuing more direct and participatory modes of development assistance. 
However, it has been argued that this celebration of diaspora organisations is based on 
limited knowledge. Drawing on extensive ethnographic fieldwork conducted with 
London-based Nigerian organisations and their sites of intervention in Nigeria, this 
thesis makes a contribution to better understanding diaspora organisations and their 
progressive potential for 'home'. The thesis argues that London-based Nigerian 
diaspora organisations are not necessarily involved in the development of 'home' to the 
extent, or in the ways, imagined in celebratory discourses of diaspora and development. 
These organisations are entwined in the politics of socio-economic status, gender and 
belonging at 'home' in ways that are profoundly ambivalent in terms of the progressive 
role expected of them. Furthermore, their monetary, material, intellectual and political 
contributions to development at 'home' appear relatively limited and rather marginal, 
especially when compared to those made by local actors. This can be traced to a number 
of factors that are widely seen to severely constrain collective transnational mobilisation 
and intervention. Nonetheless, the thesis argues that diaspora organisations have much 
to contribute to the development of 'home'. However, if states and international 
agencies are to engage and support diaspora organisations in fulfilling this progressive 
potential, it will be necessary to engage these groups in more genuine and meaningful 
dialogue through which alternative, more cosmopolitan visions of belonging and 
development can be articulated and pursued. 
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1. Introduction 
At 'home': a river never runs so far as to forget its source 
In a quiet, rural comer of Iroko State! in southwest Nigeria, some 15 kilometres down a 
narrow, anonymous side road off one of the main trade routes weaving its way inland 
from Lagos, lies the sleepy town of Ayege. Despite its isolated slumber relative to other 
more prominent Nigerian urban centres, Ayege is a distinctive and charmingly rustic 
town. It is surrounded by striking, myth-laden granite outcrops that once served its 
people as refuges in ancient wars but which are now enjoyed as retreats for weekend 
picnics. The centre of the town is dominated by the faded grandeur of the Brazilian 
architecture that became popular across southwest Nigeria in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries having been introduced by repatriated slaves who settled in Lagos. But Ayege 
is more than a town. It is one of the many ancestral kingdoms that trace their origins to 
Oduduwa, the mythical progenitor of the Y oruba people. Relative to other Y oruba 
ancestral kingdoms, Ayege may well be small and of limited profile and influence. Yet, 
with a population probably in the region of 100,000, the kingdom of Ayege covers an 
area of several hundred square kilometres and consists not only of a main town but also 
dozens of viII ages organised into over ten districts. 
In taking you to this Y oruba kingdom, my purpose is to highlight an evening meeting of 
one of its many elite social clubs. I arrived half an hour late and yet I was still early. The 
host expressed his surprise that I still hadn't fully adjusted to "African time". 
Nonetheless, he warmly welcomed me into his living room where the meeting was due 
to take place. His wife brought me some water and sat down to talk with me. She 
enquired if I enjoyed being in Ayege and then moved on to discuss university life. She 
Worked at one of Nigeria's oldest and most prestigious institutions, about an hour's 
drive from Ayege. The electricity was working and the last segment of the national TV 
news was reassuring its audience that the 2006 Nigerian census would be held as 
scheduled. 
By now it was getting on for 10.30 in the evening and the meeting had been scheduled 
to start an hour and a half earlier. Suddenly there was a flush of arrivals, all citing a big 
1---------------------
The names of some places, organisations and individuals have been changed to protect the identity of 
Some respondents. 
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wedding in the community as the reason for their lateness. With about a dozen members 
present, it was decided to open the meeting. Following the established protocol, the 
participants rose to their feet, clutched their right hands to their chests and offered a 
stirring rendition of the Ayege National Anthem. The President of the association then 
announced a minute's silence for a fellow Omoyege (as 'indigenes' of Ayege are 
popularly known) who had been killed in a road accident in the town. Once respects had 
been paid, members took their seats and the business of the meeting got underway. Like 
the wife of the host, the President sought reassurance that I enjoyed my time in Ayege. I 
confirmed that I felt all too welcome and was still feeling the effects of palm wine. The 
president beamed that I was now an Omoyege and that my Ayege passport was in the 
post. 
The real business of the meeting concerned a recent announcement by the Oba or 'King' 
of Ayege. His Majesty had declared at the annual Ayege Day celebration of 2005 that 
the kingdom's 'traditional authorities' (constituted by the Oba himself, his council of 
chiefs and its executive arm, the Ayege Progress Committee) intended to respond to the 
demands of the people by commencing a new 'headline project', the establishment of 
Ayege's very own polytechnic. Stating his wish that the project be completed within a 
year, the Oba had emphasised that it would be the latest in a long line of practical and 
prestigious 'self-help' initiatives coordinated by the 'traditional authorities' and would, 
as ever, rely on the 'communal effort' of the kingdom's 'citizens' and their associations. 
For the Omoyeges whose meeting I was attending, the key issue was how best to 
respond to this request for assistance issued by their Oba. Should they levy themselves 
to make a collective financial contribution? Had anyone seen a feasible budget for the 
project? Would it be better to donate books, computers, and other equipment? Did any 
members know anyone who worked in the education sector or ministry who would be 
able to use their skills, experience, and/or influence to benefit the project? And why did 
the 'traditional authorities' want to build a polytechnic and not a full-blown university? 
The quest!ons and debates rumbled on until the oppressive heat and passing time began 
to take their toll. The meeting was soon closed and the members quickly livened up 
again once a feast of pounded yam, egusi soup, fried chicken, jollof rice, and Nigerian 
Guinness was served. While eating, much family and community news and humorous 
banter was exchanged and I fielded yet more enquires about my experiences of Ayege. 
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At nearly 1 o'clock in the morning, members began to decide that they should let their 
host have some peace. As we prepared to leave, one member asked me how I intended 
to get back to my lodgings. I replied that I was sure I would somehow find my way on 
public transport. "Eh, eh", he exclaimed, "this area is dangerous - you can't be 
wandering around on your own at this time of night! I will give you a lift in my car". As 
we walked out of the house together, we were both hit by the sharp chill of the night air. 
I was suddenly reminded that I was not in Ayege at all but much closer to home. Indeed, 
I was in my own ancestral homeland: southeast London. 
The oppressive heat endured during the meeting had been generated not by a tropical 
evening but rather by a central heating system on full blast for the benefit of the host's 
wife who had yet to re-acclimatise to the British weather during her latest visit to the 
UK. The Nigerian national TV news was brought to us by BEN TV, an African diaspora 
channel established in London by a British-Nigerian. The feast had been supplied via 
the numerous Nigerian grocers on Deptford High Street. And the participants at the 
meeting were members of the Ayege National Progress Union, UK and Ireland Branch, 
less formally known as ANPU London. 
BUilding the 'nation': discourses of diaspora and development and the celebration 
of collective transnational beneficence 
BUilding Ayege: local discourses of diaspora and development 
Through active membership of ANPU London, 'indigenes' of Ayege resident in the UK 
continue what has been an Omoyege tradition since the early 1900s of migrating beyond 
the kingdom, coming together for mutual support while 'abroad', and ultimately seeking 
to collectively contribute to the development of the ancestral homeland. The proximity 
of such a process to the core of the Omoyege identity constructed by the kingdom's 
'traditional authorities' is revealed in the Ayege National Anthem. Imploring Omoyeges 
to 'love' their kingdom, the anthem centres around a solemn pledge to remember and 
benefit 'home' even if one should travel 'abroad'. 
The Omoyege anthem is sung not only at the opening of meetings of ANPU branches 
around Nigeria and the wider world but also at the beginning of the annual Ayege Day 
festival. Held in the town every year since the Ayege Progress Committee (APC) 
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inaugurated it as a modem tradition in the late 1980s, the week-long series of events 
into which this carnival has evolved seeks to celebrate a distinct and proud Ayege 
identity in a concerted effort to strengthen the affective ties of Omoyeges to their 
ancestral kingdom. In an address to the 2005 festival, one 'patriotic' Omoyege 
eulogised Ayege's unique and vibrant heritage and declared that the kingdom is the 
"only country" to which her "sons and daughters" belong, no matter where in the world 
they might sojourn. Like the Ayege National Anthem, such attempts to heighten a sense 
of primary attachment to the kingdom also seek to oblige Omoyeges and their 
organisations to actively support its 'progress', especially if they are based 'abroad'. As 
the Oba counselled at Ayege Day 2005, Omoyeges "in the diaspora" should 
"understand the customs of their fatherland", "come home regularly", and "contribute to 
the development of the community". 
Whether based in Nigeria or overseas, Omoyeges residing beyond the kingdom are a 
particular target of the propaganda of 'primary patriotism' (Geschiere and Gugler 1998) 
because a diasporic location is seen to afford greater opportunities for the accumulation 
of money, influential connections, and 'exposure', as access to new and useful 
know ledges and practices is popularly known. Consequently, Ayege Day is not only an 
occasion for diasporic Omoyeges to visit 'home' and reinvigorate their sense of 
ancestral identity. It is also an opportunity for them to discuss new ideas and political 
strategies with community leaders and, most importantly, to make individual and 
collective donations to the Ayege Development Fund administered by the APC for the 
'progress' of the kingdom. 
Indeed, the festival culminates when over 2000 Omoyeges and their guests don some of 
their finest 'traditional attires' and fill the town hall in the presence of the Oba, other 
senior members of the 'traditional authorities', and invited dignitaries for the 
Fundraising Grand Finale. Beyond appealing to Omoyege patriotism, this august 
Occasion incentivises 'indigenes' to employ their financial, human, and political 
resources in the service of the ancestral homeland by offering reciprocal disbursements 
of status-augmenting symbolic capital, including honorary chieftaincy titles. 
Furthermore, the 'traditional authorities' make no secret during the celebration of their 
capacity to further reciprocate contributions to the communal resource-base, most 
notably by facilitating access to political and commercial opportunities in the kingdom. 
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Building Nigeria: national discourses of diaspora and development 
'Traditional authorities' 'ruling' sub-national, geo-ethnic2 homelands such as the 
kingdom of Ayege are not alone in attempting to construct diaspora as a source of 
money, connections, and 'exposure' that can be usefully employed in developing a 
'nation'. Nor do they represent the only form of government to have expectations of, 
and to create opportunities and incentives for, their citizens abroad to fulfil this promise 
and contribute individually and collectively to the upliftment of the 'homeland'. While 
it may lag behind sub-national, geo-ethnic formations in so doing, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria has, in recent years, also attempted to reach out to its citizens 
abroad in an effort to engage them in its particular visions and practices of progress. 
After 16 years of military rule, during which gross economic mismanagement and harsh 
repression had fuelled unprecedented levels of emigration, President Obasanjo was 
elected in 1999 as the leader of Nigeria's fourth republic. Within a year and a half of 
entering office, Obasanjo embarked on what he termed the First Diaspora Dialogue. 
While in the United States for a UN conference in September 2000, President Obasanjo 
initiated this dialogue by addressing some 3,700 diasporic Nigerians gathered in 
Atlanta, Georgia. Opening the meeting, the President asserted: 
[ ... H]ere and now, Nigeria is taking the bold first step to enable 
Nigerians living outside the country to participate fully in the process 
of visioning, planning and pursuing the political well-being, the 
economic development and the sound governance of their country. 
(Obasanjo 2000) 
When President Obasanjo went on to stress the importance of human capital to the 
development process and to laud "great advances in communication technology", it 
became clear what role he envisioned for the diaspora. "We can tap the knowledge and 
skills of many of our fellow Nigerians, wherever they are", he contended. As for what 
he described as the "mechanics of the process", the President proposed the formation of 
an "NGO" to "establish structures and networks that will promote the use of special 
skilIs of Nigerians in Diaspora". Channelling expertise to the state, private sector, and 
2 
Borrowing from Bach (1997), the term 'geo-ethnic' is used to signify and encompass the diverse array 
~f sub-nat.ional, ethno-spatial formations or 'ancestral communities' found in Nigeria, ranging in scale 
rom the lIkes of the 'village', 'hometown', 'kingdom', and 'clan' to wider formations such as the 'tribe' 
and 'ethnic nationality'. 
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international agencies working in Nigeria, participation in this NGO would involve 
"reimbursable service with the promise of a handsome return". 
With the provision of some state funding to enable "take-off', Obasanjo's vision was 
realised with the creation of Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO). Established 
first in North America in late 2001 and then in Europe a year later, NIDO has since 
inaugurated chapters in several African, Asian, and Australasian countries. To facilitate 
the proposed contribution of NIDO and other diasporic professional groups to the 
Nigerian project, President Obasanjo created an agency within the office of the 
presidency to act as an enabling intennediary between the diaspora and the apparatus of 
the state. The Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS) came into operation in 2004 
and the following year instigated with the support of the Federal Ministry of Science 
and Technology its first major programme; a now annual conference in Abuja bringing 
diasporic scientists, medics, and technology experts together with some of their 
professional counterparts based in Nigeria. Further channels for the transfer of diasporic 
knowledge and expertise have been opened-up, including opportunities for suitably 
qUalified diasporans to take one to six month secondments in Nigerian universities and 
to give transnational counsel to government advisory committees. Some diasporans 
have even been offered pennanent positions in government ministries and agencies. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian state has sought more than the transnational transfer of 
human capital alone. Institutions and schemes through which diasporans can make 
financial investments in Nigeria have been promoted, such as the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and the King's Town property development in Abuja. NIDO and Nigerian 
professional organisations around the world have also been encouraged to advocate on 
behalf of Nigeria, particularly by lobbying in support of its debt relief campaign, by 
contesting its negative portrayal in the global media, and by utilising business contacts 
to encourage foreign investment. 
Building 'nations': globalising discourses of diaspora and development 
Clearly, both the Nigerian state and the 'traditional authorities' of sub-national, geo-
ethnic formations such as the kingdom of Ayege attempt to construct diaspora as a 
source of money, connections and 'exposure' that can be usefully employed in the 
development of the 'homeland'. Both fonns of government therefore expect, and create 
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opportunities and incentives for, their overseas citizens to individually and collectively 
channel 'home' flows of financial, human, social, and political capital. In so doing, 
these local and national attempts to construct and engage the support of 
transnationalised communities of belonging intersect with new, globalising discourses 
of 'diaspora and development'. 
Proliferating through a host of recent academic, policy, and civil society publications 
and the nascent initiatives of international agencies, these emergent discourses 
reinvigorate and re-orientate established debates surrounding the relationship between 
international migration and development (AFFORD 2000; Van Hear and Sj3rensen 
2003a; HCIDC 2004; 10M 2004a,b; USAID 2004; GCIM 2005; Farrant et al 2006; 
Ionescu 2006; UN 2006; World Bank 2006; Davies 2007; DFID 2007; Merz et a12007; 
Styan 2007; Bakewell 2008a; Faist 2008; Skeldon 2008). Positing migrants less as a 
drain of the brains of their countries of origin and more as powerful agents in the 
development of 'home', these discourses emphasise the substantial and growing volume 
of household remittances and reinterpret their impact more positively (Van Hear 2002; 
Black 2003; Gammeltoft 2003, Newland 2003,2007; Pieke et al 2007; de Haas 2009). 
Furthermore, by widening the conventional debate to include notions of diaspora and 
migrant transnationalism, attention has been drawn to a multitude of alternative border-
spanning linkages, networks, and flows through which overseas nationals can produce 
beneficial economic, social, cultural and political effects at 'home' (AI-Ali and Koser 
2002; Vertovec 2003; COMPAS 2004a; Newland with Patrick 2004; Portes et al 2007; 
Portes 2009). 
In these expanded debates, diaspora organisations have been identified and celebrated as 
key transnational infrastructures for inciting such positive change at 'home'. Analytical 
attention has concentrated heavily on hometown associations and their channelling of 
'collective remittances' to public services, infrastructure and micro-credit schemes in 
'home' communities (Levitt 1998; Portes and Landolt 2000; Vertovec 2003; USAID 
2004; Babcock 2006; Mohan 2006, 2008; Orozco and Rouse 2007; Styan 2007; Fox and 
Bada 2008; Mercer et al 2008, 2009; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). Diaspora 
organisations have also been cited as prominent actors in 'political transnationalism', 
utilising the strategic space of diaspora to lobby and gain the support of both 'host' and 
'home' governments on issues they believe to be of particular relevance to the progress 
of their communities and countries of origin (Danese 1998; Itzigsohn 2000; Kerlin 
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2000; Newland and Patrick 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; Cordero-Guzman 2005; 
Cano and Delano 2007; Dumont 2008; Fox and Bada 2008; Itzigsohn and Villacres 
2008; Kleist 2008; McGregor 2009). Furthermore, by engaging local and national 
institutions at 'home', it has been argued that diaspora organisations can be a major 
channel for 'social remittances' - the transfer from 'host' to 'home' contexts of 
progressive knowledges, ideas, values, norms and behaviours (Levitt 1998; Van Hear 
and S0rensen 2003b; Vertovec 2003; USAID 2004; Taylor et al 2006; UN 2006; 
Newland 2007; Portes 2009). Such remittances are seen to produce positive socio-
cultural and political changes at 'home' including the development of decision-making, 
organisational and management skills, the promotion of gender equality, and, as 
President Obasanjo appeared to hope above in the case of Nigeria, the entrenchment of 
liberal, democratic institutions and governance (ibid.). 
Building the 'nation'? Questioning discourses of diaspora and development 
In a number of ways then, diaspora organisations are being constructed and celebrated 
globally as having much potential for effecting positive change at 'home'. 
Consequently, they are being lauded as entities that should be supported by international 
agencies interested in pursuing more direct and participatory modes of development 
assistance (Levitt 1997, 1998; AFFORD 1998, 2000; Danese 1998; Kerlin 2000; 
Orozco 2003, 2004; Vertovec 2003; Newland with Patrick 2004; HCIDC 2004; Orozco 
with Lapointe 2004; USAID 2004; GCIM 2005; Ionescu 2006; UN 2006; Davies 2007; 
DFID 2007; Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2007; Orozco and Rouse 2007; Styan 2007; 
Mercer at al 2008; 0stergaard-Nielsen 2009; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). However, it 
has also been argued that such celebrations are based on limited knowledge. For 
example, a 2004 report claims of diaspora organisations, "their structure, strategies and 
influences on local and national development are only minimally understood" 
(COMP AS 2004a). Indeed, where diaspora organisations and their border-spanning 
activities are addressed it tends to be within wider studies of migrant transnationalism in 
Which they do not constitute the specific focus of research (Portes and Landolt 2000; 
Vertovec 2003; Newland with Patrick 2004; USAID 2004). Furthermore, as AI-Ali and 
Koser (2002) note, this literature concentrates largely on the particular context of Latin 
American and Caribbean migration to the US. 
23 
In contrast, this thesis is grounded in the context of African, specifically Nigerian, 
migration to the UK and employs a substantive focus on diaspora organisations. Indeed, 
seeking to engage critically with globalising discourses of diaspora and development, 
this thesis is centrally concerned with the role of London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations in the development of 'home'. In exploring this role, the thesis argues that 
London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations are not necessarily involved in the 
development of home to the extent, or in the ways, imagined in globalising discourses 
of diaspora and development. This has, the thesis contends, important implications for 
the growing tendency to celebrate and engage diaspora organisations as channels for 
more direct and participatory modes of international development assistance. However, 
far from dismissing these groups as transnational agents of progress and as potential 
development partners, the thesis asserts that diaspora organisations are widely seen by 
diasporans and, most importantly, their potential beneficiaries in Nigeria as having 
much to contribute to 'home'. If this progressive potential is to be engaged and 
supported, it is argued, the onus is on governments and international agencies to 
develop more cosmopolitan visions of progress that take account of the alternative ways 
in which development might be conceived and practiced both in diaspora and at 'home'. 
The thesis is divided into five parts, each consisting of two chapters. Part 1 sets the 
Context for the main argument, charting in more detail in Chapter 2 the emergence, 
proliferation, and key claims of globalising discourses of diaspora and development and 
setting out in Chapter 3 the research design, methods, and data on which the thesis is 
based. In particular, Chapter 3 describes how 367 London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations were identified and engaged in a scoping study with five being selected as 
case-studies for more detailed ethnographic research, including at their sites of 
intervention in Nigeria. Part 2 opens the empirical analysis, tracing in Chapters 4 and 5 
how London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations relate to development at 'home' in 
ways that could be considered rather problematic in terms of the progressive role 
expected of them in globilising discourses of diaspora and development. More 
specifically, these two chapters focus on how the identified diaspora organisations are 
embedded in some of the key power relations through which development can be seen 
to unfold, asserting that these groups are implicated in the politics of socio-economic 
status, gender, and belonging in ways that are much more ambivalent than globalising 
diScourses of diaspora and development might hope. However, these chapters 
emphasise that this is not a reason to overlook the development potential of diaspora 
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organisations, especially when their transnational visions and practices are often 
considered progressive both in diaspora and at 'home'. 
In Part 3, the empirical analysis moves on to consider the extent to which London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations are seen to contribute to development at 'home'. In 
particular, Chapter 6 examines the magnitude and impacts of the 'collective 
remittances' and 'political transnationalism' effected by the organisations in question 
and Chapter 7 focuses on the degree to which these groups transfer 'home' 'social 
remittances'. Together, these chapters conclude that while London-based diaspora 
organisations are often seen to contribute to development at 'home', they are not seen to 
do so to the extent that globalising discourses of diaspora and development might 
imagine. Indeed, it is argued that far from driving 'progress' at 'home', these groups are 
seen to make a relatively limited and ultimately rather marginal contribution to local 
and national development in Nigeria. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the much 
greater importance and potential of local agency and expertise in processes of 
development at 'home', arguing that these should not be overlooked and elided in the 
apparent rush to celebrate and support the contributions of overseas diasporas. 
Attending to the limited role of London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations in the 
development of 'home', Part 4 explores the factors that are seen to constrain the desire 
and ability of these groups to operate and intervene transnationally. Chapter 8 identifies 
an often severe lack of funds and limited levels of participation as the factors most 
readily cited as the major constraints on collective transnational contribution. It is 
Shown that these limitations are in turn traced by respondents to the challenges 
diasporans are seen to face in settling and progressing in the 'host' society and their 
apparent development of a more individualistic and self-indulgent disposition. It is 
therefore suggested that the desire and ability of diasporans to contribute to 'home' are 
not necessarily as great as is often implicitly assumed in celebratory discourses of 
diaspora and development and that any policy interventions designed to heighten the 
transnational capabilities of diasporans should make a priority of facilitating their 
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Integration' and 'inclusion' in the 'host' society. Building on this, Chapter 9 details 
how collective transnational intervention is seen to be constrained further by a distinct 
lack of transnational trust, producing what appears to verge on a culture of mistrust not 
only Within the diaspora but also between the diaspora and 'home'. With financial fraud 
and clientalism seen to be rife in Nigerian society, the prevailing suspicion is that 
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diaspora organisations are little more than vehicles for the personal enrichment and 
political gain of those who form and run them, discouraging many diasporans from 
supporting these groups. Furthermore, organised diasporans themselves are extremely 
wary of trusting local intermediaries at 'home', fearing that the latter will 
misappropriate any transnational contributions that are channelled through them. 
Intervening transnationally is seen to be made even more difficult by the lack of an 
'enabling environment' at 'home'. Indeed, unreliable telecommunications and transport 
infrastructure, a lack of security, poor science and technology facilities, a culture of 
unprofessionalism, an unstable, corrupt, and authoritarian state, and suspicion and 
resistance from the local to the national level are widely seen to make 'home' a hostile 
rather than enabling environment for collective transnational intervention. 
Consequently, it is argued that development is as much a prerequisite as an outcome of 
collective transnational contribution and that discourses of diaspora and development 
should not serve to divert attention and resources away from attending directly to the 
fundamental development needs of 'home'. 
As the final section of the thesis, Part 5 continues and concludes the empirical analysis. 
Chapter 10 contends that London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations should not be 
seen simply as agents of collective transnational intervention at 'home'. There is much 
more to diasporic associational life and very often the most immediate imperative 
bringing diasporans together is a desire to belong and develop in diaspora. Indeed, for 
many diasporans, their organisations are primarily arenas for emotional, practical, and 
professional support, cultural solidarity and expression, and, often most important of all, 
friendship, relaxation and enjoyment. Therefore, it is argued that a desire to belong and 
develop in diaspora is fundamental to forging, driving, binding, and sustaining diaspora 
organisations and making them in anyway capable of contributing to 'home'. As such, it 
IS asserted that activities undertaken by diaspora organisations to fulfil this diasporic 
desire need to be recognised and supported in any policy intervention that seeks to 
heighten the contribution of these groups to 'home'. Building on this theme, Chapter 11, 
the conclusion to the thesis, reviews the proceeding chapters and contends that what is 
also key in bringing diasporans together to create and maintain organisations is a desire 
to belong and develop at 'home'. It is shown that organised diasporans often see their 
Participation in diasporic associational life and collective transnational intervention as 
enabling them to be remembered and recognised, and even to be offered status, 
POsitions, and opportunities, back at 'home'. All of this is considered essential to 
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fulfilling what is overwhelming seen as the ultimate diasporic desire: to establish a 
'home' back at 'home', a place in which one can belong and be respected, fulfilled, 
'comfortable', and happy, a place to which one can return with greater frequency and 
duration and one day perhaps even permanently. Globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development need to recognise this desire in order to better understand what the 
development of 'home' means to those most deeply invested in its realisation. 
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Part 1: constructing and questioning collective 
transnational power 
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2. Constructing collective transnational power: diaspora and 
the development of 'home' 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the rise of globilising discourses of diaspora and development and 
their celebration of diaspora organisations as powerful and positive actors in the 
progress of 'home'. Setting the proliferation of these discourses in the wider context of 
growing academic interest in diaspora in general and 'new African diasporas' in 
particular, I show how they have reinvigorated, expanded and radically re-orientated 
conventional debates on the role of international migration in the development of 
communities and countries of origin. Recognising and reinterpreting household 
remittances and emphasising the multiple border-spanning ties involved in 'migrant 
transationalism', these discourses posit migrants and their descendents not as a drain of 
the brains of their countries of origin but rather as important contributors to the 
development of 'home'. Constructing a central role for diaspora organisations in this 
process, discourses of diaspora and development have come to laud these groups as 
entities that should be engaged and supported by international agencies interested in 
pursuing more direct and participatory modes of development assistance. However, I 
argue that such celebrations are based on limited knowledge and suggest that there is a 
need for much more substantive research on collective transnational intervention that 
embraces different diasporic contexts, more diverse organisational forms, and a stronger 
empirical engagement with sites of contribution at 'home'. 
'New African diasporas' and transnational linkages with 'home' 
Over the last twenty years, there has been a burgeoning academic interest in the notion 
of 'diaspora' as signalled by the launching of a journal by that name in 1991 and a 
proliferation of influential works (see for example Hall 1990; Safran 1991; Clifford 
1994; Brah 1996; Lavie and Swedenburg 1996; Cohen 1997; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; 
Braziel and Mannur 2003). Reflecting this wider trend, the literature on the 'African 
diaspora' has also experienced a substantial expansion (see for example: Bonnett and 
Llewellyn Watson 1990; Gilroy 1993; Harris 1993; Conniff 1994; Segal 1995, 1998; 
Gordon 1998; lalloh et al 1997; Okpewho et al 1999). Yet, as a number of critiques 
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have noted, this expanded literature on the 'African diaspora' has focussed 
overwhelmingly on the historical dispersal of Africans as a result of the Atlantic slave 
trade (Akyeampong 2000; Byfield 2000; Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002; Koser 2003a; 
ter Haar 2004; Zeleza 2005; Manger and Assal 2006). It is argued that this 
"preoccupation with slavery and its descendants has diverted our attention from striking 
new patterns and processes associated with recent [African] migrations" (Koser 2003a: 
3). 
Consequently, Koser (2003a: 3) argues that "a significant empirical research gap" 
surrounds the 'new African diasporas' which have been produced by substantial 
postcolonial movements out of Africa, often in response to a contemporary climate of 
economic hardship, political oppression, social instability, armed conflict and 
environmental crises (Peil 1995; Akyeampong 2000; Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002; 
Ajibewa and Akinrinade 2003; Styan 2007; Grillo and Mazzucato 2008)1. While the 
considerable size and dramatic growth of these 'new' diasporas has begun to attract 
detailed academic inquiry in some contexts2, their presence in the UK has received 
relatively little attention (Daley 1998). Attempting to rectify this would seem pertinent 
given that the 2001 UK Census shows that the 'Black African' population has grown 
faster than any other ethnic group since 1991, more than doubling in size to nearly half 
a million. 
Furthermore, despite Nigerians being "almost certainly the largest single national group 
amongst Africans living in Europe and North America" (Black et al 2004: 23), scant 
consideration has been given to the 'new' global diasporas they have created3, which 
may include between 2 and 5 million people (COMP AS 2004b; de Haas 2006; 
lIemandez-Coss and Bun 2007). Consequently, there is very little work on Nigerians 
based in the UK4 even though they constitute the largest national cohort of African-born 
1--------------------AI~hough focussing on migration within the continent, insightful accounts of emigration dynamics in 
A( fnca are provided by Adekanye (1998), Adepoju (1994; 1995; 1998a,b), Afolayan (1998), Agozino 
21995), Baker and Aina (1995), Milazi (1998), and Nnoli (1998). 
(totable .studies include Owusu (1998; 1999; 2000; 2006), ter Haar (1998), McGown (1999), Arthur 
2 000), DIOUf (2000), Mac Gaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000), AI-Ali et aI (2001a,b), Riccio (2001; 
~03), Reynolds (2002; 2004; 2006; 2009), Stoller (2002; 2003), Koser (2003b), D'Alisera (2004); 
(20han (2006; 2008); Konadu-Agyemang et al (2006); Kothari (2008); Mazzucato (2008); McGregor 
3 ~08; 2?O9), Mercer et al (2008; 2009); Mazzucato and Kabki (2009). 
E here IS, however, an emergent body of work on the trafficking of Nigerian women for prostitution in 
T Urope (van Dijk 2001; Aghatise 2002; Elabor-Idemudia 2002; Imoukhuede 2002; UTOPIA 2002; 
4 ~unbi 20~3; Ifekwunigwe 2004; Carling 2005). 
th he only Identified published academic works focussing substantively on 'new' Nigerian diasporas in 
e UK are Jerrome (1974; 1978; 1979) on 'Ibos in London', Oyetade's overview of 'the YoruM 
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'Black Africans' in England and Wales, numbering 86,958 according to the 2001 
Census, an increase of 88% over the preceding decade. Moreover, this Census figure is 
undoubtedly a considerable underestimate of the Nigerian diaspora in the UK as it does 
not include undocumented migrants and UK citizens of Nigerian descent (ibid.; 10M 
2007). Indeed, while there are no definitive data, the 2006 Labour Force Survey 
estimates that there were 140,000 Nigeria-born residents in the UK that year (Change 
Institute 2009) and de Haas (2006) references diplomatic sources that estimate the UK-
based Nigerian diaspora to be as large as 1 million. Illustrating just how unreliable the 
data are, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office offers an especially broad and 
undoubtedly rather excessive estimate, stating, "There is a large Nigerian community in 
the UK, estimated at between 800,000 and 3 million"s. There is, however, something of 
a consensus that UK-based Nigerians are heavily concentrated in London (COMPAS 
2004b; Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2007; Change Institute 2009; de Haas 2009), the 2001 
Census, for example, recording that nearly 80% of the Nigeria-born 'Black African' 
population lives in Greater London. 
While the data are unreliable, it is clear that there is a substantial Nigerian population in 
the UK, particularly in London. The lack of research on this population is all the more 
surprising given that Nigerians have been migrating in some numbers to the UK since 
the late colonial period. The early cohorts were dominated by students, often funded by 
government scholarships or the benevolence of their 'town unions' back in Nigeria 
(Achebe 1960; Jerrome 1978; Oyetad6 1993; Uduku 2002). These flows peaked towards 
the end of the 1950s as Nigeria prepared for its independence from Britain, which was 
achieved in 1960 (Jerrome 1978). In 1958, there were as many as 4,000 Nigerian 
stUdents in the UK (Oyetade 1993) and they had already begun to establish a rich 
associational life, creating the first Nigerian 'ethnic', 'hometown', 'national' and 
'professional' organisations in the UK (Sklar 1963; Uduku 2002). The vast majority of 
the graduates produced at this time returned to Nigeria upon the completion of their 
stUdies to take-up important government and civil service positions. However, a few 
graduates and some of those who failed to complete their studies stayed on in the UK 
(Jerrome 1978; Oyetade 1993), as did small communities of merchant seamen from 
-----------------------------------------------------------------~~unity in London' and Hunt and Lightly (2001), Harris (2006) and Burgess (2009) on UK-based 
N~genan churches. Uduku (2002) provides an historical account of the Igbo diaspora within and beyond 
5 ~geria in which she touches on its presence in the UK. 
ttP://www.fco.gov.uklenltravel-and-living-abroadltravel-advice-by-country/country-profile/sub-
saharan-africalnigerial?profile=intRelations 
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south-eastern Nigeria who had settled in port cities such as Liverpool and Cardiff 
(Uduku 2002). 
In the post-colonial period, new flows of Nigerian students continued to arrive, many 
now funded by the independent Nigerian state and most still returning to important 
positions at 'home' (Jerrome 1978). However, the outbreak of war between Nigeria and 
the secessionist Igbo state of Biafra between 1966 and 1970 saw a good number of 
Nigerian graduates, especially those of Igbo ancestry, delay their return 'home' and start 
to establish a more permanent life in the UK (ibid.). While this conflict also brought 
some refugees to settle in the UK, the Nigerian population in the country did not start to 
grow notably until Nigeria's oil-dependent economy descended rapidly into severe 
crisis in the early 1980s (Oyetade 1993; Uduku 2002; COMPAS 2004b; de Haas 2006; 
Change Institute 2009). With opportunities declining in Nigeria and corrupt and 
repressive military government tightening its grip on power, students who were already 
in the UK remained to seek work and, more significantly, were joined by an increasing 
number of their fellow nationals whose primary motives were more political and 
economic than educational (ibid.). With political and economic crisis having become 
entrenched in Nigeria, despite the return of democracy in 1999, many Nigerians have 
continued to migrate and settle overseas. It is primarily in this context that we have 
witnessed the emergence of what might be called the contemporary Nigerian 'diaspora'. 
Ascribing the term 'diaspora' to the dispersions of people produced by recent 
migrations has become common academic practice. Koser (2003a: 5) argues that the 
term "seems to apply to virtually any population that originates in a land other than that 
in which it resides" (see also Vertovec and Cohen 1999 and Brubaker 2005). Similarly, 
Raman (2003) writes of "diasporic promiscuity" whereby "diaspora is everywhere, and 
nearly everyone, it seems, is suddenly diasporic in some sense". Indeed, Vertovec and 
COhen (1999) note that, during the period 1991-1998, authors in the journal Diaspora 
had used the expression to describe 38 different groups. As Clifford argued as far back 
as 1994 (311), "Diasporic language appears to be replacing, or at least supplementing, 
minority discourse". 
SUch increasingly routine deployment of 'diaspora' has raised fears that "the continuing 
potency of the term is threatened by its misuse as a loose reference" (Vertovec and 
COhen 1999: xvii; Raman 2003; Brubaker 2005). In response, attempts have been made 
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to discipline the concept by producing classificatory frameworks. These generally draw 
on and reassert the seminal work of Safran (1991) and Cohen (1997), both of whom 
highlight six defining diasporic characteristics: 1) a history of dispersal from an original 
'homeland', 2) the maintenance of a collective myth or memory about the 'homeland', 
3) a troubled relationship with the host society, suggesting a lack of full acceptance by 
the host, 4) a desire to return to the 'homeland', 5) a collective commitment to the 
maintenance or restoration of the 'homeland', 6) a collective identity and a sense of 
empathy and solidarity importantly defined by a continuing relationship with the 
'homeland' . 
Despite this compatibility between the two models, a key difference emerges from 
Safran's (1991) attempt to reassert the Jewish experience of expulsion from Babylon as 
the defining reference point for diasporic authenticity. This positioning of the 'Jewish 
diaspora' as the "ideal type" (ibid: 84) can be interpreted as an attempt to reaffirm the 
association of diaspora with "oppression, forced displacement and the ceaseless search 
for an authentic homeland" as also reflected in its application to the dispersal of 
Africans by the Atlantic slave trade (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002: 216; Vertovec 
and Cohen 1999). Cohen (1997), along with Clifford (1994), questions Safran's (1991) 
idealisation of the 'Jewish diaspora' by emphasising its heterogeneity and arguing that 
Significant elements of Jewish historical experience do not meet his criteria of a strong 
attachment to a homeland and a desire to return there. 
Furthermore, Cohen (1997) asserts that dispersals of people displaying the traits 
deSCribed in Safran's (1991) typology are not just the result of forced displacements but 
also OCcur from more voluntary and proactive movements such as those involved in 
colonisation, trade and labour migration. This argument has gained wide currency 
(Bannerz 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002; Koser 
2003a) and has been empirically supported in the context of 'new African diasporas' by 
st d· 
u les of labour migrants from Ghana (Owusu 1998, 1999, 2000; Manuh 2003) and 
llligrant traders from Senegal (Diouf 2000; Riccio 2001, 2003) and West Africa in 
general (St?ller 2002,2003). 
In llloving away from positing a history of forced displacement as a necessary condition 
for defining 'diaspora', and in attempting to legitimate their use of the term to describe 
llligrant groups, authors have emphasised its increasing utilisation as a label of self-
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identification (Koser 2003a). As Clifford (1994: 310) states, "The language of diaspora 
is increasingly invoked by displaced peoples who feel (maintain, revive, invent) a 
connection with a prior home" (see also Raman 2003). Significantly, Koser (2003a: 6) 
notes that "the description of 'diaspora' is gaining currency within a number of African 
communities themselves". This is evidenced in the discourses of a number of London-
based African-led NGOs (for example: AFFORD 1998, 2000; T AFF 2002; 
www.africarecruit.com; www.diaspora.org.uk) and, as we will see, 'diaspora' is often 
invoked by Nigerians both in London and at 'home'. 
Beyond its deployment as a term of self-identification, a further characteristic of 
'diaspora' that is increasingly stressed is the existence of ties with the 'homeland' 
(Safran 1991; Cohen 1997; Hannerz 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Mohan and Zack-
Williams 2002). The critical importance attached to this characteristic in contemporary 
definitions of diaspora is illustrated by Sheffer (1986: 3): "Modern diasporas are ethnic 
minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining 
strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin - their homelands". 
In Akyeampong's (2000) analysis, it is the maintenance of such links that makes 
contemporary forms of African diaspora distinct. He identifies a transition from "a 
diaspora with little contact with the point of origin ... to one that maintains active contact 
with the mother continent; all culminating in the birth of a unique African who straddles 
continents, worlds and cultures" (ibid: 183). 
This argument reflects strongly the central assertion of the substantial body of literature 
on 'migrant transnationalism'. Burgeoning from the late 1980s onwards, this work 
Contends that major advances in, and wider access to, global telecommunication and 
travel enables international migrants and their descendants to forge and sustain with 
nOVel and increasing intensity border-spanning social, economic, political and cultural 
linkages between places of settlement and origin (Glick Schiller et al 1992; Basch et al 
1994; Portes 1997, 1999,2001; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Portes et al1999; Roberts et 
al 1999; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Vertovec 1999, 2001; Levitt 2001). While this 
literature ~as focussed largely on labour migration from Latin America and the 
Caribbean to the US (AI-Ali and Koser 2002; Smith 2002; Caglar 2006), it has 
prOduced a shift in the way that international migration in general is conceived. 
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Working against the traditional tendency to view migrant incorporation as a process of 
'assimilation' in the 'host' through which ties with places of origin are severed, the 
notion of migrant transnationalism affords far greater recognition to the ways in which 
migrants can live 'dual lives' , deeply and simultaneously embedded in both sending and 
receiving contexts (Rouse 1991; Portes 1997; Hannerz 1998; Levitt 1998; Grillo et al 
2000; Riccio 2001; Newland 2003; S0rensen et al 2003a). This transnational living, and 
the circular flows of people, money, commodities, information, and ideas that it 
involves, relies on the existence of border-spanning social networks, of which migrant 
or diaspora organisations have been identified as a key element (see for example: 
Okamura 1983; Gitmez and Wilpert 1987; Boyd 1989; Fawcett 1989; Gurak and Caces 
1992; Levitt 1997, 1998; Goldring 1998; Landolt et al 1999; Popkin 1999; Portes 1999; 
Roberts et al 1999; Orozco 2000, 2003, 2004; Riccio 2001, 2003; COMPAS 2004a,b; 
Orozco with Lapointe 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; Caglar 2006; Orozco and Rouse 
2007; Faist 2008; Portes et al 2007; Kleist 2008; Mazzucato 2008; Mercer et al 2008; 
Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). 
Diaspora organisations and migrant transnationalism 
As an important mode of transnational practice, migrant organisations are critical to the 
construction of diaspora. As Oussatcheva (2001: 7) asserts: 
[ .. .I]nstitutions are the core of a diaspora community. It is via 
institutions that a diaspora discourse, which creates the image of 
community, diasporan culture and consciousness, is produced and 
disseminated. [ ... I]nstitutions uphold different kinds of practices in 
which individuals can express and enhance their identification with a 
community. [ ... T]he stability of this existence is achieved through the 
institutionalization of Diaspora [ ... ]. 
The quintessential manifestation of this diasporic process is the formation of migrant 
voluntary associations. These can take a wide variety of forms, although it would seem 
that all are grounded in some kind of shared identity, very often relating to a common 
place of origin such as a nation-state, region, town, or village (Minghuan 1998; 
Vertovec 2001; Ndofor-Tah 2000; Orozco 2000,2003,2004; Owusu 2000; Orozco with 
LapOinte 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; Moya 2005; Mohan 2006, 2008; Orozco and 
Rouse·2007; Page 2007; Portes et al 2007; Styan 2007; Fox and Bada 2008; Mercer et 
al 2008; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009; Portes 2009). Indeed, a number of authors, each 
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concerned with a different migration context, claim that a common 'hometown' is the 
most prevalent basis for association (Jerrome 1978; Okamura 1983; AFFORD 1998; 
Zabin and Rabadan 1998; Guarnizo et al 1999; Landolt et al 1999; Owusu 2000; 
Vertovec 2003). For example, Okamura (1983) records that 50% of Filipino 
organisations in Hawaii are 'hometown associations' (HTAs) , while Adeyanju (2000) 
finds that 80% of Nigerian organisations in Toronto are HT As. 
In many instances bound up with a common place of origin, extended kinship and 
ethnicity (including dialect) are other key forms of identity seen to underlay associations 
(e.g. Rex 1991; AFFORD 1998; Minghuan 1998; Ndofor-Tah 2000; Owusu 2000; 
Reynolds 2002, 2009; Mercer et al 2008). Also mentioned, but given far less attention, 
are associations rooted in differences within these broader identity signifiers. These 
differences within migrant groups from the same place or of shared ethnicity delimit 
numerous "communities of interest" (AFFORD 1998: 17) including associations for 
women, youth, the elderly, workers, tenants, parents, alumni, businesspeople, 
sports people, war veterans, members of distinct professions, followers of different 
religions, and supporters of particular political parties (Schoeneberg 1985; Basch 1987; 
Joly 1987; Rex and Josephides 1987; Cheetham 1988; Peil 1995; Liu 1998; Ndofor-Tah 
2000; Styan 2007; Mercer et a12008; Portes 2009). 
The practice of international migrants forming voluntary associations has a considerable 
history (Jenkins 1988a; see also Moya 2005 for an extensive historiography). For 
example, Basch (1987: 160) claims that "[s]uch associations historically have been a 
prominent feature of the sociocultural landscape of New York", particularly since the 
arrival of Italian, Irish, and Jewish immigrants in the early decades of the 20th century. 
Similarly, Liu (1998: 582) argues that "[t]ogether with Chinese schools and newspapers, 
voluntary associations [ ... ] have long been regarded as one of the 'three pillars' of 
Overseas Chinese societies". Furthermore, migrant associations have been formed by 
people originating from a wide range of countries6. And in the context of increasing 
6 For example, Belize (Babcock 2006), Cameroon (Ndofor-Tah 2000; Page 2007; Mercer et al 2008, 
2009), China (Liu 1998; Minghuan 1998), Columbia (Sassen-Koob 1979; Guarnizo et al 1999), Cyprus 
(Josephides 1987), Dominican Republic (Sassen-Koob 1979; Georges 1988; Levitt 1997), El Salvador 
(Landolt et al 1999; Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008), Ghana (Attah-Poku 1996; Owusu 2000, 2006; Henry 
and Mohan 2003; Mohan 2006,2008; Mazzucato 2008; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009), Guatemala (Popkin 
1999), Guinea-Bissau (Kerlin 2000), Guyana (Orozco 2004), Haiti (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1998), 
Mexico (Goldring 1998; Zabin and Rabadan 1998; Roberts et a11999; Orozco with Lapointe 2004; Cano 
and Delano 2007; Fox and Bada 2008), Morocco (Danese 1998; Dumont 2008; 0stergaard-Nielsen 
2009), Nigeria (Jerrome 1978; Oyetade 1993; Adeyanju 2000; Uduku 2000, 2002; Reynolds 2002, 2009; 
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global mobility, the formation of migrant associations appears to be a practice that is 
becoming increasingly common, with a large proportion of the literature contending that 
these organisations, particularly in the form of HT As, are growing both in size and 
number (Okamura 1983; Basch 1987; Jenkins 1988a; Goldring 1998; Attah-Poku 1996; 
Levitt 1997; AFFORD 1998; Minghuan 1998; Landolt et al 1999; Roberts et al 1999; 
Adeyanju 2000; Kerlin 2000; Vertovec 2003; USAID 2004; Caglar 2006). For instance, 
Minghuan (1998) estimates that the number of Chinese migrant associations around the 
world has almost doubled to 9,000 between 1950 and 1991 and Vertovec (2003) claims 
that the number of Mexican migrant associations in Chicago alone has increased from 
35 in 1995 to 181 in 2002. 
As such growth suggests, international migrant associations perform important 
functions for their members. Traditionally, the literature has focussed overwhelming on 
functions oriented to the economic, social, cultural, and political needs of migrants in 
the 'host' environment such as assisting initial adaptation, performing a long-term 
socio-economic support function, and representing members' interests to the 'host' 
society and state (Rex 1973; Sassen-Koob 1979; Schoeneberg 1985; Basch 1987; Rex et 
al 1987; Jenkins 1988b). More recently, however, the growing literature on 'migrant 
transnationalism' has placed far greater emphasis on border-spanning associational 
functions which sustain economic, social, cultural, and political relations with places of 
origin (Basch 1987; Attah-Poku 1996; Levitt 1997; AFFORD 1998; Danese 1998; 
Goldring 1998; Landolt et al 1999; Popkin 1999; Roberts et al 1999; Adeyanju 2000; 
Itzigsohn 2000; Kerlin 2000; Owusu 2000; Riccio 2001; Henry and Mohan 2003; 
Vertovec 2003; USAID 2004; Babcock 2006; Portes et al 2007; Fox and Bada 2008; 
Mazzucato 2008; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009; 0stergaard-Nielsen 2009). 
Migrant associations are therefore seen to have a "dual orientation to both the homeland 
and the country of residence" (Schoeneberg 1985: 417). Indeed, Basch (1987: 163) 
asserts that these organisations "link [ ... ] immigrants to both the home and host 
societies simultaneously and in so doing join the two societies in a single field of 
action". From this perspective, the proliferation of international migrant associations 
can be seen as an intrinsic element of the intensification over the last 20 to 30 years of 
migrant and diasporic attempts to (re)connect materially and emotionally with 'home' 
Abbott 2006), Pakistan (Joly 1987), Philippines (Okamura 1983), Senegal (Riccio 2001), St.Vincent and 
The Grenadines (Basch 1987), Tanzania (Mercer et al 2008, 2009), Turkey (Gitmez and Wilpert 1987; 
37 
through transnational practices (Portes 1997, 2009; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; 
Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). 
Constructing collective transnational power: from 'migration and development' to 
celebratory discourses of 'diaspora and development' 
Significantly, the transnational practices enacted by diasporans through border-spanning 
social networks such as migrant organisations are increasingly seen to have important, 
transformative effects at 'home' (Portes et al 1999; AI-Ali and Koser 2002; SjZlrensen et 
al 2003a; Vertovec 2001, 2003; de Boeck 2004). This is the central contention 
underlying the rapidly proliferating academic, policy, and civil society discourses of 
'diaspora and development' (Zack-Williams 1995; AFFORD 1998,2000; Mohan 2002, 
2006, 2008; Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002; Zack-Williams and Mohan 2002; Henry 
and Mohan 2003; Newland 2003; Okoth 2003; Abdul-Raheem and Bing 2004; 
CaMP AS 2004a,b; HCIDC 2004; 10M 2004a; Newland with Patrick 2004; USAID 
2004; GCIM 2005; Farrant et al 2006; lonescu 2006; UN 2006; World Bank 2006; 
Davies 2007; DFID 2007; Merz et al 2007; Styan 2007; Bakewell 2008a; Faist 2008; 
Mercer et al 2008, 2009; Skeldon 2008; de Haas 2009). Positing diasporans and their 
organisations as powerful and positive actors in the progress of 'home', these 
globalising discourses reinvigorate, expand and re-orientate established debates on the 
relationship between international migration and development. 
Migration and development 
Prior to the emergence at the dawn of the millennium of distinctly celebratory 
discourses of diaspora and development, attention tended to focus on the role of uneven 
development in producing international migration or on the impact of international 
migration on the development of 'host' countries. Much less attention was given to the 
impact of international migration on the development of countries of origin 
(Papademetriou and Martin 1991a; Skeldon 1997a; Massey et al 1998; de Hann 1999; 
Smith 2002; SjZlrensen et al 2003a; Black et al 2004; Portes 2009). Where this 
relationship was considered, negative impacts tended to be emphasised (Hermele 1997, 
Taylor 1999; SjZlrensen et al 2003a; see for example Piore 1979; Lipton 1982; Bohning 
1984; Papademetriou and Martin 1991a,b; Collinson 1996). These conventional, 
Caglar 2006), and Zimbabwe (McGregor 2009). See also Moya (2005). 
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distinctly pessimistic discourses of 'migration and development' have been 
characterised as revolving around 'the three R's', namely recruitment, return and 
remittances (Papademetriou and Martin 1991b; S~rensen et a12003a). 
Recruitment 
The notion of recruitment focuses on the types of people who emigrate and usually 
translates into a concern with the impacts on sending countries of the loss of 
professionals and skilled workers (Papademetriou and Martin 1991b). This concern 
underlies the debates on 'brain drain' that emerged in the early 1960s as the first 
graduates of newly independent developing countries began to leave or not return after 
training abroad (Ammassari and Black 2001; Olesen 2003). Such outflows are generally 
seen to have a deeply detrimental impact on countries of origin as they constitute a loss 
of the 'best and the brightest', depleting an already limited stock of the skilled human 
capital needed to fill key social, economic and political positions at 'home' (Martin 
1991: 32; Ammassari and Black 2001; S~rensen et al 2003a). Furthermore, given the 
investment of the sending country in educating and training these people, their 
emigration represents an economic transfer to the receiving country and a loss of 
expected tax revenue (Papademetriou and Martin 1991a; Ammassari and Black 2001; 
Newland 2003). 
Further exacerbating this perceived problem, well-educated, highly-skilled professionals 
are often assumed to have the highest propensity to emigrate on the basis that they are 
more likely to have the necessary financial and social capital and given that their labour 
is in the greatest demand in the global recruitment market (Martin 1991; Ammassari and 
Black 2001; Jazayery 2003; Newland 2003; Olesen 2003; S~rensen et al 2003a). 
Supporting this assumption, Olesen (2003) notes that graduates constitute 
approximately 60% of all migrants from Ghana, Egypt, and South Africa and 74% of all 
the African migrants in the US in 1990. Similarly, Black et al (2004) note that a study 
based on census data from 2000 found that 83% of the 109,000 Nigeria-born migrants 
in the US aged 25 or over had a tertiary education. 
Given the high propensity of the well educated to emigrate, it is argued that many 
'developing' countries loose significant proportions of their skilled labour 
(Papademetriou and Martin 1991a). For example, it is claimed that around 30% of all 
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'highly educated' Ghanaians and Sierra Leoneans live abroad (Newland 2003) which 
parallels the World Bank estimate that Africa lost about one third of its professional, 
highly skilled workers between 1960 and 1987 (Hermele 1997; Ammassari and Black 
2001; Olesen 2003). Indeed, it is said that there are more Nigerian academics in the US 
than in Nigeria (Black et al 2004). 
Return 
In the wake of the mid-1970s oil crisis which left industrialised 'host' countries in 
recession and facing growing unemployment, discourses of migration and development 
shifted their focus from the detrimental impacts of 'brain drain' to the potentially 
remedial effects of return (Ammassari and Black 2001; Olesen 2003; S0rensen et al 
2003a). However, while it was suggested that returnees could benefit their 'home' 
countries by bringing back human, financial and social capital gained abroad, this 
promise was ultimately doubted on a number of fronts. It was widely asserted that few 
migrants gain new skills, knowledge and useful experience abroad as most tend to 
undertake unskilled labour in the 'host' (Stahl 1989; Papademetriou and Martin 1991a; 
Ammassari and Black 2001; S0rensen et al 2003a). Furthermore, it was argued that in 
undertaking unskilled labour, migrants might not even use the skills they already have, 
becoming deskilled (Lim 1994; Ammassari and Black 2001). If migrants did gain skills 
abroad, it was contended that they would then be less inclined to return (Papademetriou 
and Martin 1991a). And even if migrants did return with newly acquired skills, it was 
claimed that these skills would often be unsuited to the needs of the 'home' economy, 
making their productive utilisation unlikely (Hermele 1997; Ammassari and Black 
2001; S0rensen et al 2003a). Limiting even further the positive impact of returnees, it 
was suggested that any savings or other financial resources they might bring 'home' 
would rarely be invested in 'productive' activities but rather largely 'wasted' on 
'conspicuous consumption' (Ammassari and Black 2001). 
Remittances 
The very same argument also held sway in relation to migrant remittances, the money 
migrants send 'home' to family, kin and friends. Indeed, established discourses of 
migration and development are dominated by the view that remittance income is 
'wasted' at 'home' in that it is overwhelmingly spent on survival and 'conspicuous 
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consumption' (such as festivals, family events, and consumer durables) rather than 
being invested in 'productive' activities (Martin 1991; Papademetriou and Martin 
1991a; Hermele 1997; de Hann 1999; Ammassari and Black 2001; Black 2003; Gundel 
2003; Newland 2003; S~rensen et al 2003a). Consequently, remittances are seen to 
create dependency amongst recipients at 'home' when they could be used to foster 
income-generation and self-sustaining development (ibid). 
Furthermore, discourses of migration and development tend to see remittance-induced 
household expenditure not only as 'wasteful' but also as ultimately detrimental to 
communities and countries of origin. Firstly, it is argued that by increasing consumption 
without stimulating a concomitant increase in production, remittances cause inflation 
(Pi ore 1979; Burki 1991; Islam 1991; Martin 1991; Papademetriou and Martin 1991a; 
de Hann 1999; Ammassari and Black 2001; Van Hear 2002; Bracking 2003; Gundel 
2003; S~rensen et al 2003a). In tum, remittance-induced inflation increases inequality 
between households as those without relatives abroad face higher prices without the 
compensation of a remittance income. Therefore, their purchasing power declines 
relative to that of migrant-sending households (Martin 1991; Bracking 2003). 
This is seen to exacerbate the way in which the selectivity of migration reinforces 
existing income inequalities between households. International migrants tend not to 
come from the poorest households as these are seen to lack the financial and social 
capital required to facilitate a member's mobility. Consequently, socio-economic 
differentiation is seen to be accentuated as it is the already better-off households, rather 
than the poorest, that receive remittances (Lipton 1982; Papademetriou and Martin 
1991a; Portes 1997; Skeldon 1997b, 2002; Massey et al 1998; de Hann 1999; 
Ammassari and Black 2001; Van Hear 2002,2003; Black 2003; Bracking 2003; Gundel 
2003; Newland 2003; Olesen 2003; S~rensen et al 2003a,b; Sriskandarajah 2003). For 
de Hann (1999: 31), these inequality-enhancing impacts are "[p ]erhaps the most 
worrying aspect of migration" for countries of origin. Certainly, they are of great 
concern to development policy which tends, as S~rensen et al (2003b) argue, to stress 
issues of equity. 
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Diaspora and development 
Since the dawn of the millennium, there has been a strong resurgence of interest in the 
role of international migration in sending country development. Indeed, writing in 2003, 
Olesen (152) asserts that the role of migrants in development at 'home' has received 
"much more attention [ .. ,] within the last year than within the previous ten years". 
Significantly, this renewed interest has been associated with a growing tendency to 
interpret the relationship much more positively than in established discourses of 
migration and development. As Styan (2007: 1171, original emphasis) observes, 
"[ ... DJiverse UN agencies, the EU, the World Bank, the OECD and the African Union 
suddenly appear to be outbidding each other in highlighting the positive contribution 
that migration can make to development in Africa and elsewhere". Indeed, proliferating 
through a host of recent academic, policy, and civil society publications and the nascent 
initiatives of governments and international agencies, distinctly celebratory discourses 
of diaspora and development have reinvigorated, expanded, and re-orientated 
conventional debates about the impact of international migration on development at 
'home' (Hermele 1997; Taylor 1999; AFFORD 1998, 2000; Mohan 2002, 2006, 2008; 
Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002; Zack-Williams and Mohan 2002; Bracking 2003; 
Gammeltoft 2003; Henry and Mohan 2003; Newland 2003; S~rensen et al 2003a; Van 
Hear and S~rensen 2003; Vertovec 2003; Black et al 2004; COMPAS 2004a; HCIDC 
2004; 10M 2004a, b; Newland with Patrick 2004; USAID 2004; GCIM 2005; Farrant et 
al 2006; Ionescu 2006; UN 2006; World Bank 2006; Davies 2007; DFID 2007; Merz et 
al 2007; Styan 2007; Bakewell 2008a; Faist 2008; Mercer et al 2008, 2009; Skeldon 
2008; de Haas 2009). 
Positing migrants less as a drain of the brains of their countries of origin and more as 
powerful and positive actors in the progress of 'home', these discourses emphasize the 
substantial and growing volume of household remittances and radically reinterpret their 
impact. Furthermore, by widening the conventional debate to include notions of 
diaspora and migrant transnationalism, these discourses highlight a multitude of 
additional border-spanning linkages, networks, and flows through which overseas 
nationals can produce beneficial economic, social, cultural, and political effects at 
'home'. As Faist (2008: 21) argues: 
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The new enthusiasm, sometimes described as the 'new mantra' 
(Kapur, 2004), around migration and development hinges on a number 
of strong claims. They can be summarised in the statement that the 
flows of money, knowledge and universal ideas - called remittances-
can have a positive effect on what is called development in the 
countries of emigration. 
In these ways, then, international migrants and their descendents are increasingly being 
seen as a resource with "enormous potential" for the development of their countries of 
origin (de Boeck 2004: 3; S~rensen et a12003a; Faist 2008). 
Recognising and reinterpreting household remittances 
As noted above, a key factor underlying the generation of celebratory discourses of 
diaspora and development is a wider recognition of the substantial volume and 
impressive growth of migrant remittances (Hermele 1997; Black 2003; Newland 2003, 
2007; Kapur 2004; Farrant et al 2006; World Bank 2006; Styan 2007; Bakewell 2008a; 
Faist 2008). Data from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank show that 
formally recorded annual global remittances increased from less than US$2 billion in 
1970 to US$75 billion in the early 1990s, reaching US$100 billion in 2000 (Russell 
1992; S~rensen et al 2003a; Vertovec 2003). Official remittances to 'developing' 
countries were estimated to represent 60% of the global total in 2000 (Newland 2003; 
S~rensen et al 2003a; Vertovec 2003) and reached an estimated $199 billion in 2006 
(Bakewell 2008a). Accumulated over the 1990s, remittances were around 20 per cent 
higher than flows of official development assistance (ODA) (S~rensen et al 2003b; see 
also Gammeltoft 2003). Indeed, with official remittances to 'developing' countries 
almost doubling and ODA declining by 16 per cent, the relative importance of the 
former increased notably over the decade (Gammeltoft 2003; Newland 2003). 
The volume and development potential of remittances is even greater when one 
considers that officially recorded remittances represent "only the tip of the iceberg" 
(puri and Ritzema 1999: 3). A variety of informal transfer channels such as unregulated 
agencies, migrants carrying money by hand on return visits and in-kind 'gifts' mean that 
the volume of officially unrecorded remittances is often found to be substantial (Russell 
et al 1990; Werbner 1990; Hulshof 1991; Lowell and de la Garza 2000; Sumata 2002; 
Bracking 2003; Gammeltoft 2003; Gundel 2003; Newland 2003; Sriskandarajah 2003; 
Vertovec 200~; UN 2006; Pi eke et al 2007; Styan 2007). The UK Department for 
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International Development asserts that informal remittances represent twice or three 
times the amount of formally transferred funds (Bracking 2003). Puri and Ritzema's 
(1999) survey of estimates made for 11 different countries between the late 1970s and 
early 1990s found that unrecorded remittances vary between 8 and 85 per cent of the 
total with an average of 36 per cent. In the case of Africa, the London-based African 
Foundation for Development (AFFORD 2000) estimates that only 50 per cent of 
remittances go through formal channels. 
While there are differing estimations, it is clear that remittances to Nigeria are of a 
significant volume. The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago estimates that Nigerians in 
the US alone send $1.3 billion per annum (Black et al 2004). According to the 10M 
(2002), total official remittances to Nigeria increased from US$1O.01 million in 1990 to 
US$1301.06 million in 1999 and constituted nearly 30 percent of financial inflows to 
the country. Gammeltoft (2003) records that Nigeria received a total of US$6.5 billion 
in official remittances between 1995-1999, making it the 13th largest receiver in the 
world and the largest in sub-Saharan Africa. Over the same period, Nigeria was also the 
largest receiver of official remittances in relation to aid in sub-Saharan Africa, and the 
10th largest in the world, with US$6.8 of remittances for every US dollar of aid received 
(ibid: 109). Furthermore, the Central Bank of Nigeria reported that recorded remittances 
reached as much as US$2.26 billion in 2004 and it is estimated that unrecorded 
remittances would have brought the total remittance inflow for that year to 
approximately US$5 billion (Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2007). 
In addition to a much heightened recognition of the sheer size and notable growth of 
remittances, globalising discourses of diaspora and development emerge from a radical 
reassessment of the impact of these flows at 'home', which are increasingly being 
celebrated as the aspect of international mobility carrying the most potential for direct 
and positive development outcomes (Van Hear 1998; de Hann 1999; Taylor 1999; 
Gammeltoft 2003; Skeldon 2002; Bracking 2003; HCIDC 2004; Farrant et al 2006; 
World Bank 2006; Styan 2007; de Haas 2009). This reassessment has much to do with a 
re-conceptualisation of migration. Rather than seeing mobility as the product of 
individual acts of rational economic self-interest (as in the classic work of Todaro 
(1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) for example), decisions to move are increasingly 
being viewed in the broader context of family livelihood strategies aimed at distributing 
resources acr?ss space to increase household income and reduce risk (Russell et al 
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1990; Stark 1991; Adepoju 1995; Findley 1997; Ammassari and Black 2001; de Hann 
1999; Taylor 1999; Landolt 2001; Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002; Van Hear 2002; 
UN 2006; de Haas 2009). In this context of an individual's migration being initiated and 
funded by the family for the benefit of the household, the sending of remittances 
becomes the key way in which the strong, implicitly contractual obligations placed on 
the migrant are fulfilled (ibid). 
As a result of such thinking, spatial mobility in order to generate remittances has come 
to be seen not only as an increasingly important household livelihood strategy to 
increase families' income and standard of living but also as an essential household 
survival strategy (Burki 1991; Basch et al 1994; Roberts et al 1999; MacGaffey and 
Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Landolt 2001; Zack-Williams and Mohan 2002; S0rensen et 
al 2003a,b; Styan 2007). For example, studies in Somalia calculate that remittances 
constitute nearly 40 per cent of the income of urban households (Gundel 2003). Indeed, 
a number of authors writing on different national contexts argue that many families 
could not sustain themselves without the "crucial 'safety net'" represented by 
remittances (AI-Ali et al 2001a: 620; Van Hear 2002,2003; Zack-Williams and Mohan 
2002; Bracking 2003; Gundel 2003; Jazayery 2003; Newland 2003; Sriskandarajah 
2003; Newland 2007). 
Beyond highlighting how remittances are critical in household survival and livelihood 
strategies, discourses of diaspora and development also afford greater emphasis to 
studies that provide evidence of the investment of remittances, particularly in 
agricultural equipment and small businesses (Cornelius 1990; Escobar and Martinez 
1990; Russell et a11990; Hermele 1997; Ahmed 2000; Ammassari and Black 2001; van 
Doom 2001; Newland 2007; de Haas 2009). Contrary to the pessimistic tenets of 
conventional discourses of migration and development, this 'productive' spending has 
been found to reach significant levels in some cases, especially once pressing survival 
and consumption needs have been met (Oberai and Singh 1980; de Hann 1999; Taylor 
1999; Van Hear 2002; Piracha and Vickerman 2002; S0rensen et al 2003a; de Haas 
2009). 
Moreover, it is argued that these established discourses have underplayed the indirect 
'productive' effects of remittance-induced consumption expenditure. A central 
argument of the 'new economics of labour migration' is that by meeting immediate 
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consumption needs, remittances free up other elements of household income for direct 
investment in 'productive' activities (Taylor 1999; Van Hear 2002; UN 2006; de Haas 
2009). Indeed, migrant-sending households have been found to have a higher propensity 
to invest than households without migrants (Adams 1998). It has also been argued that 
some apparently 'unproductive' expenditures on factors such as food, shelter, medical 
care, cultural and family events and education are likely to increase productivity in the 
long term by improving family health, developing skills and building social capital 
(Russell 1992; Taylor 1999; Frank and Hummer 2002; Mohan and Robinson 2002; Van 
Hear 2002; S0rensen et a12003a; Vertovec 2003; UN 2006; Newland 2007). 
Furthermore, challenging concerns emphasised in conventional discourses of migration 
and development about remittance-induced social inequality, greater attention is now 
given to channels through which remittances benefit migrant and non-migrant 
households alike. Principal among these is a remittance multiplier effect through which 
the spending of remittances on consumption stimulates local production and thereby 
creates employment and other-income generating opportunities for households that do 
not receive remittances (Appleyard 1989, 1992; Stahl 1989; Durand et a11996; Hermele 
1997; de Hann 1999; Taylor 1999; Black 2003; Vertovec 2003; UN 2006; Newland 
2007; Bakewell 2008a; Skeldon 2008; de Haas 2009). In this way, beneficial effects of 
remittances can be transmitted from migrant-sending households to non-migrant-
sending households. A further key channel that is seen to distribute the benefits of 
migration more widely across a sending community, and one that has only recently 
begun to attract notable attention, is the transfer of 'collective remittances', the 
monetary and material contributions made by migrant associations to their communities 
and countries of origin (Goldring 2004). This form of remittance has been highlighted 
and increasingly lauded as globalising discourses of diaspora and development seek to 
move the migration-development debate beyond the conventional confines of 'brain 
drain', return and household remittances to embrace a multitude of alternative diasporic 
activities and transnational practices that carry much potential for the progress of 
'home'. 
Embracing migrant transnationalism and diaspora 
As noted earlier, the literature on 'migrant transnationalism' has fostered a growing 
recognition of the extent and intensity with which migrants and their descendents 
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maintain multi-faceted border-spanning linkages with 'home'. Embedded in 
transnational social networks such as diaspora organisations and manifested in circular 
flows of people, money, materials, information, and ideas, these linkages are 
increasingly seen to have much potential for inciting positive social, economic, political, 
and cultural change at 'home'. Indeed, Newland (2003: 3) asserts, "[ ... T]ransnational 
networks are today the most important developmental resource associated with 
international migration". 
Given that the maintenance of transnational ties to 'home' is a defining characteristic of 
the diasporic condition, an exploration of their transformative potential is at the heart of 
globalising discourses of diaspora and development (Zack-Williams 1995; AFFORD 
1998,2000; Mohan 2002, 2006, 2008; Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002; Zack-Williams 
and Mohan 2002; Henry and Mohan 2003; Newland 2003; Okoth 2003; S0rensen et al 
2003a; Van Hear and S0rensen 2003; COMPAS 2004a,b; HCIDC 2004; 10M 2004a,b 
Newland with Patrick 2004; USAID 2004; GCIM 2005; lonescu 2006; UN 2006; DFID 
2007; Davies 2007; Merz et al 2007; Styan 2007; Faist 2008; Mercer et al 2008, 2009). 
In moving beyond the boundaries of conventional debates on migration and 
development to embrace a multitude of alternative ways in which migrants can 
influence 'home' from afar, these celebratory discourses emphasise three key modes of 
border-spanning practice: collective remittances, social remittances, and political 
transnationalism. Significantly, diaspora organisations have been identified as central to 
each of these modes of transnational intervention and are therefore being lauded, and 
increasingly engaged, as powerful and positive actors in the development of 'home'. As 
Faist (2008: 22) notes, "[ ... T]ransnational networks and associations of migrants have 
come to stand at the centre of the optimistic visions of national and international 
economic development policy establishments". 
Collective remittances: alleviating poverty and promoting the public good 
In expanding the framework for exploring border-spanning ties with 'home', globalising 
discourses of diaspora and development have highlighted the diasporic practice of 
coming together to send collective monetary and material contributions to communities 
and countries of origin (Vertovec 2003; Goldring 2004; COMPAS 2004b; GCIM 2005; 
Babcock 2006; Orozco and Rouse 2007; Page 2007; Portes et a12007; Mazzucato 2008; 
Mercer et al 2008, 2009; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009, Portes 2009). In contrast to the 
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household remittances sent by migrants to their family members at 'home', these 
'collective remittances' are sent by organised groups of migrants and their descendents 
and tend to be aimed at projects designed to have a wider communal or social benefit 
(ibid.). Indeed, "connecting immigrants with development projects back home" is often 
seen as the central role of diaspora organisations, particularly HTAs (Attah-Poku 1996: 
63; Okamura 1983; Josephides 1987; Levitt 1997; Guarnizo et a11999; Adeyanju 2000; 
Owusu 2000; Goldring 2004; USAID 2004; Caglar 2006). It is argued that the 
collective remittances transmitted through diaspora organisations are generated largely 
through membership fees and fundraising events and tend to be aimed at health, 
education and public infrastructure projects at 'home' (ibid; AFFORD 1998; Danese 
1998; Goldring 1998; Liu 1998; Popkin 1999; Landolt et al 1999; Roberts et al 1999; 
Adeyanju 2000; Kerlin 2000; Ndofor-Tah 2000; Orozco 2000, 2003, 2004; Uduku 
2000, 2002; Henry and Mohan 2003; Vertovec 2003; HCIDC 2004; Orozco and 
Lapointe 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; GCIM 2005; Babcock 2006; Mohan 2006, 
2008; UN 2006; Cano and Delano 2007; DFID 2007; Orozco and Rouse 2007; Page 
2007; Portes el al 2007; Faist 2008; Fox and Bada 2008; Kleist 2008; Mazzucato 2008; 
Mercer et al 2008, 2009; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009; 0stergaard-Nielsen 2009). 
Exemplifying this, Levitt (1997) recounts how a Dominican HTA in Boston, the 
Miraflores Development Committee, raised funds over 25 years to purchase more than 
80% of the land where community facilities have been built in Miraflores. Between 
1992 and 1994, it raised approximately $70,000 to build an aqueduct, to renovate the 
village school, health clinic and community centre, and to fund the salary and medical 
supplies of the town's physicians (ibid). Illustrating how collective remittances can also 
be made in-kind, in 1983 the Kwahuman Association of New York shipped around 
US$12,000 worth of medical drugs and other equipment, including 40 beds and 
mattresses and 13 patient side-tables, to the hospital serving its 'clan' area in Ghana, 
following this in 1992 with a further 100 hospital beds (Attah-Poku 1996). 
While the literature tends to concern itself with simply describing such associational 
contributions rather than with assessing their relative importance and effects (Ndofor-
Tah 2000, Babcock 2006), some authors have suggested that their magnitude and 
impacts are considerable. For example, Orozco and Rouse (2007: 5) contend, "In 
Mexican hometowns with fewer than 3,000 people, HTA donations are equal to more 
than 50% of the money in municipal public works budgets. In towns with populations 
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under 1,000 people, HT A donations can amount to up to seven times the public works 
budget [ ... ]". Similarly, Portes et al (2007: 256) highlight the work of a Dominican 
HT A, arguing that it has "literally transformed" its hometown which, they claim, "has 
grown increasingly reliant on the loyalty and generosity of their migrants for a number 
of needs unattended by the national government". Indeed, in summing-up the 
contribution of HTAs, Portes and Landolt (2000: 543) claim: 
Life conditions in municipalities that receive 'grassroots transnational 
aid' confirm the economic relevance of this collective remittance 
strategy. Towns with a home town association [abroad] have paved 
roads, electricity, and freshly painted public buildings. [ ... T]he quality 
of life in transnational towns is quite simply better. 
By directing funds towards public services and infrastructure projects, the collective 
remittances sent by diaspora organisations have the potential to benefit migrant and 
non-migrant households alike (Orozco 2000, 2003, 2004; S0rensen et al 2003b; Orozco 
and Lapointe 2004; GCIM 2005; Orozco and Rouse 2007; Fox and Bada 2008; 
Mazzucato 2008; Mercer et al 2008; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009; Portes 2009). 
Furthermore, these transfers are often seen to be targeted at projects that will be of most 
benefit to disadvantaged groups; for example, Orozco and Rouse (2007) assert, "[ ... ] 
these donations are channelled primarily to the poor". In such ways, collective 
remittances are lauded for countering any inequality that individual remittances might 
create between migrant and non-migrant sending households, preventing areas of origin 
turning into examples of Galbraith's 'private affluence and public squalor' where, for 
example, new homes are accessible only over dirt roads (Martin 1991; Widgren and 
Martin 2002; Vertovec 2003). 
Moreover, collective remittances are also seen to support 'productive' projects at 
'home', often being invested directly in 'income-generating' initiatives such as 
"microenterprises" and "agricultural activities" (Orozco and Rouse 2007; see also 
Orozco 2000, 2003). "These types of projects are significant", argue Orozco and Rouse 
2007, "because of the potential they have to promote equity [ ... ]". Furthermore, 
Vertovec (2003: 41) asserts, "Channelled remittances - especially pooled funds 
represented by HT As - can go a long way toward supporting the establishment and 
work of MFIs" (see also USAID 2004). Indeed, it is argued that by engaging micro-
finance institutions (MFIs) in these ways, diaspora organisations can facilitate the 
release of funds acquired through international mobility to members of non-migrant 
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households, thereby ameliorating both the inequitable impacts of individual remittances 
and the credit constraints that are often seen to undermine 'productive' investment in 
migrant-sending areas (ibid; Orozco 2002). 
Social remittances: transferring bright ideas and good behaviour 
In addition to facilitating collective transfers of money and materials, transnational 
social networks such as diaspora organisations are increasingly being celebrated as 
channels for the transmission 'home' of developmentally-beneficial knowledge, ideas, 
values, norms, practices, and behaviours (AI-Ali et al 2001a; Ammassari and Black 
2001; Gundel 2003; Sprensen et al 2003a; Van Hear 2003; Vertovec 2003; HCIDC 
2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; GCIM 2005; Taylor et al 2006; UN 2006; Newland 
2007; Faist 2008; Fox and Bada 2008; Kleist 2008; Portes 2009). This celebration has 
built upon and expanded Peggy Levitt's (1998) influential notion of 'social 
remittances'. In advancing this concept, she contends that migrants adopt or hybridise 
some of the 'new' ideas, values, and beliefs they are exposed to in the 'host' society and 
then remit them to people at 'home' through transnational social practices such as return 
visits, international telephone calls, and the organising of collective contributions to 
community development. 
These social remittances are seen to influence the 'normative structures' that exist at 
'home' (ibid: 926). Such structures include modes of interpersonal behaviour, notions of 
intra-family responsibility, standards of age and gender appropriateness, principles of 
neighbourliness and community participation, aspirations for social mobility, and 
expectations about organizational performance (ibid). In the case of the small village of 
Miraflores in the Dominican Republic, Levitt (1998) argues that social remittances have 
produced more libratory notions of womanhood, a greater awareness of individual 
rights, and heightened demands for a more democratic politics, a more independent 
judiciary, a more accountable business community, and a more effective social welfare 
sector. 
Significantly, Levitt (1998) identifies a Boston-based HTA, the Miraflores 
Development Committee (MDC), as a particularly effective channel of social remittance 
transfer. This effectiveness derives from the MDC's close collaboration and regular 
contact with a ,counterpart organisation in Miraflores (ibid). Through such transnational 
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networking, the MDC was able to encourage its 'home' -based partner to adopt the 
"stronger financial controls" practiced in the US with the result that "migrants' 
donations toward community projects began to be more carefully managed" (ibid: 941). 
Given the capacity of migrant organisations to transfer social remittances, Levitt (1998: 
927) contends that policymakers can utilise these groups to "channel certain kinds of 
information [about health, education, business skills, and community organisation 
techniques, she suggests] to particular groups with positive results". Endorsing this call, 
USAID (2004: 29) argues that being engaged by HT As in the design and 
implementation of projects enables non-migrants to "gain capabilities that will facilitate 
future economic development - such as decision-making, organizational and 
management skills" (see also Fox and Bada 2008). 
Indeed, since Levitt (1998: 926) advanced the notion of social remittances as "migration 
driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion", the concept has been widely embraced in 
discourses of diaspora and development and expanded to refer to the transfer 'home' of 
any knowledge, idea, value, practice or behaviour deemed developmentally beneficial, 
whether at the local or national level. In this way, diasporans and their organisations 
have come to be celebrated and engaged as "conduits" of vital human, intellectual and 
moral capital that can transform not only local communities but also entire nations 
(GCIM 2005: 23), promoting, for example, such grand ideas, principles and practices as 
"human rights, gender equity and democracy" (Faist 2008: 22). 
Diasporans and their organisations are attracting particular attention as channels for the 
transnational transfer of technical and professional knowledge and skills. Lauding this 
diasporic capability, Portes (2009: 16) asserts, "[ ... ] a community of professional 
expatriates can make a significant contribution to the scientific and technological 
development of their home country". Building on such contentions, 'home' and 'host' 
governments and international agencies are increasingly looking to organise and engage 
diasporans. For example, the United Nations (UN 2006: 19) contends, "Actively 
encouraging and supporting the formation of transnational associations involving 
researchers at home and abroad may be particularly important to enhance knowledge 
exchange". Similarly, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM 2005: 
30) "[ ... ] endorses the efforts being made to mobilize diaspora knowledge networks", 
arguing that this is "[ ... ] an objective which is most effectively achieved by supporting 
the establishment of professional migrant organizations [ ... ]". Exemplifying such 
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thinking, the International Organisation for Migration's 'Migration for Development in 
Africa' (MIDA) programme has identified diaspora organisations as key targets in its 
efforts to facilitate the exchange of ideas and expertise between diasporic African 
professionals and their 'home' -based colleagues (de Boeck 2004; 10M 2004a,b). 
Political transnationalism: influencing progress from afar 
In addition to lauding social and collective remittances, globalising discourses of 
diaspora and development also draw on the literature on migrant transnationalism to 
celebrate a growing engagement between diasporans, their states of origin and the 
politics of 'home'. While it is recognised that migrants and their descendents have long 
been concerned with 'homeland politics', it is argued that their ability to act on this 
concern has increased significantly in recent decades as a result of advances in, and 
wider access to, global telecommunications and transport. What is seen to be especially 
significant about this intensified 'political transnationalism' is the role of diasporans and 
their organisations in utilising the strategic space of diaspora to lobby the 'home' state 
on issues they believe to be of particular relevance to the development of their 
communities and countries of origin (Adamson 2002; 0stergaard-Nielsen 2002; 
Newland with Patrick 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; Cordero-Guzman 2005; UN 2006; 
Cano and Delano 2007; Fox and Bada 2008; Kleist 2008; McGregor 2009). The often 
implicit assumption seems to be that such diasporic political interventions are likely to 
support 'progressive' ends and causes, such as democracy, good governance and public 
investment. 
Intensified political transnationalism is widely seen to be encouraged further by the 
increasingly common practice of 'home' governments recognising, and attempting to 
channel, the economic and political contributions made by diasporans. This move 
towards the 'transnational reincorporation' (Guarnizo and Smith 1998) of overseas 
'nationals' into the 'home' economy and polity involves extending citizenship rights to 
expatriates, establishing consular outreach programmes, giving seats to diaspora 
representatives in legislatures, providing channels for remittances and offering 
investment opportunities (Basch et al 1994; Vertovec 1999, 2001, 2003; Levitt 2001; 
Guamizo et a12003; Newland 2003; Koser 2003c; S0rensen et al2003b; Abdul-Raheem 
and Bing 2004; GCIM 2005; Portes et al 2007; Styan 2007; Faist 2008; Gamlen 2008; 
0stergaard-Nie,lsen 2009). For Itzigsohn (2000), it is the expansion of 'home' state 
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polities beyond national borders to engage diasporas that distinguishes contemporary 
processes of migrant transnationalism as 'new'. Through this 'deterritorializing' of the 
nation-state (Basch et al 1994), the opportunities for international migrants and their 
descendents to participate directly in formal political processes at 'home' are constantly 
expanding. As such diasporas are increasingly able to influence process of change at 
'home' by voting in national elections, electing diaspora representatives, financially 
supporting political parties, becoming actively involved in election campaigns and 
contributing to the drafting of constitutions (AI-Ali et al 2001a; Portes 2001; Adamson 
2002; Guarnizo et al 2003; Jazayery 2003; Koser 2003c; Van Hear and S~rensen 2003; 
Vertovec 2003). 
Significantly, Itzigsohn (2000) also argues that diaspora organisations are key actors in 
this mode of 'political transnationalism'. Indeed, in a number of cases, the lobbying of 
'home' governments by migrant associations has been seen as a critical force in 
highlighting the potential role of diaspora and achieving the extension of citizenship 
rights to expatriates (ibid; Sassen-Koob 1979; Popkin 1999; Owusu 2000; Itzigsohn and 
Villacres 2008). Furthermore, migrant associations are highlighted as important points 
of contact and interaction with the diaspora for campaigning 'home' country politicians 
and for the outreach institutions established by sending states (Okamura 1983; Basch 
1987; Guamizo and Smith 1998; Liu 1998; Minghuan 1998; Itzigsohn et al 1999; 
Landolt et al1999; Popkin 1999; Roberts et a11999; Vertovec 1999,2003; Kerlin 2000; 
Uduku 2000; Levitt 2001; Henry and Mohan 2003; Cordero-Guzman 2005; Mohan 
2006, 2008; Dumont 2008; Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008). And through these outreach 
institutions, such as consulates, embassies, cultural centres and departments of 
expatriate affairs, states of origin have even begun to support the activities of migrant 
associations by, for example, offering advice on the regularisation of immigration status 
in the 'host', providing premises for meetings and cultural events, operating a channel 
for remittance transfer and giving technical assistance, training, and funds for enacting 
development projects at 'home' (ibid). 
Held-up as the exemplar of 'home' government attempts to engage diaspora 
organisations, Mexico's 'Program for Mexican Communities Abroad' (PCME) has 
since the early 1990s assisted the establishment and reinvigoration of HTAs in the US 
and promoted the creation of state-level umbrella organisations (Goldring 1998; Mahler 
1998; Landolt et al 1999; Popkin 1999; Portes 1997, 1999; Roberts et al 1999; Orozco 
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2003; Orozco with Lapointe 2004, USAID 2004; Cano and Delano 2007; Fox and Bada 
2008). The PCME's most notable scheme is what has become the 'three for one' 
arrangement whereby the municipal, state, and federal levels of government each donate 
a dollar for every dollar raised by a HTA for a development project at 'home' (ibid). In 
2002, the entire programme generated as much as US$43.5 million from HTAs and the 
three tiers of government for development projects (USAID 2004). 
The diasporic location is also celebrated for enabling overseas 'nationals' and their 
organisations to act as 'ambassadors', lobbying 'host' governments on issues of concern 
to their communities and countries of origin such as foreign policy, trade and 
international development assistance (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002; S~rensen et al 
2003a; Kalinde 2004). For example, Kerlin (2000) reports that Guinea-Bissauan HTAs 
in Portugal petitioned the 'host' government to increase aid to their 'home' state during 
its civil war of 1998-9 and joined with 'sister' HTAs in France and across Europe in 
protesting against France's position on the conflict. Similarly, it is noted that UK-based 
diaspora organisations have been lobbying the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) to involve them in the formulation of policy towards their 
countries of origin, arguing that, through first -hand experience and regular contact, they 
have a more intimate understanding of the needs of 'home' (AFFORD 1998; Ndofor-
Tah 2000; DFID 2001; HCIDC 2004; Newland with Patrick 2004; Styan 2007). This 
lobbying forms part of a wider effort by UK-based diaspora organisations to win 
recognition and support for their transnational contributions to development at 'home' 
(ibid.). Significantly, DFID has responded and, for a period of three years from 2003, it 
funded the formation and operation of 'Connections for Development' (CfD), an 
umbrella organisation for 'Black and Minority Ethnic Organisations' designed to give 
them a voice in the UK's development policy design process (DFID 2003, 2007). CfD 
has also been tasked with exploring ways in which DFID can help fund development 
projects undertaken by diaspora organisations in their countries of origin (ibid). 
This reflects a growing argument that diaspora organisations constitute networks 
through which international development assistance can be channelled directly to 
'grassroots communities', avoiding the public sector inefficiencies and corruption that 
conventional state-to-state transfers often experience (Levitt 1997; Danese 1998; 
AFFORD 1998; Kerlin 2000; Orozco 2003, 2004; DFID 2001, 2007; Vertovec 2003; 
HCIDC 2004; Newland with Patrick 2004; Orozco with Lapointe 2004; USAID 2004; 
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GCIM 2005; Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2007; Ionescu 2006; UN 2006; Orozco and 
Rouse 2007; Mercer et al 2008; 0stergaard-Nielsen 2009; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). 
Following this logic, the Inter-American Foundation, an US government agency, is co-
funding and providing technical assistance and training for HT A projects in Mexico, 
Haiti, Honduras, and EI Salvador (Newland with Patrick 2004; USAID 2004). 
Similarly, the European Union has operated a scheme that covers 80% of the costs of 
projects undertaken by North African and Middle Eastern migrant associations (Danese 
1998) and the French government has provided funds to migrant organisations within 
the framework of its 'co-development' agreements with Mali, Senegal, and Morocco 
(Newland with Patrick 2004). 
Conclusion: questioning the construction of collective transnational power 
It is clear that in globalising discourses of diaspora and development, diaspora 
organisations are identified and celebrated as key transnational infrastructures for 
effecting positive change at 'home'. Consequently, these groups are increasingly being 
lauded as entities that international agencies interested in pursuing more direct and 
participatory modes of development assistance should support. However, some argue 
that such celebrations are based on limited knowledge. For example, Portes et al (2007: 
277) contends that the study of "immigrant transnational organizations" is "still in its 
infancy". Similarly, a 2004 report on diaspora organisations claims that "their structure, 
strategies and influences on local and national development are only minimally 
understood" (COMP AS 2004a). 
Indeed, where diaspora organisations and their border-spanning activities are addressed 
it tends to be within wider studies of migrant transnationalism in which they do not 
constitute the specific focus of research (Portes and Landolt 2000; Vertovec 2003; 
Newland with Patrick 2004; USAID 2004). Furthermore, as a number of authors note, 
this literature focuses largely on the particular context of Latin American and Caribbean 
migration to the US (AI-Ali and Koser 2002; Smith 2002; Caglar 2006). Consequently, 
there is relatively little work on the transnational activities and organisations of the 'new 
African diasporas' produced by substantial postcolonial migrations out of Africa. Such 
work is especially lacking in the context of Europe and the UK in particular. Grillo and 
Mazzucato (2008: 192) therefore call for "Further detailed empirical work on 
development initiatives emanating from African (village or other) associations based in 
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Europe", asking, "do they really work, if so for whom?" "Such initiatives have, [ ... ], 
rarely been subjected to detailed scrutiny", they argue, claiming that the literature "has 
yet to address the complexities of such transnational activities" (ibid: 186). 
Furthermore, it is clear that there is an especially notable dearth of research about the 
emergence and transnational practices of Nigerian diasporas and their organisations. In 
a report on Nigerian international migration and its relationship with development at 
'home', de Haas (2006: 25) asserts: 
There is a striking, almost total lack of basic data and research on 
Nigerian migration and its reciprocal connections with national and 
regional development. Therefore, more research on the nature and 
recent trends of Nigerian migration as well as its development 
implications is urgently needed in order to elaborate policies that can 
enhance the development potentials of migration. 
Moreover, engaging with London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations not only 
responds to pressing needs to explore African and especially Nigerian migrant 
transnationalism, particularly in a UK context, but also attends to the calls noted above 
for a better understanding of the nature and transnational effects of diaspora 
organisations in general. For example, in the existing literature on diaspora 
organisations, the focus has almost exclusively been on HTAs. Given their 
pervaSIveness and tendency to operate transnationally, these groups are undeniably 
critical forms of diaspora organisation and absolutely demand attention, particularly in 
the understudied context of their formation by diasporic Nigerians. However, I contend 
that it is necessary to begin to afford more analytical space to other forms of diaspora 
organisation that are not explicitly grounded in such localised identities, such as issue-
or profession-based groups that might be more oriented to national visions of belonging 
and development. Furthermore, as Mazzucato and Kabki (2009) argue, there are very 
few studies that combine a substantive focus on diaspora organisations with an 
empirical exploration of their sites of intervention at 'home'. Clearly, there is a need for 
research that not only devotes particular attention to diaspora organisations but also 
, employs a multi-sited approach to comprehend both the formulation of collective 
transnational interventions 'abroad' and their effects at 'home'. Only then will it be 
possible to start engaging critically with, and better assess the promise of, celebratory 
discourses of diaspora and development. 
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3. Questioning globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development: research design, methods and data 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that there is a pressing need to subject the rapidly 
proliferating discourses of diaspora and development to more rigorous empirical 
assessment, especially in terms of the much vaunted role they ascribe to diaspora 
organisations in the development of 'home'. It was also argued that such assessment is 
particularly necessary in the context of African, and especially Nigerian, migration to 
the UK and that two-ended studies are needed to better comprehend the effects that 
diaspora organisations produce at 'home'. This chapter sets out the research design, 
methods, and data utilised in this study in its attempt to meet these empirical 
imperatives. 
The chapter opens by detailing the three key research questions around which the 
empirical research is designed and through which the thesis seeks to assess the claims 
made of diaspora organisations in globalising discourses of diaspora and development. 
Drawing on the increasingly established approach of 'multi-sited ethnography' (Marcus 
1995), the chapter then outlines the challenges, possibilities, and value of attempting to 
engage empirically with both the 'host' and 'home' contexts in understanding 
diasporans' individual and collective transnational practices. Building on this multi-
sited framework, the chapter moves on to detail the three-stage programme of research 
upon which this thesis is based. The aims and conduct of the initial scoping study are 
discussed, most notably how a range of London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations 
was identified and engaged in this research. The selection and exploration of five-case 
study organisations is described before the chapter closes with an account of the 
fieldwork undertaken at the sites in Nigeria at which these organisations intervene. 
Research questions 
1) What forms do London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations take and what are the 
dynamics surrounding their creation, composition and operation? 
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In addressing this question, I aim to engage not only hometown associations (HTAs) but 
also something of the diversity of alternative organisational forms and identities 
mobilised by London-based Nigerians, such as professional associations and issue-
based NODs. In so doing, I also aim to assess the scale and composition of 
memberships and identify the range of organisational activities undertaken. 
In particular, I place emphasis on exploring individual motivations for forming, joining 
and participating in diaspora organisations. The negotiation and renegotiation of 
individual desires in the process of constructing collective aims and objectives is critical 
to understanding the forms that these organisations take, the nature and focus of their 
activities, and why these characteristics might change through time. As such, 
comprehending how the internal politics of organisations operate becomes a central area 
of analytical concern, especially in terms of tracing levels of inclusion and relations of 
power along lines such as gender, socio-economic status and generation. 
2) How, why and to what extent do these organisations connect with 'home' and what 
social, economic, political, and cultural effects do they produce there? 
To identify any impacts that the organisations have at 'home' it is necessary to chart the 
relations that they might have with Nigeria in terms of the border-crossing flows of 
people, money, materials, information, ideas, and values that they bring into being. I 
aim to place these transnational flows and linkages in the context of any strategies that 
the organisations have for making interventions in Nigeria. In order to understand these 
transnational strategies, I am interested in what it is the organisations aim to influence in 
Nigeria, what activities they engage in to exert this influence, and what effects they 
intend to produce. 
Analysing the processes through which these strategies are designed and implemented 
will extend beyond an engagement with the internal dynamics of the organisations to 
consider how far people living at the sites of intervention are given an opportunity to 
shape and benefit from the activities and projects undertaken by the organisations. It is 
critical to identify who the organisations engage and potentially empower at 'home' as 
any patterns of inclusion and exclusion carry significant socio-political implications in 
terms of reinforcing or challenging established power hierarchies. It is also of critical 
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importance to explore any political repercussions that might be produced at 'home' by 
the transnational mobilisation of different identities and constituencies. 
Throughout my overall investigation of the transnational effects produced by diaspora 
organisations, I am particularly concerned to give analytical weight to how these 
impacts are envisioned, enacted and assessed by the people most intimately involved 
with them, namely, organisation members and people who live at the sites of 
intervention in Nigeria. In so doing, I hope to highlight the ways in which 
'development' is constructed, practiced, contested and negotiated transnationally. 
3) What factors influence the ability of these organisations to produce trans formative 
effects at 'home'? 
I aim to investigate the factors, both internal and external, that heighten or constrain the 
transnational capabilities of the organisations and determine the extent to which they 
can contribute to development at 'home'. In part, this research question responds to a 
strand of work that has attempted to give some grounding to prevailing idealisations of 
migrant transnationalism by drawing attention to the realities of diasporic life that can 
limit the desire and ability of migrants and their descendents to contribute to 'home' (de 
Hann 1999; AI-Ali et al 2001b; Ammassari and Black 2001; Mohan and Zack-Williams 
2002; S!2lrensen et al 2003b). From this perspective, it is important to understand, for 
example, how the insertion of diasporans into the labour market might affect their 
capacity to initiate and support collective transnational intervention. 
This research question also responds to a strand of work that highlights the importance 
of an 'enabling environment' for diasporic intervention at 'home' (see for example 
Gundel (2003)). Given the rapidly expanding policy interest in diaspora and 
development, a key issue here is the role of the state in heightening or constraining the 
transnational capabilities of diaspora organisations. For example, it is essential to ask 
how states hinder or facilitate cross-border flows of people, money, materials, 
information and ideas. Of particular concern is how any efforts by states to directly 
engage and support diaspora organisations have been implemented and received. 
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A multi-sited approach 
In order to explore the research questions outlined above it is necessary to conduct a 
two-ended study that involves a personal engagement through participant observation, 
questionnaire survey and in-depth interview with Nigerian organisations in London and 
the sites of their interventions in Nigeria. This research strategy reflects the increasingly 
established practice of what Marcus (1995) calls 'multi-sited ethnography'. Influenced 
by 'postmodern' tendencies to destabilise fixed conceptual categories and impelled by 
"empirical changes in the world" that increasingly appear to transgress social, 
economic, political and cultural boundaries and to connect localities in novel and more 
intense ways, this mode of ethnography breaks out from a conventional single-sited, 
rigidly contained notion of the 'field' to explore the multi-faceted linkages and flows 
that occur across space and between places (ibid: 97). Consequently, "[m]ulti-sited 
research is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of 
locations in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence, 
with an explicit, posited logic of association or connection among sites that in fact 
defines the argument of the ethnography" (Marcus 1995: 105). 
Emerging from social and cultural anthropology, this research framework is 
increasingly employed to trace various border-spanning processes across and within 
their multiple sites of activity, highlighting the flows of people, capital, goods, 
information, ideas, meanings and values that they bring into being (Appadurai 1991; 
Marcus 1995; Hannerz 1998). Along with the expansion of transnational corporations, 
international commodity transfers, global media and cyberspace, the growth of 
international migration and diasporas has been a major force behind the utilisation and 
development of multi-sited ethnography (ibid). Emphasising the challenge presented to 
ethnographic theory and practice by human mobility, Appadurai (1991: 191, original 
emphasis) writes, "As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their 
histories, and reconfigure their ethnic 'projects', the ethno in ethnography takes on a 
slippery, nonlocalized quality, to which the descriptive practices of anthropology will 
have to respond". 
The movement of people, along with other, often associated global flows, undermines 
the traditional imagination of the ethnographic landscape as a series of discrete, rigidly 
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bounded, self-contained, and place-specific 'communities' and 'cultures' (Abu-Lughod 
1991; Appadurai 1991; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; D' Alisera 2004). As these socio-
cultural formations expand beyond, and interact across, the boundaries of specific 
locations such as the village, town, and neighbourhood, the conventional ethnographic 
strategy of delimiting 'the field' in terms of these localised sites becomes inadequate. 
Charting and accounting for the (re)production of socio-cultural formations across the 
variety of sites they engage requires a reconceptualisation of 'the field' which is 
delocalised, dynamic, and multiple (ibid). 
The beginnings of such a reframing in migration studies are identified by Hannerz 
(1998) in Watson's (1977) edited collection, Between Two Cultures. Hannerz (1998) 
sees this volume as heralding a movement beyond migration studies' traditionally 
singular research focus on the receiving context and processes of 'adaptation' and 
'integration' towards an multiple focus designed to engage both the sending and 
receiving contexts and the important interactions between them. Contending that the 
distinguishing feature of Between Two Cultures was that "all contributors ... had field 
experience at both ends of the migration chain", Watson argues that without such 
experience "it is impossible to gain a true picture of immigration as a process" (quoted 
in Hannerz 1998: 240, original italics). 
Since then, multi-sited ethnography has been increasingly deployed in the study of 
spatial mobility. Hannerz (1998) ascribes this to the intensification and diversification 
of migrants' linkages with 'home' and the concomitant rise of 'migrant 
transnationalism' as a field of inquiry. Exploring how, and to what effect, these linkages 
bind sites of origin and destination in novel and more intimate ways, this burgeoning 
field absolutely relies on empirical engagements with both sending and receiving 
contexts (see for example: Glick Schiller et al 1992; Basch et al 1994; Portes 1997, 
1999, 2001; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Portes et al 1999; Roberts et al 1999; Vertovec 
and Cohen 1999; Vertovec 1999a, 2001; Levitt 2001; Orozco 2000, 2003, 2004; Riccio 
2001, 2003; Orozco with Lapointe 2004; Caglar 2006; Portes et al 2007; Kleist 2008; 
Mazzucato 2008; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). Indeed, Vertovec (1999a: 457) asserts 
that multi-sited ethnography is "essential to the study of transnationalism". 
Consequently, "the 'site' of fieldwork has become multiple and complex as everyday 
modes of communication allow easy contact between related peoples scattered 
throughout the ~orld" (Hendry 2003: 500). 
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However, while multi-sited ethnography is crucial to understanding border-spanning 
processes such as migrant transnationalism it also raises important "methodological 
anxieties" (Marcus 1995: 99). Traditionally, ethnography requires a clearly defined, 
bounded, and localised 'field' in order to allow the focussed, sustained, and intimate 
interaction in which its descriptive and analytical power is grounded (Marcus 1995; 
Hannerz 1998; Hendry 2003). The quality and value of ethnographic knowledge is 
associated with being intensely involved at a single site, observing and participating for 
"twenty-four hours a day" over an extended period (D' Alisera 2004: 26-7; ibid). 
Consequently, distributing one's attention over numerous sites potentially compromises 
the possibility of meeting "normal ethnographic standards" and having the "expected 
sense of deep involvement" (Hannerz 1998: 248). 
Multi-sited ethnography therefore involves "testing the limits of ethnography" and risks 
"attenuating the power of fieldwork" (Marcus 1995: 99). Yet, for Marcus (1995: 96), it 
is impossible to avoid taking this risk because multi-sited ethnography "defines for 
itself an object of study that cannot be accounted for ethnographically by remaining 
focussed on a single site of intensive investigation". Concordantly, Hannerz (1998: 248) 
asserts that "we need to experiment with the distribution of attention" and accept some 
trade-off between 'dispersion' and 'intensity', 'depth' and 'breadth' for "[i]nsisting on 
carrying out an entirely local study in a site strongly marked by translocal and 
transnational connections would surely not result in satisfactorily complete, deep 
ethnography either". 
Furthermore, the constant, all-encompassing surveillance implied in the classical 
understandings of ethnography may not be appropriate or possible given the nature and 
circumstances of multi-sited inquiry. Indeed, Hannerz (1998: 248) argues that the 
possibility of producing "complete ethnography", involving the description of all 
aspects of a 'community' or 'culture', "now seems rather dubious" and that the 
definition of more feasible research problems, whether local or translocal in scope, often 
requires "more focussed attention on some phenomena than on others". This assertion 
reflects Portes et aI's (1999: 218) concern that studies of migrant transnationalism often 
lack a clear conceptual focus and instead mix various levels of analysis, such as those 
pertaining to the individual, the 'community', and the state, in ways that "threaten to 
frustrate the via~ility of an otherwise promising topic of research". 
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As analytical attention is distributed across space, attending to specific phenomena 
makes research more manageable not only in terms of narrowing conceptual scope, but 
also in that the study population can start to be defined and limited around particular 
networks such as families or professional groups (Hannerz 1998: 248). Reflecting the 
logic of Hannerz (1998) and the concern of Portes et al (1999), my research does not 
aim to comprehend in equal depth every aspect of the multitude of relations that might 
constitute a 'transnational community', but rather seeks to focus substantively on the 
specific sets of ties and linkages represented by diaspora organisations while, at the 
same time, recognising that these are embedded in wider socio-economic and cultural 
formations. 
In addition to 'complete ethnography' potentially being impracticable in a multi-sited 
field, achieving the level of temporal intensity conventionally expected may also be 
problematic. As Hannerz (1998: 249) notes, "In some cases, the relationship between 
the temporalities of the researcher and the field also works out differently in 
transnational and multi-sited studies than in does in classical ethnography". In the latter 
case, he argues, the ethnographer is a transient among life-time residents of a site. Here, 
even an extended period of fieldwork is short in comparison to the involvement that the 
research subjects have with the site. While this may also be the case in a multi-sited 
study, "a combination of sites can include some where the ethnographer is not alone in 
being more or less footloose" (ibid). Furthermore, sites "may themselves be short-term 
phenomena" meaning that "the ethnographer may even be around for as long as the site 
lasts" (ibid). Hannerz (1998) lists sports events, conventions, and trade fairs as 
examples of such transitory sites, and one could add as further examples the meetings 
and events held by diaspora organisations. 
Given the temporal variability of sites and the impracticability of doing 'complete 
ethnography' across a number of locations, Marcus (1995: 100) argues that "[m]ulti-
, sited ethnographies inevitably are the product of knowledge bases of varying intensities 
and qualities". Yet, for Marcus (ibid), this does not undermine their analytical potency: 
"To bring these sites into the same frame of study and to posit their relationships on the 
basis of first-hand ethnographic research in both is the important contribution of this 
kind of ethnography, regardless of the variability of the quality and accessibility of that 
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research at different sites". If we accept that bringing multiple sites into the same frame 
of study is necessary and insightful, then we need to consider how this might be done. 
Marcus (1995: 97) contends, "Strategies of quite literally following connections, 
associations, and putative relationships are ... at the very heart of designing multi-sited 
ethnographic research". More specifically, the strategies he suggests for constructing the 
field across and between various sites include, "follow the people" (employed most 
commonly in transnational migration studies), "follow the thing" (tracing the circulation 
of material objects, such as commodities, gifts, and money), "follow the metaphor" 
(located in the realm of discourse and modes of thought, this involves tracing the 
circulation of signs, symbols, and metaphors), and "follow the plot, story, or the 
allegory" (which, along with "follow the life or biography", generates narratives to 
recount connections, associations, and relationships between sites). 
As Marcus (1995) notes, following flows of people, things, and metaphors relies largely 
on identifying and tracing them in people's narratives. Reflecting this, my research has 
a focus on utilising the personal narratives of members of diaspora organisations and 
people in Nigeria to identify and trace any flows of people, things, and metaphors that 
occur between these organisations and sites at 'home'. Building on this, my research 
design also utilises opportunities to follow such flows myself by, for example, 
interacting with organised diasporans when they visit 'home' and attending 
organisations' fundraising events in London and then visiting sites in Nigeria that 
receive the funds generated. 
Responding to Marcus' (1995) strategies, Hannerz (1998: 247) advocates that "the 
formulation multi sited ethnography somewhat obscures an important fact: The research 
may need to be not merely multi local but also translocal". The implication here is that 
"parts of one's ethnography may have to be between [ ... ] sites, somehow 
deterritorialized. Serious effort must thus be devoted to an adequate conceptualisation 
and description of the translocal linkages" (ibid.). While, Marcus' (1995) strategies 
, clearly carry significant potential for comprehending these connections, Hannerz (1998) 
asserts that it is also necessary to explore relationships that are maintained across 
distance through new forms of communication technology. This is a pertinent point 
given that many scholars of migrant transnationalism cite the development of these 
technologies as a critical factor in enabling the expansion and intensification of migrants 
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border-spanning practices (see for example: Glick Schiller et al 1992; Basch et al 1994; 
Portes 1997, 1999, 2001; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Portes et al 1999; Roberts et al 
1999; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Vertovec 1999a, 2001; Levitt 2001). Picking-up on 
Hannerz's (1998) idea, Hendry (2003: 500) argues that the regular electronic 
communication that exists within "communities separated geographically" means that 
ethnographers "may even carry out some [ ... ] multi-sited research without leaving their 
computer screens". 
Exemplifying this, Horst (2002) utilises Somali Internet sites and their electronic 
forums to generate valuable information and insights. She also complements her 
fieldwork data by maintaining contact with informants through email. This reflects 
Hannerz's (1998: 249) observation that the use of communication technologies by 
ethnographers means that "fieldwork goes on in some ways, even as [they] have 
absented themselves physically from their fields". For Hannerz (1998), this practice is 
one way in which researchers can attempt to counter the compromising of ethnographic 
intensity often involved in multi-sited studies. 'Cyberspace' and electronic 
communication technologies certainly play key roles in my research design and 
practice. Websites and Internet forums representing Nigeria and its constituent states 
and ethnic groups as well as those created by diaspora organisations themselves have 
been vital sources of data and contacts. Furthermore, email has been a critical means of 
initiating, maintaining and developing valuable research relationships with respondents 
in Nigeria and the UK- and US-based Nigerian diasporas. 
Programme of research 
I tum now to the practical design and execution of my research. My fieldwork was 
conducted in three key stages: 
1) A scoping study to identify, contact, profile and form preliminary research 
relationships with a wide range of London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations 
2) A deeper ethnographic engagement with five case-study organisations selected 
from the scoping study 
3) An ethnographic engagement with sites at which these five case-study 
organisations intervene in Nigeria 
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Stage 1: scoping study 
Conducted between March 2004 and March 2005, the central empirical aim of this stage 
of the research programme was to identify and gain an understanding of the basic 
characteristics, such as form, size, composition and activity focus, of as many London-
based Nigerian diaspora organisations as possible. This responded primarily to my first 
research question, particularly in terms of giving greater analytical space to the various 
types of diaspora organisation that might exist. 
In addition to this empirical objective, the scoping study also had the more pragmatic 
purpose of preparing the ground for the second and third stages of the research 
programme. Firstly, it enabled the construction of a sample frame of London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations from which the five case-study organisations could be 
selected for the deeper ethnographic engagement of the subsequent stages. Secondly, 
the scoping study was critical to initiating the research relationships and building the 
trust required for the second and third stages of the research. 
Identifying organisations 
Nine key channels were utilised to identify Nigerian diaspora organisations in London. 
As will become clear, some of these channels have inherent biases in terms of the types 
of organisation that they tend to lead to. Therefore, my use of mUltiple channels was 
designed to counter these biases and identify as wide a range of organisational forms 
and identities as possible. The nine key channels I used are: 
1) J'he Internet: This channel generated the most potential contacts. Using search 
engines, I found many websites devoted to Nigeria and different Nigerian ethnic groups, 
regions, states, cities, towns and communities. Many of these web sites are hosted in 
diasporic locations, predominantly in the United States. Whether hosted in Nigeria or in 
the diaspora, most of these sites contain references to, and useful information about, 
related organisations at 'home' and 'abroad' (particularly in the US). If these related 
organisations have websites of their own, links to these tend to be provided although 
they do not always function. 
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Through Internet search-engines, I was also been able to identify and access directly 
websites maintained by Nigerian diaspora organisations. The overwhelming majority of 
these websites represent state, ethnic, and hometown associations based in the us. 
However, some of these US-based web sites give, or were able to provide upon enquiry, 
details of their 'sister' organisations in other parts of the world including London. 
Furthermore, it was possible to directly locate a number of websites created by London-
based Nigerian diaspora organisations, and these often contained not only contact 
details but also much valuable information about the nature, composition, and activities 
of these organisations. 
Together the different forms of website yielded references to 142 different London-
based Nigerian diaspora organisations. However, it is important to note that these 
references did not always provide contact details and do not prove the current existence 
of the organisations identified - even where contact details were given, some of the 
organisations are no longer at the postal addresses given and some of the email accounts 
no longer function suggesting that the information contained on a number of websites is 
not up-to-date. 
2) UK-published 'Black' and 'African' newspapers and directories: There are a number 
of such publications, the majority of which are taken and archived at The Africa Centre, 
London. In this archive, I found mention of, and contact details for, 19 London-based 
Nigerian organisations. As with those sourced from the Internet, not all of these contact 
details proved to be current. 
3) London-based pan-African umbrella organisations: I wrote to the two most 
prominent and active of these groups, each representing a diverse network of 
organisations formed by London-based Africans, and they were willing and able to put 
me in contact with three London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations that I had not 
already contacted through other channels. 
4) Member of Parliament: I wrote to a London MP whose constituency has a notable 
Nigeria-born population and who is noted for networking with London-based African 
communities. This MP was able to put me in contact with a prominent Nigerian 
'community leader' and three London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations. 
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5) Councils for Voluntary Service (CVS): These organisations support and represent the 
'voluntary and community sector' in local areas of the UK (www.nacvs.org.uk). I 
contacted the 33 borough-level Councils for Voluntary Service in London asking if they 
could give me the details of any African-run voluntary organisations in their respective 
areas. Most of the CVS responded although only a few had records of any such 
organisations. Unsurprisingly, these CVS represented boroughs with significant Africa-
born populations. In total, this generated contact details for seven London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations that had not already been identified through other 
channels. 
6) Nigeria High Commission, London: Motivated not only by the search for the details 
of organisations but also by an interest in the extent to which the Nigerian state attempts 
to engage the diaspora, I wrote to the Nigeria High Commission in London to enquire if 
they has any records of diaspora organisations based in the city. In response, the High 
Commission sent me a list of the contact details of 'some' of the UK-based Nigerian 
organisations they had on file. The list included 32 London-based diaspora 
organisations that I had not identified through other channels. Interestingly, 25 of these 
were state associations, each representing one of the 36 states that constitute the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. Indeed, at one time it was these associations, grouped together 
under the umbrella of the Nigeria National Union, that were the main channel through 
which the High Commission maintained contact with the Nigerian diaspora and its 
organisations based on smaller geographical entities such as HT As. However, it is 
widely reported that this system of networking has not operated effectively for some 
time. Indeed, many of the contact details on the High Commission list were no longer 
current and I received no responses from any of the contacts on the list. 
7) London-based Nigerian umbrella organisations: The Nigeria National Union (NNU), 
founded in the 1960s, has traditionally been seen as the main body representing UK-
based Nigerians. However, it is widely reported to have been paralysed by factionalism 
for some time. Indeed, I made contact with the two main factions of the NNU and while 
both were keen to assist me, neither was able to provide contact details for any other 
London-based Nigerian organisations. With a view to filling the void left by the 
effective demise of the NNU, a UK branch of the Nigerian government-initiated 
Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation Europe (NIDOE) was established in 2004 and the 
Central Association of Nigerians in the UK (CANUK) was established in late 2005. 
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Still in its infancy during the scoping study stage of my research, NIDOE UK is 
focussed more on collecting details of individual diasporic professionals than on 
operating as an umbrella for other Nigerian organisations. While CANUK is primarily 
an umbrella for other Nigerian organisations, it had not been formed at the time of my 
scoping study. However, I have since obtained the list of 44 organisations that 
constituted CANUK's founding membership, a few of which were not already on my 
scoping study database and were subsequently added. 
8) UK Charity Commission's Register of Charities: This database includes all 
organisations that have registered as charities in the UK and is available online at 
http://www.chmity-commission.gov.ukl. The database includes fields such as charity 
name, country of operation and targeted groups. It is possible to search these fields 
using keywords. In this way, I was able to identify and obtain contact details for a 
further 50 London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations. 
9) 'Snowballing': Many of the contacts I made through the channels detailed above 
were able to put me in contact with other organisations. Most notably, the leader of a 
diaspora organisation that I was able to contact through one of the channels above had 
produced a relatively up-to-date list of London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations. 
This list provided the contact details of 90 such groups, of which 65 were new to me 
having not been previously identified through other channels. While the list included 
organisations with links to a range of areas across southern Nigeria, it was 
predominated by those with links to places in and surrounding the Niger Delta, the 
region of origin of the list's author. 
Other contacts made through the various channels outlined above provided me with the 
details of a further 45 organisations that I had not previously identified. Again, the new 
contacts tended to reflect the positionalities and particular socio-cultural networks of the 
respondents who provided them. For example, the 22 new organisations for which a 
, Y oruba organisation provided contact details all represent Y oruba sub-groups and 
ancestral kingdoms. Similarly, the founder of another diaspora organisation I contacted 
is a highly successful professional and the two other organisations she provided contacts 
for were both associations of diasporic professionals. Furthermore, the more 
organisations I contacted, the more I became aware of particular venues at which 
London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations hold their meetings and/or events, such 
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as certain public halls and some well-known Nigerian-owned pubs and restaurants. This 
enabled me to visit these venues and meet more representatives and members of 
diaspora organisations, complementing the contacts I was also able to build through 
existing friends and acquaintances of Nigerian descent. 
Engaging organisations 
Through the nine channels outlined above, I identified a total of 367 London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations and obtained contact details for 311 of these. I 
attempted to contact all of the organisations for which I had details, but in 38 cases my 
letter and/or email was returned because the address was incorrect or not current. Out of 
the replies I did receive, I had one negative response, two responses informing me that 
the organisation concerned was defunct, and 63 positive responses. 
When making initial contact with organisations, I explained that I was conducting 
doctoral research on the work of Nigerian diaspora organisations in London both in 
terms of the functions they perform for their members and service-users in the UK and 
the contributions they make back in Nigeria. I traced my interest in the subject to the 
time I spent working at a university in Nigeria in 2000, when I became aware of some 
interventions that diaspora organisations had attempted to make at 'home'. I also 
detailed in my initial contact with organisations that I wanted my research to make a 
contribution to informing the growing academic, civil society, and policy interest in the 
role of diasporas and their organisations in development at 'home'. Requesting some 
insights into the basic characteristics and functions of the organisations I was able to 
contact, I suggested a number of different ways in which they could choose to initially 
participate in my research, namely by engaging in dialogue via letter, telephone, or 
email, completing a questionnaire either at distance or in person, and/or meeting for an 
informal interview. 
Giving potential respondents an opportunity to enquire about the nature and purposes of 
'my research and by making space for them to exert some influence over how and on 
what terms we might initiate interaction, this flexible approach to engagement was 
designed to encourage participation by reducing any suspicion and making people more 
comfortable about contributing. This strategy proved necessary as the participation of 
many respondents was clearly dependent on me providing further explanations of my 
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personal motives and my wider research objectives and methods. Furthermore, different 
respondents preferred to gain these explanations in different ways. Before agreeing to 
give me any information, some respondents wanted to question me in person or through 
extended email and telephone exchanges while others asked to be sent a questionnaire 
so that they could get a better idea of the types of question that I was interested in. In a 
number of cases, respondents had to report these exchanges back to their organisations 
and consult them on whether and how the group should participate. Reflecting this need 
to gain wider agreement on involvement, some respondents invited me to a meeting of 
their organisation so that I could present my research to, and field questions from, the 
assembled membership. 
While some respondents and their organisations were happy to make an initial 
contribution by completing a questionnaire, most preferred to participate through more 
informal and open dialogue, whether at distance or in person. Consequently, basic 
profile information about different organisations has been obtained in different ways 
meaning that the nature of the data is not entirely consistent across the various cases. 
However, whichever method was employed, every effort was made to address the same 
key factors relating to the form, size, composition, aims, and activities of organisations. 
The central empirical aim of the scoping study was to gain a basic understanding of the 
characteristics of a range of organisations and it would have been difficult to gain any 
sort of insight into many of the organisations had my approach had an inflexible 
reliance on only one method. 
Furthermore, I found that in comparison to questionnaire survey, the more natural and 
relaxed interaction and the greater scope for reciprocal questioning offered by informal 
dialogue was a far more effective way of putting respondents at ease, striking up a 
rapp01:t, and building the trust that was so vital for the subsequent stages of my research. 
This was especially true when such dialogue took place in person. Consequently, I came 
to favour the use of face-to-face informal, semi-structured interviews as the method of 
initial engagement. Illustrating the kind of facilitating relationship that this method 
'often brought into being, a number of the initial interviews led to me being invited to 
the meetings and events held by organisations thus allowing me to employ participant 
observation in the scoping study and to meet, engage in dialogue, and build trust with 
other members of the organisations concerned. 
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Some of the information generated through the initial informal, semi-structured 
interviews was recorded on tape with the consent of the interviewees, but in most cases 
I was meeting respondents for the first time and I felt that tape-recording could act as a 
barrier to forming the kind of relationship that would allow me to return for more 
insights in the future. If respondents provided information during these initial 
engagements, I obtained permission before noting it down during or immediately after 
the meeting. I emphasised to all participants that I would like to use in my research any 
information that I gained from questionnaires, informal dialogue and interviews, and 
participant observation. I made it clear that the participants could choose to withdraw 
any information at any point. I also committed to preserve the confidentiality and 
anonymity of all participants and their organisations unless given explicit permission to 
use real names. 
Through the flexible utilisation of email and telephone dialogue, informal semi-
structured face-to-face interviews, questionnaire survey, and participant observation, I 
was able to collect data about all 63 of the organisations that had responded positively 
to my initial enquiry. I was able to engage representatives of all of the organisations in 
email and/~r telephone exchanges and 14 of the organisations completed questionnaires 
in person or through email or the post. Representatives of 12 of the organisations that 
completed questionnaires also gave informal semi-structured face-to-face interviews. 
Representatives of a further 38 organisations gave face-to-face interviews, meaning that, 
in total, I interviewed in person representatives of 50 London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations. Furthermore, 22 of these 50 organisations invited me to one of their 
meetings and/or events, enabling me to collect further data through participant 
observation. And data that had been collected from organisations' websites was 
supplemented substantially by documents, such as constitutions, minutes, annual 
reports, and publicity material, given to me by organisations engaged in the scoping 
study. 
Stage 2: A deeper ethnographic engagement with five case-study organisations in 
'London 
Central to the entire project, this stage of the research responded to all three of my 
research questions and relied on selecting five of the organisations engaged in the 
scoping study as case-studies for more detailed, concentrated and sustained research 
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involving in-depth semi-structured interviews with members and supporters and 
participant observation at meetings and events. The stage of the research was initially 
conducted between March and June 2005 and continued again between January and July 
2006. Contact with all of the organisations and many of the respondents engaged in this 
stage of the research continues to the present. 
Selecting the five case-study organisations 
A variety of organisational identities and forms were identified in the scoping study, 
which, drawing on my data and existing literature on diaspora organisations around the 
world and associational life in Nigeria, can be classified into 8 key types. By far the 
most numerous of these are what I term, drawing on Bach (1997), 'geo-ethnic' 
organisations. These organisations are voluntary associations explicitly grounded in 
some form of sub-national ethno-spatial ancestral identity, ranging in scale from the 
likes of the 'village', 'hometown', 'kingdom', and 'clan' to wider formations such as 
the 'state', 'tribe' and 'ethnic nationality'. I employ Bach's (1997) term 'geo-ethnic' to 
describe these groups as it effectively captures the way in which, as we will see in 
Chapter 5, Nigerian ethnic identities tend to be deeply territorialised, being traced to 
defined and distinct spatial units of ancestral belonging. Furthermore, the term also 
highlights how place in Nigeria tends to be firmly ethnicised, with people 'originating' 
from specific 'hometowns', 'states', 'ethnic nations' and other territories often claiming, 
and being ascribed, particular subjective qualities, traits and characteristics and 
employing the resulting identity as a basis for collective action. Of the 367 London-
based Nigerian diaspora organisations identified in the scoping study, 236 (64%) are 
geo-ethnic organisations. 22 of these are constituted exclusively by women and are 
termed geo-ethnic women's organisations. 
The second most numeroUs type of diaspora organisation identified takes the form of 
the issue-based 'NOO' or 'charity', generally constituted by an individual founder with 
the backing of few trustees and supporters and focussing on a particular area or areas of 
,work such as providing community support services in diaspora and/or undertaking 
health and education projects at 'home'. Of the 367 organisations identified, 64 (17%) 
take the form of diaspora NOOs. The third most numerous type of diaspora organisation 
identified is the voluntary association explicitly open to all Nigerians on the basis of 
national identity. These Nigerian associations are often formed in the context of 
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particular London neighbourhoods with notable Nigerian populations or represent 
'umbrella' organisations claiming to represent all Nigerians and their associations in 
London or the UK in general. Of the 367 organisations identified, 24 (6.5%) take the 
form of national Nigerian associations. 
The fourth most numerous type of diaspora organisation identified is the professional 
association. These organisations are voluntary associations formed by London- and UK-
based Nigerian professionals in general or by those trained and/or working in specific 
professions, such as medicine, law, engineering, accountancy, academia, nursing, and 
information technology. I identified 17 of these organisations, constituting 4.6% of the 
367 London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations identified in total. The fifth most 
numerous type of diaspora organisation identified is the religious association. In the 
case of organisations grounded in the Islamic faith, these groups are open to and claim 
to represent all London- and UK-based Nigerian Muslims. Religious associations 
grounded in the Christian faith, which is the faith of the substantial majority of UK-
based Nigerians, tend to be formed in the more particular contexts of specific 
denominations, London neighbourhoods, and individual churches. 11 (3%) of the 367 
organisations I identified are religious associations. The remaining organisations 
identified take the form of Nigerian student unions at London universities (3), London-
based Nigerian sports clubs (4) and alumni associations formed by London- and UK-
based former students of prestigious Nigerian schools (8). 
Of the 63 London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations that responded positively to 
my initial enquiry and went on to participate in my scoping study, 32 are geo-ethnic 
organisations (including six geo-ethnic women's organisations), 18 are NOOs, 7 are 
professional associations, 3 are national associations, and 3 are religious associations. In 
selecting 5 of these organisations as case-studies for more detailed ethnographic 
research, I employed a purposive sampling strategy whereby organisations were 
selected in a way that represented as much diversity of organisational identity and form 
as possible. This reflects my key research aim to understand why, and with what 
'implications for development at 'home', London-based Nigerians mobilise around 
different modes of identity and organisational form. 
A further critical consideration when selecting the case-study organisations was the 
extent to which enabling research relationships had been created. Indeed, in some cases 
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my engagement with an organisation appeared to have gone as far as it was likely to go. 
For example, two organisational representatives who gave interviews were unable to 
secure on my behalf the consent of the leadership and wider membership of their 
organisations for the in-depth stage of the research. Similarly, while the representative 
of another organisation was able to get the leadership to complete a questionnaire, he 
was unable to gain their permission to be interviewed or to arrange for another 
representative to give an interview. Where enabling research relationships were formed 
in the scoping stage, it was where initial respondents had engaged strongly with the 
research and had been able to gain the enthusiastic consent of their fellow members for 
me to interact and conduct research with the group as a whole. I believed firmly that the 
deeper ethnographic engagement of stage two would absolutely depend on this kind of 
relationship being in place and I therefore felt that organisations with which such a 
relationship had been developed should be favoured in the sampling strategy. 
Given these sampling criteria and realities, I selected the following five organisations 
from the 63 engaged in the scoping study: 
• Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU) , UK and Ireland branch: Originally 
formed in the 1960s, the latest incarnation of this classic example of a geo-
ethnic diaspora organisation was established in the late 1980s. Popularly known 
as ANPU London, this organisation is constituted by 'indigenes' of the ancestral 
Yoruba kingdom of Ayege in rural southwest Nigeria. 
• Ukpenwa Women's Association UK (UW A): Created in 1992, effectively as an 
offshoot of the main Ukpenwa Development Union UK and Ireland branch, this 
geo-ethnic women's organisation represents women hailing from the ancestral 
kingdom of Ukpenwa on the fringes of the Niger Delta in the southeast of 
Nigeria. 
• Dr. Bassey Kubiangha Education Trust (BKET): Established in 2004, this 
London-based NGO was founded in the memory of the late Dr Bassey 
Kubiangha by his wife, three daughters and a few family friends. Popularly 
known as the BK Trust, the organisation works to promote health in Cross River 
State, Nigeria. 
• Development Impact for Nigeria (DIFN): Founded in 1999 by Yomi Oloko and 
five of his London-based Nigerian friends, this diaspora NGO works to promote 
community development and health in and beyond the Ipaja district of Lagos. 
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• Engineering Forum of Nigerians (EFN): Formally launched in London in 2002, 
this diasporic professional association is constituted by UK-based Nigerian 
engineers and seeks to promote engineering education and development in 
Nigeria. 
Together, these organisations represent different ways of mobilising around nationality, 
geo-ethnic belonging, gender, and socio-economic status and encompass different 
organisational forms from membership-based voluntary associations to issue-based 
NGOs. In so doing, these organisations not only highlight much of the diversity of the 
organised London-based diaspora but also represent some of the most important ways in 
which it is constituted. As such, these organisations provide a useful basis for better 
understanding some of the different and most significant means through which London-
based Nigerians organise in diaspora and intervene collectively at 'home'. 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews and document analysis 
Having selected the five case-study organisations, I conducted in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with five members or supporters of each of the organisations. All of these 25 
interviews were tape-recorded with consent and were between one and three hours in 
duration. Given that the size of the case-study organisations varies from six trustees and 
a few supporters in the case of DIFN to 200 or so members in the case of EFN, the 
interview sample was not proportional to membership. However, rather than 
constructing a statistically representative sample of each organisation, I employed a 
purposive sample designed to capture something of the diversity of positionalities found 
in and around each organisation. The aim was to generate a range of perspectives on the 
issues of interest and to facilitate an understanding of how motivations, experiences and 
perceptions might vary within and between organisations along the lines of age, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, socio-economic status, place of birth, level of involvement, and 
position in the organisation. 
, 
The interviews focussed on the following key topics: 
• motivations for, and personal histories and experiences of, involvement In 
diasporic associationallife 
• perceptions of organisational aims, operation, functions, and effectiveness 
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• factors that affect organisational participation and capacity 
• histories and experiences of living in London and the role, meaning, and 
significance of diasporic associationallife in these 
• attitudes towards, actual and desired relations with, and aspirations for Nigeria 
and the role, meaning, and significance of diasporic associationallife in these 
• organisations' transnational aspirations, activities, and modes of operation and 
the perceived meaning and effects of these at 'home' 
• organisations' actual and potential relationships with other diaspora 
organisations, wider civil society, and the state 
Information gleaned from the interviews about the case-study organisations was 
complemented significantly by members providing me with organisational documents, 
such as constitutions, minutes, project proposals, publicity material, and monthly and 
annual reports. To better understand the broader context of diasporic associational life 
and the relationship between the Nigerian state and London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations, I interviewed a representative of the Nigeria High Commission in 
London and a representative of each of the two 'umbrella' organisations officially 
recognised by the Nigerian state as representing the UK-based diaspora and its 
organisations, NIDOE UK and CANUK. 
Participant observation 
Building on the participant observation conducted in the course of the scoping study, I 
attended the meetings and events held by the five case-study organisations throughout 
the duration of this stage of the research (March to June 2005 and January to July 2006). 
Attending the formal meetings of the organisations provided rich insights into the 
operation and activities of the organisations and presented an opportunity to gauge the 
nature and extent of participation. Attending the public events of the organisations, such 
as fundraising events and seminars, facilitated further insight into organisational 
?peration and activities and enabled me to assess the extent to which the organisations 
are able to draw interest and participation from beyond the active core membership. 
Furthermore, these events were key to better understanding the ways in which the 
organisations attempt to present themselves and their activities and projects. 
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This second stage of participant observation not only produced a wealth of data in its 
own right but also enabled me to interact and build trust with the wider membership and 
support base of the organisations. This was critical to recruiting a range of interviewees 
representing something of the diversity of positionalities within and around the case-
study organisations. Participation in organisational meetings and events also facilitated 
many informal but often very insightful conversations with members and supporters. In 
particular, participation at public events enabled me to meet and explore the often 
alternative perspectives of people who were not necessarily active members or 
supporters of the organisations. Furthermore, my regular participation in organisational 
activities meant that I came to know some members and supporters well enough to 
socialise with them beyond the realm of the organisations. This helped me to see their 
participation in the organisations in the context of their wider lives and also brought me 
into contact with many London-based Nigerians who had no active involvement in, but 
often strong and insightful opinions and assumptions about, the case-study organisations 
and other organisations like them. 
Stage 3: an ethnographic engagement with the sites at which the five case-study 
organisations intervene in Nigeria 
This stage of the research was centrally concerned with my second research question in 
that it aimed to explore any social, economic, political, and cultural effects that the five 
case-study organisations produce in Nigeria. It also responded to my third research 
question by seeking to understand from the perspective of 'home' the factors that 
influence the ability of diaspora organisations to intervene at 'home'. This stage of the 
research was executed during a six month period of fieldwork between June and 
December 2005. This fieldwork was devoted principally to conducting in-depth, semi-
structured interviews, document analysis, and participant observation at the sites at 
which the five case-study organisations intervene in Nigeria. To complement and 
broaden this local case-study research, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with 
key, national-level academics, civil society activists, and government officials to whom 
, 
the issue of collective diasporic intervention is of explicit or potential relevance. This 
was in tum complemented by participant observation at highly relevant state- and 
national-level civil society and government events, such as NGO conventions in Lagos 
and Cross River State and, most notably, the Federal Government's inaugural diaspora 
engagement conference in Abuja in June 2005. 
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In-depth, semi-structured interviews and document analysis 
At the sites at which the case-study organisations intervene in Nigeria, I selected and 
conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with respondents from four key groups. 
Firstly, local leaders such as 'traditional rulers', chiefs, religious and women's leaders, 
heads of local professional bodies, and local and state government officials. Secondly, 
any local intermediaries through which the case-study organisations intervene in 
Nigeria. Thirdly, individuals and representatives of institutions that are the direct and/or 
intended beneficiaries of the case-study organisations' interventions. And lastly, a 
diverse selection of members of the public at the sites of intervention who have not been 
directly engaged or benefitted directly from the activities of the case-study 
organisations. 
In total, I conducted 81 in-depth, semi-structured interviews at the sites of intervention, 
the vast majority of which were tape-recorded and all of which addressed the following 
key issues: 
• the extent to which local individuals and institutions are involved by the case-
study organisations in the formulation, implementation, and management of 
interventions 
• the impacts that the interventions have 
• who it is that benefits from the interventions 
• the sufficiency, appropriateness, and effectiveness of the interventions 
• the extent to which the interventions reinforce or challenge local power 
s.tructures, practices, values, and ideas 
• the attitudes of local individuals and institutions to the case-study organisations, 
their members, and the organised diaspora in general 
• the importance of the interventions relative to those made by other actors such 
as other diaspora organisations and individuals, local civil society, and the state 
Data collected through these interviews was augmented greatly by obtaining access to 
highly relevant documents at the sites of intervention. For example, both DIFN and the 
BK Trust maintain offices in Nigeria and I was granted free access to the files kept 
there. Similarly, the 'traditional authorities' of Ayege allowed me to access the 
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communal archive they maintain, which contains community newsletters, publications, 
and financial accounts that provide incredibly valuable insights into communal projects 
supported by the kingdom's citizens and associations at 'home' and 'abroad'. 
Participant observation 
Building on interviews and document analysis, I conducted intensive participant 
observation at the sites of intervention in Nigeria, most notably during programmes, 
activities and events initiated and/or supported by the case-study organisations such as 
the mY/AIDS awareness seminars and summer youth camp held by DIFN and the 
inter-school health debate organised by the BK Trust. As noted above, both of these 
organisations maintain an office in Nigeria and these were key sites of sustained 
participant observation. In Ayege, I was able to witness the daily workings of the 
kingdom's 'traditional authorities' and, of key importance, the annual Ayege Day 
festival which is designed to attract 'sons and daughters' from 'home' and 'abroad' to 
make individual and collective donations to the community development fund. 
Furthermore, in the course of living and working in and around the sites of collective 
transnational intervention, I came to meet and know many people who were keen to 
offer their opinions on the role of diaspora in local development whether or not they had 
any connection to, or knowledge of, the case-study organisations and their work. This 
provided a wealth of insights into the ways in which the diaspora and its organisations 
are perceived at 'home'. Moreover, I was constantly made aware of alternative 
individual and institutional actors working to 'bring development' and this helped me to 
better understand and contextualise the contribution of the organised diaspora. 
Conclusion 
Responding to the need to subject to greater empirical assessment the positing of 
diaspora organisations as powerful and positive actors in the progress of 'home', this 
chapter has set out the research design, methods, and data through which this thesis 
attempts to identify how and with what effects London-based Nigerians organise in 
diaspora and intervene at 'home'. This programme of research has served to highlight 
the different ways in which the London-based Nigerian diaspora is organised, including 
not only the 'hometown associations' emphasised in much work on migrant 
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transnationalism but also a variety of other geo-ethnic organisations such as 'clan', 
'state', and 'tribal' unions as well as groups taking alternative forms such as issue-based 
NOOs and professional associations. The programme of research described in this 
chapter has also facilitated the selection of five-case study organisations that highlight 
much of this diversity and yet also represent some of the most important ways in which 
the London-based Nigerian diaspora is organised. Drawing on the empirical data 
generated through this research programme, the following chapters explore how and to 
what extent London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations, in their various forms, 
contribute to development at 'home'. 
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Part 2: entanglements of power- diaspora organisations 
and the transnational politics of identity and 
development 
82 
4. Collective diasporic intervention and the transnational 
politics of socio-economic status and gender 
Introduction 
As we saw In Chapter 2, diaspora organisations are being lauded globally as new 
development actors that constitute a much more direct and participatory mode of 
international assistance, channelling financial, material and intellectual resources to the 
most needy in communities and countries of origin. In so doing, diaspora organisations 
and their transnational interventions are seen not only to provide direct benefits to 
recipients but also to reconfigure established power relations at 'home' in ways that are 
deemed developmentally beneficial. In these celebratory, globalising discourses of 
diaspora and development steeped firmly in 'western' liberal notions of progress, 
diaspora organisations are especially lauded for reaching, benefiting and 'empowering' 
women and 'the poor' at 'home'. In this way, diaspora organisations are seen to further 
key strategic objectives in hegemonic visions of international development such as 
alleviating poverty, promoting the rights of women and generally reducing gender and 
socio-economic inequality. 
However, we also saw in Chapter 2 that such celebrations are based on rather limited 
evidence and could therefore be open to question. Indeed, in the case of London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations, it appears that the connection of diaspora groups to 
women and 'the poor' at 'home' is not necessarily 'empowering' and, at best, rather 
ambivalent. In this chapter I argue that while members of such groups generally aspire 
to 'help the poor' at 'home', the collective transnational contributions that they attempt 
to make tend to be directed through local elite individuals and institutions, limiting the 
direct benefit felt by 'the grassroots' and potentially reinforcing rather than reducing 
established socio-economic inequalities. Furthermore, I contend that London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations often appear to reproduce rather than transform 
established, and what might be seen as patriarchal, gender roles and relations and rarely 
express any kind of radical transnational desire to 'empower' women at 'home'. 
Consequently, I suggest that if national governments and international agencies are to 
engage constructively with these diaspora groups, it will be necessary for globalising 
discourses of diaspora and development to recognise the alternative and socially 
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mediated ways in which 'progress' might be imagined and practiced in diaspora and at 
'home'. 
Between 'grassroots' empowerment and elite interests: collective diasporic 
intervention and the transnational politics of socio-economic status 
"We cannot be here and do nothing when our people are suffering back home',]: 
diasporic desires and 'the grassroots' 
As globalising discourses of diaspora and development would hope, many if not most 
London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations explicitly frame the interventions they 
attempt to make in Nigeria as being intended to benefit ordinary people, popularly 
referred to as 'the grassroots'. For example, the Chairman of an Egba-Y oruba 
'hometown association' argues that its transnational objective is "to support the 
community at the grass root level" (Interview, London, May 2005). Similarly, the 
director of the diaspora NGO Nigerian Women for Development (NWD) contends that 
the organisation is "working in the Niger Delta to empower grass root women and their 
families" (NWD document, 2004). Furthermore, within the 'grassroots', it is very often 
the 'poor', 'disadvantaged' and 'less privileged' that are specifically targeted. For 
example, the London-based Dr Bassey Kubiangha Education Trust (BKET) is 
"committed to alleviating social and economic disadvantage in Cross River State" 
(BKET document, n.d.) and a UK-based association of Nigerian nurses aspires "to 
relieve poverty and distress by the provision of practical contributions to the delivery of 
healthcare" (Organisation document, n.d.). 
Significantly, organisational objectives such as these are often grounded in and reflect 
deeply held diasporic desires to reach and assist from afar 'the grassroots' at 'home', 
especially its most vulnerable members. In tum, these heart-felt transnational aspirations 
tend to be traced to personal experiences of poverty and hardship at 'home'. For 
example, in reflecting on his reasons for founding the diaspora NGO Development 
, 
Impact for Nigeria (DIFN), Mr Yomi Oloko highlights how he is committed to "helping 
the poor" at 'home' because he came to know "hunger and poverty" while working as a 
low and infrequently paid teacher in Nigeria during the 1980s (Interview, London, July 
2005). Similarly, a stalwart of the Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU), London 
1 Ukpenwa Women's Association member, interview, London, April 2005 
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branch, argues that he is a strong advocate of the organisation funding scholarships for 
needy schoolchildren at 'home' because he was himself once a disadvantaged pupil in 
the ancestral kingdom; "I know what a student goes through there, especially when they 
are from a poor family which I was as well" (Interview, London, July 2005). 
Even the many organised diasporans who have enjoyed relatively 'comfortable' 
conditions at 'home' often highlight indirect experiences of poverty and disadvantage 
that have compelled them to contribute individually and collectively to 'home'. 
Recalling the visits he used to make to Ayege when he was growing-up in a prosperous 
Lagos-based family in the 1970s, an executive of ANPU London states: 
I feel strongly that I have to give something back to that environment 
because even though I didn't grow-up there per se, I experienced it a 
lot and I feel they are still very, very far behind and it doesn't give me 
any happiness to know that. I mean, [ ... ], most of us here have 
everything at our fingertips but there are people there who have 
nothing. (Interview, London, June 2005) 
Similarly, in explaining his motivations for founding a diaspora NOO to improve 
healthcare access for the "poorest of the poor" at 'home', Mr Uzoma emphasises his 
deep desire to counter the "poverty and suffering" he has witnessed in his ancestral 
community since it was devastated in the Biafran War (Interview, London, May 2005). 
Mr Uzoma also emphasises that those suffering in poverty at 'home' are his "brothers, 
sisters, cousins, nephews" (ibid). Indeed, extended family affinities and ties mean that 
even organised diasporans with relatively privileged backgrounds often identify 
strongly with, and seek to benefit, 'the grassroots' and 'the poor'. As Mr Ade Fashade, a 
founding trustee of the diaspora NOO DIFN, explains: 
I'm lucky, I've come from a fairly comfortable background really, 
compared to the majority so I didn't really have those issues [of 
poverty]. But I had an awareness of it around me because the thing 
with Nigeria is, no matter where you come from, even if you are from 
the most privileged background in the country, you will still come 
across poverty and you will probably know somebody who is poor, 
there is always that connection, [ ... ], if not within your immediate 
family, then because of the system of the extended family in Nigeria, 
the extended family could be poor and they will come to your house 
anyway. So you saw it around you, so you weren't immune from it, 
[ ... ], that is what gives us that kind of awareness, that 'the fact that 
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this is around me, what can we be doing about it?' (Interview, 
London, July 2006) 
Illustrating just how strong this awareness can be, an executive of the Ukpenwa 
Women's Association UK (UW A) reports, "Even though I'm living here, I can't stop 
thinking about my extended family at home. Every time I eat breakfast or lunch I am 
thinking, 'are they able to eat this?'" (Interview, London, May 2005). As Mrs Ademola 
asserts in accounting for her committed membership of ANPU London, "I have brother 
back home, I have sister, I have cousin, I have so many people back home, I want them 
to live comfortable" (Interview, London, April 2006). 
Deeply grounded in personal experiences and familial bonds, diasporic desires to 'help' 
'the grassroots', 'the poor' and 'the disadvantaged' at 'home' are manifest in many 
collective transnational interventions. For example, the UW A has made material 
donations to an orphanage, the public library and two public hospitals in Ukpenwa and 
in 2004 the association awarded a scholarship to a local schoolgirl from a 'poor' family. 
Similarly, ANPU London has contributed to Ayege's communal scholarship, security 
and development funds, sent books to the kingdom's community library and made 
donations to a "handicapped Ayege indigene,,2 and a local victim of an acid attack. And 
as a diaspora NGO, Nigeria Action has carried out urgent repairs and sent exercise 
books to two public schools in 'disadvantaged' communities in Nigeria. 
"They can often work for the benefit of the haves',3: local intermediaries and elite 
interests 
While many collective transnational interventions appear to reflect deeply held 
diasporic desires to benefit and empower the 'grassroots', especially 'the poor' and 'the 
deprived', many others seem to attend primarily to the desires and interests of local 
elites. Indeed, as much as diaspora organisations often make contributions to the needy 
and to public health and education, they often also support the established power and 
authority of elite individuals and institutions. For example, diaspora organisations 
grounded in geo-ethnic identities generally recognise, respect and reinforce the 
'traditional authorities' of their ancestral homelands. This is most evident in the 
2 Ayege Progress Committee document, 1995. 
3 President of an Ijesha-Yoruba 'hometown association' on community development committees in 
Nigeria, interview, London, April 2005. 
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tendency of such groups to contribute to the construction, maintenance and 
improvement of palaces and other prominent markers of 'traditional' authority at 
'home', such as 'customary' court and parliament buildings and statues of ancestral 
rulers. 
Furthermore, many geo-ethnic diaspora organisations recogmse, work through and 
make donations to community development associations run by 'traditional' and 
'educated' elites at 'home'. While these 'home' -based institutions generally oversee the 
financing and execution of communal 'self-help' projects such as the building and 
repair of public schools and hospitals, they are widely viewed in the literature as often 
operating as self-serving platforms for local elites to create and consolidate power 
bases, accumulate status and resources, and access positions and patronage in the 
clientalistic Nigerian state (Ahanotu 1982; Muoghalu 1986; Adejunmobil990; Barkan 
et al 1991; Vaughan 1995,2000; Osaghae 1994, 1995; Honey and Okafor 1998; Trager 
1998; Ikelegbe 2001; Abbott 2002; Ukiwo 2003, 2005). For example, Aguda's (1998: 
24) study of a Y oruba town development union concludes that the organisation "is run 
not only by, but also for, the elite". Indeed, Honey and Okafor (1998: 149) conclude 
that such organisations are "a conservative force" and "tend to maintain" not only 
infrastructure but also "privilege". 
Certainly, the Ayege Progress Committee (APC), the 'home' -based parent body of 
ANPU London, is often seen to be dominated by, and to serve the interests of, local 
elites. The APC is regarded as the 'apex' Omoyege organisation and is charged with 
leading Ayege's quest for progress. As such, the APC coordinates the kingdom's 'self-
help' initiatives and receives and deploys communal contributions from Omoyege 
individuals and organisations at 'home' and 'abroad'. Significantly, the APC's status at 
the head of Omoyege 'communal effort' derives directly from its elevated position in 
both 'traditional' and 'modem' hierarchies of power. Firstly, the organisation is an 
inherent component of Ayege's 'traditional authorities'; not only is it formally 
constituted as the 'executive arm' of the Oba and his council of chiefs but it is also 
chaired by one of the kingdom's six high chiefs and its three other executives, the Vice 
Chairman, Treasurer and General Secretary, are all chiefs. Secondly, the APC 
executives, like the Oba and most of his council of chiefs, are widely recognised not 
only as 'traditional elites' but also as 'educated elites'. Indeed, the high chief who chairs 
the APC is a highly educated and experienced technocrat who had attained a senior 
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position in the United Nations in Europe prior to retiring to Ayege in the late 1980s. 
Similarly, in addition to being chiefs, the APC's Vice Chairman is a retired university 
professor and its General Secretary is a well-educated former civil servant. 
Dominated by 'traditional' and 'educated' elites, the APC is often seen to prioritise the 
particular interests and desires of these groups. Since the late 1970s it has, indeed, 
devoted the bulk of the communal funds it has accrued to three major projects, each of 
which is widely seen to be of primary benefit to elites. By far the biggest of these 
'headline' projects is the construction of a 'befitting' town hall for Ayege. Having 
consumed some N40 million (c.US$300,000/£180,0004) since it was initiated in 1986, 
this imposing 'edifice' is designed and utilised principally for "prestigious"S occasions 
that are routinely considered to be distinctly elite affairs. These include 'hosting' 
visiting dignitaries (especially government officials), holding lavish social events such 
as big wedding parties and, most important of all, celebrating the annual Ayege Day 
fundraising festival, the key targets of which are Omoyege individuals and associations 
that can afford to make significant donations to the communal development fund 
administered by the APe. 
The second 'headline' project undertaken by the APC in recent years is the construction 
between 1999 and 2003 of a new, 'ultra-modem' palace for the Oba. Costing in excess 
of N12 million (c.US$90,000/£55,0006), this impressive royal complex was built 
explicitly to provide Ayege's first highly educated monarch with a 'befitting' level of 
'comfort' and status. The third major activity the APC has pursued since the late 1970s 
is for many in the community an equally elite-oriented endeavour. Over the last 30 
years or so, the APC has spent "colossus" sums "defending the territorial integrity of the 
kingdom" (APC document, 2005), contesting through the courts and the state the 
'encroachment' of 'Ayege land' by neighbouring kingdoms. This extremely costly 
exercise is widely seen to be of primary benefit to the community's elites, especially its 
'traditional' leaders, popularly known as 'babas' or 'elders', because they are by far the 
biggest owners of 'Omoyege' land. 
, 
4 These figures are based on the average exchange rates for 2003, the year in which the APC issued this 
estimate. 
5 APC General Secretary, interview, Ayege, November 2005. 
6 See note 4. 
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Indeed, leadership of the APC is often seen to provide the kingdom's 'babas' with 
opportunities to consolidate and develop their own economic and political power. For 
example, when in the mid-1990s the APC paid the Ondo State Government in excess of 
N300,000 (c.US$9,5001£6,000 (1995» to purchase a large area of land with the 
purported intention of dividing it into plots for subsidised resale to any interested 
Omoyeges, there were widespread suspicions and accusations in the kingdom that the 
land was, in practice, simply "shared among elders" (APC document, 2002). Similarly, 
some in the community note with no little cynicism that the kingdom's 'apex' body is a 
major investor in the community bank founded by the APC chairman and other 'elders' 
in 1992. It is also suggested that by virtue of running both the APC and Ayege's 
community bank, the 'apex' body's chairman was able to ensure his appointment in 
2004 as the chairman of the Ondo State Government's Ayege/Asiki Community 
Development Committee, a position in which he oversees and dispenses a budget of 
some NlOmillion. 
Furthermore, it is bemoaned by some that in apparently serving the interests and 
ambitions of 'educated' and 'traditional' elites, the APC neglects the most pressing 
needs and desires of the wider community, especially the 'grassroots'. A common 
complaint is that the APC has been so consumed with contesting land disputes and 
completing the town hall that it has done little in recent years to support the kingdom's 
public schools, most of which express desperate needs for repairs, equipment and 
books. Many 'citizens' express even greater frustration that the APC appears to have 
made no tangible effort to restore to the kingdom pipe-borne water, a reliable electricity 
supply or a telephone connection. It is decried that unlike the elites, most 'citizens' 
cannot afford to sink boreholes, buy generators or purchase mobile phones that can be 
used on tra,vels beyond the kingdom. By far the greatest complaint, however, is that the 
APC has done precious little to create or improve livelihood opportunities for 'ordinary' 
Omoyeges, especially those enduring widespread underemployment or unemployment 
and the many small-scale farmers who struggle to eke out an existence in the face of 
high input costs, a lack of equipment and low produce prices. 
, 
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"In tune with the wishes and aspirations o/the people": towards 'grassroots' benefit 
and 'empowerment' 
Despite all the criticism and frustration that the APC generates by appearing to prioritise 
elite interests and ambitions over 'grassroots' needs and desires, the 'apex' body still 
receives notable respect and even praise for attempting to 'bring development' to the 
kingdom in ways that are seen to benefit the 'citizenry' as a whole. Although the town 
hall and palace constructed by the APC are widely seen as principally for the 'comfort' 
and enjoyment of elites, a broad cross section of Omoyeges are immensely proud of 
these 'edifices' and see them as raising the status and profile of the kingdom and its 
chances of attracting the attention and benevolence of the state. Furthermore, 
'indigenes' have been given opportunities to undertake much of the construction work 
for these and other APC 'building projects'. 
Similarly, while the APC's Ayege Day fundraising event is often seen as an elite affair, 
most Omoyeges assert that its role in accumulating resources from elites at 'home' and 
'abroad' is important to the development of the kingdom. Additionally, it is widely 
noted that by bringing 'home' Omoyeges based beyond the kingdom, the week-long 
festival creates economic benefits for local transport workers, traders, musicians and 
dance troupes. And while there is frustration that the APC has not utilised the 
communal funds generated at Ayege Day to undertake significant employment 
generation or infrastructure construction projects, it is generally acknowledged that such 
major interventions may well be beyond the means of the 'apex' body. In this context, 
there is much appreciation for the APC's efforts to lobby the state to create jobs and 
improve infrastructure in the kingdom. 
Furthermore, it is widely recalled that elite-led 'self-help' has, in the past at least, 
executed projects that have been oriented to the benefit of the community as a whole. 
Most notably, it is enthusiastically recounted that, in the 1950s, the APC's predecessor, 
ANPU 'home-branch', constructed the kingdom's first secondary school and, during the 
, 
course of the 1970s, the APC itself established the kingdom's first two hospitals. 
Officially taken over by the state soon after completion, the two hospitals have fallen 
into disrepair on a number of occasions only for the APC to step back in and carry out 
renovations. And the latest 'headline' initiative proposed by the APC, the construction 
of a polytechnic in Ayege, is strongly endorsed with many believing it will widen 
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access to much sought after higher education by charging reasonable fees and by 
negating transport and accommodation costs associated with attending institutions 
beyond the kingdom. For example, market women and drivers of motorcycle taxis or 
'okada' generally appear to see the polytechnic project not only as potentially bringing 
them more business but also as enabling them to fulfil their own educational ambitions. 
It is therefore with some foundation that the APC Chairman claims that the 'apex' body 
is "in tune with the wishes and aspirations of the people" (APC document, 2002). 
Indeed, the APC and the 'traditional authorities' in general do afford space for 
'grassroots' participation. All 'sons and daughters' of Ayege are automatically members 
of the APC and it holds monthly public meetings. While these gatherings tend to attract 
only 20-30 people, representatives of what are generally seen to be 'grassroots' 
interests, such as market traders, do participate, especially when there is an issue of 
particular concern to them. Furthermore, a 'traditional parliament' is held every nine 
days. This occasion extends over two days, the first involving the Oba and his six high 
chiefs meeting with senior second and third class chiefs who are expected to represent 
the "complaints and opinions" of "the people" (APC document, 1994). On its second 
day, the parliament proceeds to the palace courtyard where in excess of a 100 'citizens' 
gather in the presence of the Oba and his chiefs to hear the decisions taken the previous 
day. The 'citizens' present are expected to communicate the news to those not in 
attendance. 'Citizens' are also expected to channel any responses or issues they might 
have through the chief who represents the area of the kingdom in which they reside. 
Additionally, the leaders of local social, trade, cooperative, women's, youth, and 
religious associations are regularly called for meetings with the APC, especially when 
there are pr~ssing issues or major initiatives to be discussed. Significantly, the leaders of 
such organisations generally feel that they are listened to when they attend these 
meetings. Moreover, the Oba and all the classes of chief are also open to the everyday 
concerns of 'citizens'. On most evenings, the Oba can be found resting in the palace 
compound and 'ordinary' 'citizens' often drop by for advice on everything from 
, 
paternity disputes to getting hospital treatment. The six high chiefs each have 
responsibility for an area of the main town and receive in their compounds residents 
seeking counsel on a multitude of matters from noisy neighbours to travelling 'abroad'. 
The consultation of chiefs often relates to disputes in the community and these can be 
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passed up the 'traditional' hierarchy for resolution until they reach the highest authority 
at the Oba's weekly 'peace meeting'. 
Beyond those afforded by the 'traditional authorities', opportunities to voice 
'grassroots' concerns and interests are also carved out by 'the people' themselves. This 
is especially apparent in the case of the kingdom's 'youth', a social category defined not 
so much by age but rather by the condition of not being socio-economically 
'established' (Gore and Pratten 2003; Nolte 2004). As the social group that is seen to be 
most affected and frustrated by widespread unemployment and with little opportunity to 
enter a 'traditional' political hierarchy built largely on success and status, the 'youth' 
often find it necessary to agitate strongly for their interests to be recognised. With 
Ayege's 'youth' having become well organised in recent years, the Oba's personal 
assistant contends, "[ ... S]ome of the things the elders have turned a deaf ear to, the 
youth can say, 'Come baba, do this thing for these people'" (Interview, Ayege, 
December 2005). And the leader of the kingdom's umbrella 'youth' association is 
pleased to report that the 'babas' are now more willing to listen. Indeed, when there 
were not such good lines of communication between the 'elders' and the 'youth', the 
latter often found it necessary to engage in protest, once even marching on the palace 
and threatening to burn it down. Clearly, the APC and the 'traditional authorities' as a 
'whole are not in a position to disregard completely the interests and desires of 'the 
grassroots' . 
While ANPU London's connection with the 'ordinary' people it expresses a desire to 
benefit at 'home' is rather heavily mediated through an elite-led and, in many ways, 
elite-orientated communal apparatus, some UK-based Nigerian diaspora organisations 
have been ~ble to identify local intermediaries through which they can connect more 
directly with the 'grassroots' and their interests. With the aim of making "a positive 
difference to the lives of the less privileged,,7 and working principally in the generally 
poor and marginalized Lagos district of Ipaja, the diaspora NGO Development Impact 
for Nigeria (DIFN) recruited as its 'home'-based programme coordinator an 
'-
experienced local community worker highly regarded for his contributions to 
'grassroots' health and development. The community worker, Pastor Olabode Omokaro, 
or 'Bode' as he prefers to be known, grew up in the 'tough' Mushin area of Lagos and 
has lived in Ipaja, Lagos for the last 15 years. While Bode is respected in his community 
7 DIFN document, n.d .. 
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of residence as an ordained pastor and highly educated man (he holds a postgraduate 
certificate in community development from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria's most 
prestigious university), he is very much seen as 'a man of the people' who is 'close to 
the grassroots' . 
Bode first established this recognised connection with Ipaja's 'grassroots' through his 
work with the Red Cross, of which he has been a member since secondary school. As a 
senior district official of the organisation, Bode has become well-known for his highly-
visible role in coordinating the local teams that go from house to house in national 
immunisation programmes. Furthermore, Bode is widely praised for mobilising his 
local church and some retired nurses to establish in 1995 a 'mother and baby clinic' for 
the many young women in the area who, despite combining petty trading with 
motherhood, cannot afford to access advice, immunisations and medicines at Ipaja's 
rather limited 'public' health facilities. 
Indeed, when in 1999 Bode mentioned the popUlarity of the clinic at DIFN's first 
community health conference in Nigeria, the organisation's founder decided to pay a 
visit and, impressed with what he saw, appointed Bode as DIFN's Nigeria programme 
coordinator. With Bode joining the organisation, DIFN has been able to channel 
resources directly to an individual who enjoys not only enabling connections and 
respect among local 'traditional' elites and government officials but also a strong and 
mutually much cherished relationship with Ipaja's 'grassroots'. Consequently, Bode has 
been able to help DIFN's founders realise their deeply-held diasporic desires to reach 
and 'empower' 'the grassroots', organising community development and HIV/AIDS 
awareness seminars at local churches, introducing the Child-to-Child Health Approach 
to local pri!llary and secondary schools, providing counselling and support for people 
living with mY/AIDS and establishing skills training programmes for young mothers 
and unemployed 'youth'. 
However, while it is clear that diaspora organisations can connect with, benefit and 
, 
possibly even 'empower' 'ordinary' people at 'home' as globalising discourses of 
diaspora and development might hope, it is also clear that many such groups do so 
through local institutional intermediaries that are dominated by elites and tend to 
prioritise their interests and reinforce their positions. This is particularly true of that 
majority of diaspora organisations, including ANPU London, that are grounded in geo-
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ethnic identities. When these groups engage a local intennediary at 'home', it is 
generally some fonn of communal development committee or union, a type of 
institution that is widely seen by respondents and in the literature as little more than an 
often rather blatant vehicle for elite benefit and ambition. The local institutional 
intennediaries engaged by some diaspora NGOs and professional associations, such as 
state and federal government ministries and 'home' -based professional bodies, are 
routinely seen in the very same light. The relationship and benefit of diaspora 
organisations to the poor and disadvantaged is therefore rather more ambivalent than 
globalising discourses of diaspora and development might hope. 
"Women are home makers"s: collective diasporic intervention and the 
transnational politics of gender 
"I would rather prefer my husband to go": diasporic associational life and the 
transnational reproduction of gender roles and relations 
In addition to contending that diaspora organisations reach and benefit 'the grassroots', 
globalising discourses of diaspora and development often posit that such groups 
encourage the development and transnational transmission of new and supposedly more 
'liberatory' notions of womanhood, 'empowering' women and countering gender 
inequality both in diaspora and at 'home' (Levitt 1997, 1998; Burton 2004; Gammage 
2004; Osirim 2008; Landolt and Goldring 2009). However, London-based Nigerian 
diaspora organisations, like many migrant associations discussed elsewhere9, appear to 
do more to reproduce rather than transfonn the established, and what might be seen as 
rather patriarchal, gender roles and relations of 'home'. 
This can be seen most clearly in the case of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations that open 
their membership to both men and women. Mirroring what the literature lO and 
respondents in diaspora and at 'home' often see as a characteristic of ethnicised 
a~sociations in Nigeria, the active participation of women in London-based geo-ethnic 
diaspora organisations tends to be limited, both in tenns of the nature and degree of 
involvement. For instance, an executive of ANPU London reports that it is "mostly 
8 Female Patron of the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK, interview, Ukpenwa, November 2005. 
9 See for example: Joly 1987; AFFORD 1998; Liu 1998; Mahler 1998; Popkin 1999; Uduku 2000; Jazeel 
2006. 
10 See for example: Barnes 1975; Amadiume 1987; Barkan et al 1991; Honey and Okafor 1998; Ikelegbe 
2005a; van den Bersselaar 2005; Nolte 2008. 
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men" who attend the association's monthly meetings (Interview, London, May 2005). 
Indeed, of the 15 or so members who attend regularly, only three are women. Both male 
and female members assert that this is not a result of women being in any way 
unwelcome to attend and voice their opinions. Indeed, one of the women who attends 
regularly is one of the most vociferous participants at meetings and argues that she is 
continuing a strong tradition of Omoyege women being "very vocal" (Interview, 
London, July 2005). "Ayege women are tough", she contends, "so they can put their 
men in their place. They're not like some other cultures where the woman can't even 
open their mouth!" 
Rather than any notion that women should not participate in the associational meetings 
in London, their limited involvement is traced primarily to practical constraints and 
what are considered to be the responsibilities of motherhood. As meetings are held late 
on Saturday evenings (to accommodate members' work commitments) and in members' 
homes (for want of the funds to hire a hall), it is argued that the time and limited space 
of the gatherings precludes members from bringing along any young children they 
might have. Explicitly drawing on what is seen as the established gender division of 
labour, it is asserted by male and female members alike that it is the role and duty of the 
mother to stay at home to care for any young children while the father attends the 
meetings. Indeed, ANPU London member Mrs Ademola proclaims that she much 
prefers to concentrate on "the commitment in the house" than attend the association's 
meetings (Interview, London, April 2006). "I would rather prefer my husband to go", 
she adds, explaining that she is very happy for him to pay her dues on her behalf and 
represent her and the family as a whole. Furthermore, highlighting that women attend, 
make donations at, and prepare food for the major fundraising cultural events that the 
association .. aspires to hold annually, she argues, "Our women folk can support in 
different ways for the progress of the union and for the community". 
"It's a mother's nature"n: diasporic women's organisations and the reproduction of 
g~ndered discourses of 'care' and 'dynamism' 
A key way in which diasporic women seek, and are seen, to contribute to their 
communities at 'home' and 'abroad' is by forming their own organisations. Women's 
organisations are widely considered a well-established element of associational life in 
11 Ukpenwa Women's Association UK member, interview, London, April 2006. 
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Nigeria12, especially in the southern half of the country, and their formation in diaspora 
is routinely seen simply as a reproduction of this conventional practice rather than any 
sort of novel trend aimed at reconfiguring conventional gender norms in favour of 
women. Furthermore, and reflecting what the literature13 and respondents at 'home' and 
'abroad' often see as a feature of women's organisations in Nigeria, diaspora 
organisations formed by and for women generally appear to have little desire to 
transform established gender roles and relations. As a founding and still highly 
committed member of the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK (UWA) exclaims, "It's 
nothing to do with women's rights!" (Interview, London, June 2006). 
Indeed, like other diasporic geo-ethnic women's organisations, the establishment of the 
UW A is framed simply in terms of creating a social space in which members can pursue 
desires and employ abilities that are seen to be traditionally associated with women. The 
key factor for many members is a yearning to socialise in ways that are considered to be 
of particular interest or enjoyment to women. As a founding member and current 
executive of the UW A contends, "[ ... T]he women came together because we felt we 
could relax a little bit more when we are in each other's company, there are certain 
activities you would do more as women than if you are having a team of men being 
there" (ibid). Among the activities detailed are openly discussing women's health 
issues, learning crafts and enjoying particular forms of humour. Indeed, there is a strong 
emphasis on having "fun" in the absence of men (ibid). "As all women", a committed 
UW A member enthuses, "we relax, we chill out, we are happy, we sing songs, maybe 
things we would dare not sing when are men are there!" (Interview, London, April 
2006). Furthermore, members take particular pleasure and pride in organising 
'traditional' wedding ceremonies and recreating recipes from Ukpenwa's celebrated 
cuisine, thereby reproducing defining elements of Ukpenwa culture that are very much 
seen as the preserve of women. 
In accounting for the formation of diasporic geo-ethnic women's organisations such as 
th,e UW A, members of these groups also emphasise what is widely seen both at 'home' 
and abroad as the greater desire and ability of women to organise effectively for 
communal benefit. With explicit reference to prevailing gender norms drawn from 
12 See also Ottenberg 1955; Barnes 1975; Mba 1982; Enabulele 1985; Amadiume 1987,2000; Denzer 
1994; Imam 1997; Olukoshi 1997; Honey and Okafor 1998; Enemuo and Momoh 1999; Pereira 2000; 
Ikelegbe 2001a, 2005a; Trager 2001; Ukeje 2004; Chuku 2005, 2009; van den Bersselaar 2005; Nolte 
2008. 
13 See especially Honey and Okafor (1998) and Pereira (2000). 
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'home', the greater communal instincts and abilities attributed to women are seen to 
derive from what are posited as their inherently superior capacities for 'care' and 
'empathy' and their natural and interlinked roles as 'mothers' and 'home makers'. For 
example, in explaining why the UW A has done much more to contribute at 'home' than 
its co-ethnic and generally male-led Ukpenwa Development Union UK, a UW A 
executive argues: 
I think the main reason is that we are women. Because women, back 
home in Nigeria, you find out that women are the ones who actually 
run the home, build a home. The men go out and bring the money but 
the women build a home, [ ... ]. So we as a women's organisation 
brought this role upon us. We said, "We think about our people back 
home". Women are carers, they love caring for other people, they 
enjoy it [ ... ]. (Interview, London, April 2006) 
Similarly, another UW A member reflects: 
Women are mothers, [ ... J, we care, we think to care more for the 
people, to have that empathy. We cannot see somebody suffering, I 
mean some men, they will walk past; the women, they all have that 
sympathy and we have this caring attitude also. We are mothers so we 
have to care what is happening there [in Ukpenwa]". (Interview, 
London, April 2005) 
With further explicit reference to established conceptions of gender difference derived 
from 'home', women are widely seen not only to have a particular concern for the 
ancestral community but also a greater ability to organise and intervene effectively for 
its benefit. For example, in accounting for why it was decided to form the UW A as a 
nominally separate entity from the Ukpenwa Development Union, an active UW A 
member contends: 
Because women are powerful, they do things, they foresee things. If 
you leave it for the men alone they wouldn't achieve what we have 
achieved, [ ... ]. I mean, we have Ukpenwa Union and we have men 
there as well but you notice in every way, [ ... J, the women are more 
active to do things. So we just decided, 'Oh, the women group should 
be established and do things' because, how do you say, we are more 
intelligent, industrious and everything! [Laughs] Even back home, our 
mothers work more than the men. Our women are very industrious 
and they're more active, more dynamic than the men. (Interview, 
London, April 2005) 
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Significantly, however, the creation of diasporic geo-ethnic organisations by and for 
women does not generally constitute the wholesale withdrawal of women from what 
might be called 'mainstream' geo-ethnic associational life. Indeed, the members of 
diasporic geo-ethnic women's organisations are very often also members of geo-ethnic 
diaspora organisations that are open to both men and women. Furthermore, the women's 
groups generally work in close collaboration with their 'mainstream' counterparts, 
coordinating meetings so that they do not clash and often assisting each other with 
events and projects. Moreover, the women's groups are often formally constituted, 
and/or operate in practice, as 'wings' or 'branches' of their 'mainstream' equivalents, 
thereby interacting with them in a way that appears to recreate rather than contest 
established gender roles and relations. 
Illustrating the gendered nature of the relations that women's groups tend to maintain 
with what might be seen as their generally male-dominated counterparts, most UW A 
members are members of the Ukpenwa Development Union (UDU) and undertake 
within it roles that are conventionally associated with women. For example, a UW A 
executive who is also a member of the UDU reports: 
I have not taken any [leadership] position in Ukpenwa Union but I 
have worked really hard behind the scenes to support Ukpenwa 
Union, [ ... ]. I've always been very supportive of them in one way or 
another, where they're having their cultural dance, cooking for them, 
so I've kind of like supported them at the background [ ... ]. (Interview, 
London, June 2006) 
Furthermore, UW A stalwarts routinely see their organisation as a subordinate branch, 
rather than an equal partner, of the UDD. For example, an active member describes the 
UW A as "kind of like a subcommittee" of the UDU while others describe the UDU as 
the "mother" or "umbrella" union (Interviews, London, April and June 2006). Further 
replicating established, and what might be seen as patriarchal, gender relations at the 
organisational level, the UW A sometimes undertakes as a group to prepare the food for 
f4.ndraising cultural events held by the UDD. 
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From 'mothers' to 'home makers': collective transnational intervention and the 
'empowerment' of women at 'home' 
The case of the UW A illustrates how the formation of diasporic geo-ethnic women's 
organisations is widely seen to reproduce, rather than contest and transform, the 
prevailing and arguably patriarchal gender roles and relations of 'home'. Furthermore, 
with ethnicised women's organisations like the UW A appearing not to have any kind of 
radical agenda to reformulate established gender conventions, it is little surprise that 
there is no evidence of these groups aspiring or attempting to 'empower' women at 
'home' in the ways that glbbalising discourses of diaspora and development might hope 
and expect. For example, while the UW A supports the secondary education of a 
schoolgirl in Ukpenwa, members argue that this intervention has nothing to do with 
countering any perceived disadvantage that women might face in accessing education at 
'home'. Indeed, UW A members and their co-ethnics at 'home' contend that if there is 
any gender discrimination in accessing education in Ukpenwa, it is poor boys who are 
the victims as they are more likely than poor girls to be encouraged to seek work instead 
of pursuing education. The value of educating girls has long been recognised in 
Ukpenwa, as in most of southern Nigeria, it is argued. Furthermore, it is asserted that 
the UW A's decision to support the girl simply reflects the fact that she is enrolled at a 
school that a number of UW A members attended and wanted to contribute to in some 
way. 
Moreover, even the very few diaspora organisations that claim to pursue more radical 
agendas on behalf of women at 'home' could be seen to do little to contest and reshape 
established gender roles and relations in ways that globalising discourses of diaspora 
and development might hope and expect. This is illustrated by the case of the London-
based NGO Nigerian Women for Development (NWD). Founded in 1995, NWD is the 
only UK-based Nigerian diaspora organisation identified that has an explicit focus on 
"empowering" women at 'home'. To this end, NWD's major transnational aspiration is 
to, establish a "development centre" for the 'grassr~ots' women of the Niger Delta, at 
which beneficiaries would be given skills training in income-generating activities such 
as hairdressing, 'tie and dye', and gari (cassava flour) processing. However, it could be 
argued that while this planned intervention might improve the economic position of 
women, it would do little to "empower" them in the sense of challenging and 
transforming in their favour established gender roles and relations. After all, the areas in 
99 
which NWD proposes to provide skills training are widely seen as low-income activities 
that are very much the preserve of women. It is arguably unclear how training in these 
areas would contest prevailing gender conventions and "empower" women to enter and 
progress in areas of social, economic and political endeavour that might currently 
present significant barriers to women. 
It is clear, then, that there is very little evidence of UK-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations attempting or even aspiring to 'empower' women at 'home' to the extent 
and in the ways that globalising discourses of diaspora and development might imagine. 
Indeed, rather than working to contest and transform established gender roles and 
relations in favour of women, these groups appear to reproduce and reinforce prevailing 
gender conventions that could be seen as rather patriarchal. However, for many 
respondents in diaspora and at 'home', these prevailing conventions are entirely 
progressive, underpinning a gendered division of labour that has long served to further 
the development of women, their families and communities and the nation as a whole. 
As the director of a London-based pan-African women's organisation contends, 
"traditional gender relations are complementary rather than exploitative" (Interview, 
London, October 2004). 
Furthermore, women at 'home' and 'abroad' very much tend to argue that being 
recognised, respected and valued as 'mothers' and 'home makers' has long enabled 
them to accrue status and influence beyond the private sphere. Indeed, it is emphasised 
that by displaying supposedly inherent qualities of 'care' and 'dynamism', women in 
Nigeria have carved-out an important public presence as 'mothers' not only to their 
families but also to their communities and the wider nation. As such, it is argued, 
women have'a established a strong tradition of holding public position and power, 
heading local markets, being senior members of 'traditional authorities', playing key 
roles in 'modem' politics and government and leading anti-colonial, pro-democracy and 
Niger Delta protest movements14• Clearly, if globalising discourses of diaspora and 
deyelopment are ever to support the transnational 'empowerment' of women, it will be 
necessary for these discourses to take seriously the alternative understandings women at 
'home' may have of what gender roles and relations can be regarded as 'progressive' 
and 'empowering'. 
14 See also Afigbo 1972; Okonjo 1976; Mba 1982; Amadiume 1987,2000; Denzer 1994; Imam 1997; 
Olukoshi 1997; Enemuo and Momoh 1999; Pereira 2000; Ibeanu 2001; Ukeje 2004; Chuku 2005, 2009; 
Ikelegbe 2005a; Nolte 2008; Johnson-Odim 2009. 
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Conclusion 
Contrary to the hopes and expectations of globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development, we have seen that London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations do not 
necessarily connect directly with and 'empower' women and 'the poor' at 'home'. 
Indeed, although organised diasporans generally aspire to 'help the poor', we have seen 
that their collective transnational interventions are often channelled through local elite 
individuals and institutions, potentially limiting the benefits that might be felt at the 
'grass root level' and possibly reinforcing rather than transforming established power 
hierarchies and entrenched socio-economic inequalities. Furthermore, we have also seen 
that London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations often reproduce established, and 
what might be considered rather patriarchal, gender roles and relations and rarely 
display any transnational desire to reconfigure these gender norms at 'home'. 
However, it has also been suggested that while collective diasporic interventions are 
generally channelled through, and can reinforce, local elites, these privileged 
intermediaries can operate in ways that enable transnational benevolence to reach and 
benefit 'the poor'. And although diaspora groups might not seek to 'empower' women 
at 'home', it is clear that they can organise 'abroad' and intervene at 'home' in ways 
that maintain gender roles and relations widely considered in both contexts to afford 
women public recognition and power. From the perspective of globalising discourses of 
diaspora and development, the contribution of London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations to tackling gender and socio-economic inequality at 'home' is therefore 
rather more ambivalent than might be expected. Yet if national governments and 
international agencies are to engage and support the transnational contributions of these 
diaspora groups, it is necessary to acknowledge and respect the alternative and socially 
mediated ways in which 'progress' might be imagined and enacted both in diaspora and 
at 'home'. 
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5. 'Charity begins at home': collective diasporic intervention 
and the transnational politics of belonging 
Introduction 
Globalising discourses of diaspora and development celebrate diaspora organisations as 
new development actors that not only 'empower' women and 'the poor' at 'home' but 
also promote liberal, democratic institutions and governance. Much has been made of 
this latter hope in Nigeria's national discourses of diaspora and development. At the 
initiation of the Federal Government's diaspora engagement initiatives in 2000, 
President Obasanjo emphasised his belief that overseas nationals could come together 
and contribute to "the political well-being, [ ... ], and the sound governance" of Nigeria 
(Obasanjo 2000). However, as with tackling poverty and encouraging gender equality at 
'home', London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations again appear to perform 
problematically the progressive role expected of them in globalising discourses of 
diaspora and development. Just as these groups can be seen to reinforce socio-economic 
and gender inequality at 'home', they can also be seen to reproduce the discourses and 
practices underpinning a pervasive and deeply divisive politics of belonging that incites 
sub-national, inter-ethnic competition for state power and resources and fundamentally 
undermines the entrenchment of liberal, democratic institutions and governance in the 
multi-ethnic state of Nigeria. 
In this chapter, I trace how London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations can mobilise 
identities 'abroad' and make transnational interventions at 'home' in ways which 
implicate them in this debilitating politicisation of sub-national, geo-ethnic belonging 
that is so widely seen to threaten the very viability the Nigerian project. However, I go 
on to suggest that these groups and their border-spanning benevolence can not only 
reproduce and reinforce the ethnicised boundaries of belonging but can also soften and 
transcend them to articulate and pursue visions of Nigeria's national development. If the 
, 
hope that the organised diaspora will contribute to the building of a liberal, democratic 
nation is to be realised, national and globalising discourses of diaspora and development 
will have to take account of the deeply ambivalent transnational politics of belonging 
and devise ways in which its constructive potentials can be embraced. 
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Endangering the 'nation': ethnic politics in Nigeria and the divisive potential of 
diaspora 
A vast literature contends that, in the "immensely complex ethnic mosaic" that is 
Nigeria (Maier 2000: 76)1, the interplay between national and sub-national, geo-ethnic 
visions of belonging and development has produced an insidious and profoundly 
destabilising system of ethnicised competition for access to state power and resources 
(see for example, Nnoli 1978, 1995; Joseph 1987; Diamond 1988; Bach 1997; Osaghae 
1998, 2003; Jega 2000; Vaughan 2000, 2001; Igwara 2001; Obi 2001; Suberu 2001; 
Ukiwo 2003,2005: Adejumobi 2004, 2005; Isumonah 2004; Watts 2004a,b; Kraxberger 
2004a,b, 2005; Obadare 2005; Ikelegbe 2005b; leG 2006; Ukeje and Adebanwi 2008). 
This politicisation of ethnicity tends to be traced to British colonial rule which, 
incrementally from the late 19th century onwards, not only imposed an artificial national 
boundary on hundreds of culturally, linguistically, and politically diverse peoples but 
also divided them into geo-ethnically defined administrative units, each governed 
indirectly through a 'traditional authority'. Since independence in 1960, the 
politicisation of ethnicity is widely seen to have been perpetuated and deepened by the 
continuation of ethnicised strategies of divide and rule, a dependency on, and 
centralisation of, oil revenue, and the constitutional enshrinement of group belonging as 
a key basis for making and realising claims on the state. In these ways, geo-ethnic 
identity has become ripe for manipulation and mobilisation by 'traditional' and political 
elites in the contest to gain access to state power and resources. In turn, state largesse 
has come to be distributed more on the basis of geo-ethnic identity than on principles of 
need and economic efficiency, subverting the entrenchment of liberal, democratic 
institutions and governance. 
Furthermore, in the wake of 16 years of divisive military rule and deepening economic 
crisis, the politics of belonging are widely seen to have become increasingly intense and 
more violent in recent years (Jega 2000; Ikelegbe 2001a,b; Ukeje 2001; Osaghae 2003; 
Ukiwo 2003; Nolte 2004; Adejumobi 2004, 2005; Ukeje and Adebanwi 2008). Since 
I It is estimated that Nigeria has anywhere between 200 and 500 'tribes' or 'ethnic nationalities', the 
largest of which are the three 'majority' groups: the Hausa-Fulani of the 'North', the Igbo ofthe 'South-
East', and the Yoruba of the 'South-West' (Kraxberger 2005). The wider geo-ethnic formations of the 
'tribe' or 'ethnic nationality' can generally be broken down into smaller geo-ethnic sub-groups, such as 
the 'clan' and 'hometown'. For example, the Yoruba 'ethnic nationality' is constituted by several 
'branches' or 'sub-groups' such as the Egba, Ekiti, Ijebu, and Ijesa, each of which encompasses many 
ancestral 'hometowns' or 'kingdoms' such as Ayege. 
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the return to democracy in 1999, ethnicised vigilante and militia groups have 
proliferated and 10 to 20 thousand people have reportedly been killed in communal 
bloodshed (Akinyele 2001; Ikelegbe 2001; Harnischfeger 2003; HRW 2003a; Nolte 
2004; Adebanwi 2005; Adejumobi 2005; NIC 2005; Reno 2005; ICG 2006; Pratten 
2006, 2008). Consequently, many commentators have come to doubt the very survival 
of Nigeria as a unified entity, warning that the country is on the verge of becoming a 
'failed state'. In one such case, a 2005 report by the United States's National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) predicted that the rise of 'identity politics' in Nigeria could 
well lead to its "outright collapse" by 2015 (NIC 2005: 16). 
The NIC's specific fears for Nigeria followed its earlier warning that the growth and 
increasing transnational capabilities of diasporas was fuelling a global rise in 'identity 
politics', heightening internal ethnic and religious conflicts around the world (NIC 
2004). This reflects arguments, often marginalized in globalising discourses of 'diaspora 
and development', contending that overseas nationals can produce divisive, even 
destructive effects at 'home' by directing transnational flows of money and materials to 
civil strife (Anderson 1998; Van Hear and Sprensen 2003; Adamson 2006). Indeed, one 
of the more influential examples of such arguments asserts that having a substantial 
diaspora makes countries in post-civil conflict situations up to six times more likely to 
witness a recurrence of hostilities (Collier 2000). 
"Everybody is fighting for their own community,,2: the transnational mobilisation 
of geo-ethnic identity 
Given warnings about both the divisive potential of diaspora and the fissiparous 
tensions in the Nigerian polity, it may not be surprising that many London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations can be implicated in a number of ways in the 
transnational reproduction and politicisation of the ethnicised boundaries of belonging. 
Grounded in sub-national, geo-ethnic identities ranging in scale from the likes of the 
'village', 'hometown', 'kingdom', and 'clan' to wider formations such as the 'tribe' and 
, 
'ethnic nationality', the vast bulk of the examples identified in this study replicate the 
ethnicised modes of organisation that are widely seen to have been critical to the genesis 
and unfolding of ethnic politics in Nigeria (Coleman 1958, 1994; Sklar 1963; Aronson 
1971; Melson and Wolpe 1971; Smock 1971; Ekeh 1975, 1992; Ahanotu 1982; Barkan 
2 ANPU London member, interview, London, April 2006. 
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et al 1991; Osaghae 1994, 1995; Vaughan 1995; Honey and Okafor 1998; Ikelegbe 
2001a,b; Smith 2001; Trager 2001; Abbott 2002; Adejumobi 2004; Ukiwo 2005). 
Indeed, ever since the early 20th century when rural migrants to Nigeria's urban centres 
of colonial opportunity first came together on the basis of geo-ethnic identity to provide 
mutual support and lobby the government to attend to the development of their 
communities of origin, 'hometown associations' and 'ethnic unions' have been, and 
remain, key players in the struggles to access power and resources in a political system 
that continues to privilege geo-ethnic group belonging as a basis for making claims on 
the state (ibid.). Like these ethnicised organisations at 'home', geo-ethnic diaspora 
organisations also define membership principally on the basis of 'indigeneity,3 and 
frame their objectives primarily in relation to the interests of a shared, sub-national 
ancestral 'homeland' and its descendents at 'home' and 'abroad'. 
The boundaries of indigeneity are reproduced transnationally not only through the 
constitutional basis of these ethnicised diaspora organisations such as ANPU London, 
but also in the ways that their members tend to rehearse well-worn narratives about the 
politics of 'home'. These accounts often politicise ethnicity through the deployment of 
familiar tropes of minority status and economic and political marginalisation in what is 
constructed as an inter-group competition for fair access to the 'national cake'. The 
overriding concern is that co-ethnics at 'home' are dominated by other geo-ethnic 
groups. Members of ANPU London bemoan that the marginalisation of their ancestral 
kingdom of Ayege is such that it struggles to win fair recognition and reward even at 
level of government supposedly closest to the people. It is decried that after more than a 
century of agitation against administrative subordination to neighbouring kingdoms, 
Ayege has still not been given a local government area of its own. Members bitterly 
lament that the arrangement of 'sharing' a local government with other kingdoms means 
that Ayege has had to fight to access even the crumbs of the 'national cake' available at 
the lowest tier of the Nigerian state, afflicting their ancestral kingdom with a 
particularly woeful level of social, economic, and infrastructural development. 
, 
It is through such narratives that the dynamics of geo-ethnic contestations of power 
come to inform both the creation of ethnicised diaspora organisations and the nature of 
3 The concept of 'indigeneity' is constitutionally enshrined and popularly employed in Nigeria as a means 
of ascertaining geo-ethnic belonging. A person is regarded as an 'indigene' of, and therefore as belonging 
to, a particular geo-ethnic community if the origin of their ancestral lineage can be traced to that 
community (Bach 1997; Kraxberger 2005; HRW 2006). 
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the transnational interventions they seek to make. An argument that the ancestral 
community is politically marginalised by other geo-ethnic groups and is, as a 
consequence, inadequately provided for by the state is employed to assert a 
responsibility to organise and intervene transnationally on the basis of indigeneity. As a 
member of ANPU London contends: 
[T]he Local Government has been very unhelpful to Ayege's cause for 
years. They've starved the town of funds and they've diverted most of 
it to its neighbouring town, which tends to suck all its power. So as 
concerned sons and daughters, members have taken upon themselves 
to come together and more than often to contribute from their own 
pocket to achieve things for the benefit of Ayege. (Interview, London, 
June 2005) 
Indeed, members of ethnicised diaspora organisations often opine that the geo-ethnic 
marginalisation of their ancestral communities makes it necessary to pursue an 
indigenised understanding of an adage they often deploy; 'charity begins at home'. 
In addition to dispensing transnational benevolence within the boundaries of 
indigeneity, geo-ethnic diaspora organisations also seek to intervene more directly in the 
politics of belonging at 'home' by lobbying the state to recognise and reward their 
communities of ancestral origin. Aside from having collectively written on occasion to 
the Governor of Iroko State about issues of especially pressing concern to Ayege, 
members of ANPU London implore friends and acquaintances who occupy strategic 
positions in the local, state, and federal governments to use their influence to see that 
the particular needs and aspirations of the kingdom are attended to. Some ethnicised 
diaspora organisations, especially those bemoaning the political and economic 
marginalisation~ militarisation, and environmental degradation of their ancestral 
homelands in the oil-producing Niger Delta, have even attempted to assert indigenised 
interests by writing directly to the President of Nigeria. Furthermore, geo-ethnic 
diaspora organisations also seek to advance the sectional agendas of their ancestral 
homelands by meeting with government officials and aspiring politicians when they 
make visits to the UK. 
106 
"A negotiating committee for the town'''': ethnicised intermediaries and the 
perpetuation of geo-ethnic rivalry at 'home' 
Many London-based geo-ethnic diaspora organisations can be indirectly, and yet often 
more deeply, implicated in the reproduction of a divisive politics of belonging through 
the discourses and practices of the local indigenised institutions they engage with when 
seeking to make transnational interventions at 'home'. As we saw earlier, ANPU 
London, like many 'hometown associations' and 'ethnic unions', collaborates with, and 
provides funds to, a 'home' -based 'apex' or 'parent' organisation, in this case the Ayege 
Progress Committee (APC). For Omoyeges at 'home' and 'abroad', a central role of the 
APC is to lead the communal lobbying efforts aimed at winning Ayege a fair slice of the 
'national cake'. As the executive arm of the kingdom's 'traditional authorities', the APC 
maintains Omoyege pressure on the local, state, and federal governments with petitions 
and the sending and receiving of delegations. Prominent requests made by the APC on 
behalf of Ayege include those for the restoration of pipe-borne water and regular 
electricity supply, a connection to a telephone network, the establishment of a tertiary 
educational institution, and the creation of a separate local government for the kingdom. 
To augment their direct lobbying for such favours, the Oba, his council of chiefs, and 
the APC monitor and seek to activate ethnicised connections to the three tiers of the 
Nigerian state. The 'traditional authorities' identify Omoyeges advantageously located 
within the state apparatus and encourage them to remember the needs and aspirations of 
their kingdom in the discharge of their official duties. Not only are such well-placed 
'sons and daughters' publicly named and celebrated upon appointment or promotion, 
they are also promised further disbursements of recognition, honour, and favour should 
they utilise their strategic positions to direct the gaze and munificence of the state 
towards the ancestral homeland. 
When ethnicised lobbying and connections fail, the APC turns to Ayege's tradition of 
'self-help' in its quest to ·bring development' to the kingdom. Most of Ayege's social 
, 
and economic infrastructure, including its first secondary school and first two hospitals, 
has been provided not by the state but by the 'communal effort' coordinated by the 
kingdom's 'traditional authorities' and funded by the extended Omoyege community of 
which ANPU London has intermittently formed a part since the 1960s. Given this proud 
4 ANPU London member, interview, London, June 2005. 
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tradition of 'self-help', the APC and 'patriotic' Omoyeges at 'home' and 'abroad' 
explicitly present Ayege as having forged a considerable degree of autonomy from the 
Nigerian state. As one APC official contends, "[W]e help ourselves, we don't wait for 
the government to do anything for us" (Interview, Ayege, November 2005). 
Moreover, through its efforts to drive and coordinate 'communal effort', the APC is 
widely seen among Omoyeges within and beyond the kingdom to be more responsible 
and benevolent than 'government'. The APC thereby challenges the Nigerian state in 
tenns of the degree of legitimacy and loyalty it enjoys among its 'citizens' at 'home' 
and 'abroad'. As Ayege's Catholic priest asserts of the APC, "[W]e feel more at home 
with them than government, because if we have problems we run to them right before 
government" (Interview, Ayege, December 2005). Furthennore, in attempting to sustain 
the practice of 'self-help', we have seen above how the APC seeks to augment the level 
of 'primary patriotism' (Geschiere and Gugler 1998) it attracts from its extended 
'citizenry' by asserting through events such as the annual Ayege Day festival the 
importance and potential rewards of loyalty to an Omoyege cultural identity and 
'homeland' over all others. 
The APC's pursuit of 'self-help' not only encourages Omoyege 'citizens' at 'home' and 
'abroad' to direct their primary loyalty away from the Nigerian state towards the sub-
national, geo-ethnic fonnation of Ayege but also represents a further attempt to make an 
ethnicised claim on the state. Indeed, the practice of 'self-help' is often seen to have 
political capital in the inter-communal struggle to be considered deserving of the 
attention and munificence of the state. As an Omoyege youth leader asserts, "We want 
to believe that the government will want to assist those communities that are actually 
helping themselves" (Interview, Ayege, December 2005). Furthennore, the APC's 'self-
help' projects, especially the imposing town hall and the Oba's 'ultra-modem' palace, 
are seen as attempts to raise the profile and status of Ayege above those of other 
communities, marking it out as a 'modem' and 'progressive' realm worthy of the 
attention and benevolence of the state. 
The APC also deploys the resources accruing to it from the extended Omoyege 
community in more direct efforts to win favour for Ayege in the inter-communal contest 
for state largesse. Given the importance of population size in making communal claims 
on the state, census exercises have always been highly politicised in Nigeria (see for 
108 
example Diamond 1988 and Suberu 2001). Indeed, accusations of manipulation abound 
as competing geo-ethnic formations apparently seek to inflate their size. In Ayege, the 
national census is certainly seen to be of great importance in justifying the kingdom's 
quest to win its own local government and an attendant slice of the 'national cake'. 
Consequently, as the Oba reported to ANPU London when he visited the organisation 
during his annual holiday to the UK in late 2005, the APC was making plans to 
'supervise' the upcoming 2006 national census exercise to ensure a 'full and fair' count 
of Ayege's demographic strength. Just as it had done during the 1991 exercise, the APC 
was to provide 'guides' and 'subsidise transport costs' so as to encourage poorly-paid 
enumerators to venture out to the relatively remote and inaccessible comers of the 
kingdom they might otherwise have been unwilling to visit. While members of the 
'traditional authorities' were keen to emphasise their 'supervision' would not extend to 
paying enumerators to count phantom citizens, there were accusations in the national 
press that at least some communities in southwest Nigeria were planning to "buy the 
enumerators to inflate figures" (Oladoyinbo 2005). 
The APC takes further opportunities to 'supervise' and incentivise the state during 
government boundary commissions. Again reflecting ways in which the politics of 
belonging have unfolded nationally, the APC has attempted to assert the demographic 
and territorial strength of Ayege by becoming increasingly embroiled since the late 
1970s in land disputes with neighbouring kingdoms. When the state is brought in to 
adjudicate in these disputes, the APC stands ready to 'assist' the government boundary 
commissioners with the costs of "logistics and mobility" and by providing a team of 
'guides' who are "able to show them the boundaries" (Interview, APC official, Ayege, 
November 2005). Furthermore, it was suggested that for such 'supervision' to win a 
favourable decision for Ayege, it might also have to involve the APC 'thanking' the 
commissioners for their work. 
The issue of disputed land not only highlights further how the APC might deploy the 
fin~ncial resources entrusted to it by the extended Omoyege community to incentivise 
the state to favour the particular geo-ethnic interests of Ayege. Land disputes also 
represent the most apparent manifestation of the way in which the APC reproduces what 
is widely seen to have become such a divisive notion in the politics of belonging in 
Nigeria: indigeneity (Bach 1997; Nolte 2004; Watts 2004a,b; Kraxberger 2005; HRW 
2006; ICG 2006). Members of the 'traditional authorities' routinely trace the genesis of 
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land disputes to the actions of people who trace their ancestry to geo-ethnic homelands 
other than Ayege. Labelled 'non-indigenes' and also commonly referred to as 'aliens', 
'strangers', and 'settlers', these people are seen to have migrated from surrounding 
kingdoms to rent and farm ancestral Ayege land. Apparently emboldened by their 
demographic dominance in many Omoyege villages and supposedly supported by the 
local governments and 'traditional authorities' of their own ancestral homelands, it is 
argued that these 'non-indigenes' have not only increasingly refused to pay 'royalties' 
to their Omoyege landlords but have also, and even more provocatively, claimed for 
their communities of origin the Ayege land they 'occupy'. 
The loss of ancestral land to 'aliens' is at the heart of what members of the APe and the 
Oba's council of chiefs sometimes represent as a wider contest between 'indigenes' and 
'non-indigenes' for access to livelihood opportunities. Indeed, some members of the 
'traditional authorities' are concerned about, and have publicly bemoaned, not only how 
'non-indigenes' are claiming control of Ayege land and agricultural production but also 
how they have become a powerful force in the manual, artisan, service, and trading 
sectors of the kingdom's economy. Tensions have developed along an 'indigene'/'non-
indigene' fault line with a number of the many Omoyege occupational associations 
under the APe's umbrella taking on the character of ethnicised 'cartels' by attempting 
to bar 'non-indigenes' from entry into their respective trades. Furthermore, the APe has 
taken direct action to explicitly support 'indigenes' in their apparent struggle with 'non-
indigenes'. For example, the APe has utilised the financial resources it has attracted 
from the extended Omoyege community to buy land from the state to distribute 
exclusively to 'sons and daughters of the soil'. 
There is some concern in Ayege that the politics of indigeneity, which the APe clearly 
narrates and makes material interventions in, has the potential to incite violence just as 
it has in many other parts of Nigeria. Significantly, the APe has the ability to organise 
physical force to defend what it perceives to be Ayege's interests. Mirroring what has 
be~n a growing trend across Nigeria's communities and wider geo-ethnic formations, 
the APe, with specific funding from Omoyege individuals and organisations at 'home' 
and 'abroad' including ANPU London, established in 1996 the Ayege Vanguard (A V), 
an Omoyege vigilante group. While the AV's founding rationale and operational focus 
are not explicitly framed in terms of intervening in disputes between 'indigenes' and 
'non-indigenes', they are aimed at countering "external aggression" (A V participant, 
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interview, Ayege, December 2005). Although the particular outside threat targeted is 
armed robbery, it could be argued that the A V has the potential to make the transition 
from vigilante group to ethnic militia seen elsewhere in Nigeria, thereby heralding the 
possibility of the APC escalating its interventions in the politics of indigeneity to 
include violence. 
While the APC, the 'parent' body of ANPU London, has not mobilised force to incite 
violent communal conflict, the same cannot be stated categorically of the 'home' 
branches of other London-based geo-ethnic diaspora organisations. For example, the 
Urhobo Progress Union, which has an affiliate organisation in the UK, and its leader, 
Chief Okumagba, are often seen as key protagonists, even instigators, in the bloody 
conflagration between the Itsekiri, Ijaw, and Urhobo over the ancestral and political 
'ownership' of Warri (lbharuneafe 2001; Ikime 2001; Imobighe et al 2002; HRW 
2003b, 2006; WNC/ILF 2003; Ireyenieju 2004; Uzum 2005). Still smouldering, the 
'Warri Crisis' claimed hundreds if not thousands of lives between 1997 and 2003 
(Imobighe et al 2002; HRW 2003b, 2006). Some members of the UK affiliate of the 
UPU are critical of what they see as the inflammatory role of Chief Okumagba and the 
UPU 'headquarters' in the crisis. Nonetheless, the UK affiliate has remained 
constitutionally and financially linked to the UPU in Warri. 
"We are all Nigerians"s: from geo-ethnic loyalties to pan-Nigerian desires 
While they can be seen to reproduce and reinforce the indigenised identities and 
practices that underpin some of the most divisive forms of ethnic politics in Nigeria, 
diaspora organisations grounded in apparently exclusive geo-ethnic identities can also 
soften, negotiate, and even transcend the ethnicised boundaries of belonging in ways 
that foster cordial relations of inter-ethnic affinity. Although membership of such 
organisations is defined principally in terms of indigeneity, it also tends to be open to 
'non-indigene' spouses. Furthermore, provision is sometimes made for associate, 
afftliate, or honorary membership to be awarded to 'non-indigene' 'friends', especially 
those who have contributed in some way to the organisation and/or its community of 
origin. 'Non-indigene' 'guests' are often also welcome to attend organisation meetings 
and can even become regular participants. 
5 Hometown association member, interview, April 2006. 
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The indigenised boundaries of belonging become particularly fluid and open to the 
development of convivial inter-ethnic interaction and affinity during the fundraising 
celebrations that London-based geo-ethnic diaspora organisations generally aspire to 
hold annually. The established custom is for the hosting organisation to invite 
individuals and organisations identifying with different ancestral heritages so as to 
establish reciprocal inter-ethnic relations of hospitality and mutual benevolence. The 
reciprocal hosting and making of donations between ANPU London and unions 
representing Ayege's neighbouring kingdoms and between the respective associations 
of the three 'ethnic-nationalities' tracing their ancestry to Warri suggests that annual 
fundraising events can constitute a space in which even the most entrenched boundaries 
of supposedly intense geo-ethnic rivalry at 'home' can be softened and negotiated in 
diaspora. 
Oeo-ethnic diaspora organisations can also transcend the indigenised boundaries of 
belonging through some of the interventions they make in Nigeria. This reflects a desire 
expressed by members of a number of such organisations for their collective 
benevolence to extend to Nigeria as whole and even to other African countries once it 
had met its primary obligation to the ancestral community. After all, the common 
refrain among members of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations that 'charity begins at 
home' implies that while the dispensing of transnational munificence starts with the 
community of ancestral descent, it might not end there. Hence ANPU London recently 
donated to an appeal on a UK-based Nigerian diaspora radio station to help cover the 
medical costs of a non-Omoyege girl in Nigeria who had been badly burnt in an 
accident. The Calabar Union is very active in the multi-ethnic Cross River State Union, 
through which it has donated to a school for the blind in Obudu. The Ozubulu Women 
Association (OW A) supports 'a home for disabled children' which, while located in 
their hometown, has a regional catchment area. The OW A has also sent books and 
medical equipment to a teaching hospital in neighbouring Enugu State. 
Th~ undertaking by the Itsekiri Women's Association (IW A) to construct a 'cottage 
hospital' at 'home' is framed as an explicit attempt to make a conciliatory gesture 
towards healing some of the geo-ethnic antagonisms underpinning the 'Warri Crisis'. 
Mrs Eyimofi, an IW A member, insists that the proposed hospital is to be located on a 
disputed boundary between the association's co-ethnic Itsekiri and one of their 
adversaries in the crisis, the Urhobo, so as to be readily accessible to both groups. While 
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this could be interpreted as a transnational attempt to assert Itsekiri claims to the land, 
the fundraising launch event for the project saw a prominent member of the London-
based Urhobo community publicly endorse this Itsekiri initiative as a genuine effort to 
foster more amicable relations between the two groups. Indeed, Mrs Eyimofi argues that 
the project reflects a wider desire to see "a prosperous Nigeria where all tribes come 
together" (Interview, London, August 2004). 
Just as geo-ethnic diaspora organisations can work to soften and negotiate indigenised 
boundaries of belonging, so too can their 'home' -based 'parent' bodies. The Ayege 
Progress Committee (APU), the 'apex' organisation for the Ayege National Progress 
Union (ANPU) London, is seen to foster 'inter-community relations' through its annual 
Ayege Day festival. Despite the event being a celebration of Omoyege patriotism, the 
playing of the Nigerian national anthem precedes that of its Ayege counterpart in the 
opening formalities. Furthermore, 'non-indigenes' are invited to participate, especially 
those whose wealth and/or influence have been or may be of benefit to the kingdom. 
Framed as 'friends' rather than 'strangers', such 'non-indigenes' often join in the 
revelry as 'guests of honour' and some are even bestowed with honorary Omoyege 
chieftaincy titles. 
Bolstering still further the formation of such cordial inter-ethnic relations, the 
'traditional authorities' recognise and reward Omoyeges at the festival not only for 
remembering and acting on their primary loyalty to their ancestral homeland of Ayege 
but also for extending some of their munificence and service beyond its boundaries to 
other communities and, indeed, the wider Nigerian nation. It is made clear that a 
'patriotic' Omoyege can also be a 'detribalised' Nigerian. After all, loyal 'sons and 
daughters of the soil' are more 'useful' to Ayege if they can foster convivial 
relationships with 'non-indigenes' who are able to assist in the channelling of financial 
and political capital to the kingdom. 
The 'traditional authorities' themselves also seek to nurture cordial relations with other 
communities, including even Ayege's closest neighbour and traditional adversary, the 
kingdom of Asiki. Unlike their immediate predecessors, the incumbent obas of the two 
kingdoms interact with each other, exchanging letters and meeting regularly. Under 
these obas, the APC and its counterpart, the Asiki Development Council, meet every 
three months in order to discuss mutually beneficial political and developmental 
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initiatives and to resolve any inter-communal disputes peacefully and without expensive 
recourse to lawyers or the state. Furthermore, the two obas, their chiefs, and their 
respective development committees attend, and make substantial contributions to, each 
other's annual community fundraising events. 
The Oba, his council of chiefs, and the APC also make efforts to cultivate convivial and 
mutually supportive relations with 'non-indigenes' residing within Ayege. The 
'traditional authorities' meet with 'hometown associations' and 'ethnic unions' formed 
by migrants to the kingdom and their descendents and are responsive to their opinions 
and concerns. For example, the Oba and the APC have instructed Omoyege 
occupational associations to desist from blocking the entry of 'non-indigenes' to their 
respective trades, declaring the kingdom a 'free market zone'. In turn, 'non-indigene' 
organisations are encouraged to participate in the development of Ayege and duly 
respond, most notably through their active support of Ayege Day at which they 
regularly make substantial donations. 'Non-indigene' residents who have proven 
themselves to be particularly engaged in the progress of the kingdom have even been 
appointed to positions in the 'traditional authorities'. 
'Irrespective of tribe': organising and intervening beyond the ethnicised boundaries 
of belonging 
Beyond those grounded in, and operating through, specific geo-ethnic identities, there 
are also many London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations that do not define 
membership or make transnational interventions on the basis of ethnicity. Established in 
1999, Development Impact for Nigeria (DIFN) exemplifies diaspora NOOs that 
explicitly seek to operate in transcendence of the ethnicised boundaries of belonging, 
stating in its objectives that it is "for all Nigerians irrespective of faith, tribe, age or 
gender" (www.difn.org.uk). Indeed, in its attempts to win support for its health and 
community development-oriented transnational interventions, the organisation actively 
targets the UK-based Nigerian diaspora as a whole. While the ancestral origins of the 
six' UK-based trustees are all within the Yoruba geo-ethnic formation, they are 
nonetheless diverse and include Abeokuta in Ogun State, Igbajo in Osun State, and 
Ikorodu in Lagos State. The trustees came together in the UK through local church and 
neighbourhood connections rather than any ethnicised network. Furthermore, they are 
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anxious to attract new trustees and supporters who will enable the organisation to reflect 
more of Nigeria's geo-ethnic diversity. 
DIFN commenced its programmes and established its Nigeria office in Ipaja, Lagos 
State, a community with which none of the UK-based trustees had any prior links. The 
choice of Ipaja as the initial focus and main base of transnational intervention was due 
entirely to Pastor Bode Omokaro, who was appointed DIFN's Nigeria co-ordinator after 
meeting and impressing the organisation's diasporic founder at a conference in Lagos in 
1999. Bode is not an 'indigene' of Ipaja but has been very actively involved in local 
health and development initiatives during the 15 years he has lived there and this was 
something that DIFN wanted to support and build on. Bode was also engaged because 
he has a master's degree in community development and many years community health 
experience as a senior Red Cross volunteer. Furthermore, he was also found to share 
DIFN's inclusive notion of belonging and progress. Indeed, Bode makes a point of 
identifying himself first and foremost as a Nigerian and believes that ethnic patriotism 
has often been a detrimental force in Nigeria. This is one reason why he chooses not to 
maintain links with his ancestral Yoruba community in Ibadan, Oyo State, and prefers 
instead to devote his energy, skills, and limited financial resources to Ipaja, his 
community of residence. 
In assembling DIFN's team in Ipaja, Bode has employed two staff on the basis of their 
experience in community health work, both of whom identify with Ijaw rather than 
Yoruba heritages, one tracing ancestry to Rivers State, the other to Bayelsa State. 
Moreover, working through local schools, clinics, churches, and a variety of youth and 
community organisations, DIFN is widely seen to engage much of Ipaja's high level of 
ethnic diversity. Indeed, local teachers, health practitioners, church workers, 
government officials, national journalists, and programme participants make a point of 
noting and praising DIFN's ethnically inclusive approach to community and 
development. Just as its diasporic founders intended, DIFN explicitly operates with a 
pan-Nigerian vision of progress, not only embracing ethnic diversity within Ipaja but 
also actively extending its work across Nigeria by advertising its major training 
workshops nationally and by forging links with organisations in different geo-ethnic 
regions. 
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Diaspora organisations grounded in professional identities also have much potential for 
articulating and pursuing national visions of belonging and development. This 
contention lay at the heart of Dr Kunle Onabolu's founding vision for the Engineering 
Forum of Nigerians (EFN) , of which he became the inaugural president in 2002. He 
reasoned that in the absence of a common ethnic or religious identity, professional 
identity could constitute the "rallying point needed for [diasporic Nigerians] to come 
together for the good of Nigeria" (Interview, London, May 2005). Consequently, EFN is 
explicitly constituted as "an inclusive body [that] welcomes all peoples of Nigerian 
descent or affiliation who are engaged in [ ... ] the practice of any of the various 
engineering disciplines" (www.efn.org.uklMembership.htm). 
For Dr Onabolu, any form of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is utterly 
incompatible not only with the values of the organisation but also with the 'code of 
practice' to which professionals in general should adhere. The application of such 
thinking in the operation of EFN is suggested not only by the ethnic diversity of its 
membership and event participants but also by the way in which its transnational 
interventions are targeted at Nigeria as a whole. For example, the Higher Education 
Engineering Challenge it launched at the National Engineering Centre in Lagos in 2006 
is an annual competition to devise an innovative solution to a set engineering problem 
"considered of vital importance to national development" and is open to all engineering 
and technology undergraduates in higher education institutions in Nigeria 
(www.efn.org.uklheec.htm). 
Indeed, in line with Dr Onabolu's founding vision, EFN's central objective to contribute 
to the engineering sector in Nigeria is explicitly framed within national discourses of 
development. For example, after participants had been invited to stand for the Nigerian 
national anthem at EFN' s 2006 London event "Opportunities in the transportation sector 
in Nigeria", Dr Onabolu asserted in his welcome address that EFN was constituted by 
"engineers of Nigerian descent interested in putting something back into the 
development of their nation". By "committing time and resources" in a collective 
attempt to do so, Dr Onabolu suggested that members of the organisation were 
honouring the sentiment of President Kennedy's patriotic call, "Ask not what your 
country can do for you - ask what you can do for your country". 
116 
In pursuing this desire to contribute to the progress of Nigeria as a whole, a key strategy 
EFN has adopted is to directly engage and actively support the nation-building efforts of 
the Nigerian state. Among the audience listening to Dr Onabolu's speech at the 2006 
event were the Nigerian Deputy High Commissioner to the UK, the Nigerian Minister 
of State for Transport, and senior civil servants from Nigerian transport 'parastatals'. 
Having endorsed the latest plans these officials were to present for developing Nigeria's 
transport system, Dr Onabolu advised the assembled diasporic Nigerians and their 
British colleagues, "The time is right for the UK business community and investors to 
take a closer look and get involved". 
In response, the Nigerian Deputy High Commissioner commended EFN and asserted 
that its objectives were in line with the aspirations of the Federal Government. Indeed, 
such was the apparent concordance between the visions of EFN and those of the 
Nigerian state that when President Obasanjo received a report on the event, he decided 
to invite an EFN delegation to meet him in Abuja, some members of which were 
subsequently offered senior positions in Federal Government transport agencies. As one 
who could not resist the opportunity to deploy his knowledge and skills in the service of 
his 'home' nation, the EFN Secretary became the Project Director of the Nigerian 
Railway Modernisation Project, assuming oversight responsibility for the US$8.3 
billion dollar construction of Nigeria's new national rail network. 
Between geo-ethnic loyalties and pan-Nigerian desires: diaspora organisations and 
the articulation of multiple attachments 
In imagining and pursuing national visions of belonging and development, EFN reflects 
what is a trend among London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations grounded in 
professional identities. Associations of UK-based Nigerian accountants, lawyers, 
medics, and nurses also open their memberships beyond the ethnicised boundaries of 
belonging and explicitly aim their transnational interventions at the benefit of Nigeria as 
a whole. Furthermore, such organisations have also joined EFN in beginning to engage 
directly with the nation-building efforts of the Nigerian state. 
However, no matter how committed diasporic professional associations are to the 
'national development' of Nigeria, there can be limits to how far their memberships and 
transnational interventions extend beyond the ethnicised boundaries of belonging in 
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practice. As Mr Samuels, a senior official in the Federal Government's diaspora 
engagement programme, recognises, the geo-ethnic composition of these organisations 
generally reflects the fact that the Nigerian diaspora in the UK, like that in the US, is 
dominated by people tracing their ancestry to southern Nigeria. Consequently, he 
argues, the direct transnational interventions made by these organisations sometimes 
tend to be concentrated in that half of the country. For example, he contends that 
associations of Nigerian medics in the UK and US have sent the "bulk" of their medical 
missions to the 'South-East', 'South-West', and 'South-South' 'geo-political zones', i.e. 
the respective ancestral homelands of the Igbo, Yoruba, and the numerous 'ethnic 
nationalities' of the Niger Delta (Interview, Abuja, October 2005). Indeed, one such 
association based in the UK has stated an explicit desire to deliver 'medical missions' 
across Nigeria and yet all bar one of the five completed missions for which it has 
reported a location have been to one of these three southern geo-ethnic regions. 
Mr Samuels argues that this ethno-regional imbalance betrays how diasporic 
professional associations can distribute at least some of their border-spanning 
benevolence in ways that respond to sub-national, ancestral loyalties among their 
members. Furthermore, he contends that even though such organisations harbour 
genuine desires to intervene in geo-ethnic regions that are not well represented within 
their memberships, they tend to lack the local connections necessary to do so. Indeed, 
this illustrates how ethnicised interests and ties can manifest even through diaspora 
organisations that explicitly claim to imagine and pursue national visions of belonging 
and development. This can be seen most blatantly in some diaspora NGOs that profess 
pan-Nigerian and even pan-African visions of progress and yet appear to extend their 
transnational interventions little beyond the ancestral homelands of their founders. 
However, for many respondents, acting on affective ties to an ancestral community does 
not necessarily preclude or contradict desires and efforts to contribute to other 
communities and the development of Nigeria as a whole. Indeed, we have already seen 
how geo-ethnic diaspora organisations such as ANPU London can extend their 
transnational benevolence beyond the bounds of indigeneity and express aspirations for 
pan-Nigerian progress. Furthermore, diasporans can articulate loyalties to both an 
ancestral community and Nigeria by participating in multiple organisations. A member 
of an explicitly ethnicised organisation that directs transnational interventions primarily 
to the particular benefit of an ancestral homeland can also be a member of an 
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organisation that explicitly seeks to extend its membership and border-spanning 
benevolence beyond the ethnicised boundaries of belonging. For example, Mr Okafor is 
both a member of the 'town union' representing and supporting his ancestral community 
and an active participant in the Engineering Forum of Nigerians which, as we saw 
earlier, employs an inclusive notion of belonging, is deeply committed to Nigeria's 
'national development', and engages directly with the policies and programmes of the 
Federal Government. It would seem that one can be a patriotic citizen of both a geo-
ethnic nation and the Nigerian nation. 
Conclusion 
In contrast to Mr Okafor, Dr Onabolu, the President of EFN, is not involved in any 
explicitly ethnicised diaspora organisation, believing firmly that any form of 
intervention aimed at development should respond to need and not ethnicity. He argues 
that while such organisations often make seemingly beneficial contributions at 'home' 
such as supporting local schools and hospitals, they can be seen to do so in ways that are 
detrimental to coordinated and cohesive 'national development'. Indeed, we have seen 
how geo-ethnic diaspora organisations can reproduce a pervasive and insidiously 
divisive politics of belonging that, for many commentators, fundamentally undermines 
the entrenchment of liberal, democratic governance and renders the Nigerian state 
incapable of fulfilling its obligations to its citizens. 
However, we have seen how these explicitly ethnicised diaspora organisations and their 
transnational interventions can also transcend the ethnicised boundaries of belonging in 
ways that foster convivial inter-ethnic relations and signal desires to see Nigeria fulfil 
its promise as a nation. Furthermore, we have seen that there are also many London-
based Nigerian diaspora organisations that do not define membership or make 
transnational interventions on the basis of ethnicity but instead pursue pan-Nigerian 
visions of belonging and development. Indeed, in the case of professional associations, 
such organisations are even being engaged with some enthusiasm by the Nigerian state 
in its nation-building efforts. 
Clearly, by both reproducing and transcending a divisive politics of belonging, London-
based Nigerian diaspora organisations are involved in the progress of 'home' in ways 
that are much more ambivalent than celebratory national and globalising discourses of 
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'diaspora and development' might hope. Yet it is only by recognising and engaging 
constructively with this ambivalence that the Nigerian state and international 
development agencies can have any hope of realising the full potential of the organised 
diaspora in advancing the Nigerian project. While London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations can be seen to have a problematic relationship with the progress of the 
Nigerian nation, it is important to note that even those explicitly grounded in sub-
national, geo-ethnic identities overwhelmingly aspire to a united and prosperous Nigeria 
and have contributions to make to the realisation of this dream. However, if the 
transnational desires and capabilities of all diaspora organisations are to be harnessed in 
Nigerian nation-building, it will be necessary for the Nigerian state and international 
agencies to articulate and pursue more cosmopolitan visions of diaspora, belonging, and 
development. Only then will it be possible for the Nigerian project to embrace the geo-
ethnic diversity, multiple attachments, and full progressive promise of the organised 
diaspora as a whole. 
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Part 3: collective transnational power and its limits 
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6. Transforming 'home' from 'abroad'? Collective 
remittances, political influence and the limits of collective 
transnational power 
Introduction 
As we saw in Chapter 2, globalising discourses of diaspora and development are 
increasingly celebrating diaspora organisations as powerful drivers of development at 
'home', investing these groups with the capacity to make decisive contributions to, and 
produce major transformative effects in, communities and countries of origin. Within 
these discourses, very often the most significant way in which diaspora organisations 
are seen to make vital contributions to 'home' from afar is by remitting substantial 
volumes of money and materials. By virtue of these 'collective remittances', diaspora 
organisations are posited as a prime, and often the primary, source of tangible, material 
progress at 'home', building and maintaining schools and hospitals, providing and 
transforming public infrastructure and establishing and financing local cooperative 
enterprise. Furthermore, diaspora organisations are seen to buttress their 'collective 
remittances' through acts of 'political transnationalism', exploiting the strategic space 
of diaspora to lobby 'host' and 'home' states to attend to issues of potential benefit to 
communities and countries of origin. In this way, diaspora organisations are imbued 
with the power to exert important influence in support of the progress of 'home'. 
Through their collective remittances and political transnationalism, diaspora 
organisations are seen, then, to make profound contributions to 'homeland' 
development. As we saw earlier, Portes et al (2007: 256) give the example of a 
Dominican 'hometown association' (HTA) that has "literally transformed" its 
hometown. The hometown has, they claim, "grown increasingly reliant on the loyalty 
and generosity of [its] migrants for a number of needs unattended by the national 
government" (ibid.). Indeed, in summing-up the contribution of HT As, Portes and 
Landolt (2000: 543) argue: 
Life conditions in municipalities that receive 'grassroots transnational 
aid' confirm the economic relevance of this collective remittance 
strategy. Towns with a home town association [abroad] have paved 
roads, electricity, and freshly painted public buildings .... [T]he quality 
of life in transnational towns is quite simply better. 
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However, it would seem that the collective remittances and political transnationalism of 
London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations produce nothing like these sorts of 
profoundly transformative effects at 'home'. Indeed, there tends to be very little 
knowledge at 'home' of these groups and their contributions and even those who are 
aware overwhelmingly see collective transnational interventions as rather limited and of 
marginal importance to local and/or national development. Significantly, respondents at 
'home' consistently stress that the material benevolence and political influence of 
diaspora organisations pales into relative insignificance compared to that of individuals 
and organisations based in Nigeria. At the community level, for example, it is 
'indigenes' and their associations based in the community itself or its diaspora within 
Nigeria that are identified and celebrated as by far and away the most important drivers 
of local development. Clearly, if the danger of overplaying the monetary, material and 
political contributions of overseas diaspora organisations is to be avoided, it will be 
necessary for globalising discourses of diaspora and development to afford far greater 
recognition to the benevolence and influence of more local individual and collective 
actors based within the 'home' state itself. 
"Our little impact": transnational collective remittances and transformation at 
'home' 
Rather than seeing diaspora organisations as major drivers of change that can transform 
entire communities and even the nation as a whole, 'home' -based respondents 
overwhelmingly consider such groups to have a very limited impact on processes of 
development in Nigeria. Indeed, many 'home' -based respondents are completely 
unaware of any diaspora organisations based overseas, arguing that if these groups do 
exist, they have done nothing to contribute to 'home' and have no impact on local or 
national progress. Even the relatively few 'home' -based respondents who are aware of 
diaspora organisations generally assert that such groups tend to make a rather modest, 
often marginal, contribution from afar. For example, the director of a leading umbrella 
organisation for NGOs in Nigeria expresses an awareness of the state-initiated 
Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation but contends: 
[ ... T]he connection between [NIDO] and what's happening in Nigeria, 
I haven't seen it personally. Whether they are doing things that are 
useful, I don't know, but I haven't seen the direct connection and their 
123 
ability to harness resources from Britain for instance and actively 
deliver them to communities here. (Interview, Lagos, October 2005) 
Similarly, a senior official of one of the main professional engineering bodies in Nigeria 
argues, "There is a Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation based in U.S., Europe and Asia. 
However, it is not clear how organised they are" (Interview, Lagos, December 2005). 
Furthermore, he reports that he is not aware of any organisations formed by diasporic 
engineers and contends, "It is doubtful if any contributions have so far been made by 
any such organisations". 
At a more local level, the Vice Chairman of the Ipaja! Ayobo Local Development Area 
in Lagos claims that the founders of Development Impact for Nigeria, a diaspora NGO 
that works locally, are exceptional among diasporans, lamenting, "We have so many 
people who are overseas but we don't feel their impact over here" (Interview, Ipaja, 
September 2005). Concurring, a senior figure in Ipaja's 'traditional authorities' 
bemoans that the "many" 'sons and daughters' of the kingdom based overseas have 
failed to organise themselves and have done "nothing" for community development in 
the ancestral homeland (Interview, Ipaja, August 2005). Similarly, a prominent figure in 
the associational life of Ukpenwa asserts that while her co-ethnics living overseas have 
formed associations in the UK and the US, their contribution to the development of the 
ancestral community has been "minimal" (Interview, Ukpenwa, October 2005). Indeed, 
while the 'traditional ruler' of Ukpenwa, the Obu of Ukpenwa, asserts that associations 
of Ukpenwans based overseas are "trying" to support development at 'home', he is 
unable to identify any tangible impact they have made (Interview, Ukpenwa, November 
2005). 
However, a few elites in Ukpenwa (who generally have friends and relatives in overseas 
diaspora organisations or have been engaged directly by such groups) are able to offer 
more insight into what one of their number describes as the "little contribution" of the 
organised Ukpenwan diaspora (Interview, Ukpenwa, November 2005). The oldest 
Uk~enwan overseas diaspora organisation, the Ukpenwa Development Union, Great 
Britain and Ireland, (UDU) founded in London in the 1940s, is not recalled to have sent 
any monetary or material remittances 'home' since it made a donation to the previous 
Obu's palace and to a local orphanage sometime in the second half of the 1990s. The 
Ukpenwa Women's Association UK (UW A), founded in London in 1992, is recognised 
among the transitionally aware in Ukpenwa as the Ukpenwan diaspora organisation to 
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have done the most to 'remember' 'home'. The UWA's local 'patrons' tend to highlight 
the association's 2004 award of a scholarship to a local student that will fund her 
through to the completion of her secondary education. The Director of Ukpenwa's 
General Hospital recalled that the UW A and a Ukpenwan association based in the US 
had donated some equipment in the past, although he was unsure of the precise details. 
He delegated to the Head of Nursing who confirmed, after I jogged her memory on the 
basis of what UW A members had told me, that the association had provided in 2002 a 
respiratory device for new-born babies, a large fridge for drug storage, and mosquito 
screens and bed curtains for the maternity unit. She also recalled that the Ukpenwan 
organisation based in the US had donated a second-hand incubator that did not work. 
However, the items provided by the UW A were "very useful" and "much appreciated", 
she added (Interview, Ukpenwa, November 2005). 
Furthermore, a senior official at the Wazobia State Library in Ukpenwa enthusiastically 
recounted the UW A's provision of books, toys and furniture for the establishment of a 
children's section, proclaiming it a "wonderful idea" for which they should be 
"sincerely congratulate[d]" (Interview, Ukpenwa, October 2005). However, he 
expressed disappointment that since the project was completed in 2002, the UW A had 
not been in contact or sent any further finance or materials for the upkeep of the section. 
Indeed, by the time I visited the library in October 2005, the section had fallen into 
disuse with half of the furniture having apparently broken and been removed and not a 
single book or toy remaining. 
The only other transnational interventions made by the UW A also appear to have had a 
rather fleeting and ultimately limited impact at 'home'. While there was no memory or 
record of the donation of clothes that the UWA apparently made to the Federal 
Psychiatric Hospital in Ukpenwa, the civil servant responsible for a government 
orphanage did recall that her institution had received some years ago a donation of 
clothes and toys from the association. Although the official expressed the orphanage's 
gratitude for this diasporic benevolence, she was keen to stress that it was contributions 
from 'home' -based individuals, socio-cultural organisations, women's associations and 
the local branches of international service clubs such as Rotary and Lions upon which 
the institution "relied" in the absence of sufficient state funding (Interview, Ukpenwa, 
November 2005). Similarly, the director of the psychiatric hospital, who was confident 
that the institution had received no diasporic donations at all, emphasised the 
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importance of contributions made by local women's groups and service clubs. Indeed, 
one of the seven local branches of the Lions club in Ukpenwa had recently installed a 
borehole at the hospital and was in the process of constructing a new administrative 
annexe for the institution. 
In the kingdom of Ayege, it is also clear that the organised diaspora based overseas is 
not seen to drive the progress of the homeland as globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development might hope and expect. Indeed, as in Ipaja and Ukpenwa, it is very 
apparent that the organised diaspora based overseas is considered to make a relatively 
modest contribution to the development of the ancestral community. As the Chairman 
of the Ayege Progress Committee (APC) asserts of overseas Omoyege organisations, 
"they could do more", adding diplomatically, "they are trying their best, [but] perhaps 
we would have liked more" (Interview, Ayege, November 2005). More bluntly, the 
General Chairman of a major occupational association in the kingdom contends, "they 
can do but little", asking rhetorically, "how many people can they assist?" (Interview, 
Ayege, December 2005). "We don't depend on the people outside to assist", he adds 
pointedly. 
Indeed, the impact of overseas diaspora organisations is again such that knowledge of 
these groups and their attempts to contribute to 'home' extends little beyond those local 
elites who have friends or family as members or who are part of, or closely connected 
to, the 'traditional authorities'. Among these elites, the overseas Omoyege organisation 
most readily recalled is the Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU) branch based in 
Toronto, Canada. This association is noted as the overseas Omoyege organisation to 
have made by far the most effort to contribute to community development and the only 
one to have made a 'visible' or 'physical' impact at 'home'. ANPU Toronto has 
achieved this special recognition by virtue of the borehole it installed at one of the 
kingdom's three public hospitals in 1995 and the 'accommodation and recreation 
centre' it has been building for visiting members since 2001. 
, 
The other contributions made by ANPU Toronto have faded from the memory of even 
the transnationally knowledgeable at 'home'. However, the communal archive 
(constituted by APC documents and publications) records that when ANPU Toronto 
installed the borehole in 1995, the association also provided bedding to a local 
government health clinic and renovated the ceiling, windows, and electrics at the 
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maternity wing of Ayege General Hospital. The community archive also records that in 
2000 ANPU Toronto donated N187,000 (c.US$I,8001£1,200) towards the construction 
of the Oba's new, 'ultra-modem' palace. It is perhaps not surprising that this 
contribution was forgotten as it constituted only 1.6% of the N12million 
(c.US$90,0001£55,000) which had been raised and expended by the APC on the palace 
by the time of its commissioning in 2003. 
The couple of other contributions ANPU Toronto has made have been equally modest 
but generally appear to have been of rather less benefit. The community archive records 
that in both 1997 and 1998 the association made a shipment containing books for the 
APC's public library and computers and medical drugs and equipment for the APC to 
distribute to educational and health facilities in the kingdom. While the APC expressed 
gratitude at the time for the donated books, it found most of the computers to be 
"obsolete" and "beyond use", placing them in storage in the hope that one day a 
technician would be identified who could make them function (APC General Secretary, 
interview, Ayege, November 2005). Furthermore, staff at the General Hospital recalled 
after consulting their 'donations from the community' file that, on delivery, the bulk of 
the drugs provided by ANPU Toronto had already expired and that the majority of the 
equipment donated by the association did not function or was not useful and was put 
into storage, where it remains to this day. A member of staff advised that should any 
other overseas diaspora organisations wish to contribute, they should first consult the 
hospital about its needs and requirements. 
ANPU London appears to have made even less of a positive impression at 'home'. With 
the Union not having executed a project with a 'visible' or 'physical' impact, it is not 
only its contributions that are in danger of being forgotten at 'home' but also its very 
existence. Indeed, as far as the APC General Secretary is aware, ANPU London no 
longer exists. Certainly, the organisation is not listed in the APC's current register of 
Omoyege organisations based at 'home' and 'abroad'. When I informed the General 
Secretary that ANPU London had re-formed in early 2004 after a debilitating split in 
2009, he sceptically agreed to take my word for it, adding, "We are yet to feel their 
impact" (ibid). 
Indeed, even among the transnationally aware, the only person to recall ANPU London 
by name and to express knowledge of its continued existence was the Oba. During his 
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annual summer holiday to the UK, the Oba usually meets with ANPU London and/or 
some of its members and on his 2005 visit he received on behalf of the community a 
£425 donation from the union. This represents the only contribution the union is 
recalled or recorded to have made since 2000. Even prior to its period of dormancy 
between 2000 and 2004, ANPU London appears to have contributed little to 
development at 'home'. In 1995, the union "made a donation to a handicapped Ayege 
indigene at the Lagos University Teaching Hospital" (APe document 1995) and 
remitted some finance to the APe to establish a scholarship fund for secondary school 
students in the kingdom. While the latter benevolence enabled the award of some prizes 
of N3,000, the Oba laments that the union's scholarship fund is no longer sufficient to 
make any meaningful disbursements. As he reported to ANPU London during his 2005 
visit to the UK, the fund is in desperate need of replenishment. 
The final ANPU London contribution recorded before the association's debilitating split 
in 2000 is a donation of N20,000 (c.US$1901£125) made that year towards the 
construction of the Oba's new, 'ultra-modern' palace. This pledge constituted less than 
0.2% of the N12million raised for the project. The other interventions ANPU London 
members recall the union making sometime prior to 2000, namely, a donation to the 
APe's Ayege Vanguard 'security committee', the sending of some books for the APe 
library and a financial contribution towards the treatment of a local victim of an acid 
attack, were not recollected or recorded at 'home'. 
Like those made by ANPU London and ANPU Toronto, the contributions of other 
overseas Omoyege organisations are rather modest and appear to have made little 
impact in the collective memory of 'communal effort' at 'home'. The Oba was alone in 
recalling that during his 2005 holiday to the UK the Ayege National Development 
Association UK, which broke away from ANPU London in 2004, gave him £200 to 
donate to the community development fund. The APe General Secretary was alone in 
remembering that ANPU France once provided some bed linen to one of the hospitals in 
Ayege. He was also alone in rather vaguely recalling, "There was a time a group, I think 
froITl America, decided to give scholarships to the secondary school children" 
(Interview, Ayege, November 2005). The communal archive records that this 
contribution was made in 2003 by ANPU Houston, Texas, USA. And the APe General 
Secretary was again alone in recounting that "a group in America" once donated two 
computers, both of which are still in use, one in the APe Secretariat and the other in the 
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Oba's office (ibid). The communal archive reveals that this contribution was made in 
2002 by ANPU Maryland, USA. 
The communal archive also reveals that in 1997 ANPU New York, USA, donated 
N200,000 (c.US$2,400/£1,SOO) towards the APC's 'headline' project, the construction 
of Ayege's town hall. However, it is hardly surprising that this collective transnational 
contribution was not recalled even among the transnationally aware as it constituted 
only O.S% of the N40 million the APC had raised and spent on the hall as of 2003. 
There was, though, some recollection of ANPU New York's donations to the APC's 
library. A member of the library's staff recounts that a few years ago some money for 
the purchase of books was sent by "our people in America" (Interview, Ayege, 
November 200S). Indeed, the communal archive records that INA New York donated 
US$1,2S0 to the library in 1996 and continued its support for the institution with two 
further contributions, sending US$l,OOO in both 1997 and 1999. However, while the 
librarian asserts that this benevolence was "very helpful" in stocking the library, he 
reports that by far the most important contributions to the institution come from local 
organisations and individuals, especially local notables such as the Ayege's oldest high 
chief who is recorded and widely recognised as the initiator and principal funder of the 
library. 
"We don't depend on the people outside to assist": the importance of local 
benevolence and the 'internal diaspora' 
In the territorial imagining of the kingdom of Ayege, as in those of many other geo-
ethnic formations in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa (see for example, Onwubu 1975; 
Trager 2001; Uduku 2002; Mercer et al 2008), to be 'abroad' or 'in diaspora' is not 
necessarily to be beyond the borders of the state but simply to be beyond the boundaries 
of the ancestral, geo-ethnic homeland. For Omoyeges and many other geo-ethnic groups 
in Nigeria, to reside beyond the 'home' community in another Nigerian settlement such 
as Lagos or Ibadan is to be just as much 'abroad' or 'in diaspora' as it is to be based in 
London or New York. This perspective is entirely compatible with academic notions of 
diaspora which, as we saw in Chapter 2, overwhelmingly tend to define the diasporic 
condition in relation to an ethnically-defined homeland rather than a merely politically-
defined state of origin. Consequently, the prevailing academic understanding of 
diaspora allows for the diasporic condition to be made possible by simply crossing the 
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boundary of one's geo-ethnic 'homeland' even if this does not simultaneously involve 
crossing the borders of one's 'home' state. The diasporic condition is therefore 
attainable not just beyond, but also within, the territory of the state of origin. While 
Mercer et al (2008) have usefully proposed the tenn 'domestic diaspora' to describe 
ethnic diasporas fonned within states of origin, I employ instead the notion of the 
'internal diaspora' as it highlights the role of what are conventionally tenned 'internal 
migrants' in the production and maintenance of these diasporas. 
Significantly, there is good reason to think that internal migrants and the internal 
diasporas that they can produce carry much significance for the development of their 
'home' communities. Firstly, while reliable data or even rough estimates appear to be 
completely lacking, it is clear that internal migration in Nigeria is of a considerable 
magnitude, certainly compared to international migration from the country which 
involves no more than a very small proportion of the country's 140 million-strong 
population! (Change Institute 2009). As de Haas (2006, p6) asserts, "Due to its sheer 
population size, internal migration occurring in Nigeria is massive compared to the 
relatively modest international out-migration". Furthennore, there is a substantial and 
long established literature on Nigeria and other African countries that charts the 
contributions internal migrants have made to their 'home' communities since the early 
20th century, especially through the 'hometown associations' and 'ethnic unions' that 
they fonn in their urban centres of residence and the community development 
organisations that they support back in their rural homelands (Coleman 1958, 1994; 
Sklar 1963; Aronson 1971; Melson and Wolpe 1971; Smock 1971; Ekeh 1975, 1992; 
Ahanotu 1982; Barkan et al 1991; Osaghae 1994, 1995; Vaughan 1995; Honey and 
Okafor 1998; Ikelegbe 2001a,b; Smith 2001; Trager 2001; Abbott 2002; Adejumobi 
2004; Ukiwo 2005). 
Indeed, in identifying the most important contributors to communal development in 
Ayege, records and respondents in the kingdom point not to Omoyege diaspora 
organisations based overseas but rather to Omoyege organisations and individuals based 
in Ayege itself and its 'internal diaspora' within Nigeria. For example, in tracing the 
development of the kingdom, the APC-sponsored history of Ayege, published in 1994, 
makes no mention of any Omoyege organisations based overseas but devotes much 
attention to the multifarious and important contributions made by a plethora of 
I http://www.population.gov.ng/2006_final_results/nationafinal.pdf 
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voluntary associations, such as 'social clubs', 'church societies', 'trade guilds' and 
'cooperatives', based in the kingdom itself. The only collective diasporic contributions 
that are celebrated in this 'official' communal history are those made by the ANPU 
branches formed by Omoyege migrants and descendents residing in urban centres 
within Nigeria, most notably Lagos, Abuja, Ibadan, Kaduna, Jos, Zaria, and the capital 
of Iroko State, Lagbara. Tellingly, it is Nigerian towns and cities such as these, rather 
than London, New York or Toronto, that are most readily identified at 'home' as the 
key nodes of the 'Omoyege diaspora' and the most import sources of individual and 
collective communal benevolence from 'abroad'. 
In records and recollections at 'home', 'traditional' elites in Ayege and individuals and 
associations based in the extended Omoyege community2 within Nigeria are credited 
with coming together to establish over the course of the 21st century the kingdom's two 
main public hospitals, thirteen of its forty or so primary schools, and eight of its dozen 
or so secondary schools. Prominent Omoyeges based in Ayege and its 'internal 
diaspora' are lauded for establishing in recent years a number of highly regarded private 
schools and hospitals in the kingdom. And continuing another long-standing tradition of 
Omoyege 'self-help', local communal associations and notables win praise for stepping 
in for a negligent state by financing repairs and extensions to Ayege's road network. 
Furthermore, Omoyege 'youth' associations based in the kingdom are commended for 
making a vital contribution to such 'communal efforts' to maintain infrastructure, 
volunteering their labour to repair roads and bridges, clear drainage channels and 
reinstall electricity supply lines. 
Associations and wealthy individuals in the extended Omoyege community within 
Nigeria are also noted for providing many scholarships, awarding them far more 
consistently and in much greater numbers than Omoyege organisations based overseas. 
For example, ANPU Lagbara maintains a NIlO,OOO secondary school scholarship fund 
that enables the union to make two significant awards every year. Furthermore, as one 
of the many 'social clubs' formed by 'traditional' and educated elites in Ayege, the 
Leaders' Club has alone awarded more scholarships than all overseas Omoyege 
2 Here I invoke Berry's (1985) work on the urban-rural ties of Yoruba migrants in Nigeria and her use of 
the term 'extended community'. In this conception, a hometown community includes not only its 
'indigenes' based in the hometown itself but also its 'indigenes' resident in other urban centres within 
Nigeria. 
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organisations put together, providing 11 awards to Omoyege university students in 
Nigeria. 
Organisations in the extended Omoyege community within Nigeria are further lauded 
for creating and supporting livelihood opportunities for indigenes in Ayege. A diverse 
range of Omoyege occupation and trade guilds in the kingdom offer apprenticeships and 
rotating credit to members and the Lagos-based Ayege Economic Forum (AEF) has 
pooled the resources and contacts of its wealthy and influential membership to find jobs 
for over 100 of their co-ethnics. Furthermore, the AEF is also widely applauded for 
significantly increasing the capital base of Ayege's community bank, enabling the 
extension of micro-credit to many more local indigenes. And most notably, the AEF has 
joined with wealthy members of the 'traditional authorities' to purchase from the state 
government Ayege's only major industrial plant, the plan being to 'resuscitate' the 
currently 'moribund' facility to provide employment for the kingdom's indigenes. 
The importance of individuals and organisations based in Ayege and its diaspora within 
Nigeria is particularly apparent at the annual Ayege Day fundraising event. Instituted in 
1989, this festival is regarded as critical to Ayege's progress as it has come to constitute 
the main source of finance for the 'communal effort' driven and coordinated by the 
Ayege Progress Committee (APC). Indeed, as the executive arm of the kingdom's 
'traditional authorities', the APC deploys communal funds generated at Ayege Day in 
major 'self-help' initiatives, such as contesting land disputes on behalf of the kingdom, 
organising security against 'armed robbers', maintaining and repairing public 
infrastructure and constructing prestigious communal edifices such as the Oba's 'ultra-
modern' palace and the imposing town hall. Significantly, an analysis of the donations 
made at the eleven Ayege Days between 1992 and 2004 for which data is available 
reveals that of the total raised each year, an average of nearly 30% comes from 
voluntary associations based in Ayege itself or its diaspora within Nigeria and an 
average of nearly 50% comes from individual donors, the overwhelming majority of 
whom are based in the kingdom or the 'internal diaspora'. Furthermore, an average of 
nem:ly 11 % of the annual total raised at Ayege Day comes from local government, local 
schools, local and national businesses and neighbouring communities. This means that, 
on average, nearly 90% of the total amount raised at Ayege Day comes from 
individuals, voluntary associations, organisations, institutions and communities based 
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within Ayege itself or other locations within Nigeria. Indeed, on average, Omoyege 
organisations based overseas contribute less than 11 % of the total raised at Ayege Day. 
Significantly, even organised overseas diasporans themselves contend their associations 
make a rather limited contribution to development at 'home'. As Mrs Obafemi of 
ANPU London reflects, "I wouldn't be foolish enough to say that, 'OK, ANPU London 
plays a major role in the development, in the running of things in Ayege', no, we just 
contribute what we can according to what we have and we aspire to do more, [ ... ]" 
(Interview, London, July 2005). Furthermore, Mrs Obafemi is far from alone in also 
arguing that associations based in Nigeria are doing more to contribute to the progress 
of the ancestral homeland; "Now when we talk about ANPU, I hope you realise that it's 
not just the London branch alone, there are ANPUs in Nigeria, some are active there, 
Lagos and so on, some of them even play bigger roles that what ANPU London is 
doing". As a fellow member laments of ANPU London, "it's not performing the way 
most ANPU back home are performing" (Interview, London, July 2005). Like many 
organised diasporans, ANPU London members therefore have little choice but to 
content themselves with making what one of their number describes as "our little 
impact" (Interview, London, July 2005). 
Influencing progress from afar? Collective political transnationalism and its limits 
As we saw in Chapter 5, some diaspora organisations, particularly those explicitly 
grounded in sub-national, geo-ethnic identities, attempt to lobby the 'home' state to 
attend to the particular needs and desires of their respective communities of origin. 
However, while such organisations often see this mode of 'political transnationalism' as 
a key element of their border-spanning activities and sometimes suggest that they have 
some potentially useful contacts strategically located in the Nigerian state, they tend to 
doubt their ability to exert any meaningful influence on behalf of their ancestral 
homelands. For example, reflecting on ANPU London's attempts to encourage 
government officials at 'home' to ensure that the development of Ayege is supported by 
the Nigerian state, an active founding member of the Union laments, "there's nothing 
much you can do from here to influence them, we can only advise". Indeed, no ANPU 
London members could identify an instance where they believed that they had 
successfully turned the gaze and munificence of the Nigerian state towards their 
ancestral kingdom. 
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Similarly, the President of the Wazobia State Union (WSU) expresses considerable 
doubt about the efficacy of its attempts to lobby and influence the Nigerian state on 
behalf of UK-based 'hometown associations' and 'ethnic unions' representing various 
communities in Wazobia State. Despite enjoying official recognition from, and direct 
channels of communication with, both the Nigeria High Commission in the UK and the 
Wazobia State Government at 'home', the President of the WSU contends: 
[ ... T]hey do listen sometimes but, to answer directly, it all depends. 
Like if the issues are such that there no political consequences, then 
they can ignore [them]. [ ... I]f there are issues of political consequence 
then obviously they will have to address them but typical politicians, 
they only address issues when they think it's of any political 
advantage or concern. So take for instance we, the Wazobia State 
Union, did, some years ago, ask for a plot of land in Ukpenwa to 
convert into a theme park. [ ... T]he State Government promised they 
would do that but we're still waiting! [Laughs] For them, there's not 
any political expedience so they haven't done anything about it. So it 
all depends, I mean, we can only do what we can and that's it. 
(Interview, London, June 2006) 
Indeed, it is widely felt that that the border-spanning influence geo-ethnic diaspora 
organisations are able to exert on behalf of their communities of origin is at the mercy 
of the interests of 'home' -based politicians and officials. The president of a union 
representing diasporans hailing from a state in south-east Nigeria bemoans that 
gubernatorial incumbents and aspirants from the 'home' state are always keen to be 
"hosted" by the union when they visit the UK seeking votes and campaign funds in the 
build-up to elections (Interview, London, May 2005). However, he bemoans that once 
these politicians retain or assume office, they are "not interested" in engaging with 
members of the union. Indeed, he decries that when members have attempted to visit 
incumbent governors, they have been "treated like shit". 
Even diaspora organisations that have displayed exceptional levels of political activism 
on behalf of their ancestral communities express profound frustration at the degree of 
infllJence they have been able to exert from afar on the Nigerian state. Seeking to 
combat the economic and environmental exploitation of her "homeland", the oil-
producing Niger Delta, Mrs Ikendu, the director of the London-based NGO Nigerian 
Women for Development (NWD), stands out in terms of the scope and intensity of the 
border-spanning lobbying she has been able to coordinate through her organisation 
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since its formation in 1994. From NWD's base in London, Mrs Ikendu has forged close 
contact with the local Member of Parliament, met both Queen Elizabeth II and Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, corresponded with Pope John Paul II, and engaged the Foreign 
Office, Commonwealth Secretariat, Commission for Africa, Amnesty International and 
the Shell oil company. On visits to Nigeria, Mrs Ikendu has met with Shell, a senator, a 
presidential advisor, a former Presidential candidate, and the former military president 
General Babangida. 
In 2002, she even joined over 3000 "grass root women" in staging peaceful protests 
outside the operational headquarters of Shell and Chevron in her native state in the 
Niger Delta (Interview, London, June 2005). While the women had hoped to dialogue 
with representatives of the oil companies, they were met instead by the tear gas, boots, 
whips, and rifle butts of a combined deployment of mobile police and soldiers. For Mrs 
Ikendu, the most tangible result of her participation in the protest was the prominent 
horsewhip scars she acquired across her upper back. "Once again, the women lost to the 
oil giant operating with impunity in the Niger Delta", she laments (NWD document 
2005). Indeed, despite all the lobbying and activism in which NWD has engaged at 
'home' and 'abroad', Mrs Ikendu frequently questions the extent to which the 
organisation has been able to influence oil companies, the international community and 
the Nigerian state to end what she sees as the economic exploitation, environmental 
degradation, political marginalisation and brutal militarisation of her ancestral 
homeland. Reflecting on a meeting she had with a presidential advisor in Abuja, Mrs 
Ikendu wonders, "how did the people of the Niger Delta benefit from my efforts 
through the Chief to abate the repression and killing in the region?" (NWD document 
2006). Deeply frustrated by the limited success of NWD's 'political transnationalism', 
Mrs Ikendu concluded that positive change will be effected in the Delta only when it 
has more responsible and transparent leaders. This was why she came to make an 
ultimately unsuccessful bid to be elected governor of one of the states in the region in 
the 2007 elections. 
Despite representing a highly strategic node of what was, at one time, the internationally 
most recognised Niger Delta protest movement, the coordinator of the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) Europe also expresses deep frustration at 
the extent to which his organisation has been able to challenge from afar the 
exploitation of the region and its resources. While he argues that this London-based 
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branch became "the centre of MOSOP operations" and "kept MOSOP going" between 
mid-1994 and mid-1998 when the military regime of President Abacha brutally 
suppressed the 'home-based 'parent' body, he bemoans that MOSOP Europe has been 
unable to do more to help the movement recover the political voracity it lost with the 
state execution in 1995 of nine of its 'home' -based leaders, especially the charismatic 
and internationally acclaimed writer Ken Saro-Wiwa (Interview, London, May 2005). 
Indeed, he regrets that the European branch has been unable to utilise its strategic 
location to prevent the Ogoni cause from sliding down the agendas of the international 
community and the Nigerian state. Consequently, he decries, the human rights abuses, 
political marginalisation and environmental degradation that MOSOP sought to counter 
on behalf of the Ogoni and the Niger Delta are as bad as, and in some ways worse than, 
they ever were. 
The view from the 'hometown': the limits of collective political trans nationalism and 
the influence of the 'internal diaspora' and local agency 
Diasporans' doubts about the efficacy of their organised attempts to lobby the Nigerian 
state on behalf of communities of origin are very much confirmed by co-ethnics at 
'home'. In Ayege, for example, members of the 'traditional authorities' and ordinary 
citizens alike were unable to identify any instances where they knew or felt that an 
organisation of Omoyeges based overseas had been able to influence the 'government' 
to recognise the kingdom in the disbursement of state power and resources. Tellingly, 
the Executive Chairman of Ayege/Asiki Local Government expresses notable 
indifference to the advances of even the most established and supposedly well respected 
of such organis~tions, ANPU London; "The people in London, they've sent invitations 
for me to attend their meeting so many times, but I never find time to go" (Interview, 
Ayege, November 2005). 
Significantly, when it comes to identifying the most effective associational agents of 
communal lobbying, leaders and citizens of Ayege point consistently to Omoyege 
organisations based in the ancestral kingdom and its extended community within 
Nigeria rather than those based overseas. Given their status as the 'apex' institutions 
responsible for the development of Ayege, it is the Oba-in-council and its executive 
arm, the APC, that are held up as the most important torch-bearers of communal 
interest. From their base in the kingdom, the 'traditional authorities', as they are 
136 
collectively known, maintain Omoyege pressure on the local, state, and federal 
governments with petitions and the sending and receiving of delegations and are 
generally given the ultimate credit for any benevolence that the state affords Ayege. 
Indeed, it is the 'traditional authorities' that are seen to lead and coordinate from the 
kingdom all the communal lobbying efforts undertaken by its citizens and associations 
based at 'home' and 'abroad'. 
In driving the campaign to assert Ayege's needs and desires, members of the 'traditional 
authorities' cite the ANPU branch in Lagbara as the most important organisational node 
in the Omoyege network of communal claims-making. Emphasising the political 
significance of ANPU Lagbara, the General Secretary of the APC asserts, "there is 
nothing that we do in the town here that the Lagbara branch are not consulted on, 
because they are in the state capital, they are very close to the government" (Interview, 
Ayege, November 2005). Indeed, given its highly strategic location in the capital of 
Iroko State and with a high proportion of its members working as civil servants in the 
State Government, ANPU Lagbara is widely seen as the Omoyege organisation most 
able to influence government officials to attend to the development of Ayege. 
Furthermore, ANPU Lagbara is lauded for making the most of its advantageous 
position, producing tangible results in the quest to attract the gaze and munificence of 
the state. For example, in "assist[ing] the town to have its fair share of whatever is going 
on in the state" (ibid), ANPU Lagbara is credited with persuading the State Government 
to increase the quota of new boreholes allocated to Ayege in a recent water provision 
programme. ANPU Lagbara attracts particular praise for playing an apparently decisive 
role in encouraging the State Government to promote Ayege's 'traditional ruler' from a 
'Grade B' to a 'Grade A' ~ba, ensuring his official recognition as an educated monarch 
and enabling him to assume in 2003 the prestigious and influential role of Chairman of 
the Iroko State Council of Obas. ANPU Lagbara is also seen to make an especially 
significant contribution to the political power and progress of Ayege by assisting 
Omoyeges to obtain positions in the Iroko State civil service; "that is a major 
something", contends the APC General Secretary, "that one is not quantifiable" (ibid). 
In such ways, then, ANPU Lagbara is considered central in activating and expanding 
the communal lobbying networks through which the 'traditional authorities' seek to 
promote the needs and desires of Ayege in the contest for state largesse. 
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After ANPU Lagbara, it is another organisation located in the extended Omoyege 
community within Nigeria that is most celebrated for the political influence it is able to 
exert on behalf of Ayege. Based in Lagos but with some members located in other 
major nodes of the Omoyege diaspora within Nigeria, principally Abuja, Lagbara, 
Ibadan, and Port Harcourt, the Ayege Economic Forum (AEF) has begun to attract 
notable acclaim for the increasingly important communal influence it has been able to 
exert on the state since its formation in 2001. Constituted by prominent, "middle-aged" 
Omoyege professionals and lauded as the organisation to "gradually receive the baton of 
power" from the elderly "Babas" of the APC (APC document 2002), the AEF espouses 
a discourse of "economic empowerment" and has a key strategy to strengthen and 
broaden significantly the networks through which the development needs and desires of 
Ayege can be asserted and pursued (AEF Chairman, interview, Lagos, December 2005). 
As the Forum's founder and Chairman (and the Managing Director and Chief Executive 
Officer of one of Nigeria's biggest commercial enterprises), Mr Adesanya argues that 
the AEF possesses both the "economic power" and "network" to better champion the 
Omoyege cause, especially at the state and federal government levels (ibid). Indeed, the 
AEF is noted for having utilised its greater financial and political capital to "place" over 
100 Omoyeges in senior, strategic commercial and governmental positions. The AEF 
also wins much praise at 'home' for funding the election campaigns of Omoyeges who 
wish to stand for political office. With the assertion of Ayege's needs and desires in 
mind, all Omoyeges whose professional or political progress has been supported by the 
AEF are obliged to reciprocate by employing their influential positions to the communal 
good. Indeed, Mr Adesanya presents AEF beneficiaries with a clear challenge; "I have 
built you up but what are you doing for the community?" (ibid). 
Furthermore, the AEF has itself flexed its economic and political muscle for the direct 
benefit of Ayege. Most notably, the Forum utilised Mr Adesanya's 'very close' 
relationship with the Governor of Iroko State to ensure that the ownership of Ayege's 
only major industrial facility was transferred from the Iroko State Government to the 
AEF on behalf of the community. Members of the 'traditional authorities' gladly 
acknowledge the influence of the AEF in winning control for the kingdom of this 
currently 'moribund' but potentially highly productive and profitable economic 
infrastructure. Moreover, they enthusiastically endorse the Forum's plan to favour 
Omoyeges in the issuing of share options in the facility, thereby entrenching 
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'indigenous ownership' of the plant and ensuring that it is successfully 'resuscitated' in 
a way that provides employment for Omoyege workers. 
Having demonstrated an ability to influence such powerful government figures as the 
Governor of Iroko State, the AEF is increasingly finding it less of a challenge to lobby 
on behalf of the community less senior but nonetheless important officials such as the 
Chairman of the Ayege/ Asiki Local Government, a man with whom ANPU London has 
not even been able to secure a meeting. As Mr Adesanya, the AEF's Chairman, asserts 
with a wry smile, "We've gotten to a point today where we say, 'Mr. Local Government 
Chairman, we want to see you', and he will worry about why we're calling him" (ibid). 
It is no surprise, then, that the AEF displays an almost supreme confidence in its 
growing political influence while ANPU London expresses only grave doubts and deep 
frustration about the efficacy of its efforts to lobby the state from afar. Indeed, it is to 
Lagbara, Lagos and Abuja that the leaders and citizens of Ayege point when identifying 
the most important nodes of the organised network through which the kingdom's needs 
and desires are impressed upon the state. Tellingly, no mention is made of London, New 
York or any other location in the organised Omoyege diaspora based overseas. 
Significantly, Ayege's 'traditional authorities' and ordinary citizens even credit 
associations based in the kingdom itself, particularly its elite 'social clubs' , with greater 
political influence than Omoyege organisations based overseas. The Ayege Pacesetters, 
for example, is especially noted for consistently employing the "talents and positions,,3 
of its members to play a significant role in encouraging the state to assist with the 
provision of a number of important amenities in the kingdom over the years, including 
its 'model' farm and post office. The political importance of associations based within 
the ancestral homeland relative to those based overseas is particularly apparent in 
Ukpenwa. 
Unlike Ayege, Ukpenwa is not a relatively small and isolated rural kingdom but a 
notable 'metropolis' that enjoys the status of being a state capital and a major 
commercial hub of national significance. Consequently, while Ayege sees many, if not 
most, of its educated citizens leave the kingdom to pursue their aspirations in the bigger 
towns and cities of Nigeria, Ukpenwa offers its educated elites far more socio-economic 
and political opportunities and therefore retains at 'home' the bulk of its wealthiest and 
3 APe document 1994 
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most well-connected 'sons and daughters'. When it comes to asserting communal needs 
and desires, then, the leaders and citizens of Ukpenwa do not join those of Ayege in 
looking primarily to diasporic co-ethnics and their organisations based in other urban 
centres within Nigeria but rather turn to the elite associations formed and based in the 
ancestral homeland itself. 
As in Ayege, however, leaders and citizens in Ukpenwa certainly do not consider their 
organised co-ethnics overseas as a political force in making communal claims on the 
state. Indeed, 'indigenes' in Ukpenwa, as in Ayege, do not report any instances where 
organisations of their co-ethnics based overseas have successfully lobbied the state on 
behalf of the ancestral homeland. In contrast, just as organisations formed by the 
Omoyege diaspora within Nigeria are seen in Ayege to have an established and 
unrivalled record of exerting political influence on behalf of the kingdom, elite 
communal associations based in Ukpenwa itself are credited with a long history of 
being the most important and successful lobbyists for the progress and development of 
the homeland. 
Ever since the early 1920s, a whole series of Ukpenwa 'unions' have risen from the city 
to assert its interests, especially in times of perceived communal disadvantage. Indeed, 
what are today the two most prominent and powerful Ukpenwa organisations, the 
Ukpenwa Masquerade Society (VMS) and the Ukpenwa Culture and Progress 
Association (UCPA), were formed in the early 1980s with a key aim to lobby the 
Federal Government to create a new Wazobia State in which Ukpenwa and its co-ethnic 
hinterland would be separated from their increasingly dominant geo-ethnic neighbours, 
most especially the demographically and politically ascendant Oghedus. Having 
ultimately triumphed in this major campaign, the VMS and UCPA have remained 
focussed on the "militant defence of Ukpenwa interest" (VMS document 2004). 
Indeed, the Vice President of the VMS, Elder Chief Johnson, a senior Wazobia State 
civil servant and a prominent figure in Ukpenwa affairs, argues that although the two 
associations are described as "cultural organisations", they are, in practice, primarily "a 
kind of political movement, undergound" (Interview, Ukpenwa, November 2005). 
"[W]e just use the culture to cover it", he adds. Indeed, in describing the activities and 
significance of Ukpenwa's two "paramount" 'cultural organisations', Elder Johnson 
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first highlights their ability to establish communal networks through which Ukpenwan 
needs and desires can be asserted in the Nigerian polity: 
Well, politically, let me start from politically. If we have somebody 
from here who is contesting any national post or whatever, we have to 
rally round that person because he's our own person. The time was 
here when some people from Oghedu came to contest the Senate with 
people from here and we stood and rallied round our people and 
mobilised people to vote for our candidate and our candidate won. So, 
politically, that is what we can do. 
Concordantly, when describing the endeavours of the UCPA, Dr. Ikunwa, a founding 
father of the organisation, also prioritises what he terms "political contributions" 
(Ikunwa 2004, a history of the UCPA; Interview, Ukpenwa, October 2005). Mirroring 
Elder Johnson, Dr. Ikunwa, a local medical practitioner, university lecturer, and 
Ukpenwa High Chief, details how this "cultural NGO" has supported members in their 
quests to win political office, achieving many successes at the local, state, and federal 
levels, including his own appointment as a federal minister in the 1980s. Highlighting 
how this "fraternity policy" has produced significant and tangible benefits for Ukpenwa 
and its people, Dr. Ikunwa details how the group's advancement of his own political 
career saw the promotion of fellow UCP A members and other co-ethnics to strategic 
positions in the state apparatus and witnessed the completion of major infrastructural 
projects in Ukpenwa and its co-ethnic hinterland. For Dr Ikunwa, the mutually-
supported political progress of UCPA members is critical to the efficacy of the 
"pressure group activities" the organisation undertakes on behalf of Ukpenwa, the 
crowning glory of which remains its leading role in the successful campaign to persuade 
the Federal Government to create Wazobia State and 'free' Ukpenwa from Oghedu 
domination. Indeed, it was through this momentous victory in "the battle for Ukpenwa" 
that the VMS and UCPA established their lasting reputation among Ukpenwans both at 
'home' and 'abroad' as the most influential associational agents in the assertion of 
Ukpenwa's interests. 
Clearly, organisations formed and based in Ukpenwa itself are lauded as the most 
important and influential collective agents in pressing upon the state the city's needs 
and desires. While these organisations are widely celebrated for the memorable and 
hugely significant political 'victories' they have won for Ukpenwa, associations of 
Ukpenwans based overseas barely register in the communal consciousness and are not 
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known to have exerted any influence on the state to the tangible benefit of the 
'homeland'. Similarly, we have seen in Ayege that overseas Omoyege organisations are 
not credited with any successes in lobbying the state on behalf of the kingdom, leaders 
and citizens pointing instead to the major concessions won for the community by elite 
'social clubs' based at 'home' and, most especially, Omoyege organisations based in 
other towns and cities within Nigeria. Indeed, it is overwhelmingly apparent that, in 
both Ayege and Ukpenwa, the most important and effective organisational agents of 
communal lobbying are seen to be based within and not beyond the borders of Nigeria. 
As members of London-based associations grounded in Omoyege, Ukpenwan and other 
ancestral identities fear, diaspora organisations based overseas appear to be rather 
marginal in the assertion of communal needs and desires. 
Shaping the Nigerian project? Collective political transnationalism and its limits at 
the national level 
Diaspora organisations based overseas are seen to have a limited ability to lobby and 
influence the state from afar not only in relation to asserting local community interests 
but also in terms of shaping national policies and programmes of 'progress' and 
'development'. For example, Mr Ekpwen, a political science graduate and a senior 
federal civil servant based in Abuja, contends that the influence of diaspora 
organisations today simply does not compare to that exerted by their forebears during 
the post-World War II intensification of the movement for Nigerian independence. 
Citing the West African Students' Union and Egbe Omo Oduduwa, founded in 1925 
and 1945 respectively, Mr Ekpwen argues that it was through these diaspora 
organisations formed in London that a new generation of nationalist leaders and parties 
emerged. Indeed, it is well documented that when these nationalists returned 'home' 
with the organisational structures they had created in London, they came to play key 
roles in drumming-up nationalist sentiment and forming the political parties that set 
Nigeria irresistibly on the path to independence (see also Coleman 1958; Sklar 1963; 
Adi 1994). Today, Mr Ekpwen asserts, it is impossible to identify an organised 
diasporic influence of anywhere near such importance. For him, this has much to do 
with diasporic 'exposure' no long carrying the same aura and authority back at 'home'. 
Prior to independence, he suggests, "townspeople" would flock to Lagos to see-off one 
of their lucky "sons" going to London, maintaining a "vigil" until, having gained an 
education and "become like the white man", he returned to be greeted as "some kind of 
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god" (Interview, Abuja, August 2005). The UK today, he continues, is merely another 
land that many Nigerians can and have visited and whose inhabitants, and the Nigerians 
who have lived among them, are "only human". 
Mrs Akinyemi, the Lagos-based director of one of the most prominent networks of civil 
society organisations in Nigeria, also sees significant organised diasporic influence in 
national affairs as a phenomenon of the past, albeit the more recent past. Indeed, she 
notes that a wave of diasporic collective action played a role in the intensified pro-
democracy movement that rose in Nigeria when presidential elections were annulled by 
the military regime of General Babangida on June 12th 1993: 
We were able to do a lot of very collaborative things during the 
military because [ ... ] we had a common enemy. We were able to 
organise a branch of NADECO [National Democratic Coalition] 
outside. They as a group were able to engage the British government 
so there was high level interventions that took place and someone like 
me wrote to the Queen saying I would relinquish my father's MBE 
[Member of the Order of the British Empire] in parliament if we 
didn't have sanctions when June 12th happened. So we were able to 
engage the [British] government directly and get a lot of positive 
response because they could feel our pain, they could see that truly 
this was affecting just about everybody [ ... ]. (Interview, Lagos, 
October 2005) 
However, Mrs Akinyemi rues that once the transition to democracy was finally secured 
in 1999, the international community became much less willing to listen to any "anti-
government elements". Furthermore, she laments, the defeat of the "common enemy" 
represented by the military also precipitated, both at 'home' and in diaspora, a 
fracturing and weakening of Nigerian civil society as its energy and focus dissipated to 
pursue a range of different national issues and divergent sub-national interests. For Mrs 
Akinyemi, while civil society in Nigeria has in recent years made strides to again 
cooperate, build consensus, and form coalitions that can engage the state on major, 
inter-related national issues, civil society in diaspora has remained fragmented and 
particularistic. 
Consequently, she bemoans that, since the return of civilian rule in 1999, there has been 
very little evidence of any organised diasporic interventions aimed at supporting 
national political projects such as the entrenchment of democracy, good governance, 
and economic reform. With strong diasporic connections herself, she complains that, in 
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general, diasporans are not "looking at the big picture" or "addressing one big thing that 
could really make a difference to the country". She expresses particular disappointment 
that there is little tangible diasporic support for major, 'home' -based civil society 
initiatives aimed at reforming the Nigerian state, contending: 
[T]hey must find a way of linking with [civil society] networks that 
are here, [ ... ], [and] campaigns like 'Publish What You Pay', 
coalitions like the Freedom of Information Coalition which is now 
driving the Freedom of Information Bill - those are big things that can 
make big differences and it doesn't take much to send emails, send 
information, just share, that's maybe all that's needed. In terms of 
engineering huge changes, that can be done if they are organised out 
there in the diaspora because they can see what's going on. 
Indeed, Mrs Akinyemi suggests that diasporans could come together and "assist the 
anti-corruption drive" by tracking the international movements of Nigerian leaders and 
making them feel that they can no longer act with impunity when travelling abroad: 
[The diaspora] should make the people who are governing us shudder 
if they think of going abroad. They should be shuddering that, "oh 
God, when we get there, what's gonna happen?" There should be 
people in Heathrow Airport, Gatwick Airport with banners saying, 
"Don't come here!" That's the kind of stuff we want them to be doing. 
In calling for greater organised political engagement from the diaspora, Mrs Akinyemi 
argues that diasporic 'professionals' in particular could do much more to employ their 
status, positions and expertise to influence positive change in Nigeria: 
[ ... ] I'm afraid I don't see enough of [ ... ] professionals in the diaspora 
coming up with real, well thought out, strategic, well researched 
information and· material for Nigerians [ ... ]. [ ... W]e need more 
information about how systems work. Our privatisation exercise is 
going on - let's have a critique from our civil society out there. 
[ ... W]e want a lot more criticism, you open the newspapers here, you 
don't see much coming from the Nigerians in diaspora. [ ... ] The 
resources are there, the connections are there, they're in the 
international media, they can walk into the BBC and say, "we want to 
have a conference to talk about what's happening in Nigeria, we want 
CNN there", everybody will be there. [They can produce p ]osition 
papers on this issue and that issue. [ ... ] But they're not organised, 
that's the problem. 
Significantly, diasporic professionals themselves often feel that they could and should 
do much more to organise in an attempt to engage and influence the nation-building 
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project of the Nigerian state. Indeed, it was partly a deep frustration with the apparent 
lack of diasporic collective involvement in the political affairs of 'home' that prompted 
a group of six UK-based Nigerian professionals to form in 1999 the diaspora NGO 
Development Impact for Nigeria (DIFN). With the motto "Doing Nothing is Not an 
Option", a central, founding aim of DIFN is to "encourage Nigerians living outside 
Nigeria to see themselves as active stakeholder[s] in poverty alleviation and community 
building in Nigeria" (DIFN documents, n.d.). In pursuing this aim, DIFN has challenged 
diasporans, particularly diasporic professionals, to heighten, re-orientate and better 
organise their engagements with the Nigerian state and its policies and programmes of 
progress. For example, at an 'information day' DIFN organised to discuss "how 
Nigerians in the UK can impact Nigeria's development" (DIFN event flyer, 2005), a 
trustee of the organisation addressed the audience of some 25 people, bemoaning: 
If a Nigerian goes home and gets an audience with a politician, the 
first thing on his mind is getting a contract, not press uri sing on social 
development issues. We have many doctors in the UK now, my cousin 
is one of them, but what are they doing to put pressure on the 
government about the state of the health system in Nigeria? It's time 
we professionals in diaspora came together and started getting 
politicians to address these development issues. 
The very same concern that diasporic professionals are not doing enough to engage and 
influence the nation-building project of the Nigerian state was also central to the 
formation of the British Nigeria Law Forum (BNLF), which was launched in late 2002. 
Opening the BNLF's summer 2005 event in London, the Forum's Chair, Oba Nsugbe 
QC, emphasised to the 40 or so people in attendance that the organisation has a key 
objective to enaple its members to have an input into major Nigerian government policy 
initiatives that would benefit from expert legal advice and opinion. "Nigerian lawyers 
here have been too quiet for too long", he declared. "Nigeria is going through a crucial 
stage", he continued; "there is no reason why lawyers here shouldn't be at the forefront 
of democratic and business reform in Nigeria". Buttressing his call to action on 
important national issues such as these, Mr Nsugbe later pressed members to submit 
opinion pieces to newspapers at 'home'. Concurring, a participant argued, "We need to 
start seeing ourselves as catalysts of change back home [ ... ], we need to start speaking 
up!". "If we can speak as an organisation", he added, "we will have more influence than 
we can on our own". 
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The formation and objectives of organisations like DIFN and the BNLF clearly reflect 
an acknowledgement among diasporans that their collective efforts to shape the nation-
building project of the Nigerian state have, until recently, been rather limited in both 
extent and efficacy. However, the establishment and aims of such organisations also 
highlight a growing diasporic desire to better organise in an attempt to influence more 
actively and effectively the national affairs of 'home'. As the founding President of the 
Engineering Forum of Nigerians proclaims, its creation signals moves towards 
"building a cohesive Nigerian community especially among the professionals to enable 
us to have a greater impact as we seek to make input into Nigeria" (EFN event 
programme, 2005). Concurring, one of his fellow founding executives believes the 
formation of EFN represents a "political awakening to want to be involved in the 
process of development and making things happen for the demands of the population" 
(Interview, Lagos, September 2005). 
Opening a new space for diasporic influence? Collective transnational intervention 
and the diaspora engagement initiatives of the Nigerian state 
The (re)emergence of diasporic desires to contribute to the Nigerian project can be seen 
as both a response to, and a driver of, the creation of an emergent, border-spanning 
political sphere - a transnational space that has begun to be afforded to, and consciously 
carved out by, diasporic professionals in particular. As Ambassador Joe Keshi argues, 
the initiation in 2000 of the Federal Government's diaspora engagement programme 
was a product not only of President Obasanjo's whim but also of organised diasporic 
agitation for a greater role in the progress of the nation. Indeed, as the Nigerian Consul-
General in Atlanta, USA, Ambassador Keshi was made very much aware of a diasporic 
desire to influence positive change at 'home': 
When I got to the United States [ ... J, as I reached out to the Nigerian 
community, [ ... J I sensed their deep concern for what was going on in 
the country and, at the same time, we could also see that they 
expressed a willingness, at a given time, to say something like, "Look, 
we are here, we can help" [ ... J. (Interview, Abuja, October 2005) 
When Ambassador Keshi communicated these diasporic desires to the Federal 
Government at 'home', he found that the Presidency was itself thinking of seeking out 
diasporic support for its national reform programme. "At some point there was a 
convergence", he recalls. There was, then, one of those moments of coherence between 
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diasporic desires and political interests at 'home' that, as we saw above, are often seen 
to be crucial to the success of transnational lobbying. At a pioneering meeting in Atlanta 
in September 2000, celebrated as the 'First Presidential Diaspora Dialogue', President 
Obasanjo declared to the gathering of some 3,700 diasporic Nigerians: 
For here and now, Nigeria is taking the bold first step to enable 
Nigerians living outside the country to participate fully in the process 
of visioning, planning and pursuing the political well-being, the 
economic development and the sound governance of their country. 
(Obasanjo 2000) 
Since this statement of intent was delivered from on high, the Nigerian state has 
gradually afforded diasporans, particularly diasporic professionals, channels through 
which they can seek individually and collectively to exert influence on the nation-
building project at 'home'. With the provision of state funding to enable "take-off', 
Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO) was officially established in North America 
in late 2001 and in Europe a year later. Centrally concerned with identifying Nigerians 
abroad who are "willing to offer their skills to assist Nigeria's developmental process" 
(www.nidoeurope.org), NIDO has also been given some opportunities to address the 
state on behalf of the diaspora. The most notable of these was when the chairmen of the 
US and Europe branches were appointed by the Federal Government as the 
representatives of the US- and Europe-based diasporas at the fractious and ultimately 
unsuccessful National Political Reform Conference held in 2005. Furthermore, Dr 
Christopher Kolade, the dynamic and highly respected Nigeria High Commissioner to 
the UK, enthusiastically engaged and supported diasporic professionals and their 
associations, regularly attending their events and even arranging for them to meet with 
senior Federal Government officials visiting the UK, including President Obasanjo 
himself. 
It is clear, then, that an emergent transnational political space is gradually being created 
by, and afforded to, diasporans, particularly diasporic professionals and their 
orgaQisations. However, it is also clear that diasporans and their organisations have been 
granted little freedom to determine the precise nature of their embryonic engagement 
with the Nigerian state and its nation-building project. The Federal Government has 
sought to carefully configure the boundaries of the nascent transnational political realm 
it has afforded to its overseas nationals, not only by targeting professionals in particular 
but also by attempting to regulate the nature of any interventions diasporans might 
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attempt to make. Indeed, the emergent cross-border political engagement has been 
initiated very much on the state's own terms. Most notably, the Federal Government 
and National Assembly have stubbornly refused to satisfy calls for the introduction of 
diasporic voting. And as President Obasanjo made clear at the ground-breaking 'First 
Presidential Diaspora Dialogue' in Atlanta in September 2000, it is only diasporans with 
"high level marketable skills" and an interest in "participating positively" in his 
particular vision of Nigeria's progress that are welcome to join "our Nigerian Diaspora 
Movement" (Obasanjo 2000). Translating this presidential message more directly, an 
official at the Nigeria High Commission in the UK asserts, "The President said, 'look, 
come home and be part of development, become a part of the show, don't just stay there 
to criticise [ ... r" (Interview, London, July 2005). 
Indeed, at the Federal Government's pioneering diaspora engagement conference held 
in Abuja in July 2005, President Obasanjo made it abundantly clear that criticism was 
the last thing he wanted from the diaspora. Having celebrated in his keynote speech to 
the conference the skills, expertise, international connections, and investment capacities 
of diasporans, he railed against some of their writings on the Internet. Arguing that 
diasporic cyber-articles often "leave a lot to be desired" due to their "crass ignorance" 
and lack of "familiarity with policy", President Obasanjo asserted sharply: 
Some in diaspora have been sceptical about our reform programme 
even when our development partners and other African countries 
praise them. Every government policy is dismissed or denigrated 
without reading the documents or asking the officials. The rejection of 
everything government does must stop [ ... ]. 
Significantly, diaspora organisations that have been brought into the nascent 
transnational political sphere President Obasanjo began to open in Atlanta in 2000 
appear to have heeded the presidential demand for uncritical cooperation. For example, 
at the Engineering Forum of Nigerians' 2006 'Spring Event' in London, an executive of 
the organisation requested that members of the more than 50-strong audience be 
"constructive" when directing questions to the speakers, which included a representative 
of the Nigeria High Commissioner to the UK and, from Nigeria, the Minister of State 
for Transport and the managing directors of six transport 'parastatals'. "We are not here 
to criticise the Nigerian government", he insisted. 
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It is unsurprising, then, that there is a strong sense among the relatively few diasporans 
who are aware of it that the embryonic transnational political space afforded by the 
Federal Government is more about legitimising than interrogating Obasanjo's regime 
and reforms. This is especially apparent in that electronic repository of opinion derided 
by President Obasanjo, where a profusion of comments and articles, especially from 
diasporans based in the US, dismiss as self-serving the Federal Government's 
transnational engagement efforts, particularly its creation and funding of NIDO. Dr 
Femi Ajayi (2005), for example, a prolific, Atlanta-based columnist on the Nigeria 
World website, describes NIDO as being in a "strong scrounging hold by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria". Similarly, Professor Mobolaji Aluko (2004), a Maryland-
based essayist on another diasporic website, Nigerian Muse, asserts, "we should 
remember that NIDO is President Obasanjo's baby". And in an interview on the Nigeria 
Village Square website, Emeka Ugwuonye, a disaffected former chairman of NIDO 
Americas, concurs with the suggestion that the organisation is "an extension of the 
Nigerian government abroad" and rails that "most members of [the] NIDO board think 
their job is simply to sit down and guess the 'desires' of the government and try to 
satisfy them" (Akande 2004). 
In both its conception by President Obasanjo and its reception by the relatively small 
proportion of overseas Nigerians who are aware of it, the Federal Government's 
emergent diaspora outreach programme is clearly seen to afford little space to the 
production of critical perspective or the exertion of radical influence. In the UK context, 
however, some active figures in diasporic associational life have recently sought to 
initiate the creation of an alternative, more open transnational political sphere with the 
inauguration in October 2005 of a new umbrella organisation for Nigerian associations 
in the country. Replacing the long factionalised and ineffective Nigerian National 
Union, the Central Association of Nigerians in the UK (CANUK) seeks to forge more 
political space not only for diaspora organisations that are not grounded in a 
professional identity but also for alternative visions of Nigeria's development. 
Indeed, for Dr Ubejifor, a prime mover in the formation of the new organisation, 
CANUK offers a distinctly more inclusive and diverse associational and political space 
than NIDO. While he sees NIDO as "mostly a professional organisation" that is 
"government-linked", Dr Ubejifor contends that CANUK seeks to "encompass every 
Nigerian organisation in the UK" and aspires to be "independent" of the Nigerian state 
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(Interview, London, June 2006). Therefore, in addition to having secured at launch a 
diverse membership of 44 organisations, including ethnic and state unions and pan-
Nigerian community groups alongside professional associations, CANUK has also 
established an "office outside the High Commission" and attempts to generate "its own 
sources of funding". Consequently, Dr Ubejifor believes that this new umbrella 
organisation is not only better positioned than NIDO to represent to the Federal 
Government the manifold interests of the UK-based diaspora but is also more able to 
question the policies and programmes of the state; "it can criticise government, it can 
take a political stance if it wanted, oppose that of the government". "It's not that they 
are against the government or anything, if there's no need to oppose anything they have 
to work with the government", asserts Dr Ubejifor, adding, "but if there is a need to, 
then they have to make a stand". 
However, while Dr Christopher Kolade, the liberal-minded and avowedly democratic 
Nigerian High Commissioner to the UK, has actively encouraged and formally 
recognised CANUK, it remains to be seen whether the organisation's diverse 
associations and potentially dissenting voices will be able to exert any tangible 
influence on the policies and programmes of the Federal Government. Certainly, Dr 
Ubejifor, a key player in the creation of CANUK and the President of the Wazobia State 
Union, is, as we saw earlier, rather sceptical about the ability of diaspora organisations 
to exert influence on government at 'home' even when official, institutionalised 
channels of communication exist. As noted above, Dr Ubejifor, like others, argues that 
the success of organised transnational lobbying is ultimately dependent on the interests 
of state actors in the 'homeland'; "they only address issues when they think it's of any 
political advantage or concern" (ibid). And with diasporans neither possessing the right 
to vote at 'home' from afar nor displaying the financial strength globalising discourses 
of diaspora and development might expect, there would appear to be very little incentive 
for politicians and state officials at 'home' to respond to diasporic opinions, concerns 
and desires. This is especially true given that those in power at 'home' enjoy the 
cons~derable political autonomy that comes from controlling Nigeria's substantial oil 
wealth. Indeed, as long as Nigeria's politics and progress are fuelled by oil, it would 
seem that diasporans and their organisations have little prospect of acquiring the 
necessary leverage to be in a position to exert meaningful influence on the nation-
building project of the Nigerian state. 
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Conclusion 
Contrary to the expectations of celebratory discourses of diaspora and development, it is 
clear that the collective remittances and political transnationalism of London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations do not produce major transformative effects at 'home'. 
While these groups make monetary and material contributions to schools, hospitals and 
public infrastructure, this benevolence is overwhelmingly seen both in diaspora and at 
'home' as rather modest and ultimately marginal. In contrast to findings in other 
transnational contexts around the world, there is no evidence of diaspora organisations 
themselves successfully establishing or sustaining health and education institutions, 
public infrastructure, 'productive' enterprises or micro-credit schemes. Furthermore, the 
limited collective transnational donations that are made are consistently seen to pale into 
relative insignificance compared to the benevolence of more local individuals and 
organisations based within Nigeria itself. 
Similarly, while London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations attempt to exploit their 
strategic location in diaspora to influence 'progress' at 'home', it is clear that this 
political transnationalism achieves much less success than might be expected in 
globalising discourses of diaspora and development. Again, collective transnational 
intervention is seen both in diaspora and at 'home' to be a rather limited and marginal 
force in processes of development and change at 'home'. Even the Nigerian state's 
explicit opening of a transnational political sphere affords little space for the organised 
diaspora to voice its interests and desires and wield influence that might in some way 
change the futures of local communities and the wider nation. Indeed, from the 
perspective of local communities, the political influence wielded on their behalf by 
diaspora organisations based overseas is negligible; it is individuals and organisations 
based in the community itself and its 'internal diaspora' within Nigeria that are seen as 
the most effective voices for articulating and meeting local needs and aspirations. 
It w~uld seem, then, that if globalising discourses of diaspora and development are not 
to overplay the monetary, material and political importance of collective transational 
intervention in processes of transformation at 'home', it is necessary for these 
discourses to afford much greater recognition to the benevolence and influence of 
individuals and organisations based within the country of origin itself. With the 
proliferating celebration of diaspora, there is a danger that development discourses will 
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again fall into the trap of effacing local agency in the process of reifying an 'external' 
agent as the primary source of progress. If states and international agencies wish to 
engage and support the actors that are the major funders and shapers of change, they 
cannot avoid dealing with the local. It may seem much easier to engage with the 
diaspora, located as it often is in major centres of global power and supposedly imbued 
with hegemonic visions of development, but it is not necessarily the most effective way 
of connecting with the drivers of transformation at 'home'. If globalising discourses of 
diaspora and development are to contribute to identifying and engaging these drivers, 
one of their most important contributions might be to do much more to highlight the 
role of 'internal diasporas' based within countries of origin. As we have seen, it is the 
'internal diaspora', along with local individuals and organisations, that is for many 
communities by far and away the most important source of money, materials and 
political influence. 
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7. Transferring bright ideas and good behaviour? Collective 
social remittances and their limits 
Introduction 
While the collective remittances and political transnationalism of London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations may have a rather limited impact on progress in 
Nigeria, there remains the promise that these groups constitute a key channel for the 
transfer 'home' of new and developmentally-beneficial ideas, knowledge and practices 
acquired 'abroad'. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 2, the transnational transmission of 
what have come to be termed 'social remittances' is highlighted in globalising 
discourses of diaspora and development as one of the most important ways in which 
diasporans and their organisations produce notable transformative effects at 'home'. 
Following Levitt's (1998) original conception of social remittances, migrant 'hometown 
associations' have been identified as entities through which novel and 'progressive' 
information and capacities, such as "decision-making, organizational and management 
skills" (USAID 2004: 29), are transferred to local communities. Furthermore, with the 
expansion of Levitt's conception, diaspora organisations, and diasporic professional 
associations in particular, are being lauded and engaged as channels for the remittance 
of innovative, high-level technical knowledge and expertise that can transform not only 
local communities but also entire nations. 
However, contrary to the hopes and expectations of globalising discourses of diaspora 
and developmerit, it would appear that there are significant limits to the extent to which 
London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations can be seen to remit new and 
developmentally-beneficial ideas and practices. At the local level, there is very little 
evidence of community-based diaspora organisations such as 'hometown associations' 
transmitting and instilling innovative ways of thinking or doing development. 
Reflecting their limited monetary and material contributions to, and marginal influence 
, 
over, communal endeavour at 'home', such groups are not noted as sources of novel and 
helpful ideas and practices. Beyond the 'traditional' leaders of community development, 
it is individuals and organisations based in the ancestral homeland and its 'internal 
diaspora' within Nigeria that are identified as the key sources of innovation. 
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And while there are diaspora organisations that take the form of issue-based NOOs and 
have explicit objectives to disseminate at 'home' new and developmentally-beneficial 
information, ideas and behaviours, their 'social remittances' are rarely as novel as 
celebratory discourses of diaspora and development might expect. Indeed, it is NOOs 
based at 'home' that appear to lead the way in spreading such knowledge and practices. 
Similarly, despite the great progressive promise attached to diasporic professional 
associations in both national and globalising discourses of diaspora and development, 
there is a strong sense that the 'social remittances' offered by these groups are also not 
as innovative and useful as might be expected. Furthermore, it is also clear that in 
lauding the ideas and expertise of diasporans and their organisations, there is a danger 
of generating resentment among highly skilled and experienced individuals and groups 
at 'home', severely damaging the nascent transnational co-operations upon which any 
possibility of productive border-spanning knowledge exchange depends. Again, it 
would appear that it is necessary for globalising discourses of diaspora and development 
to afford much greater recognition to local capabilities if ways are to be identified in 
which diasporic contributions can complement and support ongoing processes of 
development at 'home'. 
'Enlightening' the community? Collective social remittances at the local level 
London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations grounded in communal identities, such 
as 'hometown associations' and 'ethnic unions', tend not to cite the transnational 
transmission of ideas and behaviours as a primary transnational objective. While often 
contending that they have been 'exposed' to, and do attempt to transfer 'home', new 
and/or possibly useful notions and practices, members of geo-ethnic diaspora 
organisations overwhelmingly give much greater emphasis to the channelling of money 
and materials and the assertion of 'homeland' interest when detailing their collective 
border-spanning desires and efforts. Indeed, of the 32 geo-ethnic organisations engaged 
in this study, only two, MOSOP Europe and the Ibenudu Development Union (lDU) , 
indicate that they have undertaken or supported an explicit project that could be 
described as a conscious collective attempt to transmit to the ancestral community some 
form of 'social remittance'. 
In both instances, the projects took the form of HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns. In the 
case of MOSOPEurope, the programme was initiated by the 'parent' branch based in 
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Port Harcourt and is funded principally by a Holland-based international NGO from 
which the late Ken Saro-Wiwa had originally garnered support in the early 1990s. 
While the mY/AIDS awareness campaign supported by the IDU in Ibenudu was 
conceived by the organisation itself and undertaken by a couple of its members during a 
visit to the ancestral homeland in 2003, a member laments that it had a rather fleeting 
impact with evidence of the leaflets, posters, and banners that were distributed around 
the community having disappeared by the time he visited 'home' later that year. There 
is little indication, then, that geo-ethnic diaspora organisations have been effective 
instigators of programmatic attempts to transfer 'home' useful ideas and behaviours. 
Members of such organisations sometimes suggest, however, that they do make 
attempts as individuals to transfer 'home' some of the novel and potentially helpful 
ideas and ways of doing things to which they often believe they have been 'exposed' in 
diaspora. For example, Chief Olajide of the Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU) , 
London contends that "political minded" members seek to employ their personal 
contacts to remit diasporic 'enlightenment' to state officials at 'home', such as the local 
government chairman: 
[ ... T]he chairman there, we know him, we try to educate him, advise 
him how to go about things the way we do here, [ ... ], we pass it on to 
him, and see the best way to help the people. [ ... S]o what will be of 
use for us back home, we pick it from here and then pass it on [ ... ], 
like primary health, I mean you have access to free healthcare at least, 
[ ... ]. (Interview, London, April 2006) 
However, even Chief Olajide is rather sceptical about the tangible difference that such 
attempted 'socia,l remittances' make in practice, bemoaning, "there's nothing much you 
can do from here to influence them, we can only advise". Indeed, no ANPU London 
members could identify an instance where they felt they had communicated an idea to 
an official in a way that produced a discernable change in state policy or practice. 
Concordantly, the Chairman of Ayege/Asiki Local Government gave no indication that 
he had embraced any visions from the diaspora and its organisations. Indeed, he saw 
assoC3iations of overseas Omoyeges not as a source of ideas and advice but simply as 
potential financial donors to local government projects and as institutions for 
'preserving' Omoyege culture 'abroad'. Furthermore, the Chairman made it clear that 
the programmes that ANPU London members had suggested to me as the kind they 
wanted the local government to 'adopt', such as the creation of more reliable water and 
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electricity supplies, had long been demanded by the local community itself and had 
been actively pursued by his administration since it took office in 2003. Moreover, as a 
well-travelled, professionally-trained engineer, the Chairman displayed confidence that 
he was himself suitably equipped with the knowledge and expertise to preside over the 
effective execution of such ideas. 
In Levitt's (1998) original conception of 'social remittances', overseas 'hometown 
associations' are identified as being especially effective at transmitting progressive 
ideas and practices, such as financial management skills, to 'home' -based community 
development committees. However, the Ayege Progress Committee (APC), the 'home'-
based 'parent' body of ANPU London, appears to have embraced very little 'exposure' 
from its overseas branches. Indeed, members of ANPU London often appear to be 
resigned to the apparent futility of attempting to 'enlighten' their 'parent' body at 
'home'. This was exemplified in early 2006 when discussion at one of ANPU London's 
monthly meetings turned to a letter recently received from the Oba and APC requesting 
financial support for the community's latest headline project, the establishment of a 
tertiary institution in Ayege. One of the assembled members expressed frustration that 
the 'traditional authorities' had again provided neither a "formal proposal" nor a 
"budget" for one of their projects and suggested that the Union should be "cautious" 
about sending any money until it had received "proper documentation". With an 
impatience that suggested certain realities had to be accepted, another member 
countered, "We only think in terms of documenting things properly because we are 
here. We are far ahead of them in terms of properly documenting things. They just don't 
think like that no matter how educated they are". If potential donors delayed their 
largesse until seeing "proper documentation", he continued, there was a danger that 
government officials would arrive in the town to accredit the polytechnic only to "find 
nothing there". Having considered the two perspectives, the Union agreed that while an 
attempt would again be made to restate their desire to see "proper documentation" for 
future APC projects, they would, as ever, press ahead with raising and sending a 
collective contribution despite not having been presented with a "written plan". It was 
quite'clear that the Union held little hope of success in its latest attempt to modify the 
thinking and behaviour of its 'parent' -body. As one member laments, "the APC back 
home, they run the place, they have their own way of doing things" (Interview, London, 
July 2005). 
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'Enlightening' the community: the importance of local agency and the 'internal 
diaspora' 
As the frustration of some ANPU London members suggests, the 'traditional 
authorities' tend to see themselves as the primary architects and most effective 
executors of communal 'self-help' endeavours and do not give the impression that they 
consider ANPU London or any other overseas Omoyege organisations as a valuable 
source of new and developmentally beneficial ideas and behaviours. Members of the 
Oba-in-Council and its "executive arm", the APC, many of whom have themselves had 
distinguished academic and professional careers 'abroad', are confident that their own 
'exposure' coupled to their intimacy with the needs and aspirations of the local 
community suitably equips them to formulate and enact initiatives in ways that best 
serve the interests of the kingdom. Within the division of organisational labour that the 
'traditional authorities' imagine and seek to preside over, Omoyege associations, both at 
'home' and 'abroad', are tasked primarily with providing financial and material support 
rather than innovative ideas and practices. 
Furthermore, in the few instances where members of the 'traditional authorities' do 
credit an Omoyege association with introducing a new and useful idea or practice, the 
credited organisation is identified as being located in the Omoyege diaspora within 
Nigeria or in Ayege itself rather than overseas. For example, in the case of what the 
'traditional authorities' note as the most significant new idea they have adopted at the 
suggestion of an Omoyege organisation, credit for its introduction is ascribed to a 
'social club' based within the kingdom. As the Oba recalls: 
[ ... T]he first Ayege Day was celebrated in 1989. There is a club in the 
town, Winners Club, they initiated it. They consulted the high chiefs 
then, I was a high chief then, and the high chiefs bought the idea and 
asked this club to start planning for it. And then it was successful [ ... ]. 
And ever since, we have been observing Ayege Day each November l . 
(Interview, Ayege, December 2005) 
1 The Oba went on to explain that the Winners Club had come up with the idea of Ayege Day because its 
members had seen and heard that "other communities all around [ ... J devote a day to raise funds for the 
development of their area". Indeed, Ayege's neighbouring kingdoms all hold their own respective 
'community days'. Furthermore, the literature on 'ethnic unions' and 'hometown associations' suggests 
that the holding of 'community days' has become a widespread practice across Nigeria, especially in the 
southern half of the Federation (see for example Honey and Okafor 1998 and Trager 2001). 
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More recently, the 'traditional authorities' have welcomed what they consider to be 
another novel and highly significant idea advanced by an Omoyege organisation based 
within Nigeria. Founded in 2001 and bringing together prominent, 'middle-aged' 
professionals from the major nodes of the extended Omoyege community within 
Nigeria, the Lagos-based Ayege Economic Forum (AEF) is credited with introducing to 
Omoyege communal endeavour an innovative notion of 'economic development'. For 
Mr Adesanya, the Forum's founder and Chairman and the head of one of Nigeria's 
largest commercial enterprises, Ayege's 'apex' organisation, the APC, remains "very 
traditional" in its approach, focussing on "cultural governance" and the construction of 
grand communal edifices (Interview, Lagos, December 2005). In contrast, the AEF 
espouses an explicit discourse of "economic empowerment", seeking to "create 
economic space for the average Ayege indigene" by establishing "engines of growth" in 
the kingdom, providing "training and skills" and ultimately generating "employment 
and jobs" (ibid). Embracing the AEF and its new way of conceiving and realising 
Omoyege progress, the 'traditional authorities' have supported its purchase from the 
state government of the only major industrial facility in the kingdom, overseen the 
management of a significant micro-credit fund it has deposited at the Ayege Community 
Bank and hosted its agricultural and micro-enterprise training programmes in the town 
hall. 
In addition to lauding the innovative ideas and practices that the Lagos-based AEF has 
introduced to the project of Omoyege development, the 'traditional authorities' also 
highlight how other organisations in the extended Omoyege community within Nigeria 
have been of great assistance in their efforts to 'enlighten' and Ore-orientate' the local 
citizenry of Ayege. Omoyege 'social clubs' and 'student' and 'youth' associations based 
in the kingdom and its diaspora within Nigeria are well known for organising free 
tutorial classes, lectures, essay writing competitions, and quizzes for local secondary 
school students. Founded in 1981 and with its headquarters in the kingdom and 
branches at universities across Nigeria, the National Union of Ayege Students is also 
noted for organising mY/AIDS awareness seminars in Ayege in recent years. 
Furthermore, prominent 'youth' organisations based in the kingdom are widely 
recognised for their efforts to bring political 'enlightenment' to Ayege. For example, the 
Ayege Youth Movement implores the community to "shun" the "politics of money and 
material gains" and to expect political office holders "to give account of their 
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stewardship" by meeting regularly with "traditional rulers" and the "electorate" (APC 
document 2001). 
Clearly, when the 'traditional authorities' and ordinary citizens of Ayege identify the 
sources of the most innovative and important ideas and practices to have been 
introduced to the project of communal progress, they point to Omoyege associations 
based in the kingdom and its diaspora within Nigeria rather than those based overseas. 
In Ukpenwa too, geo-ethnic associations based overseas appear to have a limited role as 
a source of new and developmentally beneficial knowledge and behaviours. Certainly, 
Ukpenwans in London and Ukpenwa did not identify any instances of an overseas 
Ukpenwa association making an organised attempt to transfer 'home' some kind of 
'social remittance'. A couple of the local 'patrons' of the Ukpenwa Women's 
Association UK (OW A) argue that members of the organisation do "enlighten the 
society" through their personal interaction and communication with friends and family 
at 'home', particularly in terms of promoting "etiquette", including practices of 
punctuality, queuing, and speaking quietly in public (Interview, Ukpenwa, October 
2005). However, it was made clear that members of the OW A do not have a monopoly 
on acquiring and transferring such 'exposure'. The acquisition of these forms of 
'enlightenment' by OW A members was traced not to their membership of the OW A or, 
indeed, their being in diaspora, but rather to their pre-migration 'exposure' to 'Western' 
education and Christianity in Ukpenwa itself. Sharing this 'home' -based 'exposure' 
with OWA members, the two local OW A 'patrons', like other elite women in Ukpenwa, 
assert that they already possess and extol the same ideas, values, and behaviours as their 
diasporic counterparts. Indeed, for these elite women of the city, who also tend to point-
out that they are themselves regular travellers beyond the borders of Nigeria, members 
of the OW A are not so much a source of new ideas, values, and behaviours but simply 
like-minded allies in the quest to 'enlighten' less 'exposed' members of the community. 
Promoting 'healthy living' and 'community development': diaspora NGOs and the 
successes and limits of collective social remittance strategies 
Unlike geo-ethnic diaspora associations, diaspora NGOs often focus explicitly on 
transferring 'home' what might be described as 'social remittances'. For example, with 
its space of transnational intervention defined as the city of Calabar and Cross River 
State as a whole, the London-based Dr Bassey Kubiangha Education Trust describes its 
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aim as "empowering health workers to educate the local community and fight against 
ignorance and superstition" (BK Trust document, n.d.). In short, the BK Trust, as it is 
commonly known by its members, is "committed to promoting health education in 
Cross River State" (ibid). Mrs Magdalene Kubiangha, the Trust's founder, argues that 
its focus on "informing the local community [ ... ] of the importance of healthcare and 
disease prevention" honours and continues the work of her late husband, a London-
based Calabarian medical doctor in whose memory the organisation was founded in 
early 2004 (Interview, London, June 2006). However, the focus of the Trust also 
reflects Mrs Kubiangha's desire to employ in the service of 'home' her own 
professional skills and expertise acquired through her largely UK-based training and 
career in dental and general health promotion: 
[ ... W]hen I came over here, I did dental health education and went to 
university and studied health issues and all that and then I'm into 
health promotion. So back home, there isn't much health promotion 
being practiced and therefore my aspiration is to set up the health 
promotion group and say, "look, this is the way we do things in 
Britain". 
Local actors who have been consulted and engaged in the planning and establishment of 
the BK Trust and its programmes in Cross River State voice strong enthusiasm for this 
vision, arguing that it does indeed have the potential to introduce new and 
developmentally beneficial ideas, knowledge, expertise and practices. Contending that 
the organisation "promises to be useful" and that "members of the community welcome 
it", a noted local medical practitioner explains: 
[ ... ] it, will be a very pOSItIve thing because the idea of health 
promotion is novel, is new in our community, even among 
professionals it is very new. It is an area of emphasis globally, 
globally there isa new focus, it's a strategy for the prevention of 
disease and control of disease. If we can promote health, positive 
thinking about health, then disease will be brought down, so we do 
hope that in a little way, [the BK Trust] will make it. (Interview, 
Calabar, October 2005) 
Furthermore, for Dr Joseph Ana, the Cross River State Commissioner of Health, the 
introduction of "health promotion" is central to improving the uptake and effectiveness 
of the healthcare system over which he presides (Interview, Calabar, October 2005). 
Indeed, he identifies it as one of the key policy initiatives he has sought to implement 
since assuming office in 2004, having returned to Calabar armed with the innovative 
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ideas he believes he has gleaned from his career of over 20 years as a surgeon and 
general practitioner in the UK. Arguing that "government would never be able to do it 
all", Dr Ana believes that the BK Trust can be "very helpful in putting the searchlight 
on public health promotion". 
Having taken occupancy of an office complex owned by the Kubiangha family, in April 
2005 the Trust held a 'Health Day' to mark its formal launch in Calabar. At his 
inaugural event, Mrs Kubiangha and her fellow UK trustees came together with local 
health professionals to present talks and information stalls on issues such as 
cardiovascular disease, HIV/AIDS, nutrition, diabetes, oral health, infection, special 
needs, sexually transmitted diseases, and women's and men's health. On the 24th August 
that year, the BK Trust opened its Health Promotion Resource Centre, which was 
stocked with the late Dr Kubiangha's medical books and journals and further 
publications donated by his UK-based friends and colleagues. Holding some 1,000 
medical and health-related volumes, the Centre had received 244 visits from between 50 
to 60 different users by 10 October 2005. In late September 2005, the Trust commenced 
its first major "enlightenment programme,,2, the Inter-School Health Debate in which 
teams from twelve secondary schools in and around Calabar were paired off to debate a 
health-related issue in a series of knock-out rounds held over a period of eight weeks. 
The debated issues were taken to a state-wide audience by the Cross River Broadcasting 
Corporation, which featured each round in its evening television news programme. 
During a visit to Calabar in June 2006, Mrs Kubiangha launched a "disability unit" 
within the Trust, focussing initially on Braille and computer skills acquisition for the 
"visually impaired" (Interview, London, June 2006). On the same visit, Mrs Kubiangha 
and a British colleague also brought together some 30 health workers from local 
governments across the state for a training session in how to plan, implement, and 
evaluate health promotion programmes. This marked the inauguration of the Cross 
River State Health Promotion Group, a collaborative initiative between the BK Trust 
and the Cross River Ministry of Health that seeks to provide a sustained programme of 
training and information support to health promotion facilitators at the local community 
level. 
2 BK Trust trustee, interview, Calabar, November 2005. 
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Established by a group of six church friends in 1999, the London-based diaspora NGO 
Development Impact for Nigeria (DIFN) has an even more established record of 
attempting to disseminate 'enlightenment' at 'home'. Working principally in Ipaja, 
Lagos, DIFN seeks to "challenge, encourage, and support" schools, local government, 
NGOs, CBOs, 'youth', journalists and, in particular, churches to be more actively and 
effectively engaged in "community development", especially in terms of promoting 
"life skills", "healthy living", and "HIV/AIDS awareness, care, and support" (DIFN 
trustee, interview, July 2005). The "job" that DIFN has taken upon itself is, therefore, 
principally "one of education", attempting to "re-orientate", "train", and "build the 
capacity" of local actors to adopt and pursue ideas of "community development", 
"social justice", and "poverty alleviation" in a society deemed to have become "too 
individualistic", "divided", and "impoverished" after 16 years of military rule (DIFN 
trustee, interview, July 2006). To this end, DIFN has organised in Nigeria between 
October 1999 and August 2005 twenty-five "awareness" and "training" workshops and 
programmes, cumulatively attracting over 900 participants (DIFN documents). In so 
doing, DIFN has indeed begun to be seen within its space of intervention as a source of 
'enlightenment' . 
Through participation in DIFN workshops, Pastor Oluwafemi Martins and other church 
leaders argue that they have come to embrace DIFN's message that churches should 
aspire to provide their community not only with "spiritual food" but also "practical 
help" (Interview, Ipaja, August 2005). Indeed, Pastor Martins contends that he has 
himself directly responded to the vision of DIFN, making a "radical change" to his own 
sermons so that they "face the immediate needs of the people". Furthermore, Pastor 
Martins, like other workshop participants, has come to embrace DIFN's contention that 
the church should play an active role in countering the spread of mY/AIDS, learning 
from the diaspora organisation what it considers to be the best way of doing so: 
At that seminar, I realised that it's not only what the scripture says but 
what is the reality on the ground [ ... ]. The reality on the ground is that 
people are not really living according to the scriptures and so [ ... ] 
there's no way you can use the scriptures to handle their issues 
anymore. [ ... T]otal abstinence is what the scriptures preach but our 
society has become as promiscuous as it is, so they recommended 
some of the medical safeguards like the use of condoms [ ... ]. 
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Along with other participants, Pastor Martins has also heeded DIFN's message on how 
the church should change its attitude to people living with mY/AIDS: 
Before it has been a situation of ostracising them, you treat them as if 
they should be in the lepers home, but from DIFN and some of the 
other organisations, I think people are becoming sensitised to realise 
that it is not a crime to have HIV and that those who have the 
condition need more of our love than our ostracising them ... 
Beyond church leaders such as Pastor Martins, members of other groups targeted by 
DIFN also enthusiastically celebrate this diaspora organisation as a source of 
'enlightenment'. Retired nurses who operate the Ipaja Community Health Project, a 
local NGO, credit DIFN workshops with refreshing and updating their community 
health skills. Teachers who have been trained by DIFN to operate Child-to-Child Health 
Clubs in four local schools argue that participating pupils have imbibed, and shared with 
their peers and families, knowledge about personal hygiene, sanitation, healthy diet, oral 
health, malaria and diarrhoea prevention and making health products such as soap and 
mosquito repellent. Participants in DIFN's annual week-long 'youth' training contend, 
along with their parents and teachers, that the programme has improved their 
"discipline" and "confidence" and heightened their "life and leadership skills", such as 
those of "study", "decision making", "independent living", "interaction", 
"communication", and "time-management" (Interviews, Ipaja, August 2005). This 
programme, which in 2004 and 2005 took the form of a residential camp, is also seen to 
have taught participants from various age groups useful knowledges, particularly in 
relation to HIV/AIDS, the Child-to-Child Approach to health and development 
promotion, and the dangers of alcohol, drugs, and 'cultism'. 
Complementing processes of 'enlightenment' at 'home': contextualising the collective 
social remittances of diaspora NGOs 
Undoubtedly, DIFN and the BK Trust are widely seen by those they have engaged at 
'hom~' as agents of 'enlightenment'. However, while the ideas, knowledge, practices 
and behaviours these diaspora NGOs seek to disseminate at 'home' are often deemed to 
be 'enlightening', they are by no means entirely a product of access to diasporic 
'exposure' and neither are they entirely new, innovative, or radical in the local and 
national contexts. For example, for Mr Bode Omokaro, DIFN's Ipaja-based Nigeria 
Programme Coordinator, the organisation's central contention, that individuals and 
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institutions should be actively involved in 'community development', is hardly radical. 
While he certainly agrees that this idea is not held widely enough in Nigeria, it is one he 
has himself embraced passionately since long before he ever came into contact with 
DIFN. Indeed, Bode argues that, by virtue of having joined the Scouts and the Red 
Cross while at secondary school in Lagos, he has been invested with the principle of 
"service to humanity" ever since childhood (Interview, Ipaja, December 2005). 
Furthermore, he has continued his commitment to this principle throughout his adult life 
prior to meeting DIFN, not only remaining very active in the Red Cross but also 
attaining a postgraduate diploma in community development from the prestigious 
University of Ibadan and working as a district coordinator in national immunisation 
exercIses. 
Moreover, it was also without any contact with DIFN that Bode volunteered his 
considerable experience in the field to involve his church in community development, 
becoming a prime mover in encouraging and enabling it to establish the Ipaja 
Community Health Project in 1994. Consequently, when, some five years later, Mr 
Yomi Oloko, the London-based founder of DIFN, travelled to Lagos to run the 
organisation's first ever training workshop and met Bode among the participants, he 
found someone at 'home' who already shared both his passion for 'community 
development' and his conviction that institutions such as the church should be more 
engaged in the process. It was through a meeting of minds, then, rather than any 
moment of diaspora-induced 'enlightenment', that Bode was asked to join DIFN to 
coordinate its activities in Nigeria. 
With Bode having agreed to work with DIFN' first as a part-time volunteer and, by 
2002, as its first full-time, paid member of staff, the organisation has relied heavily on 
his own knowledge and expertise along with that of other local actors. This is not to say 
that diasporic flows of ideas and information have been unimportant. During visits 
'home', Yomi tries to attend, and share his 'exposure' at, a couple of DIFN programmes 
each year. He has also recently sourced what Bode considers to be very useful 
, 
mY/AIDS resource material from two UK-based international NGOs. Furthermore, it 
was Y omi who found on the Internet the Child-to-Child Approach to health and 
development promotion and suggested to Bode that he should attempt to introduce this 
programme, developed by international experts coordinated by the University of 
London, to schools in Ipaja. However, as DIFN's UK trustees acknowledge, the credit 
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for a number of original ideas, such as the annual youth camp, and the responsibility for 
the precise formulation and ultimate execution of interventions lie overwhelmingly with 
Bode. 
Moreover, in designing and actualising DIFN programmes, Bode complements his own 
initiative and experience not only by drawing on ideas and resource materials remitted 
by Yomi in London but also by sourcing information, knowledge, and expertise from 
other local actors in Nigeria. When Y omi suggested adopting the Child-to-Child 
Approach, for example, Bode identified, and received specialised training and support 
from, a Kaduna-based NGO that had an established record of working with the 
programme. More generally, Bode has routinely sought the advice of colleagues in the 
Red Cross and friends in his church who have professional experience of community 
health and development programmes. Bode especially values the guidance of Reverend 
Major (Mrs) Bunmi Idowu-Okusanya, a close friend and neighbour who, after retiring 
as a Nigerian army medical officer in 1991, established, and continues to run, an NGO 
for the care of the local elderly in Ipaja. 
Furthermore, Bode has been able to bring additional local expertise directly into DIFN. 
In late 2004, thanks to a two-year grant of £2,000 per annum from Christian Aid in the 
UK, Bode recruited Ms Mercy Egbejule and Mr Jonathan Maxwell-Gii as full-time 
programme officers, each of whom has several years experience of working in 
HIV/AIDS awareness, care, and support with local NGOs. The knowledge, expertise, 
and connections of Mercy and Jonathan have not only enabled the formulation and 
initial development of new programmes, such as mY/AIDS counselling and support 
groups, but have also buttressed Bode's efforts to gain the assistance of other local 
organisations working on issues of community health and mY/AIDS. 
Indeed, the networking efforts of the team in Lagos mean that DIFN seminars and 
workshops have often been supported with resource materials and/or persons from a 
variety of local organisations. The organisations that have provided such support to 
, 
DIFN include the Lagos State Government, particularly its AIDS Control Agency 
(LSACA), and the Nigerian branches of two international NGOs, Hope Worldwide and 
Family Health International. However, DIFN has received most of its local information 
165 
and human resource support from five "indigenous" 3 Nigerian NOOs, namely the 
Youth Empowerment Foundation, Journalists Against AIDS, the Society for Family 
Health (SFH), Human Development Initiatives (HDI) and the Redeemed AIDS 
Programme Action Committee (RAPAC). 
Together with Bode, his staff, and a number of his contacts, friends, and neighbours, 
well-respected 'indigenous' NOOs such as SFH, HDI, and RAPAC highlight the 
existence of a vibrant and sometimes highly effective local 'civil society' sector. The 
existence of this 'home' -based 'civil society' in tum highlights the limits to which 
diaspora NOOs such as the BK Trust and DIFN can be seen to be 'introducing' at 
'home' novel ideas of 'community development' and 'health promotion' and innovative 
ways in which they can be pursued. For example, Lagos-based Human Development 
Initiatives (HDI) was founded some three years before DIFN and can be seen to have 
anticipated the diaspora organisation's vision by aiming to "build human capacity" and 
"promote human development ideals,,4. Indeed, HDI espouses very similar principles to 
DIFN, including "equality", "justice", and "solidarity", and runs analogous programmes 
including "community development" promotion, HIV / AIDS awareness, "life skills" 
training, school health clubs, and an annual youth camps. 
DIFN cannot even claim an innovation in placing particular emphasis on targeting the 
church in the promotion of 'community development' - HDI and other 'indigenous' 
Nigeria-based NOOs also see the church, as well as the mosque and faith based 
organisations (FBOs) in general, as key partners In· community health and 
development6. Many churches, mosques, and FBOs even run well-established 
'community development' programmes and NOOs of their own, some of which, such as 
the Catholic Church's Justice, Development, and Peace Commission, have attained 
national and international recognition. Indeed, most of the churches that DIFN has 
engaged in and around Lagos were already actively addressing, or at least looking to 
address, issues of commu,nity development and mY/AIDS prior to meeting, and 
receiving training from, the diaspora organisation. Even in the realm of the supposedly 
, 
"negligent,,7 church, therefore, the idea of 'introducing' and promoting the notion and 
3 http://www.silinigeria.org/About%20SFH.html 
4 http://www.hdinigeria.org/about.php 
5 ibid, http://www.hdinigeria.org/mission.php and http://www.hdinigeria.org/achievements.php 
6 http://www.hdinigeria.org/partners.php, http://www.sfunigeria.org/AboutL}?J20SFH.html 
7 DIFN trustee, interview, London, July 2006. 
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practice of 'community development' may not be quite as innovative as DIFN's UK-
based trustees sometimes appear to suggest. 
Furthermore, 'indigenous' Nigeria-based NODs and FBDs are not only already working 
with the vision of 'community development' that DIFN seeks to 'introduce' but could 
also seen to be more effective at disseminating and instilling it in practice. For example, 
with a team of 15 highly experienced trustees and staff and a much more extensive 
network of partnerships with local, national, and international state and civil society 
agencies and donors, Lagos-based Human Development Initiatives boasts an inventory 
of interventions considerably longer and more extensive than that of DIFN8. DIFN 
would appear to have even further to go before it could claim to match the 
'enlightening' efforts of another of the 'indigenous' Nigeria-based NODs from which it 
has received information and human resource support. Founded in 1983 and with 15 
regional offices, a staff of over 230 and major grants from international donors, the 
Abuja-based Society for Family Health claims to have "reached out to tens of millions 
of Nigerians" in its mission "to motivate the adoption of healthy behaviours" 9. Indeed, 
in the area of HIV/AIDS alone, SFH claims that it has, among numerous other 
interventions, introduced a peer education programme to 112 communities across the 
country and engaged 35% of the national population aged between 15 and 29 with one 
of its radio dramas lO• 
Despite having access to the supposed wealth of diasporic resources and 'exposure', 
DIFN's programme of 'enlightenment' is, therefore, neither entirely innovative nor 
anywhere near the most extensive of those undertaken by the more than 450 'civil 
society organisations' officially registered as working on the issue of mY/AIDS in 
Lagos State (Lagos State AIDS Control Agency official, interview, Lagos, September 
2005; Lagos State NODs Summit on HIV/AIDS, Lagos, 15th September 2005). Like 
many who have come into contact with DIFN and deemed its work to be beneficial, 
Pastor Martins is well aware that there are "hundreds" of other NODs based in Lagos 
and across Nigeria working ·on issues of community health and development, especially 
8 http://www.hdinigeria.org/adrninistration.php, http://www.hdinigeria.org/staffphp, 
http://www .hdi ni geri a .org/partners. php, http://www.hdinigeria.org/achievernents. php, 
http://www.hdinigeria.org/services.php 
9 http://www.sfunigeria.org/About%20SFH.htrnl, 
http://www.sfunigeria.org/Donors(fr)20and%20Partners.htrnl, http://www.slhnigeria.org/Mission.htrnl 
10 http://www.psi.org/where we workinigeria.htrnl# 
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in relation to illY/AIDS. Consequently, he is not alone in being able to put DIFN and 
its work in context, echoing the sentiments of others in arguing: 
[oo.J it's a small organisation [oo.J and yet it's making impact in its 
own little way [oo.]. [oo.J I think DIFN needs to expand beyond the 
scope of just handling few individuals here and there [oo .J, they need 
to have a national network [oo.]. [oo.J it's one thing to start it small, but 
I don't think it's the best to keep it small, I believe there is the need for 
growth [ ... J. (Interview, Ipaja, August 2005) 
While endorsing DIFN's vision and work as useful and 'enlightening' if not entirely 
innovative, such sentiments mirror the frustration of some of the organisation's Nigeria-
based staff and UK-based trustees that they have been unable to reach as many people 
and communities within and beyond Ipaja as they would have hoped. This frustration is 
all the more intense for DIFN's local staff as they appear to be much more conscious 
than their diasporic trustees of the limited scale of the organisation's 'enlightenment' 
programmes relative to those operated by the "big NODs"ll based in Nigeria. 
Oiven that 'indigenous' NODs have proliferated and attained some considerable 
strength not only in Lagos but across the nation over the last twenty years, the work of 
the BK Trust in Calabar must also be seen in the context of a vibrant and sometimes 
highly-effective local 'civil society' sector. While the BK Trust may well be an 
innovator in Cross River State in initiating a highly focussed and integrated vision of 
'health promotion', it is far from the only, and certainly not yet anywhere near the most 
powerful, NOD in the area seeking to promote notions and practices of good health. 
Like Lagos, Calabar has spawned a plethora of local NODs concerned with health, 
some of which have more developed programmes than the BK Trust and a stronger 
presence to the north of the state beyond the metropolis. Furthermore, Calabar also 
plays host to the regional offices and extensive health programmes established by some 
of the major national NODs noted above, such as the Society for Family Health, the 
Redeemed AIDS Programme Action Committee, and the Justice, Development and 
Peace Commission. 
Despite having access to the supposed wealth of diasporic resources and 'exposure' and 
although warmly welcomed as useful and developmentally beneficial, the programmes 
of 'enlightenment' undertaken by DIFN and the BK Trust are neither entirely innovative 
II DIFN staff, interviews, Ipaja, August and September 2005. 
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nor anywhere near the most powerful of those operating in their local and national 
spaces of intervention. Local NGOs have often anticipated the visions of these diaspora 
organisations and are readily identified as much more important agents of such 
'enlightenment'. Despite being two of the most successful London-based diaspora 
organisations identified, DIFN and the BK Trust are, therefore, simply making modest 
contributions to, rather than driving, the spread of 'new' ideas and 'good' behaviours at 
'home'. 
"The Nigerian renaissance will be driven by the repatriation of ideas,,12: national 
development and the promise, politics and limits of diasporic expertise 
As President Obasanjo made clear in his ground-breaking speech at the 'First 
Presidential Diaspora Dialogue' in Atlanta in September 2000, it was the promise of 
what might be termed 'social remittances' that encouraged him to initiate a transnational 
relationship through which diasporic professionals and their organisations could 
participate in the development of the 'home' -nation (Obasanjo 2000). Reasserting this 
contention at Nigeria's first diaspora engagement conference, held in Abuja in July 
2005, President Obasanjo advocated the "build[ing of] strong bridges of contact and 
exchange" with "Nigerian professionals in diaspora", arguing: 
There is a huge pool of skills and expertise in diaspora. If we 
adequately tap it, it will make a significant contribution to national 
development. [ ... ] Those that have gone abroad have acquired new 
knowledge and expertise that will help us manage our affairs along the 
lines of global practice. 
, 
Indeed, like the diaspora engagement agencies established by the Federal Government 
at 'home' (NNVS) and 'abroad' (NIDO), this pioneering conference, entitled 'Bridging 
the digital and scientific divides', was established with a primary objective to 
"encourage the repatriation to Nigeria of scientific knowledge, skills, and expertise from 
Nigerians in the diaspora" (NNVS document, 2005). 
While its development remains embryonic and its future uncertain, the Nigerian state's 
transnational engagement with diasporic professionals and their organisations has 
indeed enabled the emergence of networks for the transmission of such 'social 
12 Professor Pat Utomi, presentation at the 'Bridging the digital and scientific divides: forging 
partnerships with the Nigerian diaspora' conference, Abuja, 25 th July 2005. 
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remittances'. Held in July 2005, the Federal Government's pioneering diaspora 
engagement conference facilitated the development of interpersonal transnational 
contacts and exchanges in the fields of science, technology, health and education by 
bringing 70 diasporans, including 10 from the UK, together with over 350 of their 
'home' -based professional counterparts. Some institutionalised channels for the 
'transfer' of ideas, knowledge, and expertise were also initiated through the conference. 
It was resolved that the conference itself would be held annually and a project was 
launched to create an internet-based system for Nigerian 'experts' abroad to provide 
'distance mentoring' to university science students at 'home'. Furthermore, the 
conference was utilised by the National Universities Commission to promote its 
Linkage with Experts and Academics in the Diaspora (LEAD) schemeJ3 . Originally 
launched in November 2004, the LEAD initiative aims to encourage suitably qualified 
and experienced diasporans to assume short-term academic appointments of between 
one and twelve months in the Nigerian university system. In the words of the 
programme's director, the hope is that participants, of which there had been two by the 
end of 2005, will "bring back fresh ideas [ ... ] based on [their] exposure over there" 
(Interview, Abuja, August 2005). 
In their attempts to open-up transnational channels for the transfer 'home' of diasporic 
expertise, the Nigerian state's diaspora engagement conferences have made associations 
of diasporic professionals a key target. For example, after some two years of discussion, 
a 'Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Health Sector' was finally 
signed at the 2006 conference between the Federal Ministry of Health and the respective 
associations of Nigerian medical professionals based in the UK and the Americas. In 
addition to promising to support these two diaspora organisations in their efforts to 
provide books, equipment, and direct medical services at 'home', the memorandum is 
centrally concerned with facilitating these groups' attempts to transfer diasporic 
'intellectual capacity' to the health sector in Nigeria. 
Inspired by the established transnational practice of these targeted associations of UK 
and Americas-based Nigerian health professionals, the memorandum posits the 'medical 
mission' as a primary channel for both material and intellectual remittances. Indeed, this 
mode of collective diasporic intervention has some standing as effective means of 
13 At launch, this programme was known as the Nigerian Experts and Academics in the Diaspora Scheme 
(NEADS). This title was changed to its present form in June 2007 to avoid confusion with the National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). 
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transferring 'home' 'new' knowledge and practice. For example, having received and 
overseen two medical missions in recent years, the first from the US in November 2004 
and the second from the UK in June 2005, a senior medical official in the Lagos State 
Ministry of Health argues that through their coordinated focus on cardiovascular 
surgery and by providing "much" essential equipment while employing their "higher 
level" expertise alongside local medics, these missions provided "training on the job" 
(Interview, Lagos, October 2005). Indeed, the official contends that the participating 
local practitioners had not before undertaken the particular surgical procedure 
demonstrated by the diasporic medics on these missions, adding, "now that they're 
learning from them we are confident they can handle it later". 
However, there is also considerable doubt among medical practitioners based both at 
'home' and 'abroad' about the need for, and current effectiveness of, the 'medical 
mission' as a channel for the transfer 'home' of new knowledge and skills. This was 
particularly evident at the 'Health, Basic and Applied Sciences' 'break-out session' at 
the 2005 diaspora engagement conference, during which the value of 'medical missions' 
as a means of 'enlightenment' was a key topic of discussion among the 30 or so 
Nigerian health professionals gathered from within and without the Federation. In 
response to presentations by the Federal Minister of Health and executives of the 
respective associations of Nigerian medics in the UK and the Americas, all of which 
devoted much attention to this mode of transnational intervention, a senior professor 
from a Lagos-based medical school argued that the 'medical missions' her institution 
had received from a US-based team of diasporic medics "just focussed on treating 
patients and didn't think about training the trainers". 
In a similar vein, a doctor from one of Nigeria's most esteemed medical schools 
contended that 'medical missions' "have no long-term benefit", bemoaning that some 
members of a diasporic mission to his institution did not even speak to him and his 
colleagues. Moreover, addressing the diasporans in attendance and generating 
exclamations of concurrenc'e from an audience predominantly made up of his fellow 
locally-based medics, he argued, "most of the surgery that you do on medical missions, 
we can do". "Medical missions are good, they are humanitarian", he continued, "but we 
have the skills too". Indeed, echoing other local practitioners who addressed the session 
or participated in my research, this doctor asserted that the fundamental challenge 
facing healthcare practitioners in Nigeria is not a lack of medical expertise but rather a 
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paralysing dearth of equipment, facilities, and infrastructure. "We are working under 
difficult conditions", he insisted, pointing out that it is often necessary to cancel 
operations because of power cuts. Some diasporic medics, he suggested, "couldn't work 
under the conditions we work under here". 
Indeed, to further cries of agreement from fellow participants, he stated that it was often 
the case that the only reason 'medical missions' could overcome the challenge of local 
conditions and utilise skills was that they tend to be "taken-over" by the receiving state 
government "for political gain". Exemplifying this, he claimed that in facilitating and 
seeking to gain credit for the mission that visited his medical school, the state 
government made a special effort to ensure that, for the duration of the intervention, the 
institution was "scrubbed", stocked with essential medical equipment and drugs and 
able to operate its generators constantly. Consequently, while this doctor acknowledged 
that 'medical missions' could lead to politically motivated, short-term improvements in 
the physical capacity of medical institutions, he contended that in terms of knowledge, 
skills and expertise, "we don't need them". If diasporic medics wanted to do something 
genuinely useful for their local counterparts, he concluded to loud applause, they should 
take advantage of their new-found access to the President "to tell him he needs to 
improve facilities". 
Significantly, many of the diasporic medics present at the session were more than 
sympathetic to such arguments, expressing as much doubt as their 'home' -based 
colleagues about the need for, and efficacy of, 'medical missions' as a means of 
transnational 'enlightenment'. A UK-based consultant asserted that 'medical missions' 
tend to be conducted on a "one-off' basis and constitute "wasted effort", having little 
long-term impact once the stock of drugs they usually supply is exhausted. Similarly, a 
US-based doctor contended that diasporic medics and their associations "shouldn't be 
talking about" providing direct medical treatment through "temporary medical 
missions" but should instead focus on developing "the wider infrastructure", for 
example, by supporting businesses that can maintain medical equipment. Indeed, both 
of these diasporans agreed with a counterpart based in Singapore who argued, in 
concordance with many of the local practitioners present, that the Nigerian healthcare 
system faced "no dearth of brains, but a dearth of infrastructure and political vision". 
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Furthermore, even representatives of the respective associations of Nigerian medics in 
the UK and the Americas, through which many diasporic 'medical missions' are 
organised, accredited and/or sponsored, also expressed notable doubts about the efficacy 
of this mode of transnational intervention as a channel for knowledge and skills transfer. 
Addressing the session, an executive of the Association of Nigerian Physicians in the 
Americas (ANPA) was rather modest about the long-term, structural benefits of the 30 
missions it had carried out during its ten years of existence, conceding that they 
"represent a drop in the bucket and a miniscule improvement in the overall decay in our 
healthcare system". If ANPA missions were to make a more lasting and fundamental 
contribution, the executive argued, they should seek to do more to support 
"contemporary medical education" as part of a wider, formal and strategic collaboration 
with the Federal Ministry of Health on the development of national health policy. 
Acknowledging that "large pools of tremendous talent remain within our medical 
schools", the ANPA executive proposed that the organisation should partner such local 
institutions, augmenting their programmes with "education missions" that involve 
week-long series of lectures, workshops and symposia. 
Echoing ANPA's presentation to the session, an executive of the Medical Association 
of Nigerian Specialists and General Practitioners in the British Isles (MANSAG) was 
similarly modest about the 'enlightenment' value of the 'medical missions' conducted 
by his organisation. Noting that the six or seven medical missions conducted by 
MANSAG since its formation in 1997 were "only a drop in the ocean", Dr Okolo 
argued that the organisation was particularly concerned about "what happens when we 
leave". Consequently, he announced that MANSAG was anxious that its missions 
started "doing training to create a longer lasting legacy". To this end, Dr Okolo 
proposed that MANSAG should work with ANP A to initiate "Surgical Skills Medical 
Missions". These would rely, he suggested, on constructing and equipping "Surgical 
Skills Laboratories" within one or two Nigerian medical institutions. This proposed 3-
year project would in tum rely on obtaining state and international donor funding and, 
upon completion, would provide the necessary facilities in which teams of diasporic 
medics could conduct the enhanced mode of medical mission more oriented towards the 
training of local surgeons. 
Clearly, the representatives of ANPA and MANSAG were more confident of the value 
of diasporic expertise than many of the local practitioners and individual diasporic 
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medics in the session. Yet, there was an acknowledgement among 'home' -based medics 
in the session and my research more generally that there were indeed some cutting-edge 
ideas and practices, particularly relating to recent technological advances, to which 
medics in Nigeria could usefully be 'exposed' by their diaspora counterparts. However, 
there was something of a consensus among both 'home' -based and diasporic medics 
that the intellectual capacity to perform many, if not most, of the medical procedures 
conducted on diasporic missions existed locally. Furthermore, it was made clear that if 
diasporic medical professionals and their associations are to remit and instil at 'home' 
those know ledges and competencies that might be regarded as new and useful, they 
would not only have to somehow contribute to the development of the necessary 
facilities and infrastructure but also enhance 'medical missions' so that they devoted 
more attention to engaging and training local practitioners rather than simply providing 
direct treatment to patients. 
Attempts by other diasporic professional associations to transmit 'home' their overseas 
'exposure' can also be seen as rather limited in terms of the novelty of the ideas and 
expertise they offer and their ability to transfer any such 'social remittances' 
successfully. In seeking to transfer 'home' "ideas", "knowledge" and "skills" in support 
of "engineering development in Nigeria,,14, the London-based Engineering Forum of 
Nigerians (EFN) has, since its inaugural event in 2004, consistently sought to 'remit' 
the notion of undertaking infrastructural projects through 'public-private partnership'. 
However, as the High Commissioner and other representatives of the Nigerian state 
have made clear at EFN events, the idea of engaging the private sector in infrastructural 
development has been a cornerstone of the 'reform programme' initiated by President 
Obasanjo in 1999 and later enshrined in the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy launched in 2004. On what is a key idea for EFN's executives, 
then, engagement with state officials can be seen to represent a meeting of minds rather 
than a moment of diaspora-induced 'enlightenment'. 
Similarly, in attempting to contribute to the improvement of engineering education and 
training in Nigeria, EFN has advocated that the teaching of engineering in the Nigerian 
university system should move away from its overbearing focus on theory towards 
better preparing graduates for the practical and commercial aspects of the profession. 
However, completely unaware of EFN and its objectives, the director of a key Federal 
14 
www.efn.org.uk 
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Government agency responsible for engineering development in Nigeria has been 
vigorously pursuing exactly this vision for change since his appointment in 2003. 
Trained in Nigeria and Canada in the 1970s and with nearly 20 years experience of 
teaching and administration in one of Nigeria's premier universities, he is all too aware 
that the stark decline of the Nigerian university system under economic crisis and 
military rule during the 1980s and 90s means that today's engineering graduates "don't 
have any practical skills, [ ... ] only [ ... ] their certificate and some theories in their head" 
(Interview, Abuja, October 2005). 
Significantly, he traces this fundamental challenge in engineering training and practice 
in Nigeria not so much to the "problem of brain drain" but rather to an absence of 
adequate infrastructure; "there are still professors here teaching, but the laboratories and 
workshops are really down with outdated equipment and facilities that are not 
functioning". Consequently, he argues that the most useful contribution diasporic 
engineers could make would be to use their financial capital and commercial 
connections to assist his agency in its attempt to 'resuscitate' and equip the nation's 
Industrial and Technology Development Centres. Only when such physical 
infrastructure is in place, he contends, will diasporic engineers be able to assist local 
experts in imparting more practical and commercial skills in the next generation of 
engineering graduates. 
Despite the infrastructural constraints on the development of applied engineering 
knowledge and expertise in Nigeria, EFN has pressed ahead with its first programmatic 
attempt to promote practical and commercial engineering skills at 'home'. Launched in 
Lagos in July 2006, the Higher Education Engineering Challenge (HEEC) tasks 
undergraduate students of engineering and technology in Nigeria with designing an 
innovative and marketable engineering product, device, or system relevant to a given 
issue "considered of vital importance to national development" 
(www.efn.org.uklheec.htm). The extent to which the HEEC has been able to inspire 
participants to somehow overcome the infrastructural challenges that they face in their 
, 
universities is unclear. 
However, the HEEC has at least enabled EFN to forge some embryonic linkages with 
the Lagos-based Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE). The NSE hosted the launch of 
the HEEC in Lagos and subsequently sent its immediate past president to EFN's 2007 
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'Spring Event' in London. For Dr Christopher Kolade, the Nigerian High Commissioner 
to the UK, the presence of a senior NSE representative at this occasion was significant 
as it made EFN one of the few UK-based Nigerian professional associations to have 
responded to his call to 'host" esteemed professional counterparts from Nigeria. So 
doing, the High Commissioner contended in his address to the event, enabled diasporans 
to "see that there are Nigerians of real worth over there". Such a realisation would, he 
continued, encourage a move away from "diaspora focussed forums" towards a 
"marriage between what we have here and what we have there". Indeed, His Excellency 
concluded that it would only be through forging such transnational alliances with like-
minded and similarly highly trained and experienced counterparts at 'home' that 
diasporic professionals would be able to contribute their expertise to the project of 
change in Nigeria. 
Conclusion 
Despite the great progressive promise attached to social remittances In globalising 
discourses of diaspora and development, it is clear that there are notable limits to the 
extent to which London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations can be seen to transfer 
home new and useful ideas, knowledge, practices and skills. At the local level, 
communal diaspora organisations such as 'hometown associations' and 'ethnic unions' 
are not seen in their communities of origin as sources of innovative ways of thinking 
and doing development. Significantly, it is individuals and organisations based in the 
ancestral homeland itself and its 'internal diaspora' within Nigerian that are identified as 
the prime agents of 'enlightenment' . 
Similarly, while some diaspora NODs undoubtedly enjoy much success in 
disseminating at 'home' ideas, behaviours and skills that are considered new and/or 
developmentally beneficial, it is clear that they are far from pioneering or unique in so 
doing and they are certainly not the most significant actors in this process. Indeed, it is 
local NODs that appear to have led the way in diffusing such 'enlightenment' and they 
, 
remain much more important agents of this than their diasporic counterparts. 
Furthermore, despite the high value attached to diasporic professionals and their 
organisations in the nation-building initiatives of the Nigerian state, there are 
considerable doubts both in diaspora and at 'home' as to the novelty and utility of the 
expertise they offer. There is a notable consensus that much of the knowledge and many 
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of the skills held by diasporic professionals can readily be found among their colleagues 
at 'home'. 
It is clear that there is a danger of over-celebrating diasporic expertise and, in the 
process, eliding and devaluing the wealth of human and intellectual capital that exists 
locally. This can only serve to undermine the formation of the transnational cooperation 
upon which any utilisation of diasporic knowledge and skills will depend. Moreover, it 
is also clear that the employment of innovative ideas and practices often relies upon the 
creation of an enabling infrastructural environment. As we will see in Chapter 9, it can 
be argued that until this is achieved to a greater extent in Nigeria, the possibility of fully 
harnessing its human and intellectual capital, whether diasporic or local, is severely 
constrained. 
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8. Constraining collective transnational power I: the limits of 
diasporic mobilisation and the challenges of developing in 
diaspora 
Introduction 
In Chapters 6 and 7, it was argued that London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations 
do not appear to contribute to development at 'home' to the extent that might be 
expected of them in globalising discourses of diaspora and development. While there is 
a strong sense that it may well be beyond the capacity of these groups to meet such 
expectations, it is clear that there is considerable doubt and often deep frustration about 
the extent to which they fulfil the transnational potential that they do have. In this 
chapter, I explore the factors that are seen to prevent diaspora organisations from 
fulfilling the expectations not only of globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development but also of their own members and 'home' -based beneficiaries. 
In so doing, I build on a strand of work that has attempted to restrain dominant 
idealisations of migrant transnationalism by drawing attention to realities of diasporic 
life that can limit the desire and ability of migrants and their descendents to contribute 
to 'home' (de Hann 1999; AI-Ali et al 2001b; Ammassari and Black 2001; Mohan and 
Zack-Williams 2002; S~rensen et al 2003b). This work draws particular attention to 
how the socio-economic .condition of diasporans profoundly affects their ability to 
intervene at 'home'. In this way, the fortunes of individuals in diaspora and at 'home' 
are seen to be intimately linked. As Mohan and Zack-Williams (2002: 227) assert in an 
African context, "the well-being of diasporic Africans and Africa are not distinct 
activities, but mutually implicated". 
Concurring strongly with such arguments, diasporic respondents consistently contend 
that the challenges of settling and progressing in the UK constitute a major constraint on 
the ability of diasporans to initiate and support collective transnational intervention at 
'home'. Indeed, the difficulties of developing in diaspora are seen to underlie two of the 
greatest constraints on the vitality and transnational capacity of diaspora organisations, 
namely, a lack of funds and limited levels of participation. Together, these closely 
related problems of mobilising human and financial resources are widely seen to 
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undermine severely the sustainability and transnational aspirations of many if not most 
diaspora organisations, greatly constraining their ability to produce transformative 
effects at 'home'. 
Por many in diaspora and especially at 'home', the limits to diasporic mobilisation are a 
product not only of the challenges of living and progressing 'abroad' but also of an 
increasingly individualistic and self-indulgent diasporic disposition. Posited as either a 
product of diasporic exposure to 'Western' individualism or a reflection of the social 
atomisation created by political and economic crisis at 'home', this disposition is seen to 
disrupt and denude 'traditional' systems of obligation to extended family and wider 
community, eroding the desire of diasporans to come together for the benefit of 'home'. 
Indeed, it may well be that the transnational abilities and desires of diasporans are 
simply not as strong as is often assumed in celebratory discourses of diaspora and 
development. It is clear that these discourses need to give much more recognition to the 
individual challenges and immediate family needs and desires that diasporans, much 
like anyone it might be argued, have to face before they can think of extending concern 
and benevolence to wider kin and community. Such a recognition is critical to thinking 
through ways in which the state and international agencies can most effectively engage 
and support collective transnational intervention. Indeed, while much attention has been 
paid to the idea of advancing development funding directly to diaspora organisations, it 
would seem that policies designed to facilitate diasporic progress in the 'host' society 
have as much, if not more, potential for strengthening the capacity of diasporans to 
organise and intervene transnationally. 
"Money is like a barrier"!: the financial limits to collective transnational 
intervention 
Por their members, by far the most important constraint on the transnational capabilities 
of diaspora organisations is a severe and sometimes completely debilitating lack of 
funds.'Por example, the chairman of an Egba-Yoruba 'hometown association' formed in 
1995 bemoans that the organisation has made no progress in realising its main 
transnational objective of constructing a "befitting community hall" at 'home' because 
it has raised nowhere near the £50,000 required to undertake the project (Interview, 
1 Ukpenwa Women's Association member, interview, London, April200S. 
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London, May 2005). Furthermore, he laments that the association has not even been 
able to accumulate the £3,000 it wishes to spend on providing "sanitation facilities" for 
"disadvantaged old people" in the ancestral community. Indeed, the organisation has 
managed to raise only £500 for the benefit of 'home' , a sum which the chairman took to 
the community and spent on holding a party for its children. Given the paucity of funds, 
the organisation deemed it pointless to continue reporting its finances to the UK Charity 
Commission, with which it registered in 1995. Consequently, the organisation was 
deemed "inactive" and removed from the Register of Charities in 2002. "What am I 
supposed to report when there is nothing to report", the Chairman complains, "there are 
no finances to report!" 
Similarly, an Ijebu-Yoruba 'hometown association' formed in the mid-1990s once 
purchased from a London charity shop some "goods" and "materials" for the 
development of 'home' but was unable to ship them to Nigeria for want of sufficient 
funds (Organisation chairman, interview, London, September 2004). More recently, this 
association was disappointed that it was unable to respond positively to requests for 
financial assistance from two 'home' -based community organisations supporting blind 
people and people living with HIV/AIDS. Indeed, a lack of funds means that this 
association has been unable to make any tangible interventions in the development of 
'home'. 
My fieldwork data are replete with such accounts of financial limitations constraining 
severely or undermining completely the transnational. capacity of diaspora 
organisations. A lack of funds is identified as the primary reason why an Ijesha-Y oruba 
'hometown association' and the diaspora NGOs International Aid and Nigeria Action 
have had to suspend their modest financial and material remittances to the respective 
community, health, and educational institutions they had supported at 'home'. Members 
of an Igbo 'town union' lament that the organisation's central transnational aspiration to 
'resuscitate' electricity and pipe-borne water supply in their ancestral community 
remains an unfulfilled dream due to limited finances. And in the case of Nigerian 
Women for Development, the director regrets that a paucity of funds means that its 
proposed headline project at 'home', the construction of a 'development centre' for 
'grassroots' women in the Niger Delta, has advanced little beyond the plan displayed on 
the wall of the organisation's London office. 
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Even diaspora organisations that have be able to fund more notable progress in realising 
their transnational aspirations tend to find that financial limitations remain the major 
constraint on their border-spanning activities. While the Ayege National Progress Union 
(ANPU), London has been able to finance more contributions to 'home' than many 
other geo-ethnic unions, the nature, scope, and intensity of its cross-border interventions 
are still seen to be compromised significantly by its limited monetary resources. As an 
ANPU London stalwart reflects: 
[W]hen it comes to time of spending, you look at the purse and look at 
the cost and the purse is quite small and therefore the things you want 
to achieve will be quite small as well. If you had a purse that was say 
twenty, thirty thousand pounds, then you would look at, "OK, what do 
we want to do? We want to put in street lights? We can afford that". 
£10,000 converted to the currency would be a few millions. [ ... ]. But 
when you only have £2,000, you cannot use everything, so you are 
going to be able to use maybe 10% of that. So you can only do 
something worth £500 or £200. So limitation of finances is a very, 
very major issue and I think that is a major limiting factor [ ... ]. 
(Interview, London, June 2005) 
Similarly, despite enjoying some relative success In funding its transnational 
aspirations, the diaspora NOO Development Impact for Nigeria (DIFN), founded in 
1999, is still seen to be heavily constrained by financial limitations in its attempts to 
establish and sustain community health and development programmes at 'home'. As the 
founder of the organisation and the principal architect of its transnational vision, Mr 
Y omi Oloko is especially disappointed that financial constraints have meant that DIFN 
has been unable to extend its work much beyond the Lagos district of Ipaja, frustrating 
its founding desire to intervene in communities across Nigeria. Echoing this frustration, 
a local church leader who is regularly involved in the organisation's seminars and 
workshops insists, "DIFN needs to be better funded so it can expand beyond the scope 
of just handling a few individuals here, they need the resources to have a national 
network" (Interview, Ipaja, August 2005). As another close associate of DIFN's 
programmes in Ipaja opines, "if it is funded well, it will have been larger than this, it 
won't just be a local thing" (Interview, Ipaja, August 2005). 
DIFN's UK-based trustees and its local programme staff and participants express 
further frustration that even within the limited confines of Ipaja, funds have not allowed 
the organisation to implement the full range of programmes it originally envisaged. 
Indeed, it is argued that financial constraints have prevented the inauguration of several 
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projects central to the founding vision, such as an annual youth carnival and a livelihood 
training and micro-credit scheme for young mothers and people living with mY/AIDS. 
As Pastor Bode Omokaro, DIFN's Nigeria Coordinator, laments, "[ ... ] because of 
limited resources many of our programmes we have to shelve, sometimes we plan a 
programme and at the last minute we just have to stop it. .. " (Interview, Ipaja, December 
2005). Indeed, financial constraints have compromised even established DIFN 
programmes. For example, a lack of funds forced the cancellation of the 2005 teacher 
training workshop for the Child-to-Child Health Club programme and meant that it was 
necessary to halve the number of invited participants for that year's summer youth 
camp. As the headmistress of a local primary school that was asked to send pupils to the 
camp contends, "If they were well-funded, they wouldn't have to restrict those to come 
to the camp, [ ... ]" (Interview, Ipaja, September 2005). 
Despite representing diasporans who have trained for potentially lucrative careers, 
associations of diasporic professionals also tend to identify financial limitations as the 
major constraint on their attempts to contribute to the development of 'home'. For 
example, while the Engineering Forum of Nigerians (EFN) was finally able to launch its 
Higher Education Engineering Challenge in Nigeria in July 2006, over a year after it 
was first announced, the organisation reported in January 2007 that finance for the 
project was "still short of the target budget", delaying further its final execution (EFN 
newsletter, January 2007: 1). Furthermore, a senior, founding EFN executive argues that 
it is a lack of funds that has prevented the organisation from inaugurating its other 
planned programmes, such as instituting a new chair of engineering in a Nigerian 
university and organising internships in the UK for 'home' -based Nigerian engineering 
students. As an active EFN member asserts, "[W]e need money" (Interview, London, 
July 2006). 
'The burden is always on just a few': collective transnational intervention and the 
limits to diasporic participation 
There' is, then, an overwhelming sense that a lack of funds often compromises 
significantly, and even undermines completely, the contribution of London-based 
Nigerian diaspora organisations to development at 'home'. Indeed, financial constraints 
are often seen to constitute the most debilitating limitation on collective transnational 
benevolence. Concurring that "finances" represent "the major problem" for diaspora 
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organisations in their attempts to intervene at 'home', Mr Samuels, a senior official in 
the Federal Government's diaspora engagement agency, hints at what is for many 
respondents a key reason why this might be; "One of the shortcomings of all the 
Nigerian [diaspora] organisations [is] poor commitment". 
Indeed, my fieldwork data suggest very strongly that London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations tend to enjoy low levels of active participation and support from their 
respective diasporic constituencies, constraining significantly their ability to attract and 
organise resources that can be deployed transnationally. Such organisations are 
generally forged and sustained by a small, committed minority within their respective 
constituencies. While an active core of a few, and sometimes even just one or two, 
individuals attempt, and often struggle, to create and continue a diaspora organisation, 
the majority of nominal or potential participants tends be involved either irregularly or 
not at all. 
Despite drawing on the supposedly strong affective ties of 'primary patriotism', even 
geo-ethnic diaspora organisations appear to attract very limited participation from their 
diasporic constituencies. For example, the President and the Secretary of an Ijebu-
Yoruba 'hometown association' argue that "very few" of their fellow UK-based 
indigenes are registered as members of the organisation (Interviews, London, September 
2004). Even amongst the dozen or so who have registered, commitment and activity 
levels are considered to be all too low with the financing and conduct of most 
associational business apparently left to the executives and, particularly, the President. 
Similarly, the President of an Ijesha-Y oruba 'hometown association' notes that the 
organisation has only eight "active" members despite there being "far more" of his 
fellow indigenes based in the UK than the sixty or so who attended the association's last 
fundraising event held some years ago (Interview, London, April 2005). Not even the 
eight 'active' members can be relied upon to participate regularly, the President 
complains, meaning that associational meetings sometimes attract as few as three 
, 
attendees. Indeed, the President contends that unless he makes the effort to '''phone 
around" to remind and implore members to attend, the official, supposedly bi-monthly 
gatherings do not hold at all; in 2005, for example, only one meeting was successfully 
organised (Interview, London, January 2006). 
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Concordantly, a founding member of an Ekiti-Yoruba 'hometown association' asserts 
that although there are "dozens" of his fellow indigenes in the UK, the organisation has 
only three nuclear families as "active" members (Interview, London, May 2005). Again, 
this 'town union' struggles to get even its few 'active' members to attend meetings 
regularly. Indeed, while associational gatherings are supposed to be monthly, one had 
not been held for four months. And even though the organisation is able to make contact 
with some twenty UK-based co-ethnics beyond the 'active' membership, only about 
five of these tend to respond positively to the association's requests for funds for its 
proposed interventions at 'home'. 
The limited participation and support that geo-ethnic diaspora organisations are able to 
attract from their respective constituencies mean that the task of sustaining these groups 
falls heavily on a small number of active members, constraining significantly the 
transnational capacity and potential of diasporic geo-ethnic associational life. 
Estimating that there are over 200 of their fellow Omoyeges resident in the UK, 
members of the Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU), London, bemoan that the 
organisation has only 15 to 20 active members. As committed member Mrs Ademola 
notes, "[W]e are many here even though we are just like few people in the meeting" 
(Interview, London, April 2006). Indeed, ANPU London stalwart Mr Akinmade rues, 
"there are a lot of people that are not involved" (Interview, London, July 2005). With 
such limited participation from the UK-based Omoyege population, Mrs Obafemi 
argues, "The level of participation from individuals varies a lot and that's why the 
burden is always on just a few as opposed to a lot of people and that makes it more 
tasking, so that's a constraint" (Interview, London, July 2005). As another ANPU 
London contends; "the lifeline of the Association for the past 12-15 years has been the 
same 15 or so members", adding: 
[Y]ou have people who are particularly, always, interested, at any 
cost, to keep on going even if it means they now have to fund more. I 
mean, individually now, we contribute maybe £10 each [per month] 
and we also have auctions where we are the same people who vie for 
, the auction items [ ... ] and also we are the same people who, if we 
need to carry out an event or project, we levy ourselves £100 flat. So I 
think on funding-wise, [ ... J, the amount of money that is coming from 
the same pocket, has been coming a little bit difficult. (Interview, 
London, June 2005) 
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Indeed, with the 'burden' of sustaining geo-ethnic diaspora associations tending to fall 
heavily on a few committed members, there is a strong sense that the long-term survival 
of such groups is at risk. With UK-based Ukpenwans estimating that their numbers run 
into the hundreds, the President of the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK (UW A) 
reports, "I can confidently say that we have only 24 members" (Interview, London, 
April 2006). Even within this nominal membership, active participation appears to be 
limited. The UW A's monthly gatherings that I attended attracted an average of only 10 
members and the President reports, "even out of the 24 people that we have our on our 
membership list, I can say that only about half of those attend meetings regularly". 
Highlighting active members' concerns about the consequences of such limited 
participation, Mrs Ohaje, a stalwart of the UW A since its formation in 1992, recalls that 
there have been times when she feared that the association would "lay down 
completely" (Interview, London, June 2006). Having become acutely aware of this 
danger during her two-year term as UW A Treasurer between 2002 and 2004, Mrs Ohaje 
issued in her end of tenure report an impassioned appeal to UK-based Ukpenwan 
women: 
[ .. J]n my role as Treasurer it has become increasingly apparent that 
the majority of work is carried out by a minority of devoted members. 
In addition to this, it has been noticed that some members have not 
paid their membership fee. These funds are needed for daily 
management and to keep the UW A afloat. [ ... I]t is important that 
more Ukepenwa women join the group to provide resource, 
experience and the much needed financial assistance which will 
enable us to continue our charity. (UW A annual report, 2004) 
Diaspora organisations grounded in professional identities also tend to rely on a small 
core of active members and see the limited participation and support they attract from 
their respective constituencies as undermining their sustainability and transnational 
activities. For example, while the Engineering Forum of Nigerians (EFN) has succeeded 
in attracting nearly 200 members since its formation in 2002, its President is anxious to 
sign-up a much higher proportion of the 3,000 or so Nigerian engineers and engineering 
students he estimates are based in the UK. Indeed, with the financial returns from this 
, 
rather modest level of membership having proved insufficient, EFN's activities at 
'home' and 'abroad' have depended heavily on the largesse of a handful of the 
organisation's members, especially the sponsorship provided by two of its founding 
executives through the engineering companies they respectively own. In addition to 
having been the main sponsors of EFN's first four annual 'Spring Events' in London, 
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these stalwarts were two of the most benevolent among a group of only 11 members 
who had, as of January 2007, made donations to the association's first attempt at a 
programmatic intervention in Nigeria, its Higher Education Engineering Challenge 
(HEEC). With so few members having donated to the pioneering HEEC project, it was 
"still short of the target budget" (EFN newsletter, January 2007), delaying further the 
implementation of a transnational intervention that had been publicly announced back in 
April 2005. As a committed EFN member contends, "the major problem is just getting 
more members who buy into the cause of the association" (Interview, London, July 
2006). 
The President of the British Nigeria Law Forum (BNLF) shares such concerns that 
limited participation and a heavy reliance on a few key individuals can undermine the 
sustain ability and transnational capabilities of diasporic professional associations. 
Addressing the 35 or so people gathered for a 2005 BNLF seminar, the President 
bemoaned that there were "many more" Nigerian lawyers in the UK than the 60 to 70 
who had expressed "interest" in the organisation since its formation in late 2002. If the 
BNLF is to realise its aspiration to engage and influence processes of legal, democratic, 
and business reform in Nigeria, he argued, it would need "strength in numbers". "We 
need to get bigger", he declared. Furthermore, praising one of his fellow executives for 
"keeping the Forum going", he implored existing members to become more actively 
involved. "We all need to take responsibility for the group", he insisted, adding, 
"Otherwise it is left to one or two people and it won't make an impact". 
Indeed, an organisation of UK-based Nigerian nurses originally founded in the late 
1990s exemplifies how limited participation and an over-dependence on a few 
committed members can undermine the impact of diasporic professional associations. 
While it claims to represent "approximately 3,000 Nigerian nurses,,2 in the UK, this 
organisation had even at its height in 2002 only about 50 members. Its President 
laments that the association suffered a complete lull in activity between 2003 and 2005 
and that, as a consequence, its membership has become even smaller. Indeed, at the 
association's first public event after what its President described as its "two-year 
holiday", there were only 8 or 9 members present. The Secretary noted that the majority 
of these were the association's original founding members and stressed that the 
association would have to achieve some notable success in its renewed "membership 
2 Organisation document, n.d .. 
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drive" if it was ever to be in a position to rekindle its efforts to make financial and 
material donations to care facilities in Nigeria. 
Diaspora NOOs tend to endure even greater struggles to survive and sustain their 
transnational interventions in the face of low levels of diasporic participation and 
support. Indeed, these organisations generally depend very heavily on just one or two 
individuals and attract little involvement and benevolence from the wider diaspora, 
making their sustainability and attempts to contribute to development at 'home' 
especially precarious. For example, Nigerian Women for Development (NWD) relies 
overwhelmingly on the individual efforts of Mrs Ikendu, who founded the organisation 
in 1994. While Mrs Ikendu has made appeals in the diasporic African media and enjoys 
an extensive array of contacts among London's Nigerian population, she has been 
unable to attract any substantial or sustained support for NWD from her fellow UK-
based nationals. This means that the organisation faces a constant struggle to survive on 
the small grants it is intermittently awarded for its community welfare work in London 
and has no funds to undertake its main transnational aspiration, the construction of a 
'development centre' for 'grassroots' women in the Niger Delta. 
While Development Impact for Nigeria (DIFN) has enjoyed some relative success by 
attracting a team of six trustees, only four attend the organisation's quarterly meetings 
and occasional public events with any regUlarity. Furthermore, it is recognised among 
the trustees that Mr Yomi Oloko, who established DIFN in 1999, and his fellow 
founding trustee and close friend, Mr Ade Fashade, are overwhelmingly responsible for 
sustaining the organisation, the former providing the bulk of its intellectual and 
financial resources while the latter undertakes most of the administrative work. 
Moreover, Yomi's dream that 100 UK-based Nigerians would become members and 
donate £10 a month remains far from being realised. Indeed, although the trustees have 
been reaching out "for years,,3 to family, friends, contacts and the wider diaspora, they 
have succeeded in encouraging only 5 of their fellow UK-based Nigerians to join DIFN 
and commit to the desired monthly pledge. "And that's why we've found it difficult to 
sustain the work that we do", rues Ade (Interview, London, July 2006). "The trustees, 
especially Yomi, fund most of what we do", he argues, adding, "but that can't continue, 
it's not sustainable, we can't sustain that type of giving really". 
3 Yomi Oloko, interview, London, June 2006. 
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Significantly, it would seem that limited diasporic support can indeed make diaspora 
NOOs and their transnational interventions unsustainable. For example, since founding 
International Aid in 1996, Mr Uchedu has enjoyed little success in attracting the 
participation and benevolence of his fellow diasporans. Indeed, the organisation has had 
to depend almost entirely on the time and money of its founder and his wife. However, 
by the year 2000, Mr and Mrs Uchedu could no longer afford to finance the 
organisation. In the continued absence of any notable support from the wider diaspora, 
it became impossible for International Aid to function, heralding the termination of its 
efforts to improve the healthcare of "disadvantaged,,4 people in Nigeria. Indeed, we 
have seen that low levels of active participation and support tend to constrain 
significantly and even undermine completely the vitality, sustainability and 
transnational capabilities of diaspora organisations. 
"A sick doctor will not be able to look after his patients": collective transnational 
intervention and the difficulties of developing in diaspora 
When it comes to accounting for the limited financial strength and low levels of active 
participation and support generally enjoyed by London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations, diasporic respondents point overwhelmingly and most readily to what 
they see as the socio-economic challenges confronting Nigerians living in the UK. 
Indeed, the involvement and benevolence diaspora organisations are able to attract from 
their respective constituencies are routinely seen to be severely constrained by the 
generally unfavourable position of these constituencies in the UK economy and society. 
In the face of what are considered to be the often harsh realities of diasporic existence, 
many, if not most, UK-based Nigerians are seen to be struggling to secure an income 
that can satisfy individual and family needs let alone any desires to participate in and 
support diaspora organisations and their transnational interventions at 'home'. 
Consequently, it is consistently asserted that the majority of Nigerians in the UK lack 
the means to become involved in, and contribute to, diasporic associational life to the 
extent that they might wish. Indeed, it is often argued that the travails of living in the 
, 
UK mean that many members of diaspora organisations are unable to participate as 
actively as they might want and that many, if not most, diasporans are unable to 
participate at all. 
4 Mr Uchedu, interview, London, May 2005. 
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In detailing the constraining hardships of diasporic life, organised diasporans frequently 
emphasise that it is often hard for Nigerians to find employment in the UK. Indeed, a 
2009 report for the UK Department for Communities and Local Government on 'The 
Nigerian Muslim Community in England' found that there was particular concern about 
"high levels of unemployment amongst British-born Nigerians and new [Nigerian] 
migrants" (Change Institute 2009: 29). Furthermore, both this report and my 
respondents suggest that if Nigerians do find employment in the UK, it often involves 
doing multiple low paid, menial jobs that leave little money and time free to devote to 
diasporic associational life. The President of an Ijebu-Y oruba 'hometown association' 
contends that those of 'his people' in the UK who have secured employment tend to 
"work long and for little" (Interview, London, September 2004). Consequently, he 
asserts that "most" of his fellow UK-based indigenes "don't have a lot of money" and 
are "too busy" to participate actively in the association. Indeed, he contends that it is a 
struggle even for him as the President to find the time and resources to contribute to the 
union, pointing out that despite being a qualified accountant, he has had to settle for a 
modest income working often unsociable, 12-hour long shifts as a residential warden. 
Seeing such employment situations as inhibiting the bulk of his UK-based co-ethnics 
from participating actively in the association, the President laments, "We only have 
what a few committed members can afford and that is not much". 
Concordantly, the Vice-President of the Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU), 
London complains, "We are limited in how much we can raise amongst ourselves", 
adding, "We have a problem of development here" (Interview, London, May 2005). 
"Most have not progressed much", he continues of his co-ethnics in the UK, the vast 
bulk of whom are seen to have settled from the early 1980s onwards as part of the 
notable emigration triggered by the entrenchment of political and economic crisis in 
Nigeria. "[A]mongst us, I see a lot of people who are still where they were many, many 
years ago", he reports, adding "[they are] still doing the same kind of job; security, 
mini-cabbing, menial jobs, just assistants in offices [ ... ]". "They are still living in the 
small flats that they lived in when they first got here", he observes, "They are just 
, 
marking time". 
Suggesting that many UK-based Nigerians have indeed been facing difficult conditions 
for some time, a London-based Nigerian academic wrote in 1993, "The slang fa gburu 
('to do menial jobs' or 'to struggle for work among other commitments in order to 
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survive') is a well known phrase in general use by the Yoruba community in London" 
(Oyetade 1993: 72). Moreover, a recent major study of migrant workers in low paid 
employment in London identified a strong presence of Nigerians in the 'Migrant 
Division of Labour' found at the 'bottom end' of London's labour market (Wills et al 
2009). For example, the study found that "black Africans mainly from Ghana or Nigeria 
made up 40 percent of workers in office cleaning, over two-thirds (79%) of those 
employed as cleaners on the London Underground and over half of care workers 
surveyed (63%)" (Herbert et al 2008: 106). Mirroring the accounts of my respondents, 
the study highlights the poor conditions, profound struggles and lack of socio-economic 
mobility faced by London's low-paid migrant workers and details their 'coping tactics', 
such as maximising overtime and taking multiple jobs, as they attempt to "'get by', if 
only just, on a day-to-day basis" (Datta et al 2007a: 404). 
Asserting that such travails and a general lack of "success" in the UK have driven some 
of her fellow diasporans into "mental hospitals", Mrs Ohaje, a stalwart of the Ukpenwa 
Women's Association (UW A), the Ukpenwa Development Union (UDU) , and the 
Wazobia State Union (WSU), argues that participating in geo-ethnic diaspora 
organisations simply represents too much of a financial commitment for many UK-
based Nigerians: 
Some people don't earn much, [ ... ], you have to pay dues to come [to 
monthly meetings], and when you come there, there are other hidden 
expenditures. And you have to pay your transport to go there [ ... ]. So 
coming to meetings is a problem [ ... ]. (Interview, London, June 2006) 
Mrs Emanu, an active member of the UW A and WSU concurs, stating, "[A] lot of 
people don't come, [ ... ], [ ... ] because of the financial burden [ ... ], they can't afford it" 
(Interview, London, April 2006). Furthermore, like many members of geo-ethnic 
diaspora organisations, she also highlights the problem of the "time factor", arguing, 
"[I]t's not that rosy in this country, you know. Some people do two jobs to survive, 
some people work during the weekends and so they can't come to meetings [ ... ]". 
Similarly, a founding trustee of the diaspora NGO Development Impact for Nigeria 
(DIFN) contends, "[ ... M]ost Nigerians here are still really struggling" (Interview, 
London, July 2006). Significantly, he believes that this is a key reason why DIFN has 
enjoyed so little success in its aim to attract 100 UK-based Nigerians to donate £10 a 
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month to the organisation's community health and development projects in Nigeria. As 
this trustee rues, "When people are struggling to sustain themselves here in the UK, let 
alone meet their extended family commitments back home in Nigeria, then they are 
hardly going to have the money to give to an organisation like DIFN" (See also Datta et 
al 2007a and b on how difficult it can be for Nigerian and other low-paid migrant 
workers in London to send remittances 'home'). 
In accounting for the unfavourable socio-economic condition that is seen to undermine 
the ability of many UK-based Nigerians to participate in diasporic associational life, 
organised diasporans tend to point first to the problem of securing legal settlement. For 
example, a founding member of an Igbo 'town union' claims that many of his fellow 
diasporans are "without papers" and therefore not only "have to do menial jobs" but are 
also prone to being "cheated" by employers who "threaten to call the Home Office" 
(Interview, London, May 2005). Similarly, the Chairman of an Egba-Yoruba 
'hometown association' contends that many of 'his people' are "just languishing here 
without papers", making it "difficult for them to earn much money" (Interview, London, 
May 2005). Indeed, the Change Institute (2009: 29) argues that recent attempts to 
tighten the UK immigration system "have been identified as contributing to an increase 
in the number of undocumented Nigerians working in London" and reports, "Examples 
were given of qualified but undocumented Nigerian people in the country working 
illegally for as little as two pounds an hour". 
Significantly, the Chairman of the Egba-Yoruba 'hometown association' noted above 
asserts that the many of his fellow UK-based co-ethnics who are "without papers" and 
live "underground" generally earn so little that they often have "no money left" to send 
'home' to their family, let alone to contribute to the union and its transnational vision. 
Indeed, the problem of settling legally in the UK is widely posited as a key barrier to 
participating in and supporting diasporic associational life. As a committed member of 
the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK asserts, "[ ... S]ome people maybe their 
immigration status doesn't permit them to do the kind of work they want to do and have 
that money as much as they want to, so there are lots of forces that can debar you [from 
being involved]" (Interview, London, April 2005). Concordantly, a stalwart of Ayege 
National Progress Union (ANPU), London notes: 
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[ ... T]he new ones just coming [to the UK], [ ... ] they've not really 
been featuring at ANPU meetings. [ ... ]. There should be new 
members around though, [ ... ], [but] I've not really heard of any, either 
they're lying low or they're not showing their faces because I know 
there are a lot of Nigerians in Britain that don't have papers. 
(Interview, London, July 2005) 
Furthermore, the struggle to settle legally in the UK is seen to retard the socio-economic 
progress of many diasporans in the long-term, undermining their ability to contribute to 
diasporic associationallife even after they have acquired legal settlement. Reflecting on 
the experiences of his fellow members, the vast majority of whom, like him, arrived in 
the UK between the early 1980s and early 1990s and have since secured legal 
settlement, an active member of ANPU London explains: 
[ .. J]n terms of financial achievement, I would say amongst us it's 
been very poor. Why? [ ... ] I think a lot of people spent too much 
time having to study just to remain legal in the country. In those early 
years, some of them had previous degrees from home but they'd never 
practise because they really couldn't work as they had to be students 
[to get a visa] [ ... ]. They saw themselves as just marking time to be 
able to reside in the UK and that hampered a lot of progress in those 
early years. [ ... A] lot of them were not able to invest in property 
because they didn't have any legal standing and, like you know, real 
estate [ ... ] has become a major, booming area but only for those who 
were invested in it. [ ... ]. And [ ... ] if you want to do business, you 
have to take a risk but they didn't [ ... ] because [ ... ] if you took more 
risk, you were more exposed and therefore that could lead to 
becoming expatriated back home [ ... ]. So they were really, really 
hindered along the line. (Interview, London, June 2005) 
The short- and long-term socio-economic constraints produced through the struggle to 
acquire legal settlement are widely seen to be compounded by the difficulty of having 
Nigerian qualifications recognised in the UK. Diasporans often rue that the long and 
debilitating years of military rule had by the mid-1990s ruined the Nigerian education 
system and its solid international reputation, meaning that qualifications obtained in 
Nigeria are no longer well regarded in the UK. As a founding executive of the 
Engineering Forum of Nigerians (EFN) explains: 
When we came to the United Kingdom, I came in 1984, in those days, 
if you had a degree from the University of Lagos it was recognised 
readily by the institutions in England. So you can become a pupil 
engineer, you practise, and eventually you became a chartered 
member of an institution and so on. These days, unfortunately, that is 
not the case. Some of our guys have found their way into United 
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Kingdom by whatever means necessary and they now find themselves 
working as a chambermaid somewhere or cleaning the streets and so 
on and they're finding it difficult to enter into the engineering 
profession. When they present their credentials, their qualifications, 
no one recognises them. And, of course, if you've been to university, 
spending the whole of your time training to be an engineer, when you 
then find yourself sort of more or less doing some menial activities, 
you feel depressed and disappointed. (Interview, Lagos, September 
2005) 
Indeed, this EFN executive goes on to suggest that, deskilled and despondent, many 
Nigerian engineers who have arrived in the UK after EFN's founders are likely to feel 
that they lack not only the resources, connections, and experience to join and participate 
in the organisation, but also the self-esteem. 
Beyond the difficulties of acquiring legal status and having Nigerian qualifications 
recognised, it is often decried that diasporans also face the challenge of racism and/or 
discrimination on the basis of national origin, hindering further their socio-economic 
advancement and their ability to participate in and contribute to diaspora organisations 
and their transnational activities. For example, Mrs Temitope, the founder of a diaspora 
NOD promoting Nigerian culture in the UK, argues that there is "no question" that 
"discrimination" exists against "black people" in the UK labour market (Interview, 
London, September 2004; See also Datta et al 2007b and Herbert et al 2008 on 
Ohanaian and Nigerian workers' experiences of racism in London's labour market). 
Drawing on her own experiences and those of her "black friends", she contends, "If you 
go for a job and there are two people to choose from who are equally well qualified, you 
won't get it". Significantly, Mrs Temitope notes that it was only once she took the 
decision to become self-employed and successfully established her own management 
consultancy company that she began to make enough money to found her diaspora 
NOD. 
Concordantly, in accounting for why many Nigerians "don't do so well" in the UK, the 
founder of another· diaspora NOD begins by asserting, "There is the issue of racial 
, discrimination. It is a real problem" (Interview, London, May 2005). Indeed, he 
contends that in his profession, an association of "black" practitioners had recently 
complained that "white" Australasian colleagues yet to complete their professional 
qualifications and with no experience were being employed over well-qualified and 
highly-experienced "black" practitioners. Signalling his keen interest in the response of 
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the profession's governing body, he rails, "What explanation can there be other than 
discrimination on the basis of race?" Like Mrs Temitope, he contends that in the face of 
such racial discrimination in the labour market, it was only by establishing his own 
business that he was able to acquire the means to found his diaspora NGO. 
Pointing to overwhelmingly negative media portrayals of Nigeria and its nationals, 
diasporans often argue that the problem of racial discrimination is compounded by a 
particular prejudice towards Nigerians. Reflecting on her job as a housing manager for a 
local authority in London, Mrs Obafemi exemplifies how such prejudice is experienced 
in the workplace: 
Like where I work, because of the sort of name that Nigerians have, 
like that they're very corrupt, card theft and credit card fraud and 
whatever, some people tend to think all Nigerians are like that, that 
they all have a price, but some of us don't, some of us don't. 
(Interview, London, July 2005) 
Such experiences resonate strongly with those recorded in the Change Institute's 2009 
report for the UK Department for Communities and Local Government on 'The 
Nigerian Muslim Community in England' . As the report asserts: 
Respondents cited many examples of negative perceptions about 
Nigerians which they feel affect their employment prospects. These 
include negative perceptions of the Nigerian accent and the 
stereotypical image of Nigerians as 'fraudsters'. Many respondents 
felt very uncomfortable about the perceived media focus on 
trafficking, crime and document forgery, which they feel obscures the 
fact that the vast majority of Nigerian migrants are not criminals. 
,(Change Institute 2009: 29) 
Furthermore, Oyetade (1993: 76) suggests that such negative stereotyping has been 
hindering the progress of UK-based Nigerians for some time, arguing that this unfair 
association with 'fraud' was making it "increasingly difficult" for them to open bank 
accounts, obtain loans, and generally do business even in the early 1990s. 
Indeed, such is the apparently entrenched prejudice experienced by Nigerians and their 
descendents in the UK that nine diasporans came together in 2004 to form the Nigerian 
British Community Forum (NBCF). As a founding executive contends, the "main 
objective" of the Forum is "the eradication of stigma and the attendant prejudice which 
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we collectively suffer as a result of the intransigencies of a few" (Personal 
communication, July 2004). 
Significantly, the Forum asserts that the dominant, discriminatory attitude towards UK-
based Nigerians and their descendents "impacts negatively" not only on their "image" 
but also on their "opportunities as a community"s. Indeed, it is argued that it will only 
be when "Nigerian-British" people enjoy in the UK "an environment free of stigma and 
prejudice" that they will experience "optimal personal development and community 
upliftment,,6. Moreover, linking the condition of diasporans in the 'host' society to their 
individual and collective transnational abilities, the NBCF's submission to the British 
government's Commission for Africa adds that the "empowerment" of "the African 
diaspora" is essential if it is to "participate fully in [Africa's] development effort" 
(NBCF 2004: 2 and 4). 
While it is clear that some diasporans have managed to bypass the challenges of 
entering the UK labour market by successfully establishing their own businesses (see 
also Styan 2007 and Change Institute 2009), there is a strong sense that many 
diasporans who tum to their own entrepreneurship enjoy limited success. For example, a 
member of an Igbo 'town union' argues that his own experience of business failure is 
indicative of a common trend among fellow 'indigenes' and other Nigerians in the UK. 
Drawing a contrast with Jewish and Indian diasporas which he sees as having become 
"very rich" through commerce and enterprise and therefore as "able to do a lot at 
home", he bemoans, "My people are not doing so well here so it's difficult to help at 
home" (Interview, London, May 2005). 
Concordantly, the British Nigeria Law Forum (BNLF) devoted its 2005 annual seminar 
to "some of the difficulties encountered by small Nigerian [law] firms as they seek to 
establish themselves in the UK" (BNLF event flyer, 2005). This "practical workshop" 
centred on the problems experienced by such firms in complying with the practice 
standards laid down and regulated by the Law Society, particularly that of having a 
, sufficient capital base. It was posited that a key reason for this was that lawyers trained 
in Nigeria, like those trained in most other overseas jurisdictions, have to prepare for 
and pass the Qualified Lawyers Transfer Test, an undertaking which, it was claimed, 
5 www.nigerianbritishcommunityforum.org.uk 
6 Ibid. 
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offers little instruction and practical preparation for establishing and managing a private 
practice. As the discussion at the event developed, a suggestion was made that the 
BNLF should establish a forum to assist "distressed" UK-based Nigerian-run law firms 
to overcome this challenge. Significantly, with only about 40 people gathered for the 
event, it was argued that so doing would help the Forum itself in what was seen as its 
pressing need to "be bigger". If Nigerian lawyers enjoyed more success in the UK, it 
was asserted, they would be likely to participate in the BNLF in greater numbers and be 
able to make more substantial contributions to the organisation and its transnational 
vision. 
"It is only when we are comfortable that we are able to contribute to our 
community": collective transnational intervention and the importance of 'comfort' 
Overall, then, it is clear that diasporans are generally seen to face a range of difficulties 
that often hinder their socio-economic progress in the UK and that thereby constrain 
their ability to participate in and contribute to diasporic associational life. Indeed, we 
have explored how the often harsh realities of diasporic existence are seen to prevent 
many, if not most, diasporans from having any active involvement in diaspora 
organisations. Concordantly, those who dominate and sustain diaspora organisations are 
generally seen to come overwhelmingly from the rather limited ranks of relatively well-
established and successful diasporans (cf. Sassen-Koob 1979; Grillo 1985; Schoeneberg 
1985; Louis-Jacques 1991; Werbner and Anwar 1991; Vertovec 1996; Liu 1998; Owusu 
2000; Riccio 2001; Smith 2002; Henry and Mohan 2003). For example, a stalwart of the 
Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU), London contends that it is only those of his 
co-ethnics who have enjoyed some relative socio-economic progress in the UK who can 
afford the time and money to join and sustain the union and its transnational activities. 
As he asserts, "[ .. .I]t is only when we are comfortable that we are able to contribute to 
our community" (Interview, London, July 2005). 
Indeed, distinguishing themselves from many diasporans who do not participate actively 
, in diasporic associational life, committed members of diaspora organisations tend to 
report that they have enjoyed some notable success in fulfilling their socio-economic 
aspirations in the UK. Having generally arrived in the UK prior to the early 1990s, 
active members of diaspora organisations overwhelmingly tend to have legal settlement 
and often full British citizenship. Committed organised diasporans also tend to have 
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good academic and/or professional qualifications, often including British and/or other 
internationally-recognised qualifications. Consequently, they routinely have relatively 
secure and well-paid white-collar employment and/or their own relatively successful 
business enterprises. Reflecting this, active members of diaspora organisations generally 
own property in London, most often former council flats and houses in the inner 
boroughs of the city, with many having been able to buy bigger homes in the suburbs in 
recent years, some even managing to retain and rent-out their original property. 
Diasporic professional associations in particular tend to be dominated and sustained by 
diasporans who have enjoyed exceptional socio-economic success in the UK, often 
occupying very senior professional positions and/or owning major companies. For 
example, the Engineering Forum of Nigerians (EFN) boasts among its ranks the first 
'black' university dean in the UK, London Underground's Director of Engineering and 
several senior members of UK engineering institutes. Indeed, EFN reports that "about 
70% of members are in middle management earning in the range of £45-55K" and that a 
"smaller percentage own their businesses with turnover in excess of £1M" (EFN 
Newsletter, January 2007: 4). As Dr Christopher Kolade, the Nigerian High 
Commissioner to the UK, proclaimed in his address at the organisation's 2007 'Spring 
Event', "When I first met EFN, I found Nigerian engineers who are doing very well 
here". 
Significantly, a founding executive of EFN contends that the socio-economic success of 
those who came to form the association was an essential precondition to its 
establishment: 
[ ... W]e were the first generation of engineers who came to England 
and stayed to practise so we reached a stage in our careers where, 
[ ... ], some of us have now got ourselves into senior positions, [ ... ]. 
[ ... The formation of EFN] couldn't have happened before then 
because we didn't have anybody really who had risen to that sort of 
level of expertise and influence in the profession amongst the 
Nigerians in the United Kingdom. But by the time we set-up EFN we 
were all doing well, some of our friends were directors here and there, 
people who are senior managers in organisations, you know, people 
who have the expertise, influence, and a bit of money to start 
something like this. (Interview, Lagos, September 2005) 
However, while committed members of diaspora organisations overwhelmingly tend to 
locate themselves among the most successful and 'comfortable' of their fellow UK-
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based diasporans, they often lament that the demands of familial responsibility and the 
high cost of living in the UK, especially London, mean that diasporic existence remains 
something of a struggle and that they are therefore unable to support diasporic 
associationallife as much as they might wish. As a stalwart of the Ukpenwa Women's 
Association UK bemoans: 
[ ... T]he situation in this country, a lot of members having 
responsibilities, it's like trying too [ ... ] . You have to work so hard, 
you are trying to pay your bill and then you are trying to pay your 
mortgage, pay this, pay that, pay this, pay that, you know, by the time 
you realise, there's nothing there. It's just kind of restricting some 
people in that organisation, they have the love, [ ... ], you know, trying 
to support, but [ ... ] they can't afford to as much as they want. 
(Interview, London, April 2005) 
Complaining that the tax regime of the British government "mak[es] the yoke of the 
honest labourer heavy", a committed member of the Ayege National Progress Union 
(ANPU), London concurs: 
[ ... I]ndividual members are struggling, you know what the system is 
here, if you're not careful, you find that everything you have is based 
on one debt or the other. So even if people are running their 
businesses they still have to be careful. If you have a good house, you 
want to pay your mortgage, you don't want to get into trouble. So you 
need to take care of number one in terms of your finances. I mean, a 
sick doctor will not be able to look after his patients. (Interview, 
London, July 2005) 
Indeed, such is the challenging and precarious nature of diasporic existence that even 
the relatively successful and 'comfortable' diasporans who overwhelmingly tend to 
dominate' and sustain diaspora organisations are seen to be at risk of falling on 'hard 
times', potentially constraining or even undermining completely their ability to 
contribute to diasporic associational life and its transnational interventions at 'home'. 
For example, when members of ANPU London discussed at a monthly meeting the 
repeated absence and defaulting on dues of one of their fellow stalwarts, they attributed 
it to the grave difficulties into which his small retail business had fallen. Similarly, a 
former member of the Calabar Union traced his decision to withdraw from active 
involvement in the group to the drying up of the steady stream of temporary work 
contracts he had previously enjoyed. "I can't say I anymore have the resources to 
contribute fully", he explained (Interview, London, June 2005). 
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Significantly, with diaspora organisations generally relying on a few committed 
members, any decline in the socio-economic fortunes of these stalwarts can severely 
undermine the sustainability of diasporic associational life and its transnational 
contributions to 'home'. For example, an Ijesha-Yoruba 'hometown association' 
became inactive between the late 1990s and early 2005 because some of its most 
committed members had "fallen on hard times" and were "struggling even to meet the 
monthly dues" (President, interview, London, January 2006). Concordantly, the 
diaspora NOO International Aid was in 2000 forced to terminate its efforts to support 
healthcare at 'home' because it founder and primary funder became unable to sustain 
the organisation when his UK business "got in difficulties" and his two sons required 
support as they began courses at UK universities. Reflecting on this "very painful" 
experience, the founder of this diaspora NOO emphasises that his sons "had to be the 
priority" and reflects, "If I had the money, my philanthropy would be second to none" 
(Interview, London, May 2005). 
An 'un-African' diaspora: collective transnational intervention and the problem of 
selfish and indulgent diasporic sons and daughters 
At 'home', there is some acceptance of the diasporic contention that life overseas is 
challenging in ways that constrain and undermine collective transnational benevolence. 
However, many at 'home' have little time for this argument. Indeed, diasporans are 
widely imagined to be doing rather well for themselves, their limited pursuit of 
organised, progressive interventions at 'home' being traced not to any socio-economic 
struggle endured 'abroad' but rather to the development of a more individualistic and 
self-centred disposition that a diasporic location is seen to facilitate and encourage. 
Having participated regularly in the programmes run in and around Ipaja, Lagos by the 
UK-based diaspora NOO Development Impact for Nigeria (DIFN) , a local church 
leader epitomises the attitude of many at 'home' towards their co-nationals overseas: 
I think what DIFN's sponsors have done is in the minority, [ ... ]. You 
find many people outside of this country, they get positions of 
opportunity [ ... ] and the impact is not felt [here], rather, they become 
self-centred. [ ... Y]ou don't find people who are out there looking 
back with favourable disposition towards the development of their 
community [ ... ]. (Interview, Ipaja, August 2005) 
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As another local participant in DIFN's programmes opines: 
[ ... T]hey go there, [ ... ], and at the end of the day, they won't even 
want to spend their money on anybody. [ ... ]. These people, they go 
there for their personal reasons [ ... ]. [ ... ]. They are not thinking of 
helping [the community]. [ ... ]. All they want to do is meet their own 
needs, meet the needs of their family. That's all. It is just within their 
own little circle, they don't extend outside their circle. [ ... ]. 'Me and 
my family alone', that's what they do. (Interview, Ipaja, September 
2005) 
Indeed, while it is often held that supporting themselves and their immediate families is 
rightly a priority for diasporans, there are frequent complaints that this becomes their 
exclusive concern at the expense of fulfilling established notions and practices of 
obligation and responsibility to extended kin networks and the wider community. For 
example, a senior figure in Ipaja's 'traditional authorities' asserts that the kingdom's 
"many" 'sons and daughters' based overseas "don't show interest" in the development 
of the community, rueing, "They only give to their close family if they so wish" 
(Interview, Ipaja, August 2005). The deputy head of a village in the kingdom of Ayege 
strikes a concordant note, railing that its five "sons and daughters" residing overseas 
"have done nothing to benefit the community" because "they are just interested in their 
own private family" (Interview, Ayege, December 2005). Similarly, a prominent figure 
in the associational life of Ukpenwa asserts that her co-ethnics living overseas "have 
[ ... ] a selfish way of doing things" and dispense largesse "just within the immediate 
family" (Interview, Ukpenwa, October 2005). As another Ukpenwa notable decries, 
such behaviour is "not the best": 
the essence of going out there should be for them to bring whatever 
improvement. If there's any good thing happening there, they should 
be able to bring it back to their people, that is the only way their 
people can also develop. But if your being there is just for yourself 
and for your immediate family, then you've done nothing to 
contribute back home and that is not how we should grow, that way 
you cannot build a nation. (Interview, Ukpenwa, November 2005) 
, Diasporans themselves often contend that many of their number do indeed appear to 
develop 'abroad' a more individualistic and self-centred disposition that runs contrary to 
established notions and practices of obligation to extended family and community. As 
the chairman of a London-based geo-ethnic organisation complains of his UK-based co-
ethnics, "Most of them are only concerned about themselves" (Interview, London, May 
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2005). "Now that they've got regularised and their close family members are all OK, 
they don't want to know about [the "community"] anymore", he rails, adding 
indignantly, "Every community has its Judases". Similarly, an Ayege National Progress 
Union (ANPU), London stalwart argues that some of her fellow UK-based Omoyeges 
think and act like the "bastard child" who, in a well-known Y oruba adage, forgets its 
obligations to the ancestral hometown (Interview, London, July 2005). Elaborating on 
this unfavourable comparison as part of her explanation of why it is only "just a few" 
UK-based Omoyeges who actively support ANPU London, she contends that some of 
her diasporic co-ethnics "don't even like to share" and "don't want to invest back home 
that much". "[I]t's just like they go after whatever it is they want", she asserts 
disapprovingly. 
Similarly, in accounting for the very limited progress the UK-based diaspora NOO 
Development Impact for Nigeria (DIFN) has made towards its aim of attracting 100 
Nigerians to contribute £10 a month, a founding trustee decries that "most" of his UK-
based co-nationals "don't share [the organisation's] values" of "social justice" and 
"community development" (Interview, London, July 2006). Indeed, he expresses 
profound disappointment that his fellow diasporans tend to extend their concern and 
benevolence little beyond themselves and their families: 
We're saying to them, give to DIFN to support our work, but it's a 
case of their reaction, 'what's in it for us?' When it comes to 
voluntary giving or donations, [ ... ], Nigerian communities are not 
really into that, selfless giving, they're not that much interested. 
[ ... W]e're so obsessed with that individual attitude of 'what's in it for 
us', [ ... ], we'll only give if it's almost kind of selfish, i.e. what am I 
actually going to get out of this. [ ... T]hey will be interested in 
remittance, you know, sending money to their family, [ ... ], but when 
it comes to development projects linked with other people's well-
being or whatever, it's very difficult to get Nigerians to give, [ ... ]. 
Back at 'home', the unwelcome development among diasporans of a more 
individualistic and self-centred disposition that undermines established notions and 
, practices of obligation to extended family and the wider community is often traced to 
the heightened exposure a diasporic location is seen to give to 'Western' values, 
attitudes, and behaviours. The argument is that when living and working in 'host' 
nations beyond Africa, especially in Europe and North America, diasporans tend to be 
among, and can acquire the ways of, people who are seen to be, as a market woman in 
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Ayege put it, "too much within themselves" (Interview, Ayege, December 2005). 
Indeed, it is with this acquired, atomising social insularity in mind that a prominent 
figure in Ukpenwa bemoans that diasporans imbibe abroad "bad habits, copied from 
you people!" (Interview, Ukpenwa, October 2005). 
Concordantly, another Ukpenwa notable decries that the "extended family system" and 
the "basic principles" of "neighbourliness", "comradeship" and "community service" 
can be forgotten by co-ethnics based overseas by virtue of the contrasting cultural 
values and practices they experience in the 'host' environment: 
[ ... M]any of the societies outside Africa are very different in the sense 
that a young man grows up and when he's 17, it's like a benchmark 
and from that point on he's encouraged to be on his own [ ... ]. When 
you go to live in a society that operates a principle of that nature, 
tendency can be for you to keep to yourself, [ ... ]. So we try to 
encourage our people abroad not to be individualistic to that extent, 
[ ... ]. (Interview, Ukpenwa, November 2005) 
Exciting even more disappointment and infuriation at 'home', diasporans are often felt 
to concentrate benevolence on themselves and their immediate families not merely to 
meet basic needs but to make ostentatious displays of wealth. This apparent propensity 
to indulge in the kind of 'conspicuous consumption' with which migrants have been 
associated in much writing on mobility and development is often considered at 'home' 
to highlight the extent of the self-centred individualism diasporans acquire overseas. 
Furthermore, the brazen excess that diasporans stand accused of lavishing upon 
themselves and their immediate families is widely felt to bring into all too sharp relief 
the lamentable degree to which they are interested in organising and directing border-
spanning benevolence to extended kin and the wider community. For example, a church 
youth leader in Ipaja, Lagos, argues that diasporans "are not thinking of helping [the 
community]", contending, "If they come [back], they just come, shoot themselves 
around, 'oh, I'm a big guy, oh, you know, I'm around', [ ... ]. Some of them will just 
come home, build a big house, and go back" (Interview, Ipaja, September 2005). 
, Similarly, an Ipaja-based NOD worker asserts, "Those who go abroad, they come back, 
they build big homes, they buy flash cars for themselves and their families and that is 
the only thing you see" (Interview, September 2005). 
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Indeed, 'big' houses and 'flash' cars are widely seen to be emblematic of the 
individualism and self-centredness diasporans stand accused of acquiring overseas and 
displaying so ostentatiously at 'home'. This was made particularly clear when an 
imposing shiny-new Japanese-made 'sports utility vehicle' passed by on a Lagos street 
with a personalised registration plate emblazoned 'GEORGIA, U.S.A', prompting a 
local friend to chuckle in amused resignation, "That's your typical Nigerian in 
diaspora!" Furthermore, when we later passed a huge 'ultra-modem' two-storey house 
that towered incongruously above, and was grandly walled-off from, its much more 
modest neighbours, my friend pointed-out that it was built by a Nigerian living overseas 
and proclaimed indignantly that in constructing such "great villas" and "putting walls 
around them", diasporans display nothing but "indifference" to the conditions and 
development of the wider community. 
Indeed, the tendency attributed to diasporans to enclose and ensconce themselves in 
private grandeur often attracts particular irritation and condemnation at 'home'. 
Typifying this, an Ipaja-based church leader observes: 
While we were growing up hardly do you find any building with high 
rise walls and what have you, screening it from passers by. But today 
hardly can you pass by any street where you don't only find high walls 
covering the beautiful mansions or what have you inside, you find 
electric wires surrounding it to prevent intruders! [ ... ]. It is not in our 
nature to shut ourselves away from the community like that. It's un-
African! It's un-African! (Interview, Ipaja, August 2005) 
Bemoaning such diasporic behaviour in Ayege, a youth leader in the kingdom reminds 
his co-ethrics based overseas, "It is not the big car, it is not the better house that matters 
but your contribution to your community" (Interview, Ayege, December 2005). 
Significantly, diasporans themselves often contend that many of their number do indeed 
pursue self-indulgent 'conspicuous consumption' at the expense of such established 
notions and practices of obligation to extended kin and wider community. The chair of 
, the Emeka Maternal Health Project is far from alone among the founders of London-
based diaspora NGOs in lamenting that co-nationals in the UK tend to have much more 
interest in buying "flashy cars" and building "massive houses" in Nigeria than they do 
in supporting community-orientated initiatives at 'home' (Interview, London, May 
2005). Furthermore, diasporans also identify in their ranks a propensity to direct 
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largesse to extravagant social events rather than 'community development'. As a 
founding trustee of a London-based diaspora NOO contends, "[ ... W]hen it comes to 
remittance [ ... ], [ ... ], the only things Nigerians seem to be funding in Nigeria are big 
weddings and burials" (Interview, London, July 2006). 
Furthermore, diasporans often complain that some of the wealthiest of their fellow UK-
based co-nationals have a propensity to lavish expenditure on extravagant social events 
in diaspora. Making this point, a diasporan showed me a copy of a glossy Nigerian 
society magazine and directed me to an article entitled "London's most lavish party". 
Recounting this grand event held by a prominent UK-based Nigerian, the article begun 
by detailing how many thousands of pounds had been spent respectively on food, drink, 
security and entertainment and then went on to boast, "If anyone doubted that this party 
was attended by anything other than big hitters then they would be left in no doubt in 
the car park which contained exotic Mercedes, BMW s, Porsches and Ferraris". 
However, while special criticism is often reserved for the individualism and ostentatious 
self-indulgence that diasporans are widely seen to acquire and display, many 
respondents both at 'home' and 'abroad' see the development of these traits among 
overseas nationals in the context of a much wider, deeply entrenched, and largely 
internal process of social fragmentation and stark polarisation unfolding within Nigeria. 
Indeed, the self-centred and brazenly materialistic attitudes and behaviours that 
diasporans stand accused of acquiring overseas are widely seen to have been 
proliferating within Nigeria for many years. Consequently, a breakdown in systems of 
obligation to extended family and community and a concomitant rise in self-indulgent 
'conspicuous consumption' among apparently wealthy elites are regularly viewed as 
general, rather than diaspora-specific or diaspora-driven, socio-cultural trends. 
For example, while admonishing diasporans for "becom[ing] self-centred", a Lagos-
based church leader argues that more individualistic attitudes and behaviours have been 
taking hold not only among his co-nationals based 'overseas' but also among those 
, based at 'home' (Interview, Ipaja, August 2005). Consequently, he decries that in 
becoming increasingly neglectful of obligations to wider kin and community, 
diasporans are merely reflecting what is an all too well established trend in Nigeria: 
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[ ... Tlhe cultural upbringing of an average Nigerian family is 
communal-based but somehow along the line, it's been seriously 
damaged, everybody seems to now be on his own. In fact, the 
extended family culture has been broken now. Gradually you are now 
beginning to have a Nigerian family man who is only interested in 
himself, the wife and maybe children, it has never been like that 
before. We have always believed in this extended family programme 
and, because it is broken, gradually nobody is interested in the 
community. 
Concordantly, in accounting for why his fellow diasporans tend not to share his 
organisation's ideals of "social justice" and "community development", a founding 
trustee of the UK-based diaspora NGO DIFN contends: 
Well, it reflects the society we have come from. It's not just here that 
most Nigerians don't share those values, it's in Nigeria too. For me, 
that's why the country has still got lots of political, social issues, 
conflicts, because we're too, very individualistic, we're not a society, 
[ ... l. People are so obsessed with who they are, [ ... ], that's all they're 
concerned about, they're not concerned about their fellow human 
being and how they might not have three square meals a day or how 
he's going to get that treatment for that mv. (Interview, London, July 
2006) 
For this DIFN trustee as for so many other respondents, the self-centred individualism 
that many diasporans appear to imbibe from 'home' is the product of an entrenched and 
pervasive process of social fragmentation in Nigeria: 
[ ... Ylears ago, Nigeria was not like that, we were a community, 
people fend for each other, people cared for their next door neighbour. 
It's not always been like this [ ... ], even as recently as 30 years ago, 
we were a society, [ ... l. Back in the 60s, the local communities were 
strong, if you wanted to build a school, the local community would go 
round and get the bricks. People would support each other and leave 
their doors open and look out for each other's kids, [ ... ], and that's 
how people grew up to become caring-focussed. But those values are 
lost in our current society, we don't have that anymore, it's more 
individualistic, people are just looking after themselves. 
, Respondents at 'home' very often trace this apparent contraction in the scope of moral 
concern and benevolence in Nigeria primarily to the exigencies of economic crisis. The 
local founder of an NGO in Ipaja, which provides support for what she contends is an 
increasing number of elderly people who are no longer cared for by their families, 
explains: 
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You know, the economic crunch has even crumpled the whole of the 
extended family system. The youth nowadays find it difficult to even 
accommodate extended family. You know when your mother-in-law 
comes, or your father-in-law comes, and you haven't got enough gari 
to even eat yourself then you now want to feed another mouth?! [ ... ]. 
So it's not working [ ... ], it has disintegrated. (Interview, Ipaja, August 
2005) 
Furthermore, respondents at 'home' often contend that as economic hardship compels 
Nigerians to behave in a way that appears more self-centred, it is not only the 'extended 
family system' that is undermined but also notions and practices of concern and 
benevolence to the wider community. For example, the 'traditional authorities' in 
Ayege lament that it has become increasingly difficult to attract communal development 
funds from 'citizens' because of a seemly unrelenting decline in the mainstay of the 
kingdom's economy. As the General Secretary of the Ayege Progress Committee 
bemoans, "People cry that there is no money in town, that the cocoa business is not 
good" (Interview, Ayege, November 2005). Concurring, a stalwart of the Ayege 
National Progress Union, London asserts, "That sense of communal effort died down as 
the economic condition went down" (Interview, London, July 2005). Similarly, in 
arguing that "the spirit of giving has been lost", a local NGO worker in Ipaja points to 
the "poverty level": "Imagine somebody who has not eaten, who cannot afford three 
square meals, asking them to bring one or two Naira, they find it difficult to part with 
money. It's because of the bad economy. That's the problem" (Interview, Ipaja, 
December 2005). 
Undermin!ng further established systems of obligation to extended family and wider 
community in Nigeria, the atomising effects of economic hardship are widely seen to be 
compounded by the emergence of a self-indulgent, ostentatious and often dishonest 'get 
rich quick mentality' inspired by the excesses of a corrupt political elite. Pointing to the 
bad example set by local government officials who fail to "put community before self' 
and "build expensive houses on ill-gotten wealth" (APC newsletter, 2003), the General 
, Secretary of the Ayege Progress Committee argues that many of his moneyed co-ethnics 
"waste their resources on luxuries" and need to "wake up" to the development needs of 
the kingdom (APC newsletter, 1999). Concordantly, a local NGO worker based in 
Lagos decries, "the average Nigerian loves money too much, he just wants to spend it 
on himself and show people that he is doing well and enjoying life" (Interview, Ipaja, 
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October 2005). "But what do we expect when we have leaders going to Europe and 
spending our money on cosmetic surgery and big houses", he adds, making reference to 
a state governor who had recently been arrested in London on corruption and money 
laundering charges. As a founding trustee of a UK-based diaspora NOO contends of 
Nigeria's leaders, "[ ... W]ith all their squandering of the nation's wealth, the only thing 
they have encouraged is for people to be more materialistic, to chase the dollar, chase 
money" (Interview, London, July 2006). 
Conclusion 
Whatever it is seen to derive from, it is clear that a more individualistic and self-
indulgent disposition is posited both at 'home' and 'abroad' as a key reason why many 
diasporans appear to have limited interest in joining and contributing to diaspora 
organisations and their transnational visions of progress. This suggests that diasporic 
desires to come together for the benefit of 'home' might not be as strong as often 
appears to be assumed in celebratory discourses of diaspora and development. However, 
it is also clear that what can appear as diasporic individualism and self-indulgence is 
intimately related to direct and indirect experiences of hardship at 'home' and 'abroad'. 
Having often seen and/or faced difficult times at 'home' and while attempting to settle 
and progress in diaspora, there is a strong sense that many diasporic Nigerians are 
especially anxious to prioritise and ensure their own well-being and that of their 
immediate family, and enjoy any 'comfort' that they achieve in so doing. 
Moreover, it would seem that many diasporans are simply not in a position to initiate 
and support collective transnational intervention, no matter how much they may aspire 
to do so. Indeed, we have seen that the challenges of obtaining legal settlement, 
overcoming discrimination and racism and, relatedly, securing well-paid work with 
sociable hours, mean that many diasporans have neither the time nor the money to 
actively participate in, or contribute to, diasporic associational life. Therefore, 
governments and international agencies that attempt to engage and support collective 
, transnational intervention by, for example, offering matching development funds should 
not divert attention and resources away from what this research suggests are still 
incredibly pressing issues of migrant integration and 'minority' inclusion. There may 
well be as much, if not more, potential for the development of 'home' in advancing 
policies that pursue with renewed vigour a 'host' society that facilitates the socio-
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economic progress of diasporic populations and thereby enables many more diasporans 
to participate in diasporic associational life and support collective transnational 
intervention should they so wish. 
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9. Constraining collective transnational power II: the problem 
of transnational trust and the difficulties of doing 
development at 'home' 
Introduction 
In Chapter 8 it was asserted that diasporic mobilisation for the benefit of 'home' is seen 
to be severely constrained by the challenges of developing in diaspora and the 
emergence of a more individualistic and self-indulgent diasporic disposition. Building 
on this argument, the present chapter contends that these constraints on collective 
diasporic benevolence are compounded significantly by a distinct lack of transnational 
trust, the practical difficulties of operating transnationally and the challenges of 
intervening in a 'home' environment that is often more hostile than enabling. 
Exploring first the problem of transnational trust, this chapter traces how a pervasive 
and deeply entrenched culture of mistrust appears to exist both within the diaspora and 
between the diaspora and 'home'. With corruption, fraud and clientalism seen to be rife 
in Nigerian society, there is a prevailing suspicion among diasporans that the 
organisations formed by their fellow overseas nationals are little more than vehicles for 
the personal enrichment and political gain of those who form and run them, strongly 
discouraging many diasporans from joining and supporting these groups. Furthermore, 
when it comes to making collective transnational contributions, organised diasporans 
are generally extremely wary of trusting 'home' -based individuals and institutions to act 
as local intermediaries, fearing that they will misappropriate any benevolence that is 
channelled through them. Consequently, many diaspora organisations often decide not 
to work through local intermediaries, severely constraining their ability to intervene at 
'home'. And where diaspora organisations do engage local intermediaries, a lack of 
trust often limits the nature and extent of the relationship and the transnational 
contributions that can be made through it. 
This chapter then goes on to detail how these problems of transnational trust and 
operation are compounded by, and indeed often linked to, the lack of an 'enabling 
environment' at 'home'. The border-spanning flows of people, information, money and 
materials that are so vital to collective transnational intervention are seen to be severely 
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deterred and disrupted by highly unreliable communication and transport infrastructures 
and a major lack of security in Nigeria. The transfer 'home' of diasporic professional 
expertise is seen to be especially constrained by woefully inadequate technical facilities 
and a deeply entrenched culture of corruption and unprofessionalism. Furthermore, the 
Nigerian state is widely considered to be too unreliable and ineffective to be an enabling 
partner of collective transnational intervention and is even often viewed as actively 
hostile to modes of diasporic engagement that might question it policies and authority. 
Significantly, this is regarded as indicative of how individuals, institutions and 
communities at 'home' are often unreceptive and even resistant to collective 
transnational intervention. 
Overall, then, this chapter makes clear that collective transnational intervention can face 
more constraints and challenges than is generally assumed in celebratory discourses of 
diaspora and development, which tend to emphasise the ease and strength of 
transnational affinities, flows, and connections in this apparently global age. While 
transnational ties and networks are often seen to be readily facilitated by advanced 
transport and telecommunications technology and embedded firmly in supposedly 
strong solidarities such as family, kin, ethnicity and nationality, it would appear that 
these connections can be rather cumbersome, weak and prone to fracture. It becomes 
clear through the chapter that this is due in no small part to the lack of an 'enabling 
environment' at 'home'. Consequently, it is argued that some notable progress needs to 
be made in overcoming the development challenges of 'home' before the organised 
diaspora can begin to make a notable contribution to the progress of 'home' . 
"We Nigerians are afraid of each other": collective transnational intervention and 
, 
the problem of transnational trust 
Discouraging diasporic mobilisation: organisational operation, internal tensions and 
a lack of trust in diaspora 
Alongside the difficulties of developing in diaspora and the emergence of a culture of 
individualism and self-centredness, the very ways in which many diaspora organisations 
operate are often also seen to limit the degree of participation and support such groups 
are able to attract. Indeed, diaspora organisations are often considered to discourage 
active involvement by devoting too much of their meeting time to administrative 
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formality, excessive deliberation, trivial debate and idle 'gossip'. As a stalwart of the 
Calabar Union contends, "Some people don't like coming to the meetings because there 
is a lot of talk!" (Interview, London, May 2005). Most notably, this mode of operation 
is widely seen to be especially unappealing to younger, more 'dynamic' diasporans, 
particularly when it is coupled to gerontocractic principles that offer them few 
opportunities to participate fully. 
In addition to deterring participation and support from diasporans in general and 
younger, more dynamic diasporans in particular, the rather tedious and inefficient way 
in which many diaspora organisations are seen to conduct their business is widely 
considered to ferment potentially debilitating internal tensions and splits. Indeed, the 
nature of organisational operation often becomes a key point of contention in what can 
escalate from rather jocular discussions into fractious disputes along the lines of 
generation (see also Oyetad6 1993). In the case of the Ayege National Progress Union 
(ANPU), London, for instance, an active member contends that debates about the 
conduct of associational affairs are central to a usually benign but sometimes crippling 
contest between his fellow "business-minded" "modernisers" and the generally older 
"traditionalists" (Interview, London, June 2005). This generational antagonism is 
generally seen to do little more than "slow down" (ibid) associational decision-making 
even further but in 2000 it became so intense and debilitating that most members were 
compelled to leave, causing the association to cease functioning for four years. While 
the association was 'resurrected' in early 2004, about eight of the 'traditionalist' faction 
refused to rejoin and instead formed their own separate union. Significantly, the 
existence of two rival unions means that many former and potential members have not 
become active in either group because they do not want to 'take sides' in what is often 
seen as an unnecessarily adversarial political situation. 
In accounting for this debilitating split, ANPU London stalwarts highlight how 
generational antagonisms were inflamed and exploited by a relatively new member who 
mobilised an 'elders' faction against the association's middle-aged, and therefore 
relatively young, president. The divisive member stands accused of undermining the 
incumbent president in order to win the support of the 'elders' in a self-interested quest 
for power both within the union and in electoral politics back at 'home'. Indeed, 
personal interests and ambitions are widely seen to spark the damaging internal tensions 
and splits to which diaspora organisations in general are often considered prone. The 
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apparent pursuit of self-interest and personal ambition is generally considered to be 
particularly divisive in diasporic associational life because it readily fuels fears and 
suspicions that organisations are being 'hijacked' for individual ends that run contrary 
to, and potentially undermine, collective aims and objectives. 
Significantly, such fears and suspicions point to a fundamental issue that is widely and 
consistently seen not only to hinder the internal operation of diaspora organisations but 
also to deter many diasporans from joining and supporting these groups; a pervasive and 
deeply entrenched lack of trust between Nigerians both in diaspora and at 'home'. 
Pointing to the nepotism, clientalism and corruption that are seen to be so prevalent at 
'home', diasporans are often very wary of getting involved with their co-nationals in 
diaspora organisations because they suspect that those who form and run such groups do 
so for little other than personal and often improper gain. Indeed, what often appears to 
verge on a culture of mistrust is a major factor discouraging diasporans from coming 
together and contributing collectively to 'home'. 
For example, reflecting the scepticism with which professional associations are 
regarded in Nigeria, their diasporic counterparts are widely dismissed as networks 
through which individuals seek personal access to power and resources in the Nigerian 
state. Dr Daramola, for instance, was "hesitant" about participating in the Engineering 
Forum of Nigerians (EFN) because he suspected that it might represent a "duplication" 
of the "nepotism" with which professional bodies are widely associated in Nigeria 
(Interview, London, July 2006). Indeed, despite having been made aware of EFN soon 
after its inauguration in 2002, he only joined in 2006 when a fellow UK-based Nigerian 
engineer who he regards as his academic and professional "mentor" vouched for, and 
introduced him to, the organisation. However, he believes that concerns such as those he 
had initially about EFN are the primary factor discouraging UK-based Nigerian 
engineers from participating in and supporting the association: 
[They are] scared of getting involved, [ ... ]. I think the fear of most 
other engineers is that, 'Look, I don't want to, we've always heard 
stories of people corning together and you find out that the so-called 
core executives are only doing.it for their own selfish interest, just to 
get connected to influential people back home [ ... ] and then take 
contract' . 
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Such concerns are especially strong and prevalent towards umbrella associations 
attempting to represent the UK-based Nigerian diaspora as a whole. The leaders of such 
organisations are often suspected of employing the political capital of claiming to speak 
for the Nigerian 'community' in the UK to interact with, and seek favour from, 
representatives of the Nigerian state. This is especially true in the case of Nigerians in 
Diaspora Organisation (NIDO) , which is often seen as a 'political' organisation led by 
diasporans who are primarily concerned with seeking 'position' and 'contract' back at 
'home'. Indeed, NIDO and its leaders are the subject of particular suspicion because the 
organisation was established and initially funded by the Federal Government with a 
primary aim of linking diasporic professionals with openings in Nigeria. Furthermore, 
some diasporans even suggest that NIDO is little more than an overseas branch of the 
ruling People's Democratic Party, affording the diaspora organisation's leaders 
privileged access not only to professional opportunities but also political positions back 
at 'home'. 
Even greater than the suspicion that leaders of diaspora organisations take advantage of 
their positions to seek advantage in accessing power and resources at 'home' is the 
concern that they primarily seek direct and dishonest personal financial gain. This 
reflects widespread wariness of corruption and fraud, popularly known as '419' in 
reference to the Nigerian legislative code created to tackle the 'advanced-fee' money-
making scams with which Nigerians have come to be associated around the world. For 
example, in accounting for why it can be difficult to attract members, an executive of a 
diasporic professional association bemoans that his fellow diasporans "are suspicious of 
anyone setting up any sort of organisation", fearing that "it's just a money-making 
scheme" and that the founders will "disappear with the money" (Interview, London, 
July 2005). Indeed, the master of ceremonies at the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK 
(UW A) fundraising cultural event in 2006 acknowledged that its is a "cliche" that 
associations like the UW A raise money for what they claim is "a good cause" only for it 
to be "not used as promised". The UW A was different, he claimed, calling on me, as 
someone who had "visited Ukpenwa and seen what the Ukpenwa Women have done", 
to address the audience and "vouch" for the association and its work. 
Especially strong suspicions of corruption and fraud are aroused by diaspora 
organisations taking the form of NGOs. This reflects how, in Nigeria, NGOs are almost 
synonymous with '419' and their founders are almost instinctively suspected of seeking 
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only their own personal gain. This profoundly sceptical attitude emerged and became 
entrenched during late 1980s and the 1990s as the proliferation of NOOs in Nigeria 
soon became popularly associated with the advancement of personalised political 
agendas and, most especially, the misappropriation of state and international donor 
funding. As this trend for forming NOOs has been reproduced in diaspora, so too has 
the deep and particular suspicion associated with it. Indeed, when I mentioned diaspora 
NOOs to one diasporic respondent, he exclaimed, "There's a major source of fraud; lots 
of NOOs are set up by people just as a way to make money!" (Interview, Abuja, July 
2005). Insisting that I had to "be careful" when dealing with such organisations, he gave 
an account, very much like those given by numerous other respondents, of a fellow 
Nigerian who established an "NOO with no office" and used the money it raised to buy 
himself a Mercedes and a big house. 
Such prevailing and particular mistrust of diaspora organisations taking the form of 
NOOs, especially the idea that they represent 'money-making scams', is a key reason 
why they struggle to win the support of diasporans. As Mr Y omi Oloko, the founder of 
Development Impact For Nigeria, bemoans in accounting for why his diaspora NOO 
has made such little progress in meeting its target of attracting 100 UK-based Nigerians 
to donate £10 a month, "It's difficult for several reasons, what you'll find is that some 
Nigerians are wondering whether we are just 419, that we want to cut money" 
(Interview, London, July 2005). Yomi is far from alone in explicitly tracing such 
suspicions to a fundamental lack of trust between Nigerians in diaspora, a culture of 
mistrust he, like others, traces back to Nigeria itself. As Y omi reflects in an interview he 
gave to a newspaper in Nigeria, "[ ... W]e Nigerians are afraid of each other. We're 
afraid that we'll dupe one another. We're afraid that we'll steal each other's money [ ... ] 
and that's part of our culture" (Oikelome, 2004). Indeed, the experiences of some of my 
respondents suggest that Y omi might be right to argue that "a lot" of diasporans "have 
been 41ged" and are therefore "so wary" of donating to organisations like DIFN 
(Interview, London, July 2006). "We just have to learn how to trust", implores Yomi 
(Oikelome, 2004). 
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Discouraging and disrupting collective transnational intervention: the problem of 
trust between diaspora and 'home' 
Diasporans are generally very wary of joining and supporting diaspora organisations not 
only because they tend to be suspicious of those who run them but also because they 
often have an even greater mistrust of the 'home' -based intermediaries through which 
some of these organisations direct their transnational interventions. As one diasporan 
contends of the collective remittances made by "town union[s]", "The Oba will spend 
the money on his own people [i.e. family]. The money is to the Oba, it's not to the 
masses. That is just a problem. That is one of the reasons why I don't join these 
things ... " (Interview, Lagos, October 2005). Indeed, what verges on a culture of 
mistrust prevails not only within the diaspora but also between the diaspora and 'home'. 
This was especially apparent at a fundraising event when the founder of a London-based 
diaspora NOO that works to assist an orphanage in Nigeria was asked by a fellow 
diasporan, "Who do you send the money to?" Appearing to instinctively understand the 
implicit suspicion in the question, the founder replied, "Oh, don't worry, they're Italian 
nuns. They're not Nigerians!" "That's OK", the concerned diasporan exclaimed in 
response, "as long as they're not Nigerians!" While the diasporan was still not 
sufficiently reassured to donate or sign-up to support the NOO, the implication was that 
she would have been even less likely to do so had its local agents been fellow Nigerians. 
Indeed, the director of another diaspora NOO laments that it is "a tough job" to 
convince diasporans that any money they might donate will be "used properly" once it 
is sent to Nigeria (Interview, London, June 2005). "They just don't trust the place", he 
bemoans. 
A seemingly' profound mistrust of 'home' -based intermediaries clearly appears to deter 
diasporans from joining and supporting diaspora organisations and their transnational 
visions. Furthermore, this problem of transnational trust is also one of the most severe 
constraints on the nature and extent of the transnational contributions diaspora 
organisations are themselves willing and able to make. Leaders and committed members 
of diaspora organisations generally agree that the most effective way of executing 
, 
collective interventions at 'home' is to have a local intermediary to implement and 
oversee projects 'on the ground'. However, many diaspora organisations simply do not 
trust any individuals or institutions at 'home' to take on this role. As the president of an 
Igbo state union contends, "You can't send money to anyone there, not even your own 
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father, they will just use it for themselves" (Interview, London, May 2005). 
Concordantly, the director of a diaspora NOO asserts, "You can't just send the money 
[ ... J, whoever you send it to will just embezzle it!" (Interview, London, May 2005). 
In the common situation where diaspora organisations decide not to trust and engage a 
local intermediary, they tend to look to members to implement projects during visits 
'home'. However, this mode of cross-border operation is widely seen to have limited 
capacity for making efficient, effective and sustained collective transnational 
interventions. Sending a member or members 'home' to implement a project is 
generally considered an expensive way of operating transnationally. Indeed, some 
organisations simply cannot afford to do so and, being unwilling to trust local 
intermediaries, find it ultimately impossible to make any interventions at 'home'. Where 
diaspora organisations can afford to send members 'home', or are able to call on the 
voluntary services of members making personal trips 'home', the generally ad hoc, 
infrequent, and short-term nature of such visits means that the implementation of 
projects is piecemeal and long-drawn out, sometimes putting their successful 
completion in doubt. 
This is exemplified in the case of the NOO Mrs Chukwu founded in 1992 with the as 
yet unfulfilled aim of constructing a maternity hospital in her ancestral village. Refusing 
to trust any local intermediaries to receive and deploy money after a bitter experience 
early on in the project, Mrs Chukwu insists on expending funds and managing 
construction directly during visits 'home'. However, Mrs Chukwu complains that her 
inability to visit 'home' more than once every two years, and generally for little more 
than two weeks at a time, is a major factor retarding the construction of the hospital, 
conspiring with a general paucity of funds to make the project's completion a much 
more distant prospect than she had ever envisaged. Indeed, it is a source of huge 
frustration for Mrs Chukwu that in over a decade of deeply committed but necessarily 
incremental effort, the construction of the hospital has progressed only as far as its outer 
walls rising just few feet above the ground. 
Unwilling to trust local intermediaries and recognising the limits of relying on members 
to implement projects during visits 'home', many diaspora organisations decide that 
even if they had the necessary funds, major interventions requiring substantial and 
sustained investments of time and resources, such as constructing public infrastructure, 
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are simply beyond their logistical capabilities. If such organisations still resolve to try 
and make at least some attempt to contribute to 'home', they tend to pursue more 
modest and manageable interventions that are not only commensurate with their 
generally limited financial resources but which also lend themselves to being initiated 
and completed by a member or members within the time-frame of a visit. However, the 
concern is that such interventions have an impact as sporadic and fleeting as the visit 
itself. For example, a town union member doubts whether the HIV/AIDS awareness 
campaign his association conducted in the ancestral community in 2003 had much of an 
effect beyond the short period during which it was implemented by two visiting 
members (Interview, London, July 2006). Indeed, when this member made his own visit 
'home' later that year, he was dismayed to find that the leaflets, posters, and banners 
that had been distributed around the community had already disappeared. 
As a prominent figure in UK-based Nigerian associationallife contends, when diaspora 
organisations "don't have anyone to trust" at 'home' and have to "send people over", 
they simply "can't do sustained projects" and have little choice but to content 
themselves with making interventions that are "ah hoc", "one-off' and "contained" 
(Interview, London, June 2006). Furthermore, it could be argued that this apparently 
rather compromised and unsatisfactory mode of transnational operation limits not only 
the direct impact of collective diasporic intervention but also its potential for producing 
more indirect effects such as the transfer 'home' of supposedly new and 
developmentally-beneficial ideas, values, and practices. Given that diaspora 
organisations rarely trust 'home' -based actors sufficiently to engage and empower them 
as local intermediaries of transnational intervention, it is not surprising that there is 
limited evidence of such groups transmitting 'social remittances' to individuals and 
institutions in Nigeria. Indeed, where diaspora organisations choose not to trust and 
work through local actors in any meaningful way, it is difficult to imagine how they 
could transmit and instil virtuous notions and behaviours, such as budget and project 
management skills,as expected in celebratory discourses of diaspora and development. 
Even in cases where diaspora organisations do engage local intermediaries in making 
, 
interventions at 'home', mistrust still tends to constrain significantly the form and 
strength of the transnational relationship they are willing to forge. Indeed, a lingering, 
and sometimes rather deep, suspicion of the local intermediary often prompts diaspora 
organisations to limit how and to what degree they choose to collaborate with these 
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'home' -based actors, circumscribing the nature and extent of the transnational 
interventions they are willing and able to undertake with and through them. For 
example, the UK-branch of the Ilu Development Union (IDU UK) chooses not to make 
financial contributions to its 'home' -based 'parent' body because it fears the funds 
would not be spent "as intended" and may even be "siphoned off' (President, interview, 
London, May 2005). In an attempt to ensure that its contributions to the communal 
development efforts coordinated by its 'home' -branch produce a desired and tangible 
outcome, IDU UK instead confines itself to making donations of "equipment", such as 
the water pump and power generator it has so far sent to the local hospital. 
With IDU UK not trusting its 'parent' -body sufficiently to send it the funds to purchase 
the desired equipment locally, the association has to incur the relative expense of 
procuring the equipment in the UK and then shipping it to Nigeria. While the 
association believes that so doing increases the chances of its contributions being made 
in the intended form, it bemoans that this mode of transnational operation born of 
mistrust more readily depletes its very limited financial resources and diminishes the 
scale and regularity of the material donations it can afford to make. Furthermore, IDU 
UK even doubts whether its 'home' -branch can be trusted to oversee donated 
equipment, fearing that once it is placed in the care of the 'parent' -body, "it might not 
be used properly". The association therefore insists that its material donations are 
presented publicly at the annual Ilu Day celebration, the logic being that the wider 
community is made aware of the contributions and will take an interest in monitoring 
how they are distributed and employed. 
Indeed, the rather tentative, measured and ultimately fragile relationship geo-ethnic 
diaspora organisations tend to maintain with their 'home' -based parent bodies is 
indicative of the way in which mistrust often constrains and even completely 
undermines collective transnational cooperation. Within the Ayege National Progress 
Union (ANPU), London, for example, the extent to which it should engage and support 
the Ayege Progress Committee (APC) is a well-worn point of debate with some 
members urging that the association should refrain as much as possible from working 
, 
through, and contributing to, the 'home' -based 'apex' organisation and its communal 
'self-help' initiatives. As an ANPU London stalwart contends, "Sometimes not all 
members agree on what should be sponsored. For example, people will say, 'During 
Ayege Day we should donate as much money as possible', and some will go, 'No! All 
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this money, let's put it together and [ ... ] have our own projects [ ... ]'" (Interview, 
London, July 2005). 
Significantly, calls to bypass the APe are generally born out of "reservations"l about 
the 'apex' -organisation and the way in which it operates. The principal source of this 
mistrust is the APe's record of failing to implement projects in accordance with ANPU 
London's wishes and expectations. For many ANPU London members, like many 
Omoyeges both in diaspora and at 'home', the crux of their disappointment with the 
APe is that even after more than 20 years of fundraising and construction, the 'apex' 
organisation is yet to complete its 'headline' town hall project. In addition to the 
"dragging,,2 progress made with the town hall, ANPU London members also point to 
two instances in the Union's more direct interactions with the APe that have further 
undermined their faith in the 'parent' body. Firstly, when ANPU London resolved in 
1993 to provide some scholarships to secondary school students at 'home', the APe 
insisted that the earmarked money be added to its existing scholarship fund and then 
proceeded to defy the wishes of the Union by dispensing awards tenable only for a year 
at a time rather than for the entire duration of recipients' secondary school careers. 
Secondly, when a few years later ANPU London responded to an APe appeal for funds 
to construct "security gates" at the six main entrances to Ayege town, the Union was "so 
disappointed" to find that instead of the "high gate[s], proper gate[s]" it was expecting, 
the APe had installed merely "little bar[s]" (ANPU member, interview, London, July 
2005). These two particular incidents not only left a good number of ANPU London 
members "annoyed" but also prompted some to ask, "Why do we have to be doing our 
things through [the APe] because anything we ask them to do, they always do it their 
own way rather than the way we want it done?" (ibid). 
While some members openly doubt whether the APe can be trusted to faithfully 
implement projects on behalf of the association, ANPU London feels it has little choice 
but to continue to work through the 'parent' body given that it has even less faith in any 
alternative local intermediaries who might potentially be engaged. In common with the 
vast majority of organised diasporans involved in this study, ANPU London members 
, 
tend to dismiss out of hand the idea of executing projects through local government; like 
all tiers of the Nigerian state, local government is widely regarded as a byword for gross 
1 ANPU London member, interview, London, June 2005. 
2 ANPU London member, interview, London, April 2005. 
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misadministration and corruption and is generally expected to do little more than simply 
'chop' all funds with which it might be entrusted. Furthermore, as local governments 
often administer more than one geo-ethnic community, they are not trusted by 
ethnicised unions such as ANPU London to deploy collective transnational munificence 
to the particular benefit of the ancestral homeland. 
ANPU London has also joined many other diaspora organisations in dismissing the 
possibility of trusting individuals at 'home' to act as local intermediaries. As ANPU 
London stalwart Mr Akinmade contends, "[ ... W]here are individuals that are ready to 
do it or to assist there? The trust is not there" (Interview, London, July 2005). And again 
like many other diaspora organisations, ANPU London has also deemed it impractical 
for members to implement projects during visits home. As Mr Akinmade notes, "[ ... T]o 
do it without [the APC] would require [members] going on a regular basis, if not even 
on a monthly basis, which we can't do". 
Indeed, it is having ruled-out both this mode of transnational operation and the 
possibility of putting any trust in alternative local intermediaries that ANPU London 
finds itself with little choice but to continue to work through the APC despite the often 
serious doubts members have about the 'apex' body. As Mr Akinmade asserts with 
unenthusiastic pragmatism: 
[ ... A] few of us that go home on a regular basis realised the logistics 
problem there and [that] we can't do anything behind [the APC], or 
without involving them [ ... J. [ ... T]hey are the only recognised body. 
[ ... ]. So that's how, at the end, that's how we finally decided that, 
well, everything will have to go through them. 
There is, then, a strong sense of resignation about ANPU London's decision to maintain 
a collaboration with the APC; the 'apex' body can at times appear to be seen as little 
more than the default option, chosen not so much because it is entirely trusted but more 
because it is the least mistrusted. Consequently, it is un surprising that doubts about the 
APC remain, and often resurface, within ANPU London, fuelling continuing debates 
about how and what extent the union should support and engage its 'parent' 
organisation. Indeed, when the formal business at the March 2006 meeting of the 
association turned to how best to respond to the Oba's recent request for contributions 
to the APC's latest 'headline' 'self-help' venture, the establishment of Ayege's very 
own polytechnic, familiar concerns about whether the 'apex' body could be trusted to 
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implement a project "properly" were again rehearsed. Of particular concern was how 
the APe might handle financial contributions to the project given how its deployment of 
funds had severely disappointed ANPU London members in the past. Was it sensible to 
donate money in light of this often unsatisfactory track-record, especially when the APe 
had provided neither a formal proposal nor a budget for the project? Might it not be 
advisable to donate equipment instead? Even the member who spoke most passionately 
in favour of responding to the request for funds as promptly and generously as possible 
acknowledged that the Union had seen previous donations to the 'apex' body "wasted". 
Such concerns about the extent to which the APe can be trusted "to do things properly", 
particularly in relation to money, are often linked, like so much diasporic mistrust of 
'home', to a deep and almost instinctive suspicion of '419', that ensemble of financial 
impropriety, corruption, and fraud popularly seen to be rife in Nigeria. As an active 
ANPU London member laments, not all diasporic Omoyeges agree with her that the 
parent body is "very honest" and "accountable" and some even "say 'oh, APe, they 
embezzle money, all the chiefs are spending the money on themselves'" (Interview, 
London, July 2005). Indeed, as its officials and newsletters make clear, the APe itself is 
only too well aware that many diasporic Omoyeges have serious doubts, and often grave 
suspicions, about the 'apex' organisation and how it administers the development of the 
Kingdom. As the General Secretary of the APe bemoans: 
Our people abroad, [ ... ], some will just come home and think '[ ... ], 
all the money we have been contributing, is this how far [the APC] 
can go on the construction of the [town] hall? Wasn't it supposed to 
be complete within 10 years or 5 years?' That is the complaint. And 
people will not come here [to the APe Secretariat] to ask the 
questions, they will be talking in the bar, 'ah, they have chopped all 
the 'money, [ ... ], everything is gone!' [laughs]. (Interview, Ayege, 
November 2005) 
Significantly, the APe General Secretary decries that such doubts about the probity of 
the APe cause Omoyege organisations based overseas to limit, and even terminate, their 
collective transnational benevolence. Recalling when a representative of a Europe-based 
Omoyege union visited him at the APe Secretariat in the contentiously incomplete town 
hall in 2000, the APe General Secretary laments: 
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[ ... H]e came down and he went round the whole hall [and said], 'Is 
this how far they have been able to go with the hall? I will not put 
down my kob03!, [laughs]. We have somebody coming right from 
[Europe] even instead of encouraging the people there to pay he came 
down and even told us that he cannot subscribe his own kobo! 
Indeed, it appears that this representative of an overseas Omoyege union may well have 
discouraged his fellow members from continuing their collective support to the APe 
and its communal 'self-help' initiatives; the association concerned is not recorded as 
having made any Ayege Day donations since 2001. 
The widespread doubts and suspicions about the financial probity of the APe mean the 
'apex' organisation also struggles to win the support of Omoyege individuals and 
associations at 'home'. Indeed, the APe General Secretary admits that the organisation 
enjoys only "about 50% confidence" among the kingdom's citizens (ibid). Furthermore, 
he complains that he all too often overhears people in Ayege claiming that the APe has 
"chopped" or "eaten" all the funds entrusted to it by the community. In the face of such 
popular suspicions, the APe frequently comes close to having to cancel its annual 
Ayege Day fundraising celebration, which in the event attracts donations from a "very 
low" percentage of the community both at 'home' and 'abroad' (APe document, 2002). 
Indeed, it seems that fears of financial impropriety have the potential to undermine 
communal fundraising efforts completely; the APe General Secretary claims that 
another kingdom near Ayege has failed to hold its annual 'community day' "for almost 
ten years [ ... ] because the people complained that the money they donated was chopped 
[ ... ] and they don't want it to happen again". 
"We are in ~ separate world entirely": the problem 0/ trust between diaspora and 
'home' and the challenge o/transnational communication 
While doubts and suspicions about the financial probity of the APe are prevalent at 
'home', it is in diaspora, and especially in the overseas diaspora, that they are often seen 
to be especially pervasive. This is traced primarily to the "communication gap" the 
'apex' body has with its 'citizens' and their associations (APe document, 2004); a gap 
that is seen to be particularly wide with those based in diaspora, especially those located 
overseas. Even though the APe has since 1999 produced once or twice a year a 
3 A Nigerian monetary unit equal to one hundredth of a naira. 
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newsletter 'summary' of its income, expenditure, and activities in an attempt to close 
this gap and dampen suspicions of financial impropriety, it has had difficulties ensuring 
that these publications and their reassuring message circulate among Omoyeges based 
'abroad', especially overseas. As the APC General Secretary bemoans, "Our people 
abroad, although we send this thing to them, some of them don't see it, some will still 
think 'all the money has been chopped'" (Interview, Ayege, November 2005). 
Indeed, facing a highly unreliable postal system, the absence of an internet connection 
and extremely limited telephone access (Ayege's connection to the national landline 
network has not functioned for years and the relatively isolated kingdom has barely any 
mobile reception having no GSM mast of its own), the APC General Secretary rues, 
"We don't have means to communicate with our people ['abroad'], we are in a separate 
world entirely". Furthermore, even if the APC did have direct telephone and/or internet 
access, it would seem unlikely to make much use of these technologies, its senior 
executives apparently having a strong preference for official printed letters and 
documents which they see as appropriately formal for the important business of 
communal development and as less prone to being corrupted in transmission. Similarly, 
'traditionalists' in ANPU London have also suggested that telephone and email 
represent means of communication that would be far too informal and potentially 
corruptible for the job of engaging with the affairs of the kingdom and its most 
esteemed leaders. 
Consequently, the APC's only real option is to rely on a small cadre of loyal 
transnationals who travel relatively frequently between 'home' and 'abroad' to 'carry' 
its newsletters and other published communiques to the diaspora. However, there is a 
, 
limit to how widely and effectively the APC's modest band of messengers is able to 
pass on the 'apex' body's formal, printed words to others in the diaspora. This is 
especially so in the case of the overseas diaspora, with which the flow of envoys to and 
from the 'home' -based 'parent' -body is seen to be even less regular and intense than it 
is with the more proximate diaspora within Nigeria. Indeed, when the APC called 
Omoyege associations to what was intended to be a major summit in Ayege in 2004, it 
, 
appears the formal invitation did not travel far with a "communication gap" being 
highlighted as a major factor in the poor attendance that was achieved, particularly from 
INU branches 'abroad' and especially from those based overseas (APC document, 
2004). Many of the major ANPU branches within Nigeria, such as Lagos, Ibadan, and 
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Abuja, were absent and none of the ANPU branches based overseas attended. 
Addressing the relatively few, overwhelmingly 'home' -based Omoyege organisations 
that did attend the APC summit, the Oba un surprisingly bemoaned that the organised 
Omoyege diaspora is "out of touch" with its 'home' base (ibid). 
ANPU London has certainly experienced significant 'communication gaps' with the 
APC. In one particularly notable incident, ANPU London missed the opportunity to be a 
'host organisation' at Ayege Day 1997 as the APC's invitation to assume this highly 
honoured position was not delivered in time. Furthermore, it appears that ANPU 
London members do not receive, and are not even aware of, the newsletter the APC 
publishes once or twice a year and attempts to circulate throughout the extended 
Omoyege community in the hope of winning from it greater levels of trust and 
benevolence. Indeed, Union members often express deep frustration about the 
difficulties of communicating with the 'home' -based 'parent' -body. As one of their 
number decries: 
[ ... O]ne problem we normally have with APC is communication. 
[ ... T]he logistic problem is enormous, [ ... ] . You can post a letter from 
Ayege, you will be lucky if it gets here, you know, and if it's going to 
get here, it might take months, [ ... ]. [ ... S]o the encouragement is not 
there for [the APC] to write any letter because they will say "What's 
the point?" [ ... I]f they now see that the letter might not even get to the 
destination, then they don't bother. And that's how the whole thing 
died down and we get frustrated here. (Interview, London, July 2005) 
Consequently, this ANPU London stalwart argues that members who take the time to 
call in at the APC Secretariat during visits 'home' become vital to having any 
meaningful c,ommunication with the 'apex' body: 
[The APC] only talk to you when they see you. [ ... J. At the end of 
the day, when you go there and you see them and you talk to them, 
they explain their own situation, you then understand. But only few of 
us do. 
Indeed, another active member, Mr Oluwole, bemoans that the practice of depending 
, 
heavily on a few visiting members to facilitate exchanges of information and 
benevolence with the APC is highly unsatisfactory, undermining both the vitality of the 
association and its ability to contribute to the ancestral community: 
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[ ... ] that's hindering the amount of, and rate of, getting money sent 
over because first of all there's an issue of finding somebody who's 
going, there's an issue of working out what's going on, [ ... ], who it's 
going to get to, and how long it's going to take. And these issues just 
drag and drag and it really makes it very inefficient and it's actually 
stifling the Union, [and] I see how it stifles the hometown as well. 
(Interview, London, June 2005) 
Furthermore, while Mr Oluwole acknowledges that the Oba's annual holidays to the UK 
present an additional opportunity for ANPU London to receive direct word from the 
APC and the 'traditional authorities' in general, he complains that the Union is not 
always able to arrange a formal meeting with their king and has instead to communicate 
with His Royal Highness through members who are privileged to be granted individual 
audiences with him during his visits. Furthermore, Mr Oluwole believes that even if the 
Union is able to interact with the holidaying Oba once a year, this still represents a 
frustratingly infrequent level of communication with the individual who ultimately 
spearheads Omoyege 'communal effort'. "I've felt so held-back that I haven't been able 
to communicate with him", laments Mr Oluwole, anxious to share with his Oba the 
ideas for Omoyege 'progress' he has championed within the Union as one of its 
younger, 'modernising' executives. And having not visited 'home' for years, Mr 
Oluwole adds resignedly, "I've been patient to believe that I might have to wait until 
[the Oba] comes". 
"The Nigerian terrain can kill the soul": collective transnational intervention and 
the difficulties of doing development at 'home' 
Deterring and disrupting collective transnational intervention: the enduring 
challenge of transnational communication 
In addition to undermining the ability of diaspora organisations to trust and collaborate 
effectively with local intermediaries, the difficulties of transnational communication 
point to how 'home' does not always represent an 'enabling environment' for collective 
transnational intervention. Indeed, 'home' in the Nigerian context is often seen to 
present major disincentives and, indeed, barriers to organised diasporic engagement. As 
Dr Christopher Kolade, the Nigerian High Commissioner to the UK, warned a select 
group of diasporic professionals gathered in London to discuss how they could come 
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together to contribute to the development of Nigeria, "[T]he Nigerian terrain can kill the 
soul. That means you must be prepared for disappointments" (Adeniyi 2006). 
Among the factors routinely seen to make Nigeria a hostile rather than an enabling 
environment for collective diasporic intervention, an often highly unreliable and 
distinctly uneven communications infrastructure is highlighted as severely hindering 
transnational flows not only of information but also of money and materials. Despite the 
supposed ease with which money can be wired around the world in this 'global' age, 
some diaspora organisations that have trusted local intermediaries to handle funds on 
their behalf have experienced problems and delays when attempting to make electronic 
money transfers to their colleagues in Nigeria. For example, one of the diaspora NOOs 
engaged in this study uses a small Nigerian-run remittance company which is 
considerably cheaper than Western Union but which has not always delivered funds 
within the advertised time, forcing the organisation's local programme manager to make 
costly and inconvenient return trips to the company's office to collect transfers. 
Furthermore, when the programme manager went to collect a transfer in December 
2005, he was told that the company had a limited amount of Naira available due to the 
high volume of remittances being sent in the build-up to Christmas. This not only 
delayed the transfer but also meant that the programme manager had to pay a 'dash' to 
both the manager and the cashier to ensure that the full-amount was paid out. 
Sending equipment and materials to Nigeria is seen to represent an even greater 
challenge for diaspora organisations. With many such organisations having collected, or 
wanting to collect, container loads of goods for the development of 'home', the expense 
of shipping is widely seen to be made even more prohibitive by the additional, 
especially punitive costs associated with negotiating Nigerian ports. As the Nigerian 
state itself concedes, port and customs authorities are popularly considered to be among 
the most corrupt institutions in Nigeria and routinely refuse to release goods unless 
heavy, unofficial surcharges are paid (see for example, Ogah 2005 and Ogbodo 2007). 
Indeed, in his address to the 2006 London conference of the UK-based Engineering 
Forum of Nigerians, the Managing Director of the Nigerian Ports Authority 
, 
acknowledged that "problems with customs practice" not only severely delay cargo in 
Nigeria's ports but also mean that the total transport cost of shipping goods to Nigeria 
represents a "staggering" 20% of freight value compared to an international average of 
only 6%. 
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Certainly, in cases where diaspora organisations have been able to organise and finance 
a shipment 'home', they have indeed often been subjected to substantial, unofficial 
surcharges by the Nigerian port and customs authorities. Having already spent £4,000 to 
ship a 20 foot container of donated books and healthcare training equipment to its 
resource centre in Nigeria, one of the diaspora NGOs engaged in this study was forced 
to eat further into its limited resources when a port official 'duped' its founder into 
paying an additional N500,000 (about £2,000 or nearly $3,500 at the time) to have the 
goods 'released'. Similarly, when another diaspora NGO secured a donation of 8,000 
HIV/AIDS awareness books from a UK-based international NGO and arranged to ship 
them to Nigeria, the clearing agent at the port refused to release the shipment until his 
demands for increasingly higher 'tips' were met. This forced the diaspora NGO to enter 
into a year-long series of negotiations with the clearing agent, who eventually settled for 
a 'fee' of nearly N300,000 (nearly £1,600IUS$2,400 at the time). Furthermore, when 
another diaspora NGO attempted to ship some medical equipment to a community 
health clinic being established in Lagos by a local nurse, it simply could not afford to 
pay the extra clearance charges demanded by port officials. Consequently, the shipment 
was never released to its intended recipient. Indeed, there are fears among organised 
diasporans that any equipment and materials shipped 'home' might well be stolen and 
sold-on by port officials. After all, the Nigerian state has itself acknowledged that 
shipments to Nigeria's ports are "frequently misappropriated" (Nigerian Television 
Authority programme on the Federal Government's anti-corruption initiatives, 19 
October 2005). 
Deterring and disrupting collective transnational intervention: 'home' and the 
challenges of 'the gift' and security 
The 'home' environment can discourage and disrupt not only monetary and material 
flows of collective. transnational benevolence but also the diasporic visits 'home' that 
are often so important to coordinating and implementing organised diasporic 
interventions. A key factor deterring many diasporans from visiting 'home' is the 
, 
pressing expectation placed upon them to bring money to give to immediate and 
extended family members. As a prominent figure in the political and associational life 
of Ukpenwa contends, "the burden of extended family" tends to "scare" diasporans 
from visiting (Interview, Ukpenwa, October 2005). Indeed, a north London-based 
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member of the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK, who has not returned to Ukpenwa 
since 1989, reflects, "[ ... T]o go there now, it's not just the fare that's expensive, it's the 
gift. You know, you go there, they think 'oh my god, you are coming from a paradise, 
[ ... ], you're bag is full of money, give, give, give, give!'" (Interview, London, April 
2006). 
An often even stronger deterrent to diasporic visits 'home' is a perceived lack of 
'security' in Nigeria. Diasporans routinely complain of a 'breakdown of law and order' 
at 'home' and express deep reticence about visiting for fear of falling victim to one of 
the many potentially deadly dangers seen to prevail in Nigeria as a result. Prime fears 
include ethnic, religious, and political violence, armed 'cultist' and vigilante groups, 
and undisciplined and even criminal elements of the police and armed forces. The 
greatest diasporic fear of all, however, is 'armed robbery'. As a recent, Lagos-based 
university graduate with a number of friends and relatives based overseas contends of 
diasporans, "they're even scared to come down to Nigeria, because they think that if 
they do, [ ... ], armed robbers might get to know them and they might be killed" 
(Interview, Lagos, August 2005). Indeed, claiming that robbers in Nigeria "don't just 
rob" but "rob and kill", Mrs Ademola, a stalwart of the Ayege National Progress Union 
(ANPU), London, asserts that she and her fellow diasporans "really worry" about 
"security" at 'home' and that the lack of it there "puts a lot of people off returning" 
(Interview, London, April 2006). 
Mrs Ademola is particularly deterred from visiting her ancestral hometown of Ayege as 
doing so involves having to travel through Lagos where "you never know what might 
happen" and "robbers can appear from nowhere". And while Mrs Ademola sees Ayege 
as a relatively small, rural town that is not as threatening as Lagos, she is nonetheless 
still wary of visiting her hometown itself as it too has its own problem with 'armed 
robbery'. Indeed, like many communities across Nigeria, Ayege has since the dawn of 
the 1990s been increasingly targeted by roaming criminal gangs, visiting upon the 
kingdom "untold hardship and insecurity of life and property" (APC document, 1997). 
As we saw in Chapter 5, the Ayege Progress Committee (APC), as the executive arm of 
, 
the kingdom's 'traditional authorities'; established in 1996 a vigilante group in an 
attempt to counter this "rampant" menace (ibid). Significantly, the aba's most 
important transnational envoy argues that this 'self-help' effort to tackle "armed 
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robbers" has been made partly to prevent diasporans from being discouraged from 
visiting and contributing to the kingdom: 
[ .. .I]f the environment is not secure, people will not want to come 
home. It's just like a nation, if there is economic instability, if there is 
political instability, foreign investor will not come, they will be 
scared. So the same thing in the town, if people don't feel safe, if they 
don't feel secure, they will not want to come. (Interview, Ayege, 
December 2005) 
Diasporans are particularly fearful of falling victim to 'armed robbery' in Nigeria 
because they are considered to be at an especially high risk of being targeted by virtue 
of their assumed and sometimes flaunted relative wealth and their well-known tendency 
to carry notable amounts of cash for friends and relatives at 'home'. Moreover, in 
addition to being aware of popular stories of 'armed robbery' in Nigeria, diasporans 
often have second- and even first-hand experience of such crime at 'home'. Mr Oluwole 
reports that his parents' house in Ayege has been "raided" several times in recent years 
despite the communal efforts to improve security in the kingdom (Interview, London, 
June 2005). Fellow ANPU London member Mrs Ademola recounts that when a Canada-
based Omoyege friend of hers returned to spend Christmas 2005 in Ayege, "thieves" 
burgled his house there and shot one of his relatives in the leg (Interview, London, April 
2006). Mrs Oni, a retired, UK-based nurse, was "robbed" of the £300 she was carrying 
'home' as soon as she arrived back in her Lagos flat on a recent visit, her assailant 
apparently having got word of her return and lain in wait for her (Interview, Lagos, 
October 2005). Furthermore, for some diasporans, a direct threat or experience of 
violent crime was a key reason for deciding to leave Nigeria in the first place and 
remains a primary factor discouraging them from making return visits. 
A lack of security, particularly as manifested through the apparent prevalence of 'armed 
robbery', not only deters the diasporic visits upon which collective transnational 
intervention often relies but can also directly disrupt the contributions that diaspora 
organisations attempt to make. This can be seen in the tragic case of Mr Abimbola and 
the NOO he formed in the summer of 2000 with the support of a few of his friends and 
, 
relations. Later that year, Mr Abimbola travelled to Nigeria with a van-load of 
computers and reprographic equipment, the organisation's first contribution towards its 
vision of establishing a digital resource centre in its founder's hometown. However, Mr 
Abimbola was shot and killed in an 'armed robbery' on the house in which he was 
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staying and while it is unclear if the equipment he was transporting 'home' was stolen 
in the attack, it was not recovered and never reached its intended destination. Although 
some of Mr Abimbola's relations, friends, and fellow indigenes committed to 
continuing the work of his NGO, successfully opening the resource centre in 2003, its 
founder's murder was nonetheless a "major setback,,4 in the implementation of its 
transnational vision and highlights starkly the very dangers that often discourage 
diasporans from attempting to engage with 'home'. 
The Nigerian state has certainly found diasporic fear about security at 'home' to be a 
major challenge in its attempts to win the support of the diaspora in its nation-building 
efforts. As a senior official in the Federal Government's diaspora engagement agency, 
the Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS), contends, "most of them talk all the 
time about the issue of security" (Interview, Abuja, October 2005). Indeed, when the 
NNVS set-about organising its pioneering diaspora engagement conference to be held in 
Abuja in June 2005, the electronic mailing list that was established to publicise the 
event was soon dominated by prospective diasporic attendees expressing serious 
concerns about their security should they visit Nigeria for the gathering. The NNVS was 
so concerned about the level of diasporic trepidation that the agency was compelled to 
issue a statement guaranteeing diasporans of their safety should they attend the 
conference. However, it was clear from the mailing list discussions that many potential 
diasporic participants remained wholly unconvinced. 
Deterring, disrupting and degenerating collective transnational intervention: a lack 
of technological infrastructure and the challenge of the 'Nigerian system' 
For many diasporans, security is far from the only area in which the Nigerian state has 
failed to make 'home' a place that is conducive to collective diasporic intervention. 
Indeed, diasporans often contend that the Nigerian state still has much more to do to 
provide an 'enabling environment' at 'home', not only in terms of ensuring better 
security but also in relation to tackling corruption, reforming the economy, providing 
public services, and improving infrastructure. As a senior NNVS official concedes, "We 
, 
have not put in place the kind of environment that would give so many of them that 
confidence that they really need to be involved" (Interview, Abuja, October 2005). 
4 Organisation trustee, interview, London, July 2004. 
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A key area in which the Nigerian state has failed to provide an 'enabling environment' 
at 'home', at least for the professional, highly-skilled diasporans whose individual and 
collective contributions it covets most, is in the conditions prevailing in its hospitals, 
universities, 'parastatals' and research and development centres. Although these are the 
very institutions to which the Nigerian state has made a priority of attracting diasporic 
knowledge and expertise, it stands accused both at 'home' and 'abroad' of failing to 
endow them with the technical facilities that would enable the adoption and utilisation 
of the novel and developmentally beneficial ideas and practices that diasporans are 
expected to bring. Writing in the British Medical Journal in 2003, Dr Joseph Ana, the 
founder of the UK-based Nigerian Medical Forum, argues that a key reason his fellow 
African medics left their 'home' countries and are dissuaded from repatriating their 
knowledge and skills is because of the "failure of governments [ ... ] to create the 
enabling environment and provide the tools needed for their professionals to practise 
their expertise" (Ana 2003: 502). Indeed, when Dr Ana returned to Nigeria in 2005 to 
take up the invitation to become the Cross River State Commissioner for Health, a 
dearth of the necessary technology and equipment meant that he was unable to fulfil his 
desire to practise and disseminate locally the urological techniques he had acquired in 
the UK. While Dr Ana has assumed a position at 'home' from which he can attempt to 
ensure that the state provides facilities that are commensurate with his skills, his fellow 
medics in diaspora rarely enjoy such influence. Consequently, when they come together 
to take 'medical missions' to Nigeria, they very often have to face the additional 
challenge of sourcing and transporting their own supplies and equipment. 
For many diasporans, the Nigerian state has failed to provide not only adequate facilities 
for the transmission and adoption of diasporic knowledge and expertise but also the 
necessary professional culture. Indeed, the corruption and ineptitude of the Nigerian 
state are widely seen to have inspired and entrenched at 'home' a culture of professional 
conduct that falls well below 'international standards', creating an environment in 
which diasporans fear, and, indeed, find, that it is extremely difficult simply to apply, let 
alone disseminate, the ideas and practices they feel they have imbibed 'abroad'. As Dr 
Okafor, a member of the UK-based Engineering Forum of Nigerians (EFN), explains 
, 
with reference to a relatively recent attempt to engage professionally with 'home': 
I have to say one of my first forays into Nigeria was a rude awakening 
in terms of, 'Christ, is it that difficult?!' [ ... ], I went in with dreams of 
how I would design a road, for example, how I would make sure that 
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[it had] cats eyes and lovely signs and so on to really show them that 
this is how you ought to be designing them. But the system had gone 
so bad that they wouldn't even allow you to do that, the people you 
were dealing with were far more interested in, well .. .it's difficult to 
say, but the system wouldn't allow you to actually do it. (Interview, 
London, July 2006) 
Having hinted at the centrality of bribes and 'kick-backs' to the problem of operating in 
what is popularly known both at 'home' and in diaspora as the 'Nigerian system', Dr 
Okafor concludes mournfully: 
I do see that a lot of people in diaspora think because they're 
Nigerians and [have] all good intent, all good ideas from the UK, you 
can just sort of take it and plant it and it will work [ ... ]. [But] there are 
obstacles and you don't actually put anything in place, you won't be 
able to, the system might not allow you to do it even if it was a great 
idea. 
What is more, there is a strong sense that the 'Nigerian system' can undermine 
professional standards to such an extent that it is difficult for visiting or returning 
diasporans simply to hold-on to, let alone apply and propagate, the ideas, practices, and 
principles they feel they have acquired in diaspora. As a founding member of EFN who 
has recently returned 'home' to assume a senior position in a key transport 'parastatal', 
Mr Ojo has certainly found this to be a major challenge: 
The difficulty however with Nigeria, even I am beginning to face it, 
when I arrived here about ten months ago, just simply looking around, 
you see so much awful stuff, [ ... ], but after a while you grow 
accustomed to it, which is bad, [ ... ]. People here grow accustomed to 
poor standards, not because of their own personal failing [but] because 
here, the environment just allows you to do so. So when I see a pot 
hole in the road, I would have been disgusted 10 months ago, now I 
just find my way around it and I continue on my merry way. That is 
the problem because the benchmark is so low and poor, the 
expectations are low and poor. [ ... ]. [ ... T]his is why I insist I have to 
leave Nigeria every two months to remind myself of how things 
should be done so that I don't fall into this trap where I'm beginning 
to lower my own standards, although I can sense it happening now 
and then [laughs]! (Interview, Lagos, September 2005) 
This epitomises how diasporans often see Nigeria as a profoundly degenerative 
environment in which it is a struggle to remain true to even the most basic of one's own 
professional principles and standards let alone begin to transfer them to others at 
'home'. The 'Nigerian system', that pervasive and deeply entrenched culture of 
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clientalism and corruption inspired and driven by the workings of the state, is widely 
regarded as so formidable, all-consuming, and impervious to 'reform' that visiting or 
returning diasporans are generally seen to have little choice but to fall in line with its 
principles and practices. "The corruption is so ingrained in the society that if I went 
back I would either be poor or I would have to become corrupt", bemoans a UK-based 
Nigerian lawyer, adding, "It's a case of 'if you can't beat it, join it'" (Interview, 
London, July 2005). Consequently, he argues, diasporans who attempt to operate at 
'home' "don't go back there and practise some of the principles that they've picked up 
here, they just basically regress into those bad practices again" . As a fellow UK-based 
diasporan laments bitterly: 
[ ... I]f you stay too long in the system, you'll just start behaving like 
everything is right when it's not right. [ ... ]. So that's the problem we 
have in Nigeria. [ ... E]ven if the person has the best of intentions, 
surrounded by wolves and vultures, you can't keep being a rabbit for 
ever, you've got to change and before you know it everybody 
becomes a vulture and that's what's killing the society (Interview, 
London, July 2005). 
'Home' as a hostile environment: the enduring problem of transnational trust and 
the challenge of local resistance 
From mistrusted partner to dangerous enemy: collective transnational intervention 
and the 'home' state 
In addition to failing to create an infrastructural and professional environment 
conducive to the reception of diasporic ideas and practices, the Nigerian state is also 
widely seen by diasporans to have done too little to reform itself, limiting the extent to 
which they regard it as a committed, reliable and effective partner for collective 
transnational intervention. Indeed, diasporans tend to be rather wary and sometimes 
even completely dismissive of engaging the Nigerian state in attempting to contribute to 
'home', generally considering it too corrupt, clientalistic and inept. For many 
diasporans, the deeply frustrating challenges and inefficiencies they still strongly 
associate with acquiring Nigerian passports and visas, despite some supposed recent 
improvements in the process, epitomise the discouraging degree to which they feel the 
Nigerian state functions effectively and, indeed, is willing and able to facilitate 
diasporic involvement with 'home'. This off-putting impression has been fuelled further 
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by the ineffective, elitist and suspiciously politicised ways in which the Nigerian state is 
often seen to have established its official diaspora organisation and related diaspora 
engagement initiatives. 
Furthermore, diasporans tend to be especially deterred from working with the Nigerian 
state because they perceive it to be 'politically unstable'. Indeed, there is a strong 
feeling that it is almost futile for diasporans and their organisations to attempt to forge 
partnerships with state actors and initiatives at 'home' as the machinations of Nigerian 
politics and the personalised nature of the Nigerian state mean that government officials 
and their programmes rarely remain in position for very long. For example, while the 
director of the UK-based diaspora NGO the BK Trust is in the "lucky position" of being 
a close friend of Dr Joseph Ana, the Cross River State Commissioner for Health, and 
has therefore been able to engage him and his ministry in coordinating her 
organisation's Calabar-based health awareness work, she is concerned that the vagaries 
of Nigerian politics will all too soon undermine this vital collaboration (Interview, 
London, June 2006). "[ .. J]f Dr Ana is no longer the commissioner", she worries, "then 
the next commissioner might not want to hear about health promotion". 
Such is the degree of 'instability' attributed to the Nigerian state, there is even concern 
that its entire effort to engage the diaspora is likely to be just another initiative that is as 
short-lived as the whims and tenures of the politicians and officials who drive it. 
Certainly, at the pioneering conference of the Federal Government's diaspora 
engagement agency, the Nigerian National Volunteer Service (NNVS), held in Abuja in 
June 2005, there was considerable scepticism amongdiasporic participants as to 
whether this agency and its programmes would survive should they be shorn of the 
committed and dynamic leadership of Ambassador Joe Keshi or the political backing of 
the Obasanjo regime, then in its second and final term. In addressing the conference, 
even Ambassador Keshi and President Obasanjo expressed concern that it would be 
necessary to formally legislate for the creation of the NNVS as an official agency of 
state if it was to have any hope of surviving beyond the end of Obasanjo's presidency in 
2~07. Indeed, with the NNVS having lost Ambassador Joe Keshi to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs since President Y ar' Adua came to power, its website has ceased to 
function and its annual diaspora engagement conference is widely seen to have been 
given increasingly less publicity. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that respondents 
report that diasporic attendances at this supposedly emblematic event have dwindled, 
235 
apparently reaching a low of little more than 30 or so in 2009. Furthermore, respondents 
also claim that the Federal Government has terminated its funding of Nigerians in 
Diaspora Organisation, Obasanjo's great vehicle for harnessing diasporic resources and 
expertise. 
Moreover, in the wake of the heavily disputed and deeply divisive 2007 presidential 
election, diasporans generally fear the demise not only of Obasanjo's nascent efforts to 
engage the diaspora but also his entire 'reform agenda'. While this wholesale 
programme for transforming and ore-orientating' the Nigerian state and economy 
attracted considerable scepticism and even derision from many diasporans, it had at 
least begun to win a measure of confidence from some and given them renewed cause to 
consider involving themselves more deeply with 'home'. With government widely seen 
to have stalled under Yar' Adua, or 'Baba Go Slow' as he has come to be known, the 
greatest diasporic concern is not just that any progress made under Obasanjo might 
grind to a halt but that it will be completely undone and even reversed, especially if, as 
many in diaspora and at 'home' genuinely fear, Nigeria once again returns to 'the dark 
days of military rule'. 
However, even under a nominally democratic and progreSSIve government, some 
organised diasporans still see the Nigerian state operating not so much as a potential 
partner of collective transnational intervention but more as its hostile enemy. For 
instance, there is a strong sense that any attempts by diasporans to contribute to the 
reform of the Nigerian state by presenting it with some of the ideas, values, and 
practices they feel they have acquired 'abroad' are likely to be met not with open arms 
but rather with potentially robust resistance. Exemplifying this, Mrs Oni, a retired, UK-
trained nurse who divides her time between London and Lagos, contends that 
diasporans can be "afraid" to remit "what they've learnt" (Interview, Lagos, October 
2005). "[ ... P]eople in authority might not listen to you", she explains, "and if they listen 
to you, if they know that what you are saying is something that will take the authority 
from them, then you are not safe". 
Indeed, when the Chair of the British Nigeria Law Forum encouraged members at its 
July 2005 seminar in London to write articles in Nigerian newspapers commenting on 
key areas of government policy such as democratic reform and anti-corruption, an 
audience member voiced concern that doing so might threaten the safety of members 
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should they visit or return to Nigeria. As another participant explained at the post-
seminar drinks, diasporans are often "reticent" about criticising government policies and 
officials, believing that the harsh and often brutal state repression many of them 
witnessed during the long years of military rule has to some extent continued under the 
latest 'democratic dispensation'. Certainly, this respondent was not alone in asserting 
that if one "speak[s] out" against those in power at 'home', whether at the local, state, or 
federal levels of government, one may well "disappear". 
Elaborating on this fear, the co-ordinator of the UK-branch of a geo-ethnic organisation 
noted for protesting the political, economic, and environmental exploitation of its 
ancestral homeland in the oil-producing Niger Delta contends that despite the return to 
democratic rule in 1999, the "human rights situation" at 'home' is now actually "worse" 
than it was under military rule (Interview, London, May 2005). Claiming that state 
security forces recently "came for" the organisation's 'home' -based leader, who 
apparently escaped only through good fortune, he asserts, "It's more subtle now, but 
they will still kill you". Certainly, Mrs Ikendu, the director of another London-based 
diaspora organisation that campaigns for the political, economic, and environmental 
'rights' of the Niger Delta, has had good reason to fear for her life at the hands of the 
Nigerian security forces. As we saw earlier, Mrs Ikendu's non-violent transnational 
activism has not only seen her detained and interrogated by the widely feared State 
Security Service but also horse-whipped and permanently scarred when a combined 
deployment of 'mobile police' and soldiers forcefully broke-up a peaceful protest of 
Delta women in which she was participating in August 2003. 
"We don't really need you here": professional suspicion and resistance at 'home' 
The way in which the Nigerian state can at times appear to be more of an enemy than a 
partner to collective transnational intervention points to how the 'home' environment in 
general is often considered unreceptive and even resistant to organised diasporic 
attempts to contribute. Indeed, the state is not alone in being accused of making 'home' 
an environment that is more hostile than enabling. The professions, which tend to be 
, 
heralded as a sector in which the diaspora has much to contribute, are also widely seen 
to be rather suspicious of, and even averse to, diasporic efforts to engage them. 
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In attempting to support and develop the engineering profession at 'home', the UK-
based Engineering Forum of Nigerians (EFN) is seen by some members to have 
received a rather guarded, potentially adversarial, reception from the professional 
institutes of engineering in Nigeria. "I think there is no question they would initially see 
people like the EFN as sort of muddying the field for them", argues a Forum member, 
adding, "it's sort of a case of 'we don't really need you here'" (Interview, London, July 
2006). As a fellow member contends, "I think the problem of trust, [ ... ], from already 
established engineering association in Nigeria is one of the core problems or challenges 
which the association is facing at the moment because you don't want it to be seen as a 
rivalry. [ ... B]ecause I think they think EFN is sort of, [ ... ], usurping their own 
authority" (Interview, London, July 2006). Indeed, it would seem that it is only with 
some rather gentle diplomacy and a few "fortuitous" personal contacts that EFN has 
been able to forge the tentative beginnings of a cooperative interaction with the 
principal engineering institute at 'home', the Nigerian Society of Engineers (EFN 
executive, interview, London, May 2005). 
Other professions appear to be even more resistant to diasporic attempts to engage them. 
For example, UK-based Nigerian medics and lawyers often complain that the bodies 
representing their respective professions in Nigeria maintain regulatory requirements 
that make it unnecessarily difficult for visiting or returning diasporans to practise at 
'home'. The British Nigeria Law Forum (BNLF), for instance, has been compelled to 
call on the President of the Nigerian Bar Association to remove the "unfair restrictive 
practice"S that requires UK-trained lawyers to undergo a two year period of re-
qualification in order to be able to practise in Nigeria. Similarly, diasporic medics have 
complained that their attempts to bring 'medical missions' to Nigeria are hindered by 
requirements to register with, and acquire temporary licenses from, medical bodies at 
'home'. 
Exemplifying the sceptical, sometimes hostile, attitude that is often seen to underpin 
such apparent "red tape", an Ibadan-based surgeon argues in a Nigerian newspaper that 
it }s essential that the medical authorities "validate" the credentials of diasporic 
practitioners given the existence of "fake" qualifications from 'abroad', adding: 
5 BNLF, 'Letter from the Chair, Oba Nsugbe, 21 April 2005' . 
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[ ... T]he MDCN [Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria] and the 
Nigerian Medical Association should be commended for living up to 
their responsibility of safeguarding the health of Nigerians from all 
these 'tokunbo,6 Greek gifts in the name of 'Medical Missions', which 
most of the time are not as altruistic as they appear on the surface. 
(Olumide 2007) 
Indeed, there is a strong sense at 'home' that diasporic medical and other professionals 
seeking to intervene transnationally are ultimately most interested in advancing their 
own professional and/or political careers, making contributions in an effort to win 
'contract' and 'position' in Nigeria. 
Given such suspicious attitudes towards diasporic professionals who attempt to make 
transnational interventions, it is no surprise that even when these diasporans do enjoy 
some success in engaging with 'home', they can still face the ongoing hostility of their 
local colleagues. For example, Dr Ana, whose work through the UK-based Nigerian 
Medical Forum (NMF) since 1991 led to his appointment as Cross River State 
Commissioner of Health in 2005, has encountered some considerable resistance from 
local practitioners in attempting to promote his ideas for health sector reform at 'home'. 
Indeed, Dr Ana himself concedes that his efforts both through the NMF and as 
Commissioner of Health to encourage continuing education and research among health 
professionals at 'home' are yet to find much favour with overworked and underpaid 
local practitioners more concerned with "mak[ing] ends meet" (Interview, Calabar, 
October 2005). As one local health sector professional contends, Dr Ana is often seen as 
a "British man" whose "ideas won't work here" (Interview, Calabar, October 2005). 
"Are you sure you are doing a good work?" Local community resistance and the 
enduring challenge of transnational mistrust 
Beyond the state and the professions, local communities can also make 'home' an 
environment that is often more hostile than enabling for collective diasporic 
intervention. Indeed, collective transnational contributions can be hindered and 
sometimes completely undermined by power struggles and disputes in local 
'homelands'. For example, when the UK-branch of an association of a Yoruba sub-
group attempted to send 'home' some computers for distribution to schools in each of 
6 A Yoruba name meaning 'born overseas' popularly employed to refer to second-hand goods imported 
from abroad. 
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the five 'townships' in the ancestral homeland, the Obas of four of these sub-divisions 
initially refused to accept the computers because they were offended that the 
intervention had been arranged not through them but rather through the fifth and 
supposedly most senior Oba. The computers were eventually delivered only once the 
state government intervened in this latest contestation between the five Obas. However, 
in the case of the Wazobia State Union's plan to construct a leisure park in Ukpenwa, 
not even the intervention of the state government could resolve the local land dispute 
that prevented the project from being executed. 
Furthermore, local communities can also join the state and the professions in being 
rather suspicious of, and even resistant to, organised diasporic interventions. Mirroring 
the way in which diasporans themselves so often doubt the motives of those among 
them who establish and lead diaspora organisations, there is much suspicion in local 
communities at 'home' that collective transnational interventions are intended to serve 
primarily the financial and political interests of the diasporans who make them. 
Exemplifying this pervasive attitude, an Ipaja-based nurse contends, "Nigerians [ ... ] 
believe if you are a charity group, there must be something for you in it [ ... ]. [ ... W]hen 
you say charities, they will say, 'oh, there's bread and butter there!'" (Interview, Ipaja, 
August 2005). As a Ukpenwa-based teacher argues, "you have to be suspicious of any 
project that a person comes back home to do", adding "there is a problem of people 
setting up NOOs to earn easy money" (Interview, Ukpenwa, October 2005). Indeed, a 
Lagos-based church leader believes this is exactly what diasporans are actually doing, 
forming organisations to access international donor support only to "divert these 
fundings to personal use" (Interview, Ipaja, August 2005). 
It is with such suspicions being so prevalent at 'home' that diaspora organisations, 
especially those taking on the particularly mistrusted form of NOOs, often find local 
communities rather unreceptive and even hostile to collective transnational intervention. 
As the 'home' -based programme coordinator of the diaspora NOO Development Impact 
for Nigeria (DIFN) , Pastor Bode Omokaro has certainly found it a challenge to win 
local support and participation for its interventions in and around Ipaja, Lagos. 
"[ ... P]eople have reservations", he explains, "they will look at you twice, 'Are you sure 
you are serious, are you sure you are doing a good work?'" (Interview, Ipaja, December 
2005). Mrs Chukwu and the NOO she established to construct a maternity hospital in 
her 'home' community of Emeka have met even more overt local suspicion and 
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resistance. Since commencing the project in 1992, Mrs Chukwu and her NOO have 
been increasingly subject to rumour, gossip, and accusation within the community, the 
main theme of which is that they are building the hospital to make money for Mrs 
Chukwu and to provide a job at 'home' for her UK-based son, who is a medical doctor. 
Fuel has been added to this fire of speculation because Mrs Chukwu and her immediate 
UK-based family have not built a large house in the community and do not drive around 
in a big car, apparently indicating that they are "not doing well,,7 in diaspora and 
therefore that they have a real need to create lucrative opportunities at 'home'. 
Significantly, this popular suspicion has sparked active resistance from the community. 
Emeka's market women have contested the location chosen for the hospital; while Mrs 
Chukwu has insisted on a site by the main road running along the edge of the 
community to ensure space for expansion and to make it accessible to neighbouring 
villages, the market women want it to be situated centrally near their market. Having 
failed to get their way, some of the market women refuse to speak to Mrs Chukwu. 
Furthermore, the non-cooperation of some landowners in the community has made it 
difficult for Mrs Chukwu and her NOO to locate and acquire a sufficient plot for the 
hospital. Indeed, the project has had to resort to using Chukwu family land and even 
then one villager has steadfastly refused to part with an adjoining parcel of land, leaving 
a smaller area than planned in which to construct the hospital. Ultimately, Mrs Chukwu 
feels that such hostility from some elements of her ancestral community has been a key 
factor in making the progress of the project so painfully slow. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that collective transnational intervention can face far greater challenges than 
generally appears to be assumed in globalising discourses of diaspora and development. 
While these discourses tend to highlight the ease and strength of transnational affinities, 
flows and networks in this supposedly global age, we have seen that the relations 
London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations attempt to forge and sustain with 'home' 
tend to be rather cumbersome, weak and prone to fracture. At the heart of this is what 
appears to verge on a culture of mistrust both within the diaspora and between the 
diaspora and 'home'. Reflecting fears of the corruption, fraud and clientalism that are 
7 Mrs Chukwu, interview, London, May 2005. 
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widely seen to dominate Nigerian society, this distinct lack of transnational trust not 
only discourages diasporans from joining and supporting organisations formed by their 
fellow overseas nationals but also makes diaspora organisations extremely wary of 
engaging local intermediaries in attempting to contribute to 'home'. This in tum means 
that many diaspora organisations simply do not engage local intermediaries and those 
that do tend to do so very tentatively, initiating rather fragile transnational relationships. 
In both cases, this means that the ability of diaspora organisations to operate 
transnationally is reduced significantly, as is the potential for exerting influence over, or 
transferring social remittances to, 'home' -based individuals and institutions such as 
'traditional rulers' and community development committees. 
It is argued that this enfeebling lack of transnational trust has much to do with the 
presence of a deeply disenabling environment for collective transnational intervention at 
'home', not least what are seen as woefully inadequate telecommunication, transport 
and technical infrastructures, a worrying security situation, and a corrupt, inept and 
often repressive state, all of which seriously discourage and disrupt the necessary 
border-spanning flows of people, information, money, and materials. More than this, 
however, the 'home' environment is seen to fuel a culture of mistrust by affording few 
opportunities for making an 'honest living', encouraging the growth of the alternative 
livelihood strategies, such as '419', that are widely seen to make Nigerians so wary of 
one another both at 'home' and 'abroad'. This points to how the 'home' environment 
faces fundamental development challenges that it is hard to imagine collective 
transnational intervention alone can overcome. Indeed, if states and international 
agencIes are to support diaspora organisations in contributing to 'home', policy 
interventions will have to engage diaspora and 'home' simultaneously as it will only be 
when some of the latter's major development challenges are addressed that the diaspora 
will be able make a more notable contribution to progress in Nigeria. After all, it would 
seem that development is as much a prerequisite as an outcome of collective 
transnational contribution. Furthermore, it is argued that policy will again have to afford 
greater recognition to local agency, not only for its critical role in the transformation of 
'home' but also for its ability to challenge and undermine collective transnational 
intervention. Only when diasporic visions and interests are brought into closer 
conversation with the aspirations of 'home' will it be possible to achieve meaningful 
and transformative transnational cooperation. 
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Part 5: the power of belonging - developing 'home' here 
and there 
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10. Making a 'home from home': the importance of 
developing and belonging in diaspora 
Introduction 
In national and globalising discourses of diaspora and development, there is a tendency 
to see diasporans and their organisations primarily, and sometimes exclusively, as 
agents of transnational intervention at 'home'. While contributing to 'home' is clearly 
an important objective for the vast majority of diaspora organisations, the heavy 
academic and policy focus on this particular aspect of their functioning can elide other 
critical, and sometimes more important, activities they undertake in diaspora. In so 
doing, discourses of diaspora and development tend to overlook key imperatives and 
desires that forge, drive, bind, and sustain diaspora organisations and, indeed, make 
them in any way capable of contributing to 'home'. 
Indeed, for those who create and join diaspora organisations what is very often the most 
immediate imperative is a desire to develop and belong in diaspora. Consequently, 
many diasporans view their organisations first, and often foremost, as social spaces in 
which they can pursue their own progress, fulfilment and happiness in diaspora and feel 
at 'home' while 'abroad'. From this perspective, diaspora organisations are 
fundamentally arenas for emotional, practical, and professional support, cultural 
solidarity and expression, and, often most important of all, friendship, relaxation and 
enjoyment. Significantly, however, this foundational concern with creating a supportive 
and convivial socio-cultural realm in diaspora is rarely seen to conflict with any 
ultimate desire to contribute to 'home'. Indeed, these two key objectives tend to be seen 
as entirely compatible and, moreover, inextricably linked; it is only by coming together 
in an attempt to meet their own needs 'abroad' that diasporans are able to mobilise the 
necessary social, cultural, economic, and political capital to make collective 
interventions at 'home'. 
In this way, supporting each other, maintaining and celebrating a shared cultural 
identity, and enjoying conviviality become inherent to the development of 'home'. In 
exploring each of these fundamental facets of diasporic associational life, I argue that 
discourses of diaspora and development need to give greater recognition to how they are 
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absolutely vital to driving, binding, and sustaining diaspora organisations and making 
these groups in any way capable of intervening at 'home'. Only by broadening their 
conception of what elements of diasporic associational life count as, and contribute to, 
development will governments and international agencies be able to engage and support 
diaspora organisations in a way that embraces and realises their full potential for 
contributing to the progress of 'home'. 
"To be each other's brother's keeper!": providing support in a foreign land 
In the face of the challenges brought by life in general and diasporic living in particular, 
a desire to create a space for emotional, material, and practical support is very often a 
founding imperative and sustaining dynamic of diaspora organisations2. This is 
especially true of diaspora organisations grounded in sub-national, geo-ethnic identities. 
Mirroring established associational practices from 'home', these organisations have a 
prime concern with employing ancestral belonging as a basis for creating and 
institutionalising relations of mutual support among members. Indeed, a stalwart of the 
Calabar Union argues that this is very much the first priority of the association: 
We do help back home but it's really about the community here. [ ... J 
We have to look after ourselves first before we can help people back 
there. When you come to a foreign land, you don't have your family 
to support you, so you have to come together to support each other. 
(Interview, London, May 2005) 
Certainly, a yearning for mutual support appears to be a key driver in the initial 
formation of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations. Recalling the "initial aims" behind the 
establishment of the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK in 1992, a founding member 
states: "I think the first thing I could think of was for the women to come together to 
support each other, [ ... J" (Interview, London, June 2005). Similarly, a founding 
member contends of the Ayege National Progress Union, London, "the main idea of 
setting it up originally, [ ... J, was to support ourselves here as well, not just the cause 
there" (Interview, London, July 2005). As the president of another Yoruba hometown 
1 Ayege National Progress Union member, interview, London, July 2005. 
2 While this 'social welfare' role tends to be underplayed in globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development, it is very much emphasised in earlier work on migrant adaption, integration, and, to a lesser 
extent, transnationalism (see for example, Sassen-Koob 1979; Okamura 1983; Schoeneberg 1985; Basch 
1987; Rex et a11987; Jenkins 1988b; Rex 1991; Ireland 1994; Soysa11994; Peil1995; Attah-Poku 1996; 
AFFORD 1998; Danese 1998; Liu 1998; Minghuan 1998; Home Office 1999; Adeyanju 2000; Kerlin 
2000; Owusu 2000; McLeod et aI2001). 
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association reflects, "a group of guys come together thinking, 'oh yeah, we come from 
the same town, how do we support each other?" (Interview, London, July 2005). 
With a desire to establish relations of mutual support being such a fundamental 
imperative in the initial formation of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations, it tends to be 
reflected prominently in the constitutional foundation and long-term functioning of such 
groups. Indeed, providing some kind of mutual support and welfare function to 
members and their families is generally high among the formally stated aims and 
objectives of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations. For example, the second formal aim of 
the Efon Alaaye Association is, "To enhance the welfare and progress of Efon Alaaye 
indigenes in the UK and Europe" (http://efonalaayeukandeurope.com/abouCus.html). 
Similarly, the third stated aim of the Nnewi Community Association is, "To provide 
support, help and advice to Nnewi Community members" 
(www.nnewiuk.orglconstitution.htm). 
Furthermore, the constitutions of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations tend not only to 
provide for the executive positions of a welfare officer and/or committee but also devote 
considerable space to detailing the support and numerous welfare benefits members can 
expect. For instance, the constitution of the Nnewi Community Association (NCA) 
states that a member is entitled to £200 for a wedding, £100 for the christening of a 
child, £200 upon the death of a parent, £150 upon the death of a child, and £500 upon 
the death of a non-member spouse. In the event of a member's death, the NCA 
constitution provides for £2,000 to be given to the bereaved family and for £500 to be 
put towards the cost of thewake keeping and stipulates that a return ticket and £200 will 
be given to a member "to accompany the corpse home to Nigeria" (ibid). 
Moreover, such constitutionally enshrined welfare benefits only hint at the full extent of 
the social support geo-ethnic diaspora organisations offer their members. In addition to 
formal provisions for emotional and financial support around life events such as birth, 
death, and marriage, a wide range of less formal, supplementary assistance is organised 
through these associations. In the event of the death of a member, it is generally 
expected that members make. their own additional financial contributions and 
consolation visits to the bereaved family and also that they assist them with, and attend, 
the wake, funeral, and any subsequent annual memorial events. Members are also 
generally expected to give such additional, individual support to any member who is 
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bereaved. Similarly, when a member or a member of their immediate family has a birth, 
christening, birthday, marriage, anniversary, or educational or professional success to 
celebrate, members are again generally expected to make their own material and/or 
logistical contribution and attend any associated events. 
Furthermore, it tends to be an established convention that if an active member is absent 
for one or two meetings, a member will be nominated to telephone or visit them to 
check on their welfare and offer any assistance that might be required. Certainly, if a 
member is known to be ill, in hospital, or too elderly to attend meetings, members will 
make regular visits and provide ongoing support. Members are also encouraged to take 
a healthy interest in each other's domestic life, a role sometimes supported by the 
practice of holding meetings on a rotational basis at members' homes. And if a member 
needs advice on, or mediation in, any personal, marriage, or family problems, fellow 
members are generally expected to assist, especially those who are attributed with the 
experience, wisdom, and moral authority of being 'elders'. Where medical, legal, or 
other professional advice is required or deemed generally useful, any suitably qualified 
members tend to be called on to share their knowledge and expertise. 
Members also help each other to settle and advance in diaspora. When new arrivals 
present themselves to geo-ethnic diaspora organisations, they are provided with 
information and advice they might need on immigration, housing, and employment and 
are likely to be offered temporary accommodation by a member. If a new arrival or a 
member has an 'immigration problem', such associations will often extend to raising 
funds to engage a lawyer for them. Furthermore, members are expected to share 
knowledge of any education, training, employment, and investment opportunities that 
might, be of interest to other members and their families. Members are also encouraged 
to share business expertise and services with each other and to patronise enterprises run 
by fellow members. Geo-ethnic diaspora associations as corporate entities also patronise 
members' businesses, for example to print associational documents, to produce videos 
and DVDs of associational events, and to host or cater for associational parties. One 
such organisation even donates useful equipment to members establishing new 
businesses. And in many cases, these organisations extend rotational credit or hardship 
funds to members. 
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Significantly, the provision of such an array of benefits can be seen as central to binding 
and sustaining geo-ethnic diaspora organisations. Indeed, it is the prospect of enjoying 
such social support that is often identified as a primary motivation for joining, and 
becoming actively involved in, these associations. For example, having detailed the 
wide range of support offered by the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK (UW A), Mrs 
Emanu, a committed member of the association, contends: 
I think all of those things put together, it actually makes me see the 
organisation as something I want to belong to. It's like having a 
family where you don't have one, confiding, [ ... ], encouraging, 
helping out here and there, [ ... ], you know, just help and support, 
things that your own family would do for you so that you don't feel 
that you don't have anybody here. [ .. .I]1's good for you to have a 
back-up as if you're back home. (Interview, London, April 2006) 
The support given to members during bereavement appears to play an especially 
important role in attracting and attaching diasporans to their geo-ethnic associations. For 
example, Ms Thrune of the UW A suggests that she has become a much more committed 
member of the association in response to the "very helpful" support it afforded her when 
her mother died in 2000 (Interview, London, April 2005). Similarly, a UK-raised 
diasporan in her mid-twenties who was always rather "cynical" about the purpose of her 
parents' 'hometown' and 'home-state' associations now contributes to these groups in 
the light of the support they gave her family when her father passed away in 2004: 
I've learnt that they are support networks as well at the very least and 
also I think their existence has been maybe validated for me since we 
lost my dad and I saw how the communities really came together in 
their own ways to help, whether it was the women coming to stay with 
my mum, people phoning, people from the different communities 
coming to visit us, coming to just give us strength. Everyone really 
helped and it was organised on a personal level and a family level and 
then on that organisational level as well. So I can see now the good 
work that they're doing and I know that they do a lot of fundraising 
events that I will support, raffle tickets, jumble sales and so on, 
because I know that the money will be going somewhere [ ... ]. 
(Interview, London, June 2006) 
Indeed, detailing how members "create 'Love Unlimited' by caring for one another", an 
annual report of the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK (UW A) affirms the importance 
of such mutual support in sustaining geo-ethnicdiaspora associations, stating, "It is this 
type of friendliness and love in most cases that binds the Organisation together" (UW A 
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annual report, 2004). Such yearnmgs for mutual support are also central to the 
formation and maintenance of associations of diasporic professionals. Indeed, these 
organisations also tend to have a central concern with creating a space through which 
diasporans can help each other to settle, cope, and advance 'abroad'. In some cases, 
these organisations mirror geo-ethnic associations by making formal provisions for 
members to receive moral and financial support around important life events. For 
example, the Nigerian Nurses Charitable Association pursues an objective "To offer 
support to individual members in joyous or sorrowful circumstances such as death of 
close relatives to members, marriage, birth" (www.nncauk.orglaims.htm). More 
generally, diasporic professional associations are seen to reflect their geo-ethnic 
counterparts by constituting an arena in which diasporans can develop new social 
relationships and augment their informal support networks. However, beyond their 
creation of formal and informal avenues for social support, diasporic professional 
associations are generally most appreciated for the opportunities they afford members to 
develop professionally. 
Accordingly, the first stated objective of the Engineering Forum of Nigerians (EFN) is 
"to promote the exchange of ideas and engineering knowledge and create networking 
opportunities among Nigerian engineers in the UK" (www.efn.org.uk). Indeed, while 
EFN's founders are primarily concerned with making collective transnational 
interventions at 'home', they reason that if the organisation is to attract meaningful 
numbers it also has to "facilitate members' career aspirations in the UK" (EFN 
executive, interview, London, May 2005). To this end, EFN holds 'networking events' 
at which members can interact with, and learn from, the well-established and highly 
successful engineers who are largely responsible for driving the association. EFN also 
devoted its 2005 'annual Spring event' to discussing 'engineering opportunities and 
professional development'. This seminar not only saw some prominent members 
sharing their experiences of forging a successful engineering career in the UK but also 
included a presentation by a representative of the Institution of Civil Engineers on how 
to obtain professional accreditation in the UK. Furthermore, EFN affords members 
additional opportunities to establish and develop their engineering careers in the UK by 
publicising sometimes privileged information about training and employment vacancies 
on a member's-only area of its website and by giving space for members to advertise 
their engineering products or companies in its publications and at its events. 
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Significantly, and as EFN's founders intended, offering members opportunities to 
launch and advance their careers in the UK plays a key role in attracting and attaching 
them to the association. For example, in outlining his reasons for becoming an active 
member of EFN, Dr Daramola asserts, "it's going to help my professional development" 
(Interview, London, July 2006). Referring to the luminaries of the association, he 
explains, "I know that I can always learn from the so-called giants who have done so 
well in this country". In particular, he feels that these highly experienced and successful 
members will be able to help him in his ongoing efforts to acquire chartered status with 
the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (1MB) in the UK. "As a matter of fact", he adds, 
"one of the EFN members, I hope to or I plan to have him as one of my mentors, [ ... ]. 
He's a member of, a fellow of, 1MB here, he knows a lot of people, he can write a 
reference letter, so I think I will probably gain from that [ ... J. 
Facilitating social support and mutual progress is central to driving and sustaining not 
only diaspora organisations grounded in geo-ethnic and professional identities but also 
many of the diaspora organisations that take the form of NOOs. Indeed, while most 
diaspora NOOs have a prime concern with contributing to development at 'home', 
many also have a strong desire to further socio-economic advancement in diaspora, or 
what Mohan (2002) aptly terms 'development in the diaspora'. Orienting their 
interventions not only towards 'home' but also towards diaspora, these NOOs attempt to 
support the welfare and 'empowerment' of Nigerians in the UK by providing advice and 
advocacy on issues such as immigration, employment, housing, discrimination, health, 
education, and state services and benefits. Some of these organisations also offer 
diasporans additional services such as 'cultural mediation' in dealing with statutory 
bodies, bereavement counselling and support, business and skills training, and 
specialised programmes for youth, the elderly, those with mental health problems, and 
pnsoners. 
Significantly, it is providing such support and welfare services that has enabled a 
number of these NOOs to obtain some diasporic support and some short-term, project 
specific funding from local authorities and national funding bodies in the UK. Although 
this funding is generally rather modest and sporadic, it has at least helped these NOOs 
to eke out an existence and become a little more established. For example, such funding 
has often just about enabled recipient directors to establish offices for their respective 
NOOs and/or work for them on a full-time basis. With a slightly more solid 
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organisational base in place, these NGOs can become more capable of being utilised as 
vehicles for transnational intervention at 'home'. For instance, having attracted some 
community and statutory funding through its efforts to tackle socio-economic exclusion 
among Nigerians in the UK, Nigerian Women for Development (NWD) has been able 
to start pursuing its transnational aspiration to 'empower' 'grassroots' women in the 
Niger Delta. 
Furthermore, NWD's founder argues that the organisation's work to further the welfare 
and progress of Nigerians in the UK heightens not only its own transnational 
capabilities but also those of individual diasporans. Indeed, it is widely held among 
organised diasporans that the provision of social support 'abroad' not only attracts 
participation and resources for diaspora organisations and their transnational projects 
but also increases the ability and desire of individual diasporans to contribute to the 
development of 'home'. Contending that the Engineering Forum of Nigerians presents 
him with opportunities to develop professionally in the UK, a member of the association 
asserts, "When I'm fully established here, I will be ably to start thinking of doing 
something to help back home" (Interview, London, June 2006). Concordantly, an 
executive of the Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU), London, opines, "[ .. .I]f we 
can expand people's ability to undertake what they are capable of doing, they would be 
more willing to see themselves being able to help back home more as well" (Interview, 
London, June 2005). As a fellow ANPU London member contends: 
[ .. .I]t is when we are comfortable that we will be able to contribute to 
our community. But that will only happen when we are together 
because we do learn from each other, not only financially but the way 
we do things as well [ ... ]. So the more we are, the bigger we are, the 
better. (Interview, London, July 2005) 
"We have to remember what we call culture,,3: preserving and promoting the 
heritage of 'home' 
In the creation and maintenance of diasporic associational life, a concern with 
facilitating mutual support and progress is often intimately bound-up with, and 
augmented by, a yearning to reproduce and celebrate a shared cultural identit/. Indeed, 
3 ANPU London member, interview, June 2005. 
4 Again, this is an aspect of diasporic associationallife that attracted more attention in earlier work on 
migrant adaption, integration, and transnational ism (see for example, Sassen-Koob 1979; Okamura 1983; 
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a desire to forge a diasporic space for cultural 'preservation' and expression is often 
another key founding and sustaining imperative of diaspora organisations. Again, this is 
especially true of diaspora associations grounded in sub-national, geo-ethnic identities. 
As a stalwart of ANPU London argues, a primary reason for forming such organisations 
is "to maintain our culture as it is back home" (Interview, London, July 2005). 
Concordantly, Mrs Ohaje recalls that a desire to create a diasporic space in which to 
reproduce and uphold the culture of 'home' was a key factor bringing her and her fellow 
founding members together to form the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK in 1992. 
"[ ... T]here was a lot of emphasis on promoting our culture", she contends (Interview, 
London, June 2006). In particular, she argues, there was an especially strong desire to 
organise in an attempt to sustain the use of the Ukpenwa language; "[ ... O]ur language is 
becoming extinct and we felt that if we come together, we'll speak our language ... ". 
With a desire to 'preserve' and 'promote' ancestral culture so often playing such a key 
role in compelling diasporans to come together to form geo-ethnic associations, it tends 
to be reflected strongly in the constitutions and long-term functioning of these 
organisations. Indeed, constitutional provision is often made for the executive to include 
a 'cultural secretary' and/or 'cultural committee'. Furthermore, upholding ancestral 
culture is usually high on the list of formal associational aims and objectives. For 
example, the first stated aim of the Ijaw People's Association is "to preserve the cultural 
heritage of the Ijaw people" (www.ijawland.comJaboutus.html). Similarly, the second 
stated aim of the Nnewi Community Association is "to promote awareness and 
understanding of Nnewi customs and culture" (www.nnewiuk.orglconstitution.htm). 
With 'a stated objective "to promote and maintain our rich cultural heritage" (OW A 
constitution), the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK (OW A) also places much 
emphasis on creating a diasporic space for the formal and informal reproduction of 
ancestral culture. Indeed, a recent annual report of the OW A states, "The cultural aspect 
of our tradition has been paramount within the Ukpenwa Women's Association. We 
have tried as much as possible to bring forth our tradition to the limelight despite the 
fact that we are far away from home" (UW A annual report, 2004). In its efforts to 'bring 
Schoeneberg 1985; Basch 1987; Cheetham 1988; Pei11995; Attah-Poku 1996; AFFORD 1998; Goldring 
1998; Minghuan 1998; Landolt et a11999; Popkin 1999; Adeyanju 2000; Kerlin 2000; Ndofor-Tah 2000; 
Owusu 2000). 
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forth' ancestral cultural 'tradition', the UW A has devoted particular attention to 
reproducing and sustaining in diaspora what is widely celebrated both at 'home' and 
'abroad' as the distinct and especially delicious cuisine of Ukpenwa. In addition to 
holding "workshops" for members to share with each other their knowledge of 
"Ukpenwa cooking", the UW A documents Ukpenwan recipes and aims ultimately to 
produce an "Ukpenwa cook book" (UW A members, interviews, London, April 2005 
and April and June 2006). Beyond cuisine, the association directs much effort to 
rehearsing and performing Ukpenwan songs, dances and plays as well as 'traditional' 
death and marriage ceremonies, enacting the latter not only for UW A members and their 
relatives but also for members of the wider UK-based Ukpenwa diaspora. 
Significantly, a desire to participate in such collective cultural 'maintenance' often plays 
a key role in attracting and binding members to geo-ethnic diaspora organisations. For 
example, in detailing what motivates her to be such an active member of the UW A, Mrs 
Ohaje contends, "we promote our culture", adding, "I love our culture, I love dancing, 
Ukpenwa music and all that [ ... J" (Interview, London, June 2006). Similarly, in 
outlining her reasons for being a committed member of ANPU London, Mrs Obafemi 
states, "I'm a cultural woman, I love our culture" (Interview, London, July 2005). "I 
love to identify with where I'm from", she continues, detailing how it is very important 
to her to have a social space in which she can continue to speak in her ancestral 
'dialect', recall wise adages and folkloric tales from the homeland, eat 'traditional' 
food, and wear 'traditional' clothes. 
Furthermore, through their efforts to 'preserve' and 'promote' ancestral culture, geo-
ethnic diaspora associations not only attract a core of committed members but can also 
gain some important additional participation and support from beyond the generally 
limited active membership. This can be seen most explicitly at the major cultural events 
that geo-ethnic associations generally aspire to hold annually. Through the display and 
celebration of aspects of the 'host' association's cultural heritage, these convivial and 
entertaining occasions attract diasporic co-ethnics who are not usually actively involved 
in the association. As the president of the Wazobia State Union contends, "there's so 
many people from Wazobia State that come out from the woodwork at events" 
(Interview, London, June 2006). Similarly, Mrs Emanu, the president of the Ukpenwa 
Women's Association UK (UW A), claims that at their annual cultural event "a lot of the 
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members you don't see will turn up [ ... ], [ ... ] they love the dance!" (Interview, London, 
April 2006). 
Such cultural festivities also draw individuals and organisations from the wider 
Nigerian diaspora and UK society in general. As Mrs Emanu explains, the UW A's 
cultural events attract "other Nigerian organisations within the country" and "friends 
that we met here who are not even from Nigeria". Indeed, the UW A's 2006 cultural 
event not only drew far more Ukpenwans than the 15 or so women who sustain the 
association through their committed membership but also attracted a geo-ethnically 
diverse array of diasporic Nigerians and their organisations as well as at least a dozen 
non-Nigerians, swelling the total attendance to about 250 people. As one UW A stalwart 
contends, "you only need to see when we do events, people will come, they love the 
food, they love the cultural displays, so they will come" (Interview, London, June 
2006). 
Critically, employing ancestral culture to draw in participation and support from beyond 
the generally rather narrow confines of the committed membership is very often key in 
sustaining geo-ethnic diaspora organisations and their transnational visions for 
contributing to development at 'home'. Indeed, while the cultural events that such 
associations hold are explicitly framed and undoubtedly enjoyed as displays and 
celebrations of ancestral heritage, they are also very much intended to be fundraising 
events. As an active member of the UW A claims, "we have cultural display [ ... ], it's 
just a way of raising funds" (Interview, London, April 2005). 
Accordingly, such events not only have an entry fee but also tend to involve other 
fundr-aising activities such as auctions and raffles, the 'spraying,5 of performers, the 
setting aside of time for participants to make donations to the 'host' organisation, and 
the appointment and recognition of wealthy and esteemed individuals as 'chairs', 
'supporters' or 'patrons' of the occasion. Coupled to the attraction of cultural display 
and celebration, these fundraising strategies are able to generate a substantial, often 
critical, boost to the income of the 'host' organisation. As an executive of the UW A 
attests, "we sell the ticket and we promise Ukpenwa food and all that entertainment, so 
it's always a huge turn out and we manage to raise some money as well that will see us 
through the following year or two years" (Interview, London, April 2006). Indeed, the 
5 The practice of recognising and celebrating performers by placing money on them. 
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UW A's finances were augmented substantially by its 2006 cultural event, which raised 
some £4,000, more than double what the association had in its accounts. 
Moreover, the attempts made by geo-ethnic organisations to raise money through 
cultural events are often directly and explicitly linked to their efforts to contribute to 
development at 'home'. Indeed, the fundraising that geo-ethnic organisations do through 
cultural events is often specifically targeted at making interventions at 'home'. As the 
president of the Wazobia State Union contends, "we are having an event in August and 
we are hoping to use the donations from that event to do one or two activities back 
home" (Interview, London, June 2006). Similarly, a stalwart of the Ukpenwa Women's 
Association UK (UW A) remarks, "each fund raising event we want to do we will say 
we want to raise money for a particular project at home" (Interview, June 2005). 
Accordingly, the UW A's 2006 cultural celebration was advertised as raising funds "in 
aid of special needs people in Ukpenwa" (UW A flyer, 2006). In the event, the occasion 
successfully enabled the UW A to make a £200 contribution to a "centre for the blind" 
being built in the city (UW A President, personal communication, September 2006). 
Indeed, with the funds raised internally through members' dues and donations tending 
to prove insufficient, its is often only the finance that is generated through cultural 
events that enables geo-ethnic diaspora organisations to begin to pursue their 
transnational aspirations. In this way, the 'preservation' and 'promotion' of ancestral 
cultural heritage in diaspora can be see as critical to the pursuit of development at 
'home'. 
"So they can know themselves": passing on the heritage of 'home' 
The €ultural 'maintenance' activities of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations are seen to 
further augment collective· transnational capabilities through their particular targeting of 
younger diasporans, especially those who have been born and/or brought up 'abroad'. A 
desire not only to 'preserve' ancestral culture but also to 'pass it on' to younger 
generations is often a key imperative drawing diasporans together to form and sustain 
geo-ethnic associations. For example, this desire was central to Mrs Emanu's decision 
to join the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK (UW A) in 1994; "I looked at their aims 
and their objectives and I liked what they were doing, the whole idea for me then as at 
that time was a place where my children could learn about my culture, where I come 
from ... " (Interview, London, April 2006). 
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Indeed, like many other geo-ethnic diaspora organisations, the UW A has since its 
formation placed much emphasis on such cultural transmission, the second part of its 
founding overall aim stating, "To ensure our zeal for our heritage is passed on to the 
next generation" (UW A constitution). To this end, the UW A has made constitutional 
provision for the executive position of Youth Co-ordinator, one of the roles of which is 
to "be responsible for teaching the youth the Ukpenwa culture/language" (ibid). While 
financial and logistical constraints have undermined efforts by the UW A and other geo-
ethnic diaspora associations to hold ancestral language classes for the 'next generation', 
such groups have attempted to transfer something of their cultural heritage to younger 
constituents by encouraging them to have at least a degree of involvement in 
associational activities, especially major cultural events. For example, a stalwart of the 
UW A argues, "[ ... W]henever we're organising a big dance like we're going to do in 
July this year, we involve the kids; the kids are going to come round and practise all 
those traditional dances with us, we are teaching them how to dance and sing our 
traditional songs [ ... ], so it's something" (Interview, London, April 2006). Indeed, like 
those held in previous years, the UW A's 2006 cultural event saw several young 
diasporans participate in the performances of Ukpenwan heritage. 
Significantly, what tends to underpin the desire to come together in an attempt to 
transfer ancestral culture to the 'next generation' is a profound concern with the 
development of 'home'. There is a firm belief among committed members of geo-ethnic 
diaspora organisations that younger diasporans who have grown-up 'abroad' will only 
develop an attachment and commitment to their 'home' community and its progress if 
they are encouraged to appreciate its culture. As a stalwart of the Ayege National 
Progr,ess Union, London, opines, "we want the children [ ... ] to grow up knowing a lot 
about Ayege culture so that they at least will have ties; if not, they will all be lost, no-
one will want to contribute to 'home' in the future [ ... ]" (Interview, London, July 
2005). 
While active members of geo-ethnic organisations tend to express great disappointment 
at the extent to which they have succeeded in transferring ancestral culture to younger 
diasporans, it seems that they might at least have planted in the 'next generation' the 
seeds of affinity with 'home' out of which could grow a new wave of collective 
transnational intervention. For example, although Ms Joy Akwehe "wasn't really that 
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interested" when she used to be taken along to the cultural events held by her parents' 
Ukpenwa associations, she did feel it was 'her' heritage that was being displayed 
(Interview, London, June 2006). Now in her late twenties and soon to marry, Joy is 
looking forward to having children of her own and has consequently become much 
more interested in exploring the Ukpenwa culture that her parents and their geo-ethnic 
associations had introduced to her: 
I really don't want my children to feel they are just English, [ ... ]. So 
it's really important for me to know my culture and build a 
relationship with Ukpenwa so that I can pass the same on to my 
children so that my children will become familiar with it and won't be 
cynical about it. 
A key way in which Joy thinks she might attempt to deepen her engagement with her 
ancestral culture is by being "more involved" with her parent's Ukpenwa associations. 
Significantly, Joy believes that if she did become more active in these organisations and 
through them developed a stronger attachment to Ukpenwa and its culture, she would 
then begin to do more to support their "projects" at 'home'. 
Furthermore, the efforts of diaspora organisations to 'pass on' the culture of 'home' are 
seen to heighten not only the desire of the 'next generation' to support collective 
transnational intervention but also their ability to do so. It is often argued that if younger 
diasporans, particularly those brought-up 'abroad', are to have the confidence to 
progress and prosper in diaspora, it is necessary for them to have a strong and positive 
sense of 'their' cultural heritage and identity. Indeed, diaspora NOOs that have a 
particular concern with what can be described as 'development in the diaspora' often 
seek to 'promote' the culture of 'home' in an attempt to 'empower' Nigerians brought-
up in the UK. For example, in its "mission" to further the social and economic 
"inclusion" of Nigerians in the UK, the Nigerian Community Forum (NCF) aims "to 
enhance and ensure the promotion of Nigerian cultural heritage and history" (NCF 
document, n.d.). Its Chief Executive argues that a tendency to "forget their culture" 
turns the minds .of young, UK-raised diasporans "upside down", hindering their socio-
economic advancement (Interview, London, September 2004). Consequently, his NOO 
organises "Nigerian Culture, History and Language Classes" (NCF document, n.d.) so 
that "the youth" can "appreciate their roots" (Chief Executive, interview, London, 
September 2004). In the words of the director of a diaspora NOO that publishes 
"traditional" stories and organises an annual festival in an attempt to "increase 
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awareness and knowledge of Nigerian culture" among young diasporans, the logic is, "if 
you don't know where you come from, you cannot move forwards" (Interview, London, 
August 2004). 
"The joy of the meeting": identifying, socialising and having fun 
What is very often the most immediate and important imperative bringing diasporans 
together to forge and sustain organisations is a desire to create a diasporic space of 
sociability, companionship and conviviality. This key associational yearning is for an 
arena 'abroad' in which one can socialise, consolidate old friendships and create new 
ones, and, often most importantly of all, relax and enjoy oneself. Consequently, many 
diasporans view their organisations first, and often foremost, as cherished spaces of 
familiarity, friendship and fun. From this perspective, it is a diasporic desire for 
sociability, companionship, and conviviality that is often fundamental to the creation 
and sustenance of diasporic associational life and any potential it may hold for 
contributing to development at 'home'. 
While it can be seen in the emergence of all forms of diaspora organisation, the 
importance of the yearning for sociability is especially apparent in the formation and 
functioning of diaspora organisations grounded in geo-ethnic identities. As an active 
member of the Calabar Union and Cross River State Union contends when explaining 
the purpose of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations, "we all find ourselves living in the 
UK, we have to create a platform for us to be able to socialise ... " (Interview, London, 
June 2005). Similarly, an executive of the Ayege National Progress Union, London, 
highlights the centrality of this social imperative in the creation of his association; "the 
origin of it was to initially act as a kind of social gathering for the people from that part 
of the world here" (Interview, London, July 2005). 
With the desire for sociability being so important in bringing diasporans together to 
form geo-ethnic associations, it tends to be reflected strongly in the constitutional 
foundation of these organisations. Indeed, their formal aims and objectives usually 
highlight a prime concern with arranging 'social activities' and augmenting the 'social 
life' of members. For example, the first stated aim of a London-based Ijaw 'club' is to 
"Promote a purely social and harmonious forum for members to meet and interact 
periodically" (www.londontariclub.com). In pursuance of such aims, geo-ethnic 
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diaspora associations often make constitutional provlSlon for a social secretary or 
committee, charging them with the responsibility of organising social events and group 
outings. 
Underpinning the formal social objective of geo-ethnic organisations is often a specific 
constitutional aim to encourage some kind of companionship within the association. For 
instance, one of the key stated aims of an Egba-Y oruba 'hometown association' is "To 
foster friendship and cooperation among its members" (Organisation document, 2005). 
Indeed, within the social imperative bringing diasporans together to form and sustain 
geo-ethnic organisations is a particular and strongly felt desire to nurture 
companionship through the consolidation of pre-existing friendships and the creation of 
new ones. For example, the chairman of the an Ekiti-Yoruba 'hometown association' 
argues that the main reason for forming the association in 1997 was to encourage more 
regular social interaction between three co-ethnic nuclear families, including his own, 
who had been good friends back in Nigeria but who had struggled to see as much as 
they would have liked of each other since moving to London in the mid to late 1980s. It 
was also hoped, he adds, that the Union would grow, enabling the three founding 
families to forge new friendships with other co-ethnic individuals and families known to 
be based in the UK. 
Similarly, an executive of the Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU), London, 
contends that it was primarily a desire to rekindle old friendships and acquaintances and 
establish new ones that led him to join the association a few months after arriving in the 
UK in 1989. Explaining what joining the Union meant to him at that time, he argues, "I 
think it was more social, it allowed me to come across people that I maybe hadn't seen 
in a, long time or hadn't come across before" (Interview, London, June 2005). 
Concordantly, in recounting her reasons for seeking out the association, a fellow active 
member recalls, "[ ... W]hen I travelled from Nigeria, come to London, [ ... ], I'm happy 
to meet a group of friends, myoid class-mates, and make new friends" (Interview, 
London, April 2006). Indeed, among the 15 or so stalwarts of ANPU London, some 
have known each other since being at school together in Ayege while others have forged 
close friendships in diaspora during the 15 or so years in which they have been 
members of the association. Significantly, it is by enabling both the maintenance of 
long-standing friendships from 'home' and the construction of new friendships in 
diaspora that the Union is seen to provide the companionship so keenly sought by its 
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founders and committed members. As one stalwart attests in reflecting on the central 
purpose of forming and sustaining the Union, "we just want to know each other so that 
we're very close" (Interview, London, April 2006). 
Intimately bound-up with this yearning for sociability and companionship through geo-
ethnic association is a particularly strong desire to create a diasporic social space in 
which to relax and have fun. Emphasising the importance of this convivial imperative in 
the foundation and ongoing operation of ANPU London, an executive contends of the 
Union, "as a social gathering it's always been very good because then we have 
somewhere to go out and socialise every last Saturday of the month, [ ... ], it's always 
good to have a bit of enjoyment and relaxation in your normal course of working day-
to-day" (Interview, London, June 2005). Similarly, in accounting for her highly 
committed membership of the Ukpenwa Women's Association UK (UW A), Mrs Ohaje 
enthuses of the organisation, "[ .. .I]t is really fun because when we meet [ ... ] there is 
singing, [ ... ], and we do relaxation programmes, we talk, [ ... ], we look at crafts, we 
look at cooking" (Interview, London, June 2006). Concordantly, in detailing what draws 
members to participate actively in the UW A, an executive of the association proclaims, 
"[ ... W]e relax, we chill out, we sing songs, we are happy!" (Interview, London, April 
2006) 
While geo-ethnic organisations do in some cases arrange occasional 'outings' and 
'trips' to places of leisure such as amusement parks, it is their regular, usually monthly, 
meetings that are very much the main, and most deeply cherished, space of associational 
relaxation and enjoyment. As Mr Akinmade of ANPU London contends: 
Most of the time, even the meeting will turn into social event [ ... ]. 
[ ... W]e use it as a social area, to interact socially, and that's why 
alcohol and food is provided by the host, [ ... ] we see it as a 
commitment that 'how can my kin's brothers and sisters come to my 
place and they won't eat or drink?!' (Interview, London, July 2005) 
Indeed, although the meetings of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations open and proceed as 
formal gatherings at which associational affairs are orderly and soberly discussed, the 
close of official business generally heralds the serving of a generous spread of 
'traditional' dishes and favourite tipples and sparks a vibrant crescendo of news, gossip, 
banter and laughter, remaking a rather austere occasion into a profoundly convivial 
event that often runs late into the night and sometimes into the early hours of the next 
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morning. In the words of an ANPU London member, this "social aspect" represents "the 
joy of the meeting" (Interview, London, March 2006). 
Such joy was especially apparent at a monthly meeting of the Ukpenwa Women's 
Association UK (UW A) when, soon after the close of formal business and as the food 
members had prepared was being served, a joke threw one of the assembled women into 
hysterics. Upon recovering her composure, she chuckled, "When I get home from 
meetings, I'm always still laughing to myself - my neighbours must wonder what I'm 
up to!" Indeed, it was evident that members of the UW A share the sentiment expressed 
by the president of the women's wing of an Igbo 'town union'; "We like to let our hair 
down!" (Interview, London, July 2005). Clearly, as one UW A member put it, "a big 
part of the meeting is about having fun" (Interview, London, March 2006). 
Significantly, the promise of relaxation, joy and fun not only draws members to the 
regular meetings of geo-ethnic diaspora organisations but also attracts participants to the 
major cultural events that these groups tend to aspire to hold annually. While these 
occasions undoubtedly win much support because they are seen to 'preserve', 
'promote', and 'pass on' ancestral culture, it is clear that they also attract participation 
and benevolence simply because they promise a 'good time'. As the president of an 
Ijebu-Y oruba 'hometown association' contends, "we get two to three hundred at our 
events - people like to come and party!" (Interview, London, Spetember 2004). Indeed, 
it is the sheer enjoyment offered by such events that is often seen to be their main 
attraction, drawing participants not only from London but also from the UK regions, 
Ireland, continental Europe, North America and even Nigeria itself. From this 
perspective, it is principally through their promise of conviviality that these fundraising 
events can be seen to attract the financial support that, as we saw above, is so often 
critical to sustaining geo-ethnic diaspora associations and their transnational visions. 
"To know ourselves,,6: from sociability, companionship and conviviality to a sense 
of belonging 'abroad' 
What is most important about sociability, companionship and conviviality in sustaining 
geo-ethnic diaspora organisations and their interventions at 'home' is how they are 
generative of a profound sense of belonging. Indeed, what very often appears to be the 
6 ANPU member, interview, London, July 2005. 
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primary imperative bringing diasporans together to forge and maintain such associations 
is a desire to create a social space of familiarity, friendship and fun through which they 
can feel at 'home' while 'abroad'. It is in attending to this yearning for an arena in 
which to relax, enjoy and, above all, belong that geo-ethnic organisations ultimately win 
the loyalty and support of diasporans. Time and time again and with heartfelt emphasis, 
active members of such groups contend that it is through the companionship and joy of 
geo-ethnic associational life that they find a deeply cherished 'home from home', a 
place in diaspora to which they can belong and to which they are therefore strongly 
attached and highly committed. 
As Mr Akinmade asserts of the Ayege National Progress Union (ANPU), London, 
"[ ... W]hen you see your own people, when they come here to visit me, I feel at home. 
We talk, we eat the same food and everything and that really matters you know" 
(Interview, London, July 2005). Fellow ANPU London stalwart Mr Oluwole elaborates: 
I think the culture in Ayege especially, it's a very tight-knit 
community and people really have the values that they share, in the 
language, in the behaviour, in the socials, so being associated with the 
group is very important [ ... ]. [ .. .I]t makes us closer, you can feel that 
you can talk to somebody who will understand where you are coming 
from and where you are going, and that closeness has been well-
maintained [ ... ]. In order to maintain it like that, we decided to keep 
the meetings held at individual's houses, [ ... ], the fact that you invite 
us to your home shows that you open your heart to us, [ ... ], and we 
come and celebrate and we have our meeting but, most especially, we 
socialise as well. So typically you would prepare food for us, and it is 
food again that is what we are used to, you know, the pounded yam, 
the soup, the meats. So all those kind of things add up to making you 
feel like you are part of the community, that you are a member and 
relate to it well. 
Striking a concordant note, Ms Ibrune reflects on what attracts her to the Ukpenwa 
Women's Association UK (UW A): 
It's a forum that you go there, you unwind, you meet your people, you 
speak the same language [ ... ]. [ ... I]t's a forum that we all come 
together because we know ourself, it's just like one big family. [ ... W]e 
joke, we laugh, we talk, we care about each other, you know? So I feel 
it's just that togetherness [ ... ]. (Interview, London, April 2005) 
Similarly, in explaining why she is such a committed member of UW A, Mrs Ohaje 
enthuses: 
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I think what motivates me is the fact that, at the end of the month, 
taking four or five hours out to be with the women is top of my 
priority because when you go there, you laugh, we share things 
together, you share the culture together, even the language you share 
together. So I look forward to going because I think being within the 
group is being at another place, it's one way in which I can socialise 
with my people, I can be with my people. (Interview, London, June 
2006) 
As the president of an Ijesha-Y oruba hometown association contends, "We meet every 
month in each other's house, cook for each other, have family parties, just to network 
and to have that sense of belonging" (Interview, London, July 2006). Concurring, the 
president of an Igbo state union reflects, "It's to create a new world, to have an identity, 
a sense of belonging" (Interview, London, May 2005). 
It is clear that diaspora organisations grounded in geo-ethnic identities are very often 
forged, sustained and cherished primarily as spaces of companionship, joy, and, 
ultimately, belonging. It is this promise of a much sought after arena of familiarity, 
friendship and fun in which one can feel at 'home' while 'abroad' that attracts and holds 
so much of the participation and support that these groups enjoy. Significantly, other 
forms of diaspora organisation also draw much of their vitality from the space they 
create for companionship, conviviality and belonging. For example, non-geo-ethnic 
diaspora organisations taking on the form of NODs and professional associations very 
often emerge out of pre-existing friendship networks, create opportunities for new 
friendships to be forged, produce space for sociability, and represent a further avenue 
through which to feel at 'home' in diaspora. 
The diaspora NOD, Development Impact for Nigeria (DIFN), for instance, was founded 
in 1999 by a group of six UK-based Nigerians who had become good friends over a 
decade or so of living in the same east London neighbourhood and attending the same 
local church. Having spent much of their social time together discussing Nigeria and its 
progress, these friends one day decided to take more direct action to support 
development at 'home'. As the prime mover in the group, Mr Yomi Dloko recalls, "As a 
group of friends, we got together and said, 'we need to do something'" (Interview, 
London, July 2005). "[ .. .I]t was a case of saying, 'it's alright debating about these 
things, what are we actually going to do about it?"', concurs Mr Ade Fashade, another 
key member of the group (Interview, London, July 2006). "So we met on a Saturday 
263 
afternoon and decided to set up Development Impact for Nigeria, really just off-the-
cuff', continues Ade, "It wasn't anything formal or anything, we just decided we were 
going to start this, meet in each others house once in a while and discuss how we can go 
about it". 
While DIFN was undoubtedly founded with the primary aim of contributing to 'home', 
it is clear that its founders also wanted to create a strong rationale for continuing to 
come together as friends, especially as busy London life seemed to continually leave 
less time for socialising and, more importantly, as members began to move out to 
different suburbs and satellite towns. This desire to maintain companionship and 
conviviality through the formation and operation of DIFN is most apparent when the 
group meets at a member's home to discuss the NOO's affairs. Reflecting the typical 
course of events at the regular gatherings of geo-ethnic associations, the formal business 
of DIFN trustee meetings tends to soon give way to the serving of food and drink and 
the jovial exchange of news, stories and general banter. Sometimes meetings even take 
place on a weekday evening over a few beers in a pub or bar, the emphasis of the 
gathering tending to shift promptly from DIFN affairs to the business of unwinding after 
a hard day's work. 
Furthermore, DIFN and diaspora NOOs in general tend not only to build-on and 
maintain established relations of friendship and conviviality but also, in further 
reflection of geo-ethnic associations, seek to attract wider diasporic support by holding 
events that involve a notable degree of sociability. While DIFN has not gone as far as 
other diaspora NOOs in organising such highly sociable occasions as fundraising 
parties, cultural celebrations and sponsored 'fun runs', it has arranged awareness 
seminars that double as congenial 'networking' events. 
Significantly, through the conviviality of DIFN meetings and events, trustees are not 
only able to maintain old friendships but also have an opportunity to forge new ones. 
Indeed, in the course of trying to promote DIFN's work to the wider diaspora, the 
trustees have come to meet other UK-based Nigerians, some of whom have become 
good friends not only of the organisation but also of the trustees themselves. Similarly 
as trustees have moved out to London's suburbs and wider commuter belt, some of 
them have met other Nigerians residing in these neighbourhoods, a few of whom have 
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joined DIFN as supporters and, in one case, as a trustee and through this have been fully 
incorporated into the friendship network underpinning the organisation. 
In these ways, DIFN has come to be highly valued by its original founders as a means of 
maintaining and expanding their friendships with fellow UK-based Nigerians, especially 
as they have little involvement with any other diaspora organisations and now that they 
find themselves living in neighbourhoods in which there are very few of their fellow 
diasporans. Indeed, although the trustees all enjoy great friendships with many non-
Nigerians, the opportunity to socialise with friends of Nigerian origin appears to be 
particularly cherished. Ultimately, while DIFN's trustees undoubtedly share a deep 
commitment to contribute to the development of Nigeria, it is clear that they are also 
driven and bound together by a desire to share a diasporic space of friendship and 
conviviality through which can feel at 'home' while 'abroad'. 
This desire for companionship, sociability and belonging is also important in driving 
and sustaining associations of diasporic professionals. Like geo-ethnic associations and 
diaspora NOOs, these professional groups tend to emerge out of, and often reflect a 
desire to consolidate and expand, pre-existing friendship networks. In the case of the 
Engineering Forum of Nigerians (EFN), for example, the association was established in 
2002 by a small group of UK-based Nigerian engineer friends, most of whom had 
known each other since studying together at university in Nigeria and/or the UK during 
the 1980s. While a desire to contribute to 'home' was undoubtedly the principal 
imperative in the formation of EFN, the founding friends also wanted a means through 
which to continue and extend their relations of conviviality and companionship in the 
face of growing personal and professional responsibilities. As one of the original 
founders explains: 
[ ... B]ecause we were friends, [ ... ], it was just a natural evolution .. 
[ ... W]e all knew each other so we'd meet, we'd play football, we'd 
play cricket, we'd chat, we'd party, [ ... ] and then as time moved on 
everybody was now becoming a bit older and possibly even wiser, we 
reached a stage I think in our careers where, [ ... ], a lot of us got 
ourselves into senior positions, [ ... ]. [ ... S]o we met one day and we 
decided, "look, let's get together one day and talk about what we want 
to do" and that's what we did. We determined to meet every month at 
that stage, [ ... ] and those who knew others in the profession invited 
them to these meetings as well, [ ... ] and that's how it began. 
(Interview, Lagos, September 2005) 
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Having emerged out of a network of friends and a series of informal social gatherings to 
be formally constituted in 2003, EFN has remained true to the imperatives of 
conviviality and companionship. Its headline annual 'Spring Event', the first of which 
was held in 2004, not only involves a seminar on an important engineering topic, 
usually related to development in Nigeria, but also culminates in an evening reception 
and dinner at which much highly congenial 'networking' ensues amongst old friends 
and new acquaintances. Furthermore, EFN organises group outings to locations of 
engineering interest, attending not only to member's professional curiosities but also 
their yearnings for sociability. In a similarly social vein, the Britain Nigeria Law Forum 
(BNLF) complements its periodic seminars on legal issues of particular relevance to 
Nigeria and Nigerian practitioners with monthly informal 'networking events' at a 
central London wine bar. Like the Medical Association of Nigerian Specialists and 
General Practitioners in the UK (MANSAG), the BNLF also embraces the spirit of 
conviviality by holding an annual gala ball. The Nigerian Nurses Charitable Association 
even goes as far as stating a formal aim to "entertain members" 
(www.nncauk.orglaims.htm). Members certainly enthuse about the NNCA's "social 
events", noting that these occasions are not only fundraising events for the 
organisation's work at 'home' and 'abroad' but also "great fun" (NNCA member, 
interview, London, May 2005). Indeed, members of diasporic professional associations 
make it clear that while desires to develop in diaspora and contribute to 'home' are 
critical in drawing them to these groups, their participation also owes much to a strong 
desire to enjoy the companionship, conviviality and sense of belonging that is generated 
in the company of old and new friends who share not only a profession but also a 
'home'. 
"They're one and the same thing": developing and belonging in diaspora and 
contributing to the progress of 'home' 
It is clear that desires to foster mutual support and progress, to preserve, promote and 
pass on cultural heritage, to enjoy companionship and conviviality and, ultimately, to 
feel at 'home' while 'abroad are critical in the creation and maintenance of diasporic 
associational life. Together these key desires can be seen to constitute a yearning for a 
diasporic space in which to develop and belong 'abroad'. It is this overarching yearning 
that very often appears to be the most immediate and important imperative bringing 
diasporans together to form and sustain organisations. Therefore, it is by attending to 
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their own needs and desires for development and belonging 'abroad' that diasporans 
create and maintain the organisations that enable them to contribute to development at 
'home'. Furthermore, we have also seen that by attending to the yearning for a diasporic 
space of development and belonging 'abroad', diaspora organisations not only attract 
the participation and resources that sustain them and make them in any way capable of 
contributing to the progress of 'home' but also build the individual transnational 
capabilities of their diasporic members, participants, and beneficiaries. 
Consequently, the foundational concern with creating a supportive and convivial 'home 
from home' is rarely seen to contradict or conflict with any ultimate desire to contribute 
to the development of 'home' itself. Indeed, these two key objectives are generally 
considered to be entirely compatible and, moreover, inextricably linked. This is most 
clearly reflected in the way that diaspora organisations and their members tend to 
articulate as one unified imperative the yearning to create a space of development and 
belonging in diaspora and the desire to contribute collectively to the progress of 'home'. 
For example, the first constitutional objective of the Ukpenwa Women's Association 
UK (UW A) is, "To cater for the welfare and well-being of Ukpenwa women, and their 
families, living in the United Kingdom and in Nigeria" (UW A constitution). Similarly, 
one of the formal aims of the Bayelsa State Union is to, "Promote the economic and 
social development of Bayelsa State and its people in Great Britain and Ireland" 
(www.bayelsa.org.ukltoplinks/about-us/). The diaspora NGO Nigerian Women for 
Development is "for the welfare of Nigerians in Nigeria and in the UK" (Organisation 
document, 2005) while the "mission" of the Nigerian Community Forum, another 
diaspora NGO, is "to tackle social and economic deprivation facing our Nation and 
people both Home and Away" (Organisation document, n.d.). As an organisation of 
diasporic professionals, the Nigerian Nurses Charitable Association also articulates its 
desire to support progress within the diaspora and its yearning to contribute to 
development at 'home' as a singular, coherent objective, stating that one of its key aims 
is, "To make vital contributions to health promotion in our community in the United 
Kingdom and Nigeria" (www.nncauk.orglaims.htm). 
While diaspora organisations generally seek to pursue a unified mission to support 
development in diaspora and at 'home', they are not always able to do so initially. 
Indeed, before attaining the desired balance and unity between their progressive desires 
at 'home' and 'abroad', many diaspora organisations first find it necessary to prioritise 
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the imperative to construct a supportive and convivial social space in diaspora. For 
instance, the Ozubulu Women Association (OWA), founded in 1998, claims, "Initially, 
the objective of the founding members was to create a social forum at which the women 
could discuss mutual cultural and ethnic issues. However, in 2002, there was a 
consensus among the members that there was a pull towards helping local Ozubulu 
indigenes in Nigeria" (OW A leaflet, n.d.). Similarly, an executive of the Ayege 
National Progress Union (ANPU), London, asserts of the association: 
[ ... T]he origin of it was to initially act as a kind of social gathering 
[ ... ], and then, [ ... ], that led to how we could assist Ayege back home. 
So it was just to help ourselves where we needed help, either 
financially or information-wise or any other way, and gradually the 
focus shifted to how we could actually assist with the hometown itself 
and let it progress further and further. (Interview, London, June 2005) 
In this way, pursuing a yearning to contribute collectively to the 'upliftment' of 'home' 
is seen to depend on, and flow from, first attending to diasporic needs and desires for 
development and belonging 'abroad'. As a founding member of ANPU London 
contends, "We just want to find a way of helping ourselves here, [ ... J, we just want to 
know each other so that we're very close, then how can we help our people back home" 
(Interview, London, April 2006). Concordantly, Mrs Ibrune of the Ukpenwa Women's 
Association UK (UW A) enthuses of the organisation: 
[ .. .I]t's just for that togetherness [ ... ], it's for us to talk and laugh and 
then see what we can do for our people back home [ ... ]. [ ... ] The 
objective is knowing ourselves in this country, you know, those who 
want to belong, we know ourself, we know what is going on, if 
anybody has any need, we help out as much as we can, financially, 
emotionally and otherwise, and so we see what we can do for each 
other and also not only in this country but back home as well because 
we have a lot of things going on just to better ourselves and to better 
people back home also. (Interview, London, April 2005) 
For organised diasporans, then, supporting each other, maintaining and celebrating a 
shared cultural identity, and enjoying companionship and conviviality become inherent 
to attempting to contribute collectively to the development of 'home'. As Mrs Ubule of 
the UW A insists, "We socialise here to contribute to Ukpenwa" (Interview, London, 
April 2006). Concurring with this sentiment, the president of an Egba-Y oruba 
'hometown association' asserts, "[ ... I]n knowing each other, we contribute to our town" 
(Interview, London, May 2005). Like these stalwarts of geo-ethnic associationallife, the 
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founders and members of diaspora NOOs and professional associations also tend to see 
the creation of spaces of development and belonging 'abroad' as fundamental to the 
making of collective transnational interventions at 'home'. Indeed, we have seen that by 
building-on and facilitating cooperation, companionship, and conviviality in diaspora, 
these organisations are routinely seen not only to attract support for their own 
transnational activities but also to develop the individual capabilities of their members, 
participants, and service-users to contribute to 'home'. This is why the founder of the 
diaspora NOO Nigerian Women for Development sees her organisation's work to 
counter socio-economic exclusion among Nigerians in the UK as intrinsic to its efforts 
to "empower" 'grassroots' women in Nigeria (Interview, London, June 2005). "They 
are one and the some thing", she contends, adding, "It is only when we support each 
other here that we are able to help back at home". 
Engaging diaspora organisations and supporting the development of 'home': the 
need to recognise the importance of developing and belonging 'abroad' 
Recognising that the creation of a diasporic space of development and belonging 
'abroad' is inherent to the making of collective transnational interventions at 'home' is 
clearly crucial in comprehending what drives, binds and sustains diaspora organisations 
and makes them in any way capable of contributing to the development of 'home'. 
Furthermore, recognising this is also crucial if states and international agencies are to 
engage diaspora organisations in ways that are supportive and help realise their potential 
to make progressive interventions at 'home'. Indeed, there is some evidence that such 
engagements can be constrained and even undermined by the apparent failure of 
potential 'partners' to understand and recognise that creating a space of development 
and belonging 'abroad' is inherent to diasporic associational life and its capacity to 
contribute to the development of 'home'. 
For example, while many diaspora organisations believe that registering with the UK 
Charity Commission would increase significantly their chances of obtaining external 
funding for transnational interventions at 'home', they are often reluctant to do so 
believing that the regulatory body's rules would prohibit them from directing funds 
towards the socio-cultural and welfare activities that underpin their existence in the UK 
and make them in any way capable of contributing to 'home'. A senior member of the 
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Ukpenwa Women's Association UK, who has many years experience of working in the 
UK not-for-profit sector, typifies such concerns: 
[ ... W]hen you are registered you are restricted, [ ... ]. If we register 
and we want to buy something for the organisation or give money, for 
instance, if anybody dies, in our constitution we have to pay to family, 
mother, father, give them money, but if you register I don't think you 
can do that, [ ... ]. [Currently,] we are free to utilise funding like that 
but there is a limitation to what you can do if you register. I think 
that's why we didn't want to register. If it's somebody's birthday we 
give a card, if a child is born we organise, we go there and we give 
them money. So those are the kind of things we do for the people 
around here and therefore we are using our money to look after, 
somehow, the welfare of the people in England; to me, I think its 
good, but you can't do it anymore if you're registered. (Interview, 
London, April 2006) 
Indeed, some diaspora organisations that have put aside such concerns and attempted to 
go ahead with registering as a UK charity have had their applications rejected because 
they were deemed to be primarily concerned with socio-cultural activities and the 
welfare of the their members. For instance, a founding member of an association of 
diasporic professionals recalls that the organisation was at first denied registered status 
because its activities were judged to be "social rather than charitable", the Charity 
Commission apparently highlighting the group's practice of supporting members in the 
wake of a birth or bereavement and its holding of social events (Interview, London, 
May 2005). "But social events aren't just social", she protests, adding indignantly, 
"Social events are fundraising events - that's how we generate our funds to be used for 
charitable purposes!" 
While her association succeeded with a second application having "adjusted" its 
objectives to make them "more charitable", this acceptance came at the cost of 
removing from its constitution formal provision for the socio-cultural and welfare 
activities orientated towards members. Such 'adjustments' can, indeed, undermine the 
appeal of diaspora organisations and thereby diminish their transnational capabilities. 
For example, the president of a 'hometown association' argues that a key reason why 
the organisation has been unable to expand its active membership beyond the three 
founding nuclear families is because it has registered as a UK charity and can therefore 
no longer make enforceable, constitutional provision for the socio-cultural activities and 
welfare benefits that he believes would attract and hold new members. Indeed, 
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contending that registering as a charity undermines the "mutual support" on which 
African diaspora organisations "are based", an executive of an umbrella association for 
such groups in the UK insists, "If they stop doing what they've always done, their 
memberships will lose interest and the associations will fall apart" (Interview, London, 
October 2004). Certainly, the evidence suggests that the state and international bodies 
will be able to engage constructively with diaspora organisations only when they 
recognise that creating a space of development and belonging 'abroad' is fundamental 
to the emergence and sustainability of diasporic associational life and its capacity to 
contribute to development at 'home'. 
Conclusion 
We have seen that a desire for a social space through which to develop and belong 
'abroad' is a key imperative in the creation and maintenance of diasporic associational 
life. Indeed, this yearning for a supportive and convivial 'home from home' very often 
appears to be the most immediate and important imperative bringing diasporans 
together to form and sustain organisations (see also Sassen-Koob 1979; Okamura 1983; 
Schoeneberg 1985; Basch 1987; Rex et al 1987; Cheetham 1988; Rex 1991; Ireland 
1994; Soysal 1994; Peil 1995; Attah-Poku 1996; AFFORD 1998; Danese 1998; 
Goldring 1998; Minghuan 1998; Landolt et al 1999; Liu 1998; Minghuan 1998; Popkin 
1999; Adeyanju 2000; Kerlin 2000; Ndofor-Tah 2000; Owusu 2000; McLeod et al 
2001). Consequently, it is in pursuing their own desires for personal development and 
belonging 'abroad' that diasporans forge and maintain the organisations that enable 
them to pursue any ultimate desire they might have to contribute collectively to 
development at 'home'. Furthermore, we have also seen that by attending to the 
yearning for a diasporic arena of development and belonging 'abroad', diaspora 
organisations not only attract the participation and resources that make them in any way 
capable of contributing to the progress of 'home' but also build the individual 
transnational capabilities of their diasporic members, participants, and beneficiaries. 
In these ways, then, coming together to develop and belong 'abroad' becomes inherent 
to any attempt to contribute collectively to the development of 'home'. Consequently, 
any move to understand or engage constructively with diaspora organisations and their 
progressive potential for development at 'home' cannot view these groups simply as 
vehicles for transnational intervention and attend only to their border-spanning visions 
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and activities. Comprehending and embracing diaspora organisations as agents of 
development at 'home' relies on recognising that these groups come into being and 
accrue progressive transnational capacity and potential only through their attempts to 
create spaces of development and belonging 'abroad'. National and globalising 
discourses of diaspora and development might therefore do well to broaden their 
conception of what elements of diasporic associational life contribute to, and count as, 
development at 'home'. 
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11. Homeward bound: towards a conclusion 
Introduction 
This concluding chapter opens by reviewing the main empirical findings of the thesis. 
This review is organised around the five parts into which the thesis is divided and sets 
my research findings in the context of the existing literature, pointing to areas in which 
they challenge and contribute to the body of work on diaspora and development. 
Continuing to reflect on the existing literature, the chapter then moves on to draw out 
six key contentions made in the thesis. In so doing, the chapter also highlights some 
limitations of the thesis and the most important areas that I believe would benefit from 
further research and policy attention. My aim in this is to point to new directions I feel it 
is necessary for research and policy to take in order to better understand and support the 
contributions that diasporans and their organisations make to the development of 
'home'. 
A review of the thesis 
Part 1: constructing and questioning collective transnational power 
Burgeoning globally since the tum of the new millennium, celebratory discourses of 
diaspora and development have imbued international migrants and their descendants 
with the capacity to transform from afar their communities and countries of 'origin' 
(Hermele 1997; AFFORD 1998, 2000; Portes et al 1999; Taylor 1999; Vertovec 2001, 
2003; AI-Ali and Koser 2002; Mohan 2002, 2006, 2008; Mohan and Zack-Williams 
2002;' Zack-Williams and Mohan 2002; Bracking 2003; Gammeltoft 2003; Henry and 
Mohan 2003; Newland 2003; SlZ\rensen et a12003a; Van Hear and SlZ\rensen 2003; Black 
et al 2004; COMP AS 2004a,b; de Boeck 2004; HCIDC 2004; 10M 2004a,b; Kapur 
2004; Newland with Patrick 2004; USAID 2004; GCIM 2005; Farrant et al 2006; 
lonescu 2006; UN 2006; World Bank 2006; Davies 2007; DFID 2007; Merz et al 2007; 
de Haas 2009). As we saw in Chapter 2, these discourses have radically reinterpreted 
the impact of household remittances and embraced notions of diaspora and migrant 
transnationalism to highlight a multitude of border-spanning practices, linkages, and 
flows through which overseas 'nationals' connect with 'home' and carry "enormous 
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potential" for its development (de Boeck 2004: 3). Exemplifying such thinking, 
Newland (2003: 3) argues, "[ ... T]ransnational networks are today the most important 
developmental resource associated with international migration". 
In highlighting the development potential of overseas nationals and their border-
spanning networks, these discourses have drawn particular attention to diaspora 
organisations, lauding them as powerful and positive actors in the progress of 'home'. 
As Faist (2008: 22) notes, "[ ... T]ransnational networks and associations of migrants 
have come to stand at the centre of the optimistic visions of national and international 
economic development policy establishments". Consequently, diaspora organisations 
have been presented as 'new' agents of development that should be engaged and 
supported by states and international agencies interested in pursuing more direct and 
participatory modes of development assistance (Levitt 1997; Danese 1998; AFFORD 
1998; Kerlin 2000; Orozco 2003, 2004; DFID 2001, 2007; Vertovec 2003; HCIDC 
2004; Newland with Patrick 2004; Orozco and Lapointe 2004; USAID 2004; GCIM 
2005; Hernandez-Coss and Bun 2007; lonescu 2006; UN 2006; Orozco and Rouse 
2007; Mercer et al 2008; 0stergaard-Nielsen 2009; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009). This 
positioning of diaspora organisations has emphasised how these groups send monetary 
and material 'collective remittances', transfer innovative and progressive knowledge, 
ideas, and practices (termed 'social remittances'), and engage in 'political 
transnationalism' through which they utilise the strategic space of diaspora to influence 
'host' and 'home' governments to attend to the progress of their 'home' communities 
and countries (ibid; Levitt 1998, 2001; Itzigsohn 2000; Kerlin 2000; Ndofor-Tah 2000; 
Orozco 2000; Portes 2001, 2009; 10M 2004a,b; Orozco and Welle 2004; Cordero-
Guzman 2005; Babcock 2006; Caglar 2006; Mohan 2006, 2008; Cano and Delano 
2007;, Newland 2007; Portes et al 2007; Dumont 2008; Fox and Bada 2008; Itzigsohn 
and Villacres 2008; Kleist 2008; Mazzucato 2008; McGregor 2009; 0stergaard-Nielsen 
2009). 
However, it was also argued in Chapter 2 that this celebration of diaspora organisations 
is grounded in a rather limited empirical evidence base. For example, Portes et al (2007: 
277) contends that the study of "immigrant transnational organizations" is "still in its 
infancy" and a 2004 report on diaspora organisations claims that "their structure, 
strategies and influences on local and national development are only minimally 
understood" (COMP AS 2004a). Indeed, studies of migrant transnationalism rarely focus 
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substantively on the organisations formed by migrants and their descendents and when 
they do address these groups, analytical attention tends to extend little beyond the 
particular organisational form of the 'hometown association' (see for example, Portes 
and Landolt 2000; Vertovec 2003; Newland with Patrick 2004; USAID 2004). 
Furthermore, as a number of authors have also noted, work on migrant transnationalism 
that does include diaspora organisations has been conducted largely in the particular 
context of Latin American and Caribbean migration to the USA (AI-Ali and Koser 
2002; Smith 2002; Caglar 2006). In contrast, this thesis has concentrated on the little 
researched context of Nigerian migration to the UK and has focussed substantively on 
diaspora organisations, attending not only to hometown associations but also to other 
organisational forms such as issue-based NODs and professional groups. 
In so doing, this thesis has been centrally concerned with subjecting to greater empirical 
assessment the powerful and progressive role ascribed to diaspora organisations in 
celebratory discourses of diaspora and development. Drawing on the increasingly 
established concept and practice of 'multi-sited ethnography' (Marcus 1995), this 
assessment has been undertaken through a two-ended study conducted with Nigerian 
diaspora organisations in London and their sites of collective transnational intervention 
in Nigeria. As detailed in Chapter 3, the first stage of this research was a scoping study 
to identify, engage, and profile as many London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations 
as possible. Using diverse channels, 367 such groups were identified, including 236 
geo-ethnic organisations. (such as hometown, clan, state, and ethno-national 
associations), 64 issue-based NODs, 24 Nigerian national associations, 17 professional 
associations, 11 religious associations, 8 alumni associations, 4 sports clubs, and 3 
student unions. 
Contact was made with 63 of these groups and basic data was collected about each 
through various combinations of informal dialogue, semi-structured interview, 
questionnaire survey, participant observation, and documentary analysis. Five 
organisations were then selected as case-studies for the deeper ethnographic 
engagement that constituted stage two of the research. This involved in-depth semi-
structured interviews with five members of each case-study organisation, participant 
observation at the organisations' meetings and events, and analysis of organisational 
documents. In the third and final stage of the research upon which this thesis is based, 
the empirical focus moved to the sites in Nigeria where the case-study organisations 
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intervene. Here, ethnographic and archival methods were employed to explore from the 
perspective of 'home' the effects, reception and meaning of collective transnational 
contribution. 
Part 2: entanglements of power - diaspora organisations and the transnational 
politics of identity and development 
Building on this empirical foundation, it was argued in Chapters 4 and 5 that London-
based Nigerian diaspora organisations are entangled in a transnational politics of socio-
economic status, gender, and belonging in ways that could be considered highly 
problematic in terms of the progressive role expected of them in globalising discourses 
of diaspora and development. One of the most important development virtues ascribed 
to diaspora organisations in these discourses is that they direct their collective 
remittances to the poor and to public goods, such as schools and hospitals, and, in so 
doing, tackle inequality and disadvantage at 'home' (AFFORD 1998; Danese 1998; 
Kerlin 2000; Ndofor-Tah 2000; Orozco 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004; S0rensen et al 2003b; 
Vertovec 2003; HCIDC 2004; Orozco with Lapointe 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; 
USAID 2004; GCIM 2005; Babcock 2006; UN 2006; Cano and Delano 2007; DFID 
2007; Orozco and Rouse 2007; Portes el al 2007; Faist 2008; Fox and Bada 2008; 
Mazzucato 2008; Mercer et al 2008; Mazzucato and Kabki 2009; Portes 2009). 
Organised diasporans engaged in this study undoubtedly harbour heart-felt desires 
grounded in personal experience and extended family bonds to reach, benefit, and 
'empower' 'the grassroots' at 'home', especially 'the poor' and 'disadvantaged'. 
However, the collective transnational interventions they make often appear to do more 
to recognise, respect, and potentially reinforce established power hierarchies and local 
elite individuals and institutions. Indeed, while London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations often direct their transnational contributions to the needy and to public 
goods such as schools and hospitals, they often also make interventions that seem to 
attend primarily to the interests and aspirations of local elites. We saw, for example, 
how diaspora organisations grounded in geo-ethnic identities tend to channel their 
transnational benevolence to and through the 'traditional authorities' of their ancestral 
homelands, making donations to the construction, maintenance, and improvement of 
prominent symbols of traditional power, such as palaces and 'customary' courts, and 
directing money and materials intended for the public good through community 
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development committees that can appear to be most concerned with benefitting the 
elites who run them (see for example: Ahanotu 1982; Muoghalu 1986; Adejunmobi 
1990; Barkan et al 1991; Vaughan 1995,2000; Osaghae 1994, 1995; Honey and Okafor 
1998; Trager 1998; Ikelegbe 2001a; Abbott 2002; Ukiwo 2003, 2005) 
Similarly, in contrast to work that imbues collective transnational intervention with a 
propensity to contest and transform prevailing, patriarchal gender norms (Levitt 1997, 
1998; Burton 2004; Gammage 2004; Osirim 2008; Landolt and Goldring 2009), it was 
argued that London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations, like migrant associations 
discussed elsewhere (Joly 1987; AFFORD 1998; Liu 1998; Mahler 1998; Popkin 1999; 
Uduku 2000; J azeel 2006), appear to do more to reinforce than to challenge the 
established, and what might be seen as rather patriarchal, gender roles and relations of 
'home'. And with especially serious potential consequences for the progress of 'home', 
it was asserted that rather than supporting the entrenchment of liberal democratic 
institutions and governance as globalising discourses of diaspora and development 
might hope (Levitt 1997, 1998; Obasanjo 2000; HCIDC 2004; Newland with Patrick 
2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; USAID 2004; UN 2006; DFID 2007; Faist 2008), these 
groups can reproduce the discourses and practices underpinning an insidious and deeply 
divisive politics of belonging that is widely seen to fundamentally undermine the ability 
of the Nigerian state to fulfil its obligations to its citizens (see for example, Nnoli 1978, 
1995; Joseph 1987; Diamond 1988; Bach 1997; Osaghae 1998, 2003; Jega 2000; 
Vaughan 2000, 2001; Igwara 2001; Obi 2001; Suberu 2001; Ukiwo 2003, 2005: 
Adejumobi 2004, 2005; Isumonah 2004; Watts 2004a,b; Kraxberger 2004a,b, 2005; 
Obadare 2005; Ikelegbe 2005b; ICG 2006; Ukeje and Adebanwi 2008). Indeed, we saw 
that in the ways they mobilise identity abroad and intervene transnationally at 'home', 
London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations often respond to and recreate a 
thoroughly destabilising and profoundly dangerous system of ethnicised competition for 
power and resources within the Nigerian polity. This would appear to lend at least some 
weight to fears often marginalized in globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development that overseas nationals can produce divisive, potentially destructive effects 
at 'home' (Anderson 1998; Collier 2000; Van Hear and S~rensen 2003; NIC 2004; 
Adamson 2006). 
However, we saw that London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations can also work to 
soften and transcend the ethnicised boundaries of belonging to articulate and pursue 
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visions of Nigeria's national development. Similarly, it was argued that some of their 
collective transnational interventions do appear to reach, benefit and even empower 'the 
grassroots' in relatively direct ways and that even the 'traditional authorities' and elite-
led community development committees through which some diaspora organisations 
intervene can be in touch with, and to some extent obligated to fulfil, the needs and 
desires of 'the people'. Furthermore, it was asserted that by reproducing established 
gender roles and relations, diaspora organisations are seen to maintain gender 
conventions that are, regardless of how patriarchal they might appear, widely 
considered both in diaspora and at 'home' to be entirely progressive, having long 
enabled women to assume public positions of status and influence as 'dynamic' 
organisers and 'mothers' not only of their families but also of their communities and the 
wider nation (see also Afigbo 1972; Okonjo 1976; Mba 1982; Amadiume 1987, 2000; 
Denzer 1994; Imam 1997; Olukoshi 1997; Enemuo and Momoh 1999; Pereira 2000; 
Ibeanu 2001; Ukeje 2004; Chuku 2005, 2009; Ikelegbe 2005a; Nolte 2008; 10hnson-
Odim 2009). It was argued, therefore, that through the transnational politics of gender, 
socio-economic status, and belonging, London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations 
are entwined in the progress of 'home' in ways that are much more complex and 
ambivalent than tends to be assumed in globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development. 
Part 3: collective transnational power and its limits 
It was asserted in Chapters 6 and 7 that in addition to being connected to the 
development of 'home' in ways that are much more ambivalent than discourses of 
diaspora and development might hope, London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations 
also -appear to be considerably less powerful agents of transformation than these 
discourses generally suggest (Levitt 1997, 1998; Orozco 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004; 
Newland 2003; Vertovec 2003; HCIDC 2004; 10M 2004a; Newland and Patrick 2004; 
Orozco with Lapointe 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; USAID 2004; GCIM 2005; 
Farrant et al 2006; lonescu 2006; UN 2006; World Bank 2006; DFID 2007). Far from 
driving progress in a 'home' environment that is somehow dependent on collective 
transnational intervention (the scenario suggested in some of the most celebratory 
accounts of diaspora and development - see for example Portes and Landolt (2000); 
Orozco and Rouse (2007); Portes et al (2007», these groups are overwhelmingly seen to 
have a relatively limited and ultimately rather marginal role in the development of 
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'home'. While diaspora organisations often send collective remittances to public 
institutions such as schools, hospitals, and community development committees, these 
monetary and material contributions are consistently seen to pale into relative 
insignificance compared to those made by individuals and organisations based within 
Nigeria itself. For example, we saw that, on average, Omoyege diaspora organisations 
based overseas contribute less than 11% of the total amount raised at the annual Ayege 
Day fundraising event, the vast bulk of the benevolence generated each year coming 
from donors based in Ayege itself or other locations within Nigeria. 
Similarly, while London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations attempt to utilise the 
strategic space of diaspora to lobby the UK and Nigerian governments on issues deemed 
critical to the development of communities of origin and Nigeria in general, the 
influence they exert through this political transnationalism appears to be negligible. 
These groups certainly do not appear to wield the sort of influence on local and/or 
national affairs that would be expected of them in globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development (Vertovec 1999a, 2001, 2003; Itzigsohn 2000; Kerlin 2000; Levitt 2001; 
Portes 2001; Guamizo et al 2003; Newland 2003; Van Hear and S~rensen 2003; 
HCIDC 2004; Kalinde 2004; Newland with Patrick 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; 
USAID 2004; Cordero-Guzman 2005; GCIM 2005; UN 2006; Cano and Delano 2007; 
Portes et al 2007; Dumont 2008; Fox and Bada 2008; Gamlen 2008; Itzigsohn and 
Villacres 2008; 0stergaard-Nielsen 2009). Indeed, we saw that at the community level, 
it is individuals and organisations based within Nigeria that are considered to be by far 
and away the most effective agents for encouraging the state to attend to local needs and 
aspirations. And at the national level, we saw that even the Nigerian state's tentative 
opening of a transnational sphere of engagement has afforded little space for the 
organised diaspora to voice its interests and desires and wield political influence that 
might in some way change the futures of local communities and the wider nation. 
Furthermore, it was also argued that despite the celebration of collective transnational 
intervention as a key channel for the transfer of 'social remittances (Levitt 1998; 
Vertovec 2003;"HCIDC 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; USAID 2004; GCIM 2005; 
Taylor et al 2006; UN 2006; Newland 2007; Fox and Bada2008; Portes 2009), there are 
significant limits to the extent to which London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations 
can be seen to transfer 'home' new and developmentally-beneficial knowledge, ideas, 
and practices. Community-based diaspora organisations are not noted for remitting to 
279 
their ancestral homelands novel ways of thinking and doing development and it is 
individuals and organisations based within Nigeria that are lauded as the key sources of 
local innovation. Similarly, the useful knowledges and healthy behaviours promoted by 
many diaspora NGOs and the high-level expertise offered by diasporic professional 
associations are not necessarily as innovative in the context of 'home' as globalising 
discourses of diaspora and development might assume (ibid). Indeed, local NGOs have 
led, and continue to lead, the promotion of community development and healthy living 
and 'home' -based professionals already appear to be endowed with much, if not most, 
of the knowledge and skills supposedly promised by their diasporic counterparts. 
Part 4: constraining collective transnational power 
In attempting to account for the relatively limited and ultimately rather marginal role of 
London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations in the development of 'home', Chapters 
8 and 9 explored the key factors that are seen to constrain the ability and desire of these 
groups to intervene transnationally and fulfil the expectations not only of discourses of 
diaspora and development but also of their members and potential beneficiaries in 
Nigeria. It was found that the vitality and transnational capabilities of diaspora 
organisations are consistently seen to be severely undermined by a lack of funds and 
limited levels of active participation. Indeed, it was argued that diaspora organisations 
tend to depend heavily on the time and modest resources of a few, and sometimes just 
one or two, committed members. We saw that this problem of mobilising money and 
members is routinely and most readily traced by diasporic respondents to the difficulties 
of settling and progressing in diaspora. The challenges of obtaining legal settlement, 
facing discrimination and racism, and, relatedly, securing well-paid work with sociable 
hours.., mean that many diasporans are seen to have neither the time nor the money to 
actively participate in or support diaspora organisations, greatly constraining the ability 
of these groups to contribute to 'home' (see also de Hann 1999; AI-Ali et al 2001b; 
Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002; SSZlrensen et al 2003b; McGregor 2009). 
However, we also saw that for many in diaspora and especially at 'home', the limits to 
diasporic mobilisation are a product not only of the difficulties of developing in 
diaspora but also of an increasingly individualistic and self-indulgent diasporic 
disposition. Posited as either a product of diasporic exposure to 'Western' individualism 
or a reflection of the social atomisation created by political and economic crisis at 
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'home', this disposition is seen to undermine 'traditional' systems of obligation to 
extended family and wider community, limiting the desire of diasporans to come 
together for the benefit of 'home'. It was also argued that the transnational capabilities 
of London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations are further, and often critically, 
undermined by a distinct lack of transnational trust. With corruption, fraud, and 
clientalism widely seen to be rife in Nigerian society, we saw that there is a prevailing 
suspicion among diasporans that the organisations formed by their fellow overseas 
nationals are little more than vehicles for the personal enrichment and political gain of 
those who form and run them, further discouraging many diasporans from joining and 
supporting these groups (see also Guarnizo et al1999). 
Moreover, it was asserted that this culture of mistrust also exists between diaspora and 
'home'. Indeed, we saw that organised diasporans are generally very wary of engaging 
'home' -based institutions, individuals, and even relatives to act as local intermediaries 
for fear that they are likely to misappropriate any collective transnational benevolence 
that is directed through them. This means that many diaspora organisations decide not 
to engage a local intermediary and even those that do tend to establish a relationship 
that is rather tentative, limited, and fragile. In both of these situations, the ability of 
diaspora organisations to operate at 'home' is severely constrained, as is the possibility 
of these groups exerting influence over, or transferring social remittances to, 'home'-
based individuals and institutions. 
It was also demonstrated that the desire and ability of diasporans to come together for 
the benefit of 'home' is further constrained by the absence of an 'enabling environment' 
at 'home'. Indeed, it was argued that a worrying lack of security and a frustratingly 
uneven and unreliable transport and communications infrastructure are routinely seen to 
create a thoroughly disenabling environment at 'home', deterring and disrupting the 
flows of people, information, money, and materials upon which collective transnational 
intervention relies. The collective transfer of high-level professional expertise is widely 
seen to be particularly undermined by woefully inadequate technical facilities and a 
pervasive cultu"re of unprofessionalism manifested most blatantly in the corrupt 
practices of the so-called and seemingly intractable 'Nigerian system'. Furthermore, 
there is little confidence that the Nigerian state has the desire or the ability to mitigate 
these major challenges to collective transnational intervention. Moreover, we saw that 
the Nigerian state is itself often regarded as a barrier to diasporic contribution, being 
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widely accused of placing unnecessary and often corrupt bureaucracy in the way of the 
initiatives of organised diasporans and even of having a tendency to respond with 
unwarranted repression and violence when it feels its authority is being challenged. It 
was argued that this points to how 'home' is routinely considered to be an environment 
that is often more hostile than enabling, with not only the state but also local 
communities and the professions having the potential to obstruct, resist, and undermine 
collective transnational intervention. 
Part 5: the power of belonging - developing 'home' here and there 
However much globalising discourses of diaspora and development might laud diaspora 
organisations for the contributions they make to development at 'home', we saw in 
Chapter 10 that these groups should not be viewed simply as vehicles for collective 
transnational intervention, valued and engaged only for the money, materials, ideas, and 
influence that they transmit to their communities and countries of origin. For those who 
form and sustain London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations, these groups mean and 
represent much more than this. Indeed, we saw that these organisations are forged first 
and often foremost as social arenas through which diasporans can support one another, 
maintain and celebrate a shared cultural identity, and, often most important of all, 
develop friendships, socialise, relax, and have fun. From this perspective, it was argued, 
diaspora organisations are primarily supportive and convivial socio-cultural spaces 
through which members and participants can pursue their own settlement, progress, 
fulfilment, and happiness in diaspora and feel at 'home' while 'abroad'. Consequently, 
globalising discourses of diaspora and development would do well to revisit some of the 
earlier work on migrant adaption, integration, and transnationalism which gives much 
greater attention to the socio-economic and cultural importance of diaspora 
organisations in the 'host' context (see for example, Sassen-Koob 1979; Okamura 1983; 
Schoeneberg 1985; Basch 1987; Rex et al 1987; Cheetham 1988; Rex 1991; Ireland 
1994; Soysal 1994; Peil 1995; Attah-Poku 1996; AFFORD 1998; Danese 1998; 
Goldring 1998; Liu 1998; Minghuan 1998; Landolt et al 1999; Popkin 1999; Adeyanju 
2000; Kerlin 2000; Ndofor-Tah 2000; Owusu 2000; McLeod et aI2001). 
Furthermore, it was argued that this foundational concern with coming together to 
develop and belong in diaspora is rarely seen to contradict or conflict with any desire to 
contribute collectively to 'home'. Indeed, we saw that these two key imperatives are 
282 
generally considered to be entirely compatible and, moreover, inextricably linked; 
diasporic respondents often emphasise that it is only by organising in an attempt to meet 
their own needs and aspirations for development and belonging 'abroad' that they are 
able to mobilise resources for the development of 'home'. In this way, creating a 'home' 
in diaspora becomes central to the attempt to re-make 'home' in Nigeria. And as I will 
go on to suggest later in this conclusion, the effort to re-make 'home' in Nigeria extends 
far beyond the kinds of largely material and intellectual development that are generally 
imagined in globalising discourses of diaspora and development. Just like the creation 
of a 'home from home' in diaspora, the making of 'home' in Nigeria involves much 
more than maintaining schools and hospitals, constructing town halls and palaces, 
enlightening and empowering communities, transferring high-level expertise, and 
supporting democracy and good governance; at its heart, and underlying all of this, is a 
desire to create a place in which one can settle, progress, celebrate a shared cultural 
identity, socialise, relax, and have fun, a place in which one can develop and belong. 
Key contentions, limitations, and future directions 
Building on the main empirical findings outlined above, I now want to draw from the 
thesis six key contentions. In so doing, I also wish to highlight some limitations of the 
thesis and some areas that would benefit from further research and policy attention, 
pointing to new directions that I believe it is necessary to take to better understand and 
engage the role of diasporans and their organisations in the development of 'home'. 
1) It is important to recognise and engage with the diversity of the organised diaspora. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, research that has addressed diaspora organisations and their 
transnational linkages with 'home' has focussed overwhelmingly on the particular 
organisational form of the 'hometown association' or 'HTA'. The HTA is undeniably a 
key mode of organising in diaspora. Indeed, of the 367 London-based Nigerian 
organisations I identified, 92 (25%) were HTAs, making them the most numerous type 
of diaspora organisation in this study. However, this study also identified three other 
important types of geo-ethnic diaspora organisation, based respectively on the generally 
wider geo-ethnic formations of the 'clan' or ethnic 'sub-group' (41, 11%), 'ethnic-
nationality' (60, 16%), and state of origin within the Federal Republic of Nigeria (43, 
12%). While these other wider forms of geo-ethnic organisation were addressed in the 
283 
thesis, both of the case-study geo-ethnic organisations represent geo-ethnic formations 
that are strongly centred around a particular town or city. 
I believe it is necessary to give greater attention to diaspora organisations grounded in 
wider geo-ethnic identities such as 'ethnic nationalities' and 'states' as the data I was 
able to collect about such groups in this study suggests that the nature and focus of their 
activities can be rather different from those of HTAs, with potentially important 
implications for mobilising resources in diaspora and intervening in development at 
'home'. Diaspora organisations grounded in 'bigger' geo-ethnic identities have the 
potential to muster diasporic constituencies that are often considerably larger than those 
of HTAs. However, with their ancestral homelands often covering hundreds if not 
thousands of square miles, including many towns and often cities, and containing 
hundreds of thousands if not millions of fellow 'indigenes', these groups tend to lack a 
convenient point of intervention in Nigeria. The problem of satisfying all of the more 
parochial interests in these large geo-ethnic formations means that these groups tend to 
avoid making the sort of highly focussed material donations to local schools and 
hospitals associated with HTAs. 
In their attempt to contribute to 'home', these wider groups tend to confine themselves 
to the more diffuse and explicitly political role of attempting to represent and further 
from afar the wider geo-ethnic interest. This kind of high-level political 
transnationalism is often seen to be of primary interest to only the most politically 
ambitious diasporans and of less immediate interest to the wider majority, who, if they 
have any sub-national geo-ethnic interest at all, are generally seen to be most concerned 
with the progress of their particular hometowns. Consequently, diaspora organisations 
grounded in wider geo-ethnic identities tend to attract narrower and less committed 
membership bases than HT As, especially outside of elections and other moments of 
especially heightened political intrigue or crisis in Nigeria. However, those who 
dominate and sustain these groups are often seen to be highly active and committed and 
as having, or as working hard to create, influential connections at home. Furthermore, 
the substantialgeo-ethnic power blocs that these groups embody represent the axes 
around which much of the major state- and national-level, and potentially most 
destructive, politics of belonging revolves in Nigeria, as was suggested by the case of 
the Urhobo Progress Union in Chapter 5. However, it is the constructive engagement 
and negotiation of such blocks upon which much of Nigeria's future progress depends. 
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It is therefore essential to know more about the nature and operation of diaspora 
organisations grounded in the wider geo-ethnic identities around which development 
unfolds in Nigeria and many other countries in Africa and the wider world. 
Beyond 'HTAs' and geo-ethnic diaspora organisations in general, this study also 
identified seven other key forms of organisation employed by London-based Nigerians. 
The selection of five case-study organisations included the two most numerous of these 
alternative organisational forms, namely the issue-based NOO and the professional 
association. In so doing, this research demonstrated the value of extending analytical 
attention beyond HT As. Both of these organisational forms represent popular alternative 
modes of diasporic mobilisation which are not explicitly grounded in, or connected to, 
localised geo-ethnic identities and institutions at 'home' and it was shown that this has 
much significance for the articulation and pursuit of national visions of Nigerian 
belonging and development. Furthermore, there were indications that the way in which 
issue-based NOOs organise and operate transnationally, especially through a deeply 
embedded local individual, might facilitate more direct and potentially empowering 
engagements with 'grassroots' communities at 'home'. I suggest that there would be 
much value in conducting equally detailed research with the five other key forms of 
alternative London-based Nigerian diaspora organisation identified in this study, 
namely Nigerian national associations, religious associations, alumni associations, 
sports clubs, and student unions. A deeper analysis of these modes of diasporic 
mobilisation is likely to reveal further ways in which development and belonging at 
'home' are imagined and pursued from afar. Furthermore, this study found that 
examples of some of these other groups are constituted as gender specific organisations. 
Any future research should be cognisant of this as we saw that women's branches of 
geo-ethnic organisations are widely seen to embody alternative transnational aspirations 
and capacities. 
In better understanding the nature and implications of the diverse ways in which 
diasporans mobilise for the benefit of 'home', another key task for future research is to 
extend debates about diaspora and development to include work on religious 
transnationalism. It was clear throughout this research that the mosques and churches 
formed by Nigerians in London are fundamental elements of their diasporic lives, 
constituting key spaces for developing and belonging 'abroad' and for forging 
transnational connections with 'home'. Indeed, some respondents were keen to 
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emphasise that these diasporic religious institutions are far more important to them than 
any diaspora organisations in which they are involved. While there has been some 
insightful work on Nigerian religious life in London and the UK (Hunt and Lightly 
2001; Harris 2006; Burgess 2009), this work has said little about any role that Nigerian 
churches and mosques in this country might have in development at 'home'. With work 
on diaspora and development having in tum said little about the role of religious 
transnationalism, there is a pressing need to fill this research gap, especially in contexts, 
such as the Nigerian example, where religion and its institutions are widely recognised 
to be of particular significance in individual lives and national progress. 
2) Diaspora organisations do not necessarily contribute to development at 'home' to 
the extent, or in the ways, imagined in globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development. However, this is not a reason to dismiss these groups as transnational 
agents of progress and as potential development partners. 
As detailed in Part 3 of this thesis, London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations do 
not appear to produce developmental effects at 'home' of the magnitude that might be 
expected in globalising discourses of diaspora and development. While these groups 
tend to make generally welcome and often much appreciated contributions to public 
goods such as schools, hospitals, and community development initiatives, they certainly 
do not drive progress in a homeland that has somehow become dependent on their 
transnational benevolence, contrary to situations described in work on other 
transnational contexts (see for example, Levitt 1997, 1998; Orozco 2000, 2002, 2003, 
2004; Portes and Landolt 2000; Newland 2003; Vertovec 2003; Newland with Patrick 
2004; Orozco with Lapointe 2004; Orozco and Welle 2004; Orozco and Rouse 2007; 
Porte,s et al 2007). Indeed, we have seen that these organisations appear to have a 
relatively limited, rather marginal role in the development of 'home'. We have also seen 
that one of the main reasons advanced for this is that London-based Nigerian 
organisations and their transnational aspirations tend to suffer from a severe, often 
crippling lack of funds. The much mooted idea that governments and international 
agencies should award matching funding to diaspora organisations might therefore do 
much to heighten the transnational contributions that these groups are able to make to 
development at 'home'. 
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However, it has been also been argued in this thesis that London-based Nigerian 
diaspora organisations relate to development at 'home' in ways that are highly 
problematic in terms of the progressive role constructed for them in globalising 
discourses of diaspora and development. Indeed, we have seen that rather than 
supporting liberal, democratic institutions and governance these groups can contribute 
to the reproduction of an insidious and deeply divisive politics of belonging at 'home' 
that is widely argued to fundamentally undermine the Nigerian nation-building project. 
Furthermore, we have also seen that London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations can 
do more to reinforce than reconfigure established socio-economic and gender 
hierarchies, cementing 'the grassroots' and 'women' in their apparently disadvantaged 
positions rather than empowering them as might be hoped. Consequently, it might be 
argued that dispensing matching funding to heighten the transnational capabilities of 
these groups could in practice produce effects deemed detrimental to development at 
'home'. 
Yet we have also seen that London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations can reach, 
benefit and potentially empower poor and disadvantaged people at 'home' as well as 
maintain gender roles and relations that are widely seen both in diaspora and Nigeria as 
entirely progressive, having long enabled women to attain public positions of power and 
influence. Furthermore, we have seen that these groups, even those grounded in 
supposedly exclusive and particularistic geo-ethnic identities, can articulate and pursue 
national visions of belonging and development, signalling heart-felt desires for a united 
and prosperous Nigeria. So while London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations may 
well connect with development at 'home' in ways that might be considered rather 
problematic from the perspective of globalising discourses of diaspora and 
development, it is clear that they can also make thoroughly progressive transnational 
contributions, certainly as far as many in diaspora and at 'home' are concerned. If 
governments and international agencies have a real interest in engaging and supporting 
diaspora organisations in any meaningful way, they will need to be open to the 
alternative ways in which organised diasporans and their potential beneficiaries at 
'home' might imagine and pursue development (see also Mercer et al 2008 and Mohan 
2008). However, this all depends on discourses and policies of diaspora and 
development being created in genuine dialogue with the organised diaspora and its 
intended targets at 'home', something that I will argue below has yet to be achieved, 
and is much needed, in the case of London-based Nigerian organisations. 
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3) It is important to recognise the significance of local agency and the internal 
diaspora in the development of 'home'. 
In their rush to highlight the transformative role of diasporans and their organisations, 
globalising discourses of diaspora and development can tend to give the impression that 
these transnational actors are somehow the only, or at least the major, agents of progress 
at 'home'. In this way, local agency is elided and 'home' becomes little more than a 
passive site of intervention waiting patiently, almost helplessly, for the transnational 
benevolence of the diaspora to spark development. However, we have seen in this thesis 
that 'home' is far from an inert environment deeply dependent on diasporic 
contribution. Indeed, it has been shown that it is in fact local actors who are by far and 
away the main drivers of, and contributors to, development at 'home'. Whether as 
'traditional rulers', leaders of community development committees, communal 
benefactors, members of social clubs, women's groups, youth organisations, or trade 
associations, NGO founders or workers, or health, education or other professionals, 
local actors are seen both at 'home' and in diaspora as overwhelmingly the most 
important sources of money, materials, influence, ideas, expertise, and endeavour in the 
development of 'home'. 
Clearly, if the global rise of discourses of diaspora and development is not to obscure 
the key drivers of progress in 'home' environments, it is necessary to reassert and give 
far greater recognition to local agency. While it might appear much easier to identify 
and engage diasporic actors, located as they often are in major centres of global power 
and supposedly imbued with hegemonic notions of development, any attempt to connect 
with"and support the progress of 'home' cannot bypass local actors. Furthermore, we 
have seen that even in terms of simply heightening the contribution of diasporans and 
their organisations, it is stilI vital to recognise the role of local actors. Examples such as 
that of the London-based diaspora NGO Development Impact for Nigeria and its local 
programme-coordinator, Pastor Bode Omokaro, show that collective transnational 
intervention is· not only greatly facilitated, but also profoundly enhanced, by the 
engagement, enterprise, and expertise of 'home' -based intermediaries. And it has also 
been shown that collective transnational intervention can be questioned, resisted, and 
ultimately undermined by local actors, particularly when they feel interventions are 
made without their consultation and with little account of their needs, interests, and 
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aspirations. As we have seen in the case of interventions made by diasporic 
professionals and their organisations, local hostility can be especially strong when 
transnational contributions are seen to bypass and devalue local agency and expertise. 
Local actors are clearly absolutely central to the success or failure of collective 
transnational intervention and they must therefore be consulted and fully engaged in any 
attempt by governments and international agencies to heighten the individual and 
collective contributions of overseas diasporans to 'home'. After all, it will only be when 
diasporic desires are brought into closer conversation with the aspirations of 'home' that 
it will be possible to achieve meaningful and transformative transnational cooperation. 
Furthermore, at the community level, we have seen that the diasporic actors that most 
augment local agency in the development of 'home' are based not overseas but rather in 
the 'internal diaspora' within Nigeria. Considered as much 'abroad' or 'in diaspora' as 
their co-ethnics based overseas, it is 'indigenes' who have migrated beyond the 
community to other towns and cities in Nigeria who are consistently identified as by far 
and away the most important individual and collective diasporic contributors to progress 
at 'home'. It would therefore seem necessary to give much greater recognition to the 
developmental contribution of 'internal diasporas' in better understanding the role of 
mobility in development. Indeed, one of the most important contributions discourses of 
diaspora and development could make is to do far more to highlight the transformative 
actors, linkages, and effects associated with internal migration. Certainly, as some 
recent, more critical accounts of diaspora and development have suggested (Bakewell 
2008b; Mercer et al 2008; Skeldon 2008), it would seem essential that a broader 
conceptual framework is advanced that integrates analyses of both internal and 
international processes of migration in the wider project of identifying, understanding, 
and engaging the key drivers of change in 'home' environments. 
4) It is essential to recognise the importance of development in diaspora in the 
development of 'home'. 
This thesis has shown that the capacity of London-based Nigerian diaspora 
organisations to intervene transnationally and contribute to the development of 'home' 
is widely seen to be heavily constrained by the challenges diasporans face in settling 
and progressing in the UK. Indeed, we have seen that the difficulties of developing in 
diaspora are consistently posited as underlying two of the greatest constraints on the 
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vitality and transnational capabilities of diaspora organisations, namely, an often 
crippling lack of funds and limited levels of active participation. It is routinely argued 
that the challenges of obtaining legal settlement, overcoming discrimination and racism 
and, relatedly, securing well-paid work with sociable hours, mean that many, if not 
most, diasporans have neither the time nor the money to actively participate in, or 
contribute to, diasporic associational life and any collective transnational interventions 
organised through it. 
Consequently, a key contention of this thesis is that any policy interventions aimed at 
heightening the contribution of diasporans and their organisations to development at 
'home' need to make a priority of attending to the challenges of development in 
diaspora. While there is undoubtedly much potential in directly engaging and 
supporting the transnational interventions of diaspora organisations with programmes 
such as matching funding, there may be as much if not more potential in pursuing with 
renewed vigour policies designed to foster a society in which migrants and their 
descendents have far greater opportunities to advance and prosper. Indeed, we have seen 
in this thesis that when diasporans are able to achieve notable socio-economic progress, 
they are much more likely and able to create, join, and sustain diaspora organisations 
and collective transnational contributions to 'home'. It would therefore seem that the 
more established and successful diasporans can become, the greater their capacity to 
come together and mobilise resources for the benefit of 'home'. 
Consequently, discourses of diaspora and development should do more to re-emphasise 
and address what this and other research clearly suggest are still critical issues of 
migrant integration and minority inclusion (de Hann 1999; AI-Ali et al 2001b; Mohan 
and Zack-Williams 2002; S0rensen et al 2003b; McGregor 2009). One way in which 
this could be undertaken is to afford greater recognition and support to diaspora 
organisations for the important and much cherished work that they do to ease the 
settlement and heighten the long-term 'comfort' and progress of their members and 
beneficiaries. Ultimately, it is only when diasporans have the opportunity to fulfil their 
potential 'abroad' that they will be able to fulfil their potential to contribute to 
development at 'home'. A central principle of any policy of diaspora and development 
has to be that development there is inseparable from development here. 
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5) Development at 'home' is as much a prerequisite as an outcome of collective 
diasporic contribution. 
It is clear in this thesis that the lack of an 'enabling environment' at 'home' is widely 
considered to be a major constraint on collective transnational intervention. We have 
seen that diasporic contributions are discouraged and often severely disrupted by what 
are generally seen as Nigeria's worrying security situation, woefully inadequate 
telecommunication, transport, and technical infrastructures, and its corrupt, inept, and 
often repressive state. With collective transnational intervention so often foundering in 
the face of such fundamental development challenges, it is hard to imagine that it is 
possible for diasporic effort alone to engender and entrench major progress at 'home'. 
As Skeldon (2008: 13) argues of the 'home' environment in one of the more critical 
explorations of diaspora and development that have recently begun to emerge, "The 
underlying structures need first to be in place in order for the agency of migrants to 
function" . 
As much as collective transnational intervention can undoubtedly make contributions to 
development at 'home', any possibility of it producing decisive and durable 
transformations clearly depends on some notable progress having already been made 
towards creating an 'enabling environment' at 'home'. This puts the onus on 
governments and international agencies to refocus on the task of tackling directly any 
major structural factors at 'home' that undermine not only effective diasporic 
intervention but also development in general. Certainly, 'home' -states and their 
development 'partners' should not use the individual and collective contributions of 
diasporans as an excuse to step back from their responsibilities and undertakings to 
addr~ss the most pressing problems involved in devising and realising progress. As even 
one of the most enthusiastic proponents of the transformative potential of diaspora 
declares: 
A laissez-faire approach that merely waits for the market to work its 
'magic' through spontaneous remittances and knowledge transfers 
will not work. Governments must meet their half of the bargain 
because, in the absence of suitable conditions that only they can 
create, the best-intentioned transnational projects cannot succeed. 
(Portes 2009: 17) 
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6) It is essential to recognise and engage the power of belonging. 
It has been argued in this thesis that central to the creation and maintenance of diasporic 
associational life is a yearning to develop and belong in diaspora. Indeed, we have seen 
that London-based Nigerians tend to be brought and held together in organisations first 
and often foremost by a desire to establish and sustain relations of mutual support and 
progress, to preserve and celebrate a shared cultural heritage, and, often most important 
of all, to socialise, relax and have fun in a space in which one can feel at 'home' while 
'abroad'. Significantly, it has been asserted that this foundational concern with creating 
a supportive and convivial socio-cultural realm in diaspora is overwhelmingly seen as 
fundamental to building the capacity to contribute collectively to the development at 
'home'; it is only by coming together in an attempt to meet their own needs and desires 
'abroad' that diasporans are able to mobilise the necessary social, cultural, economic, 
and political capital to make collective transnational interventions. 
Consequently, a key contention of this thesis is that any policy intervention aimed at 
heightening the transnational capabilities of diaspora organisations needs to recognise, 
respect, and possibly even support associational activities undertaken in the 'host' 
environment, such as the extension of financial support to members and the holding of 
social and cultural events. As these activities are fundamental to the vitality and 
transnational capacity of diaspora organisations, the policy environment should 
certainly not discourage them as the UK Charity Commission appears to do in the case 
of London-based Nigerian diaspora organisations (see Chapter 10). If governments and 
international agencies are to help diaspora organisations fulfil their transnational 
potential, they will have to expand their conception of what elements of diasporic 
assof:iationallife count as, and contribute to, development at 'home'. In so doing, policy 
makers should consider supporting the socio-cultural activities of diaspora organisations 
as an effective way of furthering progress at 'home'. 
Furthermore, there were clear indications in this research that the key imperative to 
develop and belong 'abroad' is greatly augmented by an ultimate desire to develop and 
belong at 'home'. Constituting what I believe is one of the most important areas for 
further research in the wider project of better understanding diasporic associational life 
and its connections to development at 'home', there was a strong sense that the 
overriding imperative bringing many London-based Nigerians together to form 
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organisations and intervene transnationally is a desire to accrue status and create socio-
economic opportunities at 'home' in order to be able and welcome to return more often 
and possibly even begin to (re)settle there. While most first generation London-based 
Nigerians engaged in this study have remained in the UK much longer than they ever 
imagined they would, the vast majority remain deeply attached to the dream of returning 
to live for extended periods, or more or less permanently, in Nigeria. Significantly, 
many respondents who have enjoyed some notable socio-economic success in the UK 
have already begun to take more frequent and longer trips to Nigeria to make 
investments and arrangements for a more permanent return. A particularly common 
aspiration is to create a situation in which it is possible and comfortable to spend at least 
half a year each year at 'home'. Furthermore, with age, many second-generation 
respondents contend they have developed a growing interest in visiting Nigeria more 
often and even working and/or investing there. Such diasporic desires for visits and 
return(s) tend to be strongly linked to a sense that despite all the infrastructural 
limitations, threats to life and property, and the uncertain political and economic 
situation, life at 'home' would simply be much more enjoyable and satisfying than it is 
in the UK; the sense of cultural 'comfort' and affinity and the contentment of feeling 
that one would be contributing directly to the progress of one's own community and 
country is imagined and, often felt, to be irresistible. 
Significantly, initiating and supporting collective transnational intervention is widely 
seen to play a key role in pursuing these aspirations to enjoy development and 
belonging at 'home'. Often drawing on a host of 'traditional' adages that implore 
migrant 'indigenes' to remember, benefit, and finally return to their ancestral homeland, 
respondents tend to express a very strong sense of obligation to contribute to their 
com"munity and country of origin and stress that they would be unlikely to be welcomed 
and respected by family, kin, and community members should they attempt to return 
without having been seen to have made some effort to fulfil this obligation. Recognised 
as a key way in which those 'abroad' can signal and pursue a desire to fulfil their 
obligations to 'home', active support of collective transnational intervention is seen an 
important step towards being (re)accepted upon visits or more permanent returns. 
Certainly, respondents in Nigeria, particularly influential community elites, claim that 
diasporic visitors and returnees are much more likely to be afforded hospitality and 
assistance with important arrangements, such as securing access to land, if they are 
known to have engaged in collective contribution to 'home'. And beyond local elites, no 
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matter how little tangible impact collective transational intervention may appear to 
have, its symbolic value to ordinary people, who often take great heart from not having 
been 'forgotten' by their co-nationals overseas, should not be underestimated. 
Moreover, especially notable participation in collective transnational intervention can 
sometimes win not only basic acceptance, respect, and assistance at 'home' but also 
special recognition and, through this, exceptional opportunities to (re)establish and 
progress at 'home' (some of the earlier work on 'migrant transnationalism' is 
particularly instructive here; see for example, Okamura (1983); Basch (1987); Levitt 
(1997); Liu (1998); Guarnizo et al (1999); Landolt et al (1999); Popkin (1999)). At the 
community level, some diasporans have been bestowed with honorary chieftaincy titles 
for their support of collective contributions to 'home', allowing them greater access to 
'traditional' hierarchies of power (see also Fisiy and Goheen (1998)). And at the state 
and national level, some diasporans have come to the attention of government through 
their committed participation in collective transnational intervention and have 
consequently been offered senior political and professional positions. 
It is knowing that active involvement in collective transnational intervention has the 
potential to create such recognition and opportunity at 'home' that many London-based 
Nigerians appear to be especially keen to establish and join diaspora organisations. 
While the immediate imperative is to belong and develop in diaspora, the ultimate 
aspiration is to belong and develop at 'home'. This relationship between participation in 
diasporic associationallife and the desire to (re)make a 'home' to which one can return, 
prosper, and enjoy respect, fulfilment, and 'comfort' deserves much deeper empirical 
exploration and must be recognised and supported in discourses of diaspora and 
dev~lopment. Any unease on the part of policy makers that this relationship signals the 
kind of diasporic self-interest that might run contrary to wider development objectives 
should be placed aside; the relationship between collective transnational intervention 
and the personal aspirations of diasporans to develop and belong in their communities 
and countries of origin likely reveals just how much organised diasporans are invested 
in the development of 'home'. 
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"They pay lip service"l: From celebratory discourses of diaspora and development 
to meaningful engagement - a final thought 
The global proliferation of celebratory discourses of diaspora and development has done 
much to draw attention to the transformative potential diasporans and their 
organisations can contribute to the development of 'home'. However, it has been argued 
in this thesis that there is much more for these discourses to recognise and engage with 
in attempting to understand and heighten the role of diaspora organisations in 
supporting positive change in communities and countries of origin. Firstly, the diversity 
of ways in which diasporans organise in an attempt to meet their needs and desires in 
diaspora and at 'home'. Secondly, the alternative ways in which the organised diaspora 
and its potential beneficiaries at 'home' might imagine and pursue progress. Thirdly, the 
importance of local agency and the internal diaspora in driving and contributing to 
development at 'home'. Fourthly, the challenges diasporans face in attempting to 
develop 'abroad'. Fifthly, that development at 'home' is as much a prerequisite as an 
outcome of collective diasporic contribution. And lastly, the power of belonging in 
bringing and binding diasporans together in their effort to support development in 
diaspora and at 'home'. 
Critically, recognising and engaging all of this requires states and international agencies 
to enter into genuine and meaningful dialogue with the organised diaspora as a whole as 
well as its potential beneficiaries at 'home'. Currently, and despite the best efforts of the 
organised diaspora to make itself known, hegemonic discourses of diaspora and 
development appear to be a long way off entering into such a dialogue even with the 
overseas nationals they do so much to celebrate. For example, while the UK Department 
for ~nternational Development has begun to consult 'the Nigerian diaspora' in initiatives 
such as its country development plan for Nigeria and the Commission for Africa, these 
consultations have taken place principally through the UK-branch of Nigerians in 
Diaspora Organisation Europe (NIDOE), the Nigerian government-initiated umbrella 
body that this and other research suggests has precious little connection to, and even 
less trust and respect among, the wider population of UK-based Nigerians (de Haas 
2006). Consequently, the discourses of diaspora and development constructed by states 
and international agencies have passed the vast majority of organised diasporans by, 
1 Diaspora NGO trustee, interview, London, July 2006. 
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leaving them no closer to participating in the 'mainstream' policy debates and initiatives 
undertaken in and around their communities and countries of origin. As a stalwart of the 
Ayege National Progress Union, London, remarks with no little frustration: 
[ ... W]hat's his name, the Live Aid guy, Geldof, I mean Bob Geldof. I 
know he's doing a lot of, you know, he's breaking his neck for Africa 
and everything, but so am I. But Ijust don't have a voice that can be 
heard. (Interview, London, June 2005) 
Until such voices are given a genuine opportunity to be heard, and are actually listened 
to, discourses of diaspora and development will have done little to understand and 
support the contributions made by diasporans and their organisations to the 
development of 'home'. 
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